Vol. I.

PLATO

Apud F. Ursinum in gemma.

M. Vdr Gucht Sculp.

THE WORKS OF *PLATO* ABRIDG'D:

With an Account of

His Life, Philosophy, Morals, and Politicks.

Together with

A Translation of his Choicest DIALOGUES, *Viz.*

1. Of *Human Nature.*
2. Of *Prayer.*
3. Of *Wisdom.*
4. Of *Holiness.*
5. *What one ought to do.*
6. *Immortality of the Soul.*
7. *Valour.*
8. *Philosophy.*

In Two Volumes.

Illustrated with Notes. By M. *DACIER.*

Translated from the French, *by several Hands.*

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OF THE

DIALOGUES

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THE

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING PLATO.

WHAT is every Day ſeen to befal the Nobleſt Houſes, whoſe Great Names are uſurp'd by obſcure Families, ſo that the true Heirs who only have Right to bear them, are in Time no longer diſtinguiſhed, has been the Fate of Philoſophy. A great Number of Arts and Sciences which indeed may be of Uſe in their Places, but are worthy only to be the Slaves of that Science which alone renders our Lives equally good and happy, have ſeiz'd on this magnificent Name, and render'd it contemptible in the Eyes of Men. We have now no Idea of a true Philoſopher, ſince this Auguſt Title is laviſhly beſtowed on a Sort of curious and lazy People, who make it their only Buſineſs to underſtand ſome of the Secrets of Nature, and ſpend the Time of their Life in making Experiments on the Weight of the Air, and the Virtues of the Loadſtone. This Name has been ſtill more degraded, in being given to

thoſe, whoſe unſatiable Avarice chains them Day and Night to a Furnace; as if Gold, the greateſt Quantity of which is not comparable to the leaſt Virtue, were the End of Philoſophy. In fine, Men are not content with having given it ſuch Blemiſhes as theſe, but have alſo render'd the Name odious, in throwing it away on thoſe Libertines, who by a pretended *Force d' Eſprit*, or Strength of Thought, which at Bottom is no better than Weakneſs and Ignorance, live rather like Beaſts than Men. Is it then to be wonder'd at, that Philoſophy is miſtaken and neglected, and that Men no longer pay her that Reſpect and Veneration, which ſhe formerly excited in their Minds? Aſham'd of being confounded with the Daughters of the Earth, ſhe is reaſcended to Heaven, from whence *Socrates* brought her.

The *Athenians* heretofore by a publick Decree forbad that the Names of *Harmodius*, and *Ariſtogiton*, who had deliver'd their Country from the Tyranny of *Hippias* and *Hipparchus*, ſhould ever be given to Slaves: For they thought it a horrible Indignity, by ſo ſhameful a Communication, to blaſt thoſe Names that were devoted to the publick Liberty. Philoſophy is another Deliverer, ſhe triumphs over Vices, overthrows Impiety, and confounds the Wiſdom of the World. 'Tis ſomewhat greater than the Arts, and than what Men commonly call the Sciences; 'tis the Love of true Wiſdom, the Knowledge of Divine and Human Things, that is to ſay, the Science of God, a Science which teaches us to know the Relation which our Souls neceſſarily bear to their Creator, and by and in him to all rational Creatures, and which produces the certain Knowledge of all our Duties, towards God, our Neighbours, and Ourſelves.

To be truly a Philoſopher, is to have Temperance, Juſtice, and Fortitude, to love the Truth, to avoid ſenſual Pleaſures, to deſpiſe Riches; to weaken, as much as may be, the Bands that faſten the Soul to the Body; to hate and contemn this Body, which is always oppoſing Wiſdom; to renounce all our Deſires, to fear neither the Poverty, nor Shame, nor Reproach we may be expos'd

pos'd to, for the Sake of Righteouſneſs and Truth; to do Good to Mankind, even our very Enemies; to have nothing in View, but how to die well; and for this End to renounce one's ſelf and every Thing elſe. This is the Idea the wiſeſt Heathens had of Philoſophy.

This being ſuppos'd, nothing can be more fit and uſeful, than to follow the certain and viſible Progreſs which they made in their Reſearch after thoſe Truths, and to ſee to what Degree of Knowledge it pleaſed God to lead them. If we don't make ſuch an Examen as this, we can't ſpeak of them with Judgment, and without falling into a falſe Account of Things, as it has often happen'd, and ſtill happens every Day to the moſt Learned Men. Whenever they ſpeak of the Heathens, they bear Witneſs againſt themſelves that they never well read them, and that they have only an imperfect Idea of them; for they impute ſuch Sentiments to them as they never had, and deny them others which they had in Reality; which is a great Piece of Injuſtice: Nay, it ſeems (if I may ſo ſpeak) to diminiſh ſomewhat from the Mercy and Juſtice of God, not to acknowledge all the Teſtimonies he was pleaſed to give of himſelf among the Pagans, in thoſe Times that were corrupted with the moſt abominable Idolatry, in order to reduce them to the true Religion.

This Negligence is the more blameable; in that a Man needs only to read *Plato*, to be perfectly inform'd of the Extent of their Knowledge: For his Writings have amaſſed together all the Truths that were ſcatter'd up and down in the Works of other Philoſophers; and with the Advantage of new Diſcoveries of his own, they compoſe as it were a Body of Doctrine, which contains the higheſt Perfection of Knowledge to be found among the Heathens.

Let a Man read ever ſo little of him with Attention, and reflect upon what he teaches, and he'll eaſily diſcern, that God, to ſtop the Mouth of Incredulity, was long ſince preparing the Way for the Converſion of the Heathens, which had been ſo often predicted by the Prophets: For was it not the Work of God, and a kind

of Preludium of their Converſion, that a Heathen in the moſt idolatrous City in the World, and almoſt four hundred Years before the Light of the Goſpel illuminated the Univerſe, ſhou'd declare and prove a good Part of the Truths of the Chriſtian Religion?

The Circumſtance of the Time is remarkable, for *Plato* began to write immediately after the three laſt Prophets that were in *Iſrael*. So that as ſoon as the Prophets ceaſed among the *Jews*, God raiſes up Philoſophers to enlighten the *Gentiles*; and divers of the Principles of the Goſpel are taught at *Athens*. Where 'tis prov'd,

That there is but one God; that we ought to love and ſerve him, and to endeavour to reſemble him in Holineſs and Righteouſneſs; that this God rewards Humility, and puniſhes Pride.

That the true Happineſs of Man conſiſts in being united to God, and his only Miſery in being ſeparated from him.

That the Soul is mere Darkneſs, unleſs it be illuminated by God: That Men are uncapable even of praying well, unleſs God teaches them that Prayer, which alone can be uſeful to them.

That there is nothing ſolid and ſubſtantial but Piety; that this is the Source of Virtues, and that it is the Gift of God.

That 'tis better to die than to ſin.

That we ought continually to be learning to die, and yet to endure Life, in Obedience to God.

That 'tis a Crime to hurt our Enemies, and to revenge our ſelves for the Injuries we have received.

That 'tis better to ſuffer Wrong than to do it.

That God is the ſole Cauſe of Good, and cannot be the Cauſe of Evil, which always proceeds only from our Diſobedience, and the ill Uſe we make of our Liberty.

That Self-love produces that Diſcord and Diviſion which reign among Men, and is the Cauſe of their Sins; that the Love of our Neighbours, which proceeds from the Love of God as its Principle, produces that ſacred Union which makes Families, Republicks, and Kingdoms happy.

That

That the World is nothing but Corruption, that we ought to fly from it, to join our ſelves to God, who alone is our Health and Life; and that while we live in this World we are ſurrounded by Enemies, and have a continual Combat to endure, which requires on our part a Reſiſtance without Intermiſſion; and that we cannot conquer, unleſs God or his Angels come to our Help.

That the WORD fram'd the World, and render'd it viſible; that the Knowledge of the WORD makes us live very happily here below, and that thereby we obtain Felicity after Death. Λόγος.

That the Soul is immortal, that the Dead ſhall riſe again, that there ſhall be a final Judgment both of the Righteous and of the Wicked, when Men ſhall appear only with their Virtues or Vices, which ſhall be the Occaſion of their eternal Happineſs or Miſery.

But I forbear to proceed, that I may not repeat that here, which will be found in its full Extent elſewhere. Yet I cannot chuſe but add, that *Plato* had ſo great and true an Idea of perfect Righteouſneſs, and was ſo thoroughly acquainted with the Corruption of Mankind, that he makes it appear, * that if a Man perfectly righteous ſhould come upon Earth, he would find ſo much Oppoſition in the World, that he would be impriſon'd, revil'd, ſcourg'd, and, in fine, crucified by ſuch, who, tho' they were extremely wicked, would yet paſs for righteous Men. *Socrates* was the firſt Proof of this Demonſtration. For as St. *Juſtin* ſays, the Devils ſeeing this Philoſopher made their Nullity appear by the Diſcovery of the Truth, and that he endeavour'd to reclaim Men from giving them religious Worſhip; theſe malicious Spirits ſo order'd the Matter by Means of Men who were corrupt, and took Pleaſure in Vice, that this righteous Man was put to Death as if he had been an impious Perſon, that liv'd without God in the World, and introduc'd new Gods.

* In the 2d Book of his Commonwealth, *Tom.* 2.

There are ſome who pretend the abovementioned Paſſage of *Plato* is a Prophecy, becauſe the Terms don't agree with the Circumſtances of *Socrates*, who was put to Death only by a Draught of Poiſon, but preciſely ſuit with thoſe of the Saviour of the World, who was both ſcourged and crucified.

But we ſhall not preſume to make a Prophet of our Philoſopher, from whom Reaſon alone, when mov'd by the Injuſtice of Men, might extort ſuch exaggerated Expreſſions; but ſhall content our ſelves to enquire what there may be in his Writings conformable to the Deſigns of God, who always deſir'd the Salvation of Men, and often made uſe of the Pagans for the Execution of his eternal Decrees.

We underſtand by the Holy Scripture, which is the only Lamp of Truth, that natural Religion was the firſt Uſe Men made of their Reaſon; that Luſt and irregular Paſſions having corrupted their Reaſon, they abandon'd themſelves to the ſacrilegious Worſhip of Idols; and that God, to ſtop the Courſe of this Abomination, made himſelf known a ſecond Time, and gave the *Jewiſh* Law; which as it reviv'd in the Minds of Men the Principles of the Law of Nature, ſo it promis'd a more ſacred and perfect Covenant which the Righteous were to expect, and which alone was capable of triumphing over Death; and ſo alone able to conduct Men to a glorious Immortality,

Plato ſeems to have been acquainted with the Divine Conduct in this Matter, and to endeavour to reclaim the Heathens by the ſame Means.

He endeavours to re-eſtabliſh natural Religion, by oppoſing Paganiſm, which was the Corruption of it.

He gives a Law which in its principal Heads is entirely conformable to the Tradition of the *Hebrews*, and the Precepts of *Moſes* and the Prophets; from whom he has borrowed that which is moſt rational and ſubſtantial in his Works.

And he ſupports this Law by a great many Principles more ſublime than thoſe of natural Religion, and of the Law of *Moſes*; and by clear and expreſs Promiſes of

of ſpiritual and eternal Bleſſings, which the Chriſtian Religion alone can make Men enjoy, and which *Moſes* and the Prophets only promiſed under the Veil, and Figures of temporal Enjoyments. So that *Plato* is not content to give a Teſtimony only to natural Religion, and the *Jewiſh* Law, but alſo in ſome ſort pays Homage to Chriſtianity; in piercing, by a ſupernatural Light, into a Part of thoſe Shadows and Figures that cover'd it; and in propoſing moſt of the greateſt Motives, and glorious Objects, which it has always employ'd to raiſe Men above themſelves, and to make them Maſters of their Paſſions.

* *A happy Immortality* (ſays he) *is a great Prize ſet before us, and a great Object of Hope, which ſhould engage us to labour all the Time of our Life to acquire Wiſdom and Virtue.* This the reading only of theſe two firſt Volumes will compleatly ſet in its true Light.

'Tis commonly enquir'd on this Subject, how the Books of *Moſes* and thoſe of the Prophets could come to *Plato*'s Knowledge. I will not undertake to prove that there were *Greek* Tranſlations of 'em before that of the Septuagint; 'tis too difficult a Matter to ſupport that Suppoſition, and I muſt confeſs I can find no ſolid Foundation for it. But I'll declare what ſeems moſt probable to me.

After the Departure of the *Iſraelites* out of *Egypt*, they almoſt always continued their Commerce with the *Egyptians*. They traded in their Country, they ſometimes deſir'd their Aſſiſtance againſt their Enemies, and often enter'd into Treaties and Alliances with them. By theſe Means the Memory of all that had happen'd to their Nation was eaſily preſerv'd among thoſe People. † The Captivity of King *Jehoachaz*, whom *Pharaoh Necho* carried away Priſoner about the Beginning of the forty-ſecond Olympiad; and ‖ the Dwelling of the Prophets *Jeremiah* and *Baruch* in *Egypt* ſome Years after with the miſerable Remainder of the *Jews*, that the King of

* Vol. 2. † 2 Kings 23. ‖ Jer. 43.

Babylon had left in *Judea*, could not ſuffer the *Egyptians* to forget theſe Things.

About this Time *Pythagoras* travell'd into *Egypt*, from whence he brought theſe Traditions into *Greece*; his Diſciples communicated them to *Socrates*, who acquainted *Plato* with them; and he, to be more perfectly inſtructed in them, went to the ſame Place where he might ſee not only the Grand-Children, but the Children of ſuch as had convers'd with the Fugitives that retired thither with thoſe Prophets. And perhaps 'tis no ill-founded Suppoſition, that by his frequent Converſation with them he learned enough of their Language to read thoſe Originals himſelf, of which the *Egyptians*, who were a very curious People, might have Copies. But whether he read them, or knew nothing of them, but what he learned in Converſation, 'tis certain he could draw that Tradition which he calls *Sacred* from no other Source. For he harmonizes ſo well with thoſe Originals in many Things, not only in reſpect of the Truths themſelves, but moreover in the very Manner of his Expreſſions, that one would often think he tranſlates them. From whom, unleſs from the *Hebrews*, could the *Egyptians* have a Tradition containing ſuch wonderful Doctrine, and of which never any other People had heard, before the peculiar People of God were inſtructed in it?

But 'tis ſaid there are many Errors intermix'd with the Writings of *Plato*; that in his Explication of the greateſt Truths, he is full of Doubts and Uncertainty; and 'tis obſerv'd that *Socrates* conſtantly profeſſes that *he knows nothing*: What Advantage can be received from a Man that knows nothing but his own Ignorance? And 'tis fit theſe Objections ſhould have an Anſwer.

'Tis certain *Plato* is not without his Errors; but when they come to be ſtrictly examin'd, there are to be found in them ſome Traces of ancient Traditions, and Predictions of the Prophets: And if theſe Traces are compar'd with the Doctrine of the Holy Scripture, one may diſcover the Source of thoſe Errors, which by this Means become one of the Proofs of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion. For we muſt be forc'd to acknowledge

knowledge that the Heathens had a dim Sight of divers great Truths, which becauſe they were not to be fully unveiled till the coming of the *Meſſiah*, were involved in Darkneſs too thick to be penetrated by their Eyes. And this was predicted by the Prophets, who all declar'd that *Chriſt ſhould be the Light of the World.* None but *Jeſus Chriſt* was able to diſcover to them thoſe Myſteries, which were to be kept ſecret before his coming. Therefore 'tis no very ſurprizing Thing, that ſuch Perſons as attempted to penetrate * theſe Myſteries, on'y by the Light of their Reaſon, did evaporate into vain Imaginations. And for this Reaſon we ought not to pretend to give a clear Explication of the Truths of Religion by the Notions of this Philoſopher; but on the contrary ſhould explain his Notions by theſe Truths: This is the Way to diſplay Light every where, and diſſipate all Errors. And when his Principles accord well with thoſe Truths, we may with very good Advantage make uſe of the Proofs he has given of them.

The Doubts and Uncertainty, of which he is reproached, about the moſt eſſential Points, are ſo far from ſhaking his Principles, that they only give the greater Confirmation to them; and one may ſay that Certainty and Conviction ſpring from theſe very Doubts. For Inſtance, in his *Phædon*, where he is treating of the great Objects of our Hope in the other Life, he inſinuates that 'tis a very difficult Matter certainly to know the Truth of theſe Things, while we live here; and that how ſtrong ſoever the Proofs are, on which we may found an Expectation of a happy Eternity, the Greatneſs of the Subject, and the natural Infirmities of Man, are inexhauſtible Springs of Doubts and Uncertainties; for theſe ſpring up in Multitudes from the Stock of corrupt Nature, which oppoſes the moſt manifeſt Truths, and reſiſts the moſt evident Proofs which Reaſon can produce. What was to be done then to diſſipate theſe

* Such as the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Reſurrection, the Fall of Man, and the Creation of the Souls of Men before their Bodies.

Doubts? The Prophets had ſpoken, but their Oracles were yet obſcure, and Men might not diſcern in their Words the Divine Spirit that animated them. It was neceſſary that God himſelf ſhould ſpeak. Nothing leſs than an expreſs Promiſe, nothing leſs than a plain Divine Revelation could entirely diſperſe the Clouds of Ignorance and Incredulity, and convert theſe Doubts into Certainties. This is what * *Plato* confeſſes in expreſs Terms. For he brings in ſome Philoſophers that render Homage to God, calling his Promiſes *the Veſſel in which no Danger is to be feared, and the only one in which we can happily accompliſh the Voyage of this Life, on a Sea ſo tempeſtuous and full of Rocks.* Thus we ſee where his Doubts terminated; they led Men to acknowledge the Need they had of a God, to aſſure them of the Reality of the great Bleſſings for which they hop'd. And this is accompliſhed in the Chriſtian Religion; which as it is the only Religion that has God for its Teacher, ſo has it alſo the Promiſes of eternal Happineſs, of which the Prophets ſpake, and of which *Plato* had a Glimpſe; and for which the Word of this God, by the Confeſſion even of theſe Pagans, is a moſt certain Security. So that, by the Acknowledgment of the moſt enlighten'd Heathens, there are now no reaſonable Doubts concerning the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion; that being the only Veſſel in which we can never be loſt. And this is what the Prophets predicted, that in Jeſus Chriſt Life and Immortality ſhould be fully brought to Light, and that he ſhould be the Deſire of Nations.

'Tis not only in theſe principal Points that *Plato* doubts, but almoſt in every Thing; and his Doubts have given Occaſion to many to make a wrong Judgment of the Academick Philoſophy; for it has been imagined that it aſſerted nothing, but accounted all Things equally uncertain, which is a very unjuſt Suppoſition. *Socrates* and *Plato* were not of the Number of thoſe Philoſophers, whoſe fluctuating Minds kept them continually wandring, ſo that they had no fixt and ſteddy Principles. This was

* In his Phœdon, Vol. 2.

their

their Principle and Rule: They taught that Men could not of themſelves have any Opinion but what was founded only on Probabilities; but that when God enlighten'd them, that which was no more than Opinion before, now became Science. And this they explain'd by a pretty Compariſon: *Dædalus* made two Sorts of Statues that could walk, with this Difference, the one Sort had a Spring which ſtop'd them when one pleas'd, and the other had none; ſo that when they were let go, they run along to the End of their Line, and could not be ſtop'd. The latter were not of ſo great a Price, but the former were very dear. Now *Socrates* and *Plato* compar'd Opinion to theſe Statues, that could not be ſtop'd; for Opinion is not ſtable, but is ſubject to change. But when 'tis reſtrain'd and fix'd by Reaſoning drawn from Cauſes which the Divine Light diſcovers to us, then Opinion becomes Science, and is fix'd and ſteddy, like thoſe Statues which had that governing Spring added to them. So that their Meaning was, that Opinion turns only on Probability, which is always like moving Sand; but that Science reſts on Certainty and Truth, which are a firm Foundation. Thus *Socrates* and *Plato* diſputed about every Thing, while they had only Opinions; but when theſe Opinions, after ſerious Reſearches and long Labour, were become Science by the Divine Light, then they affirm'd what they knew. Till then all was doubtful and uncertain to them. But theſe Doubts were more wiſe and ſafe than the Arrogance of thoſe poſitive Philoſophers, that raſhly affirm'd every Thing, and always took Opinion for Science.

The third Objection againſt *Socrates*, *That he only knew that he knew nothing*, is no more ſolid than the former; and is to be anſwer'd by the ſame Principle: And if I am not miſtaken, we ſhall find in this Ignorance a marvellous Fund of Knowledge.

There are two Sorts of Ignorance, the one natural, which is good or evil, according to the good or ill Uſe that is made of it; and the other acquired, and always good: For this latter is the Ignorance of thoſe who after

after they have learned all that Men can know, are convinc'd that they know nothing. This was *Socrates*'s Ignorance, it was * *a learned Ignorance that knows it ſelf.* He had run through Aſtronomy, Geometry, Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks, Poetry, Polite Learning, *&c.* and ſaw the Vanity of them. He even undertakes to prove that all theſe Sciences are either uſeleſs, or dangerous, and that nothing but the Knowledge of God can make us happy; that where this Divine Science is not, there can be no Good, and conſequently that there is a Sort of Ignorance more uſeful than the Sciences; for this Ignorance ſeeks not for Knowledge in it ſelf, well knowing it has none, but only in God who is pleas'd to fill its *Vacuum.* It was for this Reaſon, *Socrates* always began his Inſtructions with an Affirmation that he knew nothing. By this he ſignified that our Souls have no true Knowledge of any Thing, any farther than they are enlighten'd by God: That they ſhould always look on that piercing Light, in which alone they can ſee Light; and that when they turn their Looks another Way, they neceſſarily fall back into Obſcurity, and produce nothing but the Works of Darkneſs. Let the Proud Wiſe Men of the World appear, and compare themſelves with this Ignorant Man.

So much for one of the Uſes that may be made of *Plato*'s Writings, which ought to be look'd upon as ſo many Titles belonging to Chriſtianity, found long ago among the Pagans, and are ſo much the more venerable, in that ſo much as is found in them is faithfully copied from thoſe which the Prophets have left us; and in that which we find altered and corrupted, we may however diſcover the Veſtiges of thoſe Truths which irreproachable Witneſſes publiſh'd.

The ſecond Uſe that may be made of them, and which is no leſs conſiderable than the former, is that by this Means we may be confirm'd in the Knowledge of a

* 'Tis an Expreſſion of *Socrates*, which ſtates two Sorts of Ignorance, one that is ignorant of it ſelf, and t' other that knows itſelf.

great

great many Chriſtian Truths, which are prov'd in 'em with ſuch a Strength and Evidence, as no reaſonable Man can reſiſt.

Religion only propoſes them; for it belongs not to the Majeſty of a God to prove the Neceſſity, Juſtice, and Truth of all he commands. He makes Men love what he requires, and that is more than to prove it to be reaſonable. But a Philoſopher, who has no Authority over us any farther than he perſuades us by his Reaſons, is obliged to give Proofs of every Thing he advances; and thus *Plato* does, and his Proofs can't chuſe but be very agreeable to them that believe, and very uſeful to Unbelievers, if they are but willing to attend a little to 'em for their Inſtruction.

Some learned and zealous Perſon, who is well read in *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, will perhaps ſay, If *Plato* be ſo uſeful, whence come thoſe thundering Cenſures, which ſome of the Fathers of the Church, and above all St. *Chryſoſtom*, have let fly againſt him? It would be a ſufficient Anſwer to this, ſhould I only oppoſe to it thoſe great Praiſes, which other Fathers have given him, eſpecially St. *Auguſtin*. But is it to be imagined, that the ſame Principles that charmed St. *Auguſtin*, were diſpleaſing to St. *Chryſoſtom*? No certainly: The Spirit of God is not divided, and Truth always appears to thoſe whom God is pleaſed to illuminate. I'll therefore endeavour to ſhew from whence this Difference of their Sentiments proceeded.

The Philoſophy of *Plato* was look'd on two different Ways, which have given Occaſion to two very oppoſite Opinions concerning it.

Chriſtian Philoſophers look'd upon it as a Doctrine, which by its Principles naturally led to the Chriſtian Religion.

And Pagan Philoſophers conſidered it as a Doctrine, which contain'd Morals as perfect as thoſe of Chriſtianity, and which might even take Place of this holy Religion.

In the firſt Reſpect it was worthy of all the Encomiums that have been given it by the greateſt Doctors of the Church, who came out of his School.

And

And on the ſecond Account it deſerved the greateſt *Anathema*. The Defects of this Philoſophy could not be too much aggravated, nor could thoſe haughty Philoſophers that valued themſelves ſo much upon it, be too much abaſed; for the Wiſdom of the Wiſe, and the Knowledge of the Learned, are no better than Folly, if they lead us not to the Knowledge of Jeſus Chriſt. *Plato* himſelf, by his Principles, would furniſh us with Arms, to oppoſe thoſe of his Admirers, that ſhould be ſo ſenſeleſs, as to take up with his Opinions, and ſhut their Eyes againſt the bright Truths of Religion.

But this Difference is now ceaſed: There are now none of thoſe ignorant Perſons. No Body is ſo blind to prefer, or even compare *Plato* and *Socrates*, I will not ſay to the Evangeliſts or Apoſtles, but to the meaneſt Chriſtian. So that there is no Danger in ſetting a Value on thoſe Truths which are found in *Plato*, and in rendering them all the Honour they deſerve. They are not the leſs worthy of our Reſpect, becauſe they proceed from the Mouth of a Heathen. Did not God take *Balaam* from among the Gentiles to communicate his Spirit to him? When we render Homage to the Truths foretold by that covetous and corrupt Prophet, we don't honour the Prophet, but him by whom he was inſpir'd. For as St. *Ambroſe* ſays, * *'Tis not the Deſert of him who propheſies, but the Oracle of him who calls, and which the Grace of God reveals.* The greater the Darkneſs was that benighted thoſe Times, the more Eſteem we ought to have for *Plato* and *Socrates*, whom God ſeems to have choſen to be the firſt Heralds of thoſe great Truths, and if I may venture to ſay it, the Fore-runners of St. *Paul*, in the moſt ſuperſtitious and idolatrous City in the World. 'Twas the Doctrine of theſe Philoſophers that had produc'd and cheriſhed thoſe Sparks of Knowledge which this great Apoſtle found in the Hearts of ſome of the *Athenians*, concerning the Reſurrection of the Dead, and the Immortality of the Soul.

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* Non confitentis meritum, ſed vocantis oraculum eſt revelante Dei Gratia. *S. Ambr. Lib.* 6. *Epiſt.* 37.

What

What Reſpect we have for this Doctrine, will turn to the Glory of the Chriſtian Religion: For if the Conformity of a Part of *Plato*'s Opinions, with what is revealed to us in the Goſpel, has ſo raiſed this Philoſopher's Name, that he is called the *Divine Philoſopher*; what Eſteem and Veneration do they deſerve, whoſe Minds and Hearts are fill'd with all the Truths of Chriſtianity, and who are fed with the Celeſtial Doctrine, which our Lord Jeſus Chriſt learned of God the Father, and came himſelf to teach us?

This Conformity of *Plato* with the Doctrines of the Goſpel, laſt Year engag'd a Learned and Pious Eccleſiaſtick to give a ſmall Extract of it, which was very well received by the Publick. This Extract, which was made in the Palace, and under the Eye of one of the beſt and moſt learned Archbiſhops God has given his Church, is a great Elogium on the Doctrine of this Philoſopher. What greater Approbation can it have, than that of a Prelate, who ſo ſtrongly adheres to the Word of Truth, and is ſo diligent in inſtructing the People in it himſelf, as well as in cauſing others to inſtruct 'em?

Another great Advantage to be gained out of *Plato*'s Writings, is, that a Man may form his Judgment by 'em; and acquire that Juſtneſs of Mind, and Accuracy of Reaſoning, which are neceſſary in all Conditions of Life, in order to diſcern Truth from Error, that he may take the right Side in all Affairs that occur. For the Philoſophy of *Socrates* is the Source of good Senſe, as * *Horace* himſelf acknowledges.

There is no Work in the World that teaches, ſo well as this, the Art of confuting Sophiſts, who by their poiſonous Maxims labour to corrupt the Minds of Men, and to deſtroy Truth and good Senſe. As there will always be ſuch Impoſtures to be found, this Art will always be of very great Uſe, and there's no Man teaches it like *Plato*. There is nothing more compleat than his Logick, which infallibly gains its Point in every Thing it

* In Arte Poetic. V. 310.

under

undertakes; and 'tis impoſſible for a Man to defend himſelf from the Force of it. It may be compar'd to the Sun, which, when it riſes, ſcarce makes us feel its Heat, but gradually increaſes it, ſo that at length it becomes too hot to be endur'd.

I ſhall not ſpeak of the Charms of his Dialogues, which are inexpreſſible: There are no Satires or Comedies that come near 'em. We can no where find ſuch Sharpneſs of Wit, ſo many Graces, and decent Turns of Thought, not ſo much Variety either of Conceptions, or Expreſſions: Nor were Ironies ever ſo finely manag'd; ſo that 'tis not ſo much an Entertainment of Reading as an Inchantment. In the Life of *Plato* I have ſufficiently expos'd to View the Advantages of Dialogue above all other Ways of treating a Subject. I ſhall here only add, that *that* which contributes moſt to render it ſo agreeable and uſeful, is, that Truth comes gradually out of the Bowels of the Diſpute; juſt as when Pictures are unrolled we ſee the Perſons repreſented riſe up by Degrees, till at laſt they appear in their full Proportion: And there is nothing more agreeable to the Mind than the ſpringing up of Truth after this Manner, the inſenſible Progreſs of which even leaves the Soul Time to be before-hand with it, and to foreſee its Appearance. Now a Truth which our Minds have as it were divided, pleaſes us much more than that which has been formally prov'd to us, which moſt commonly only irritates and makes us uneaſy.

Theſe Dialogues have been the Admiration of all Ages: In the Reign of *Trajan* they were ſtill ſo much eſteemed at *Rome*, that they occaſion'd the introducing of a Cuſtom which was received with great Applauſe; they us'd to chuſe the fineſt of theſe Dialogues, and make their Children learn them by heart, that ſo they might at their Feaſts recite 'em at Table, with thoſe different Tones and Geſtures that were ſuitable to the Manners and Characters of the different Perſons whom *Plato* brings in ſpeaking.

'Tis true, this Cuſtom laſted not long; but that which put an End to it was no leſs honourable than that which introduc'd it. For the Philoſophers that condemn'd and abo-

aboliſhed it, did ſo only becauſe they accounted *Plato* too ſublime to be ſo uſed, and becauſe they could not endure that Dialogues ſo ſerious and ſolid ſhould ſerve for a Divertiſement at Table, and be heard amidſt the Merriment, Noiſe and Tumult of a Feaſt. And this Sentiment of theirs was ſupported by the Authority of *Plato* himſelf, who in his Banquet, being to ſpeak of the End of Man, of the Sovereign Good, and other Theological Matters, does not puſh on his Demonſtration very far; he does not, according to his ordinary Cuſtom, imitate a vigorous Wreſtler, who never lets go his Hold, and who locks his Adverſary ſo cloſely that he can't eſcape him; but he ſoftens his Proofs, and makes 'em pleaſant, and attracts his Auditors by the Inſinuation of Fables and Examples, which ſeem to be contriv'd not ſo much to convince as to divert 'em. For no Queſtions ought to be ſtarted at Table but ſuch as may move the Soul after an agreeable and uſeful Manner, and ſuch as every one may eaſily underſtand; and thoſe ought to be baniſhed (to uſe the Words of *Democritus*) that are thorny, and out of which 'tis difficult to extricate one's ſelf. The Diſcourſe at Table ought to be for every one, like the Wine; and ſuch as propoſe there abſtracted and difficult Queſtions, baniſh thence this kind of Community, and renew the Feaſt of the Fox and the Crane.

If I had only conſider'd the Eloquence, the Strength and Harmony of theſe Writings, I confeſs I ſhould never have had the Courage to tranſlate 'em; in doing which, either through my own Defect, or that of the Language in which I write, I have had the Uneaſineſs of finding my ſelf unable to preſerve a Multitude of Beauties, and Elegancies that render theſe Dialogues Maſter-pieces, not to be equall'd. But I conſider'd, that ſeeing they contain'd Matters of ſo great Importance and Neceſſity, it would be a great Piece of Folly, to be ſo ſuperſtitious about Terms, as to deprive Mankind of ſo great an Advantage. And by good hap, that which is the moſt uſeful can't be hurt by my Tranſlation. It preſerves the Art of Logick, and all the Truth which *Socrates* proves by that Means, and that's enough. Thoſe Beauties which

conſiſt

conſiſt only in Expreſſion are not ſo neceſſary, and we may eaſily forgo 'em, provided we enjoy others; and not do like a certain Writer of the laſt Age, who after he had made very good Reflections on *Socrates*, and had acknowledged him to be *an admirable Pattern in all great Qualities*, amuſes and perplexes himſelf with Trouble, that a Soul ſo lovely had met with a Body ſo deform'd, and diſagreeable to its Beauty. Which is as if a Soldier in reading the great Actions of *Cæſar* or *Alexander*, inſtead of making Advantage of his reading, and learning the Art of War, ſhould diſtreſs and afflict his Mind, becauſe one was bald, and t' other inclin'd his Head on one Side.

But it may be I have leſs Reaſon to fear how it will go with my Tranſlation, than how *Socrates* himſelf will eſcape. Our Age ſo much reſembles that wherein this Philoſopher liv'd, that, in all Appearance, if this wiſe Man now finds ſome intelligent Judges who will do him Juſtice, he'll find a greater Number of Perſons extremely prejudic'd, who will be ſure to condemn him. In an Age wherein nothing is eſteem'd but Riches; wherein that Slavery, which leads to Wealth, is prefer'd to Liberty, and Men chuſe rather to nouriſh the Vices of others by their Flatteries, than to augment their own Virtues by their Labour; the Temperance, Frugality, Fortitude, Juſtice and Liberty of *Socrates*, will be laugh'd at; and this will be but the Accompliſhment of what he predicted: * *If my Fellow-Citizens* (ſays he) *have not been able to endure my Maxims, much leſs will they be tolerable to Strangers.*

The greateſt Part will not give themſelves ſo much Trouble as to read him. † They will much ſooner read the *Mileſian Fables*, as St. *Jerom* ſays; that is, ſuch Pieces as corrupt the Heart and Mind, than Dialogues which inſpire nothing but Wiſdom. And among thoſe that will read him, many will do it only out of Curioſity

* Apology 69. † Multoq; pars major eſt Mileſias Fabulas revolventium, quam Platonis Libros. *St.* Jerom *in the Preface to his 12th Book on* Iſaiah.

for in our Time we may make the ſame Complaint that was made heretofore by *Taurus* the Philoſopher, an ancient Commentator on *Plato*. One aſks for *Plato*'s *Dialogue of the Banquet*, to have the Pleaſure of ſeeing the Exceſſes of *Alcibiades*. Another for his *Phædrus*, becauſe 'tis a Treatiſe of Criticiſm, and the Oration of *Lyſias* is examin'd in it; and others deſire thoſe Dialogues which have the greateſt Reputation, and are accounted the beſt pen'd, only for a frivolous Pleaſure: And not one of all theſe thinks of embelliſhing his Mind by reading of theſe Books, ſo as to become more modeſt, temperate, juſt, patient, and pious.

But thoſe who will prove the leaſt favourable to *Socrates*, are a Sort of Men who highly value themſelves upon their refin'd Wit; and a great many of thoſe who are taken with the Pomp and gay Appearances of the World.

The former not having Eyes piercing enough to diſcover the ſecret Light of thoſe hidden Beauties that adorn theſe Dialogues, will count *Socrates* a dull and languid Author, becauſe he has no Witticiſms, nor genteel Turns. An obſcure Perſon who never did any Thing worthy to be read, ſhall call in Queſtion the Reputation of *Socrates*, a Perſon who has been an Honour to Human Nature by the Excellency of his Underſtanding; and ſhall prefer himſelf to him, trampling under his Feet * *the Teſtimonies which all the learned Men of Antiquity, and all* Greece *have rendred him, that for good Senſe, Wit, Pleaſantneſs, Subtilty, Strength, Variety and Abundance, he excelled all that ever had appeared in the World.* A Man muſt have a great Stock of good Opinion of himſelf, to appeal from ſo ſolemn a Judgment, and to make his Appeal to himſelf too.

The latter are commonly corrupted by reading frivolous Books, which are wholly compos'd for Oſtentation, and, as *Montagne* ſays, *can't perceive Riches unleſs they make a pompous Show*, and ſo have a Diſguſt for every

* *Cicero* in his 3d Book of Oratory.

Thing

thing that is plain and ſimple; being perſuaded that what is natural and eaſy, is a-kin to Dulneſs and Stupidity. Theſe will think it below 'em to attend to a Philoſopher who entertains them only with ſuch Diſcourſes as they count vulgar and trivial, who is ſcarce ever to be found out of Shops; who talks only of Husbandmen, Smiths, Maſons, Carpenters, Shoemakers, and Taylors, and is eternally hammering on the ſame Subjects, and repreſenting the ſame Images.

'There are not wanting good Reaſons to prove to them, that as a Man ſometimes is thought plump, and in good Caſe, when he is only *ſwell'd* and *bloated*; ſo that which is frequently taken for Accuracy of Judgment, is the Effect of ſome Diſtemper, and not at all the Mark of a nice and fine Reliſh. The higheſt and moſt ſublime Conceptions are often hid under a Form that appears vile and contemptible. Are not the moſt celeſtial Truths propos'd to us in the Goſpel under popular Images and Modes of Expreſſion, like thoſe us'd by *Socrates?* That which creeps on the Earth, is no leſs capable than that which is rais'd to the Heavens, of ſerving for a Repreſentation to let the greateſt Secrets, both of Nature and Grace, into our Underſtanding. Nay, many Times the moſt ſimple and common Ideas are the moſt proper to impreſs Truth on the Minds of Men; for beſides that theſe are more proportionate to us, they do not tranſport us out of ourſelves, as the moſt magnificent Ideas do. If none but great and dazling Images could ſtrike us, God would not have fail'd to have conſtantly employ'd them; and ſince 'tis no more difficult for him to change Men than to illuminate them, he would have been ſo far from making his Spirit ſtoop to the Manners and Cuſtoms of thoſe whom he inſpired, that on the contrary he would have transform'd their Manners and Cuſtoms, to ſubject them in ſome ſort to his Spirit; and yet he did not do thus. When he inſpires *Daniel*, he leaves him to ſpeak like a Man educated in a Royal Court, he uſes only Great and Magnificent Ideas; and when he inſpires a Shepherd, ſuch a one as *Amos*, he leaves him to explain himſelf by

by ſuch Terms as were moſt familiar to him: But the Truth is every where equally ſublime, and as it receives no Acceſſion to its Luſtre by the Majeſty of Figures, ſo neither does it loſe any Thing of its Glory by their Simplicity. *Socrates* was ſo well perſuaded, that this Simplicity was alone capable to move and correct the Minds of Men, that when *Critias*, the moſt cruel of the thirty Tyrants, commanded him to let all the Artificers alone, and talk no more of them, he anſwer'd, * *I muſt then let all thoſe Conſequences alone too, which I draw from them, and muſt ſpeak no more, either of Holineſs or Juſtice, or any other Duties that become a good Man.*

But perhaps our Cenſors will have leſs Deference for the Authority of Reaſons, than for that of Examples: 'Tis therefore neceſſary to give them an Account of what paſs'd in the Time of *Socrates* himſelf; and to ſhew them the Characters, both of his Friends and Enemies.

On the one Side were the moſt ſtupid and moſt corrupt among the People, ſome of whom, through Ignorance, laugh'd at his Morality, and the Manner of his Behaviour: Others, through the Corruption of their Hearts, could not endure his generous Liberty.

On the other Side, Perſons of the greateſt Honour, and of chief Note in the Commonwealth; *Pericles*, *Nicias*, *Xenophon*, *Apollodorus*, *Criton*, *Critobulus*, *Æſchines*, *Antiſthenes*, &c. Theſe found infinite Charms in his Converſation. Who is it that is ignorant of *Alcibiades?* No Man had more Wit, or a truer Guſt of Things; he was one of the beſt-made, braveſt, moſt gallant, moſt magnificent, moſt ambitious, and niceſt Men in the World; he was at the Head of the *Athenians*, he commanded their Armies, he had won ſeveral Battles, he had glitter'd in the Courts of Kings, and had not been rudely treated by Queens. According to the Maxims of the World, there's nothing more bright and illuſtrious than ſuch a Man as this. Yet this ſame *Alcibiades*, amidſt all this Glory and Pomp, is ſo

* *Xenoph* in the 1ſt Book of the memorable Things of *Socrates.*

far

far from being offended at *Socrates*'s Way and Manner of Deportment, which were ſo oppoſite to his own, that he no ſooner became acquainted with him, but he was ſtruck with ſuch a Senſe of his Merit, and the ſolid Gracefulneſs of his Converſation, that he knew not how to leave him; he was enchanted with his Diſcourſes, which he prefer'd to the moſt excellent Muſick; * he confeſſes, that a Man could neither hear him ſpeak, nor even hear others repeat what he had ſaid, without being tranſported. The Force and Truth of his Words drew Tears from him, and made him even leap for Joy. He compar'd him to certain Statues of *Satyrs* and *Silenes*, which were made to open and ſhut: To look on the Out-ſide of them, nothing was more ugly; but when they were open'd, all the Deities were found in them together. He hardly lov'd or reſpected any one beſides him, and he never met with him, but he took off from his own Head the Crown, which he, according to the Cuſtom, wore on Days of Ceremony, and put it on the Head of *Socrates*.

Therefore there is no *Medium*, we muſt judge of *Socrates*, either as the worſt and meaneſt of the *Athenians* did, or like *Pericles* and *Alcibiades*; we may take our Choice.

All theſe Contradictions which I have foreſeen, and which indeed may make theſe Dialogues become to the greateſt part of Readers † *like thoſe exquiſite Dainties that were formerly ſet on Tombs*, have not diſcourag'd me, but only convinc'd me that a bare Tranſlation, though ever ſo exact and faithful, would not make a ſufficient Impreſſion on the Minds of ſome Men, if it were not ſupported by ſomething, that might prevent all theſe Inconveniencies, or at leaſt a good Part of 'em; and I could think but of two Ways to ſucceed in this.

The firſt was, to place an Argument at the Head of every Dialogue, to explain the Subject of it, to unfold the Art and Method of it, and to take particular Notice of every Thing in it of the greateſt Importance. The

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* In the Dialogue of the Barquet.

† Quaſi appoſitiones Epulārum circumpoſitæ Sepulchro. *Eccleſiaſtic.* 30, 18.

Argu-

Arguments of *Marſilius Ficinus* do not go to the Matter of Fact; beſides, they are too abſtracted, and are abundantly more difficult to be underſtood than the Dialogues themſelves. And thoſe of *De Serres* are too wide and indefinite, they never well fix the State of the Queſtion, or the Quality of the Proofs; nor do they ever explain either *Plato*'s Deſign, or his Addreſs. Now an Argument ought to be a faithful Guide always to attend the Reader, to conduct him wherever he goes, and always to ſet him into the right Path.

The ſecond Way was to make Remarks to elucidate the principal Difficulties, to render the hidden Beauties diſcernible, to explain the Train of Reaſoning, and the Solidity of the Principles and Proofs, and to help to diſcover what is falſe, from that which is true.

Marſilius Ficinus did not ſo much as think of this; *De Serres* on this Account is more uſeful than he; for by his Marginal Notes he at leaſt hinders you from loſing the Thread of *Plato*'s Reaſoning, and makes you comprehend the Train and Progreſs of his Proofs: But yet he abandons you in the greateſt Difficulties.

In the Time of *Maximus Tyrius*, that is, in the ſecond Age, it was very earneſtly deſired, that ſome one would undertake to elucidate thoſe obſcure and knotty Paſſages of *Plato*; above all, in what Reſpects his Opinions in Theology: And many Philoſophers labour'd in this Work, as may be ſeen in his Life; but with ſo little Succeſs, that inſtead of reſolving the Difficulties, they have increaſed them. They have ſcarce aſſiſted me once or twice in the ten Dialogues which I have tranſlated; and they would have very often led me into Miſtakes, if I would have followed them.

The Cauſe of their Errors was, that they did not draw from the true Fountain, and had a Mind to explain *Plato* by *Ariſtotle*'s Principles, which are very different from thoſe of *Plato*. The latter is moſt commonly conformable to ſound Theology, or may be very eaſily reduc'd to it by his own Principles well explain'd: But 'tis otherwiſe with his Diſciple; and where *Plato* may be once corrected by *Ariſtotle*, *Ariſtotle* may be corrected a hundred Times by *Plato*.

I don't preſume ſo much on my own Ability, as to think I have filled up all the Devoirs of a good Interpreter; without doubt ſome Difficulties will yet be found in that which I have tranſlated, but perhaps all of them ought not to be imputed to me. Obſcurities ordinarily ariſe from three Cauſes, from the Sublimity of the Subject, from the Ignorance of the Interpreter, and from the Incapacity or Unattention of the Reader. It will be reaſonable for the Reader to accuſe me of ſome of them; but let him alſo ſometimes accuſe either the Subject or himſelf: If this Conduct be obſerved, I may venture to hope for the Diminution of theſe Difficulties.

At the End of the firſt Volume the Reader will find an Abridgment of three Dialogues, which are alſo entirely tranſlated in the ſame Volume. That which has given Occaſion to this Repetition, is as follows: I had a very great Deſire to publiſh *Plato* in *French*, but I made this Reflection, That Philoſophy, as *Plato* himſelf ſomewhere ſays, requires Free Men who are Maſters of their Time, and who, provided they find the Truth, don't enquire whether the Diſcourſes that lead to it, are long or ſhort: But nothing in our Time is more rarely found, than theſe Free Men. Some are ſo oppreſs'd with Care and Buſineſs, that they are ſcarce ever at their own Diſpoſal; and others are ſo continually agitated and ruffled by a thouſand Paſſions, that they are always in Action, without doing any Thing, and reſemble ſo many fugitive Slaves.

Therefore to accommodate *Plato* to the Occupations of the former, and the reſtleſs Humour of the latter, I thought ſuch Abridgments might be made, as would be of very great Uſe; and I made ſome, in which I preſerved, the beſt I could, the Spirit of *Socrates* and his Method, ſo that none of his principal Strokes might be loſt. From hence I ſuppos'd two conſiderable Advantages might be drawn: Firſt, That by this Means *Plato* might be read in a Week's Time, and then, that the Truths he teaches would be more deeply fix'd in the Mind; becauſe the Proofs being more contracted, would make

make a more lively Impreſſion. I was farther confirm'd in this Thought by obſerving the Effect theſe Abridgments produced on all that heard them read; every one was mov'd by them, and could not chuſe but feel the Force of them.

But it muſt be confeſs'd, to the Glory of *Plato*, and perhaps ſomewhat to my Shame too, that when I was on the Point of committing them to the Preſs, and was willing to reviſe them by the Original, I was my ſelf diſguſted with my Work, and found in the Original ſo many Elegancies which I had not been able to preſerve; that I was afraid I ſhould make it ſuſtain too great a Loſs in not publiſhing it entire, for nothing can be taken from it that is not worthy to be admired. And to think there are any Vacuities and uſeleſs Parts in his Writings, is but to deceive one's ſelf. There is a great deal of Difference between a Man's quitting his Subject, and ſounding it to the Bottom. *Plato* always goes back to firſt Principles, and examines every Subject on all its different Sides: He maintains that this is the only Way to make ſure Demonſtrations; and he is every where ſuch an Enemy to long Diſcourſes, that is, ſuch as are uſeleſs, that he looks upon them as the Rock on which Truth is ſplit, and as the Character not of a Philoſopher, but of a Sophiſt. This obliged me to alter my Reſolution: However, in Obedience to ſome Perſons of very great Merit, who deſired theſe Abridgments of me, I have publiſhed three, that the Publick may draw ſome Profit from them, or at leaſt may make a Judgment of them.

I might here have a fair Occaſion to anſwer the Invectives that have been made againſt *Plato* in our Time: But ſince they come only from ſuch Perſons as never read ſo much as one of his Dialogues; perhaps they'll change their Sentiments when once they have read him. Beſides, 'tis waſting of one's Time to defend *Plato*; for he ſufficiently defends himſelf: And that may be ſaid of him with yet more Juſtice, which the greateſt of the *Latin* Hiſtorians ſaid of *Cato*, equal-

ly ridiculing the Praiſes *Cicero* had given him, and the Satires *Cæſar* had made on him; * *None could ever augment the Glory of this Great Man by his Praiſes, nor diminiſh it by his Satires.*

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* Cujus Gloriæ neque profuit quiſquam laudando, nec vituperando quiſquam nocuit. *Titus Livius.*

THE LIFE OF *PLATO.*

WITH

An Account of the Principal of his Opinions in Philoſophy.

GOD was pleas'd to endow the firſt Man with true Wiſdom; but the Paſſions ſoon communicated to him their mortal Poiſon, and precipitated him into a State of Rebellion againſt his Maker, and ſo made him loſe all the Advantages of his Origin. 'Tis from this Fountain his Poſterity have deriv'd all their Errors. Being unhappily taught what Good they had loſt, by the Evils they ſuffer'd, they made their beſt Efforts to repair their Loſs. But ſince

The Riſe of all the different Sects of Philoſophers.

Man in a State of Perfection had not Strength enough to keep that Happineſs he enjoy'd; how ſhould he be able, when in a State of Corruption, to put himſelf in Poſſeſſion of that true Good, of which Sin had depriv'd him? No, 'tis not to be expected from him, that he ſhould conduct us back to our former Felicity. This is the Work of God, and not of Man. All the wiſe Pagans may in this Reſpect be compar'd to drunken Men, who while they have a Mind to return Home, knock at every Door, and take every Houſe for their own. Some Remains of Reaſon ſtill gave them a Diſcovery of what they ought to ſeek; and an inexhauſtible Source of Blindneſs and Corruption, ſtill hinder'd them from finding it, or if they found it, from embracing it. *Socrates* was the firſt of them, who was eminently diſtinguiſh'd from others by a clearer and purer Light, (which perhaps was the Reward of his Modeſty and Humility) and acquir'd a more ſublime and certain Knowledge of the Duties of Man, of the Nature of God, of the Law of Nature, and of Juſtice. Therefore *Plato* ſays of him, that he added Fire to Fire; thereby ſignifying, that by amaſſing together thoſe Degrees of Light, which he found ſcatter'd up and down, and giving them a new Luſtre by his luminous and fruitful Mind, he ſpread Light far and near, and rais'd a great Flame out of that, which before his Time was but a Number of little Sparks almoſt buried under the Aſhes. But this ſublime Knowledge of his, was not without a Mixture of many Errors; ſo that to gain Advantage by his Doctrine, which has been preſerv'd and improv'd by *Plato*, Care muſt be taken to ſeparate the Truths, which it pleas'd God to diſcover to him, from the Falſhoods and Illuſions, in which he himſelf involv'd them. This we may moſt certainly do, ſince we have the true Meaſure of Truth in our Hands, which is the Word of God. All he ſays, that is conformable to this, is undoubtedly true; and may moreover ſerve to prove the Truths of the Chriſtian Religion; and whatever is oppoſite to it, is the Fruit of Falſhood and Error. And the Doctrine of *Plato* it ſelf has this Advantage, that ſuch an Examen as we plead for

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is one of his principal Rules, and his firſt Principle; for he maintains, that nothing ought ever to be received in any Science, but what agrees with * Eternal Truth, and with the Oracles of God.

Plato founded the old Academy on the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, thoſe of *Heraclitus*, and thoſe of *Socrates*: And by adding to the Diſcoveries of theſe great Men that Light which he had acquir'd in his Travels, and had deriv'd from the ſame Springs, he eſtabliſh'd a Sect of Philoſophers much more perfect than thoſe that had appear'd in the World before him. However, I ſhall not look back ſo far as thoſe Philoſophers I have mention'd, whoſe Opinions may be ſeen in *Diogenes Laertius*. I'll ſay but a Word of them by the Way, and confining my ſelf only to what relates to *Plato*, I ſhall firſt give an Account of his Life; after this, I ſhall explain his Doctrine, and examine it with reſpect to Morality, Religion, Policy, Phyſicks, and Logick. I ſhall, as much as in me lies, diſcover the Source, both of the Truths and Errors he teaches: I ſhall ſpeak of his Way of treating the Subjects on which he inſiſts. From thence I ſhall proceed to make a Judgment of his Stile; I ſhall ſpeak of his principal Interpreters, and, in fine, ſhall give a Tranſlation of ſome of his Dialogues, the Method and Subjects of which I ſhall explain: And here I ſhall remark whatever I think may be ſtill of Uſe to us. 'Tis with ſuch a Diſpoſition of Mind as this, that we ſhould read the Works of the Heathens; for thoſe who are too much enamour'd of them, and take up with them, never find enough Truth in them to give them Satisfaction, and Righteouſneſs enough to fortify them againſt Vice, but continue to want the true Food of Souls, and remain indigent of ſolid Virtue. This Method I ſpeak of, is taught us by a † learned Father of the Church, and was followed by himſelf, as he informs us in the || Letter he wrote to Pope *Damaſus*; in which, after

* By this Eternal Truth *Plato* means an ancient Tradition, which he pretends the firſt Men received from God, and tranſmitted to their Poſterity.

† St *Jerome*. || Letter 146.

he had applied to this Purpoſe the * Law God gave his People, concerning a ſtrange Woman, when taken Captive in War, who was not to be married to an *Iſraelite* till he had caus'd her to change her Clothes, to be purified, and to have her Nails and her Hair cut; he adds, † "*We do the ſame when we read the Heathen Philoſo-*
"*phers (who to us are that ſtrange Woman) and when*
"*the Books of the Wiſdom of this World fall into our*
"*Hands. If we find any Thing in them that is profit-*
"*able, we make uſe of it by referring it to our own*
"*Principles; and when we find any Thing uſeleſs and*
"*ſuperfluous, as when they treat of Idols, of Love, and*
"*of the Care of earthly and periſhable Things, this we*
"*pare away. Theſe are the Clothes which we take from*
"*this ſtrange Woman; theſe are the Nails and Hair we*
"*cut off with a ſharp Inſtrument.*"

By this Means we reſtore to the good Philoſophy and ſound Theology of the ancient *Hebrews*, what the *Greeks* have ſtolen from them, for they are enrich'd only with their Spoils.

Plato deſcended from a Brother of *Solon*, and conſequently was of the Family of *Codrus* King of *Athens*; and thus his Genealogy may be trac'd to *Neptune* by *Neleus* King of *Pylos*, from whom *Codrus* deſcended in the fifth Generation: So that in Reſpect of his Birth, his Nobility was as great as any the Pride of any Man can flatter themſelves withal. *Ariſton* having eſpous'd his Couſin German *Perictione*, ‖ 'tis pretended that *Apollo*

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* Deut. Chap. 21.

† Itaque & nos facere ſolemus quando Philoſophos legimus, quando in manus noſtras libri veniunt ſapientiæ ſæcularis; ſi quid in eis utile reperimus, ad noſtrum dogma convertimus; ſi quid vero ſuperfluum, de Idolis, de Amore, de Cura ſæcularium rerum, hæc radimus, his Calvitium inducimus, hæc in unguium morem ferro acutiſſimo reſecamus.

‖ Theſe Suppoſitions were uſual in thoſe Times: For inſtance, there was ſoon after this a Woman of the Kingdom of *Pontus*, who perſuaded a Multitude of People that ſhe was with Child by *Apollo*, and was brought to Bed of a Son, who was named *Silenus*, whom *Lyſander* was willing to make uſe of to carry on the Deſign he had laid to make himſelf King of *Sparta*.

appear'd

appear'd to him in a Dream, and forbad him to approach his Wife, becauſe ſhe was with Child by him. *Ariſton* obey'd; and now look'd upon *Perictione* no more as his Wife, but as a Goddeſs, till ſhe was deliver'd of *Plato*, on the Day of *Apollo*'s * Nativity, as the *Delians* affirm. *Plutarch* makes a Reflection upon this, which deſerves not to be forgot. He ſays, Thoſe that have made *Apollo Plato*'s Father, have done that God no Diſhonour in attributing to him the Production of a Man, who is the Phyſician of Souls, and labours to cure them of the moſt violent Paſſions, and moſt dangerous Diſtempers. And St. *Jerome* ſomewhere obſerves, That thoſe Philoſophers who firſt gave out this Fable, did not believe that he whom they look'd upon as the Prince of Wiſdom, could be born of any other than a Virgin.

Plato was born the firſt Year of the eighty-eighth Olympiade, that is, 426 Years before the Nativity of *Jeſus Chriſt*. He was at firſt call'd *Ariſtocles*, after the Name of his Grandfather: His Wreſtling-Maſter call'd him *Plato*, from his broad ſquare Shoulders; and he continued ever after to bear this Name. In his Infancy, as he was one Day ſleeping under a Myrtle-Tree, 'tis ſaid a Swarm of Bees ſettled upon his Lips, which was taken as an Omen to ſignify that his Style would be extremely ſweet. He began his Studies under a Grammarian call'd *Dionyſius*, made his Exerciſes under *Ariſton* of *Argos*, learn'd Muſick of *Draco* the *Athenian*, and under *Metellus* of *Agrigentum* he apply'd himſelf to Painting and Poeſy: He even made ſome Tragedies, which he burnt when he was twenty Years of Age, after he had heard *Socrates*. To this Philoſopher he entirely adher'd; and having a marvellous Inclination to Virtue, made ſo good a Proficiency by the Diſcourſes of this righteous Man, that at twenty-five Years of Age he gave ſuch Proofs of his extraordinary Wiſdom, as made it appear that he was already capable of governing a State.

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* The 7th of *Feb.*

The *Lacedemonians* had then made themſelves Maſters of *Athens*, and *Lyſander* eſtabliſhed there the Government of thirty, who at firſt rul'd with ſome kind of Mildneſs, but ſoon after made uſe of a tyrannical Power. At this Juncture *Plato* gave a very conſiderable Inſtance of the Freedom of his Soul, and ſhew'd he could not truckle to make his Court to a Tyrant. *Lyſander*, who made all ſtoop to him, and had render'd himſelf formidable by his Cruelties, kept ſome Poets about him, who made it their Buſineſs to celebrate his Glory, and flatter his Vanity. *Antimachus* and *Niceratus* were of this Number; they made Verſes in Praiſe of *Lyſander*, by way of Emulation: He being made Judge of their Performance, gave the Prize to *Niceratus*. *Antimachus* overborne with this Diſgrace, ſuppreſſed his Poem. *Plato*, who lov'd him for his fine Poetry, endeavour'd to encourage him, and without fearing *Lyſander*'s Reſentment, told him, that he was not ſo much to be blam'd as his Judge; *For* (ſaid he) *Ignorance is as bad a Diſtemper in the Eyes of the Mind, as Blindneſs in thoſe of the Body.*

Plato's Merit, which now began to be much taken Notice of, induc'd the Miniſters of Tyranny to make the greateſt Efforts they could to draw him to their Party, and to engage him to concern himſelf in the Government Nothing was propos'd to him but what was ſuitable to his Age, and agreeable to his Maxims. Indeed all his Ambition lay in a Deſire of making the Knowledge he had acquir'd ſerviceable to his Country; and he was ſo far perſuaded by the Promiſes of thoſe thirty Tyrants, that he did not deſpair of inducing them at length to abandon their arbitrary Methods, and govern the City with all the Wiſdom and Moderation of good Magiſtrates. While he employ'd his Thoughts to this Purpoſe Night and Day, and was in Search of the moſt proper Means to make this Deſign ſucceſsful, he carefully obſerv'd all their Steps: But ſoon perceiv'd that the Miſchief grew worſe and worſe; and that the Spirit of Tyranny was too deeply rooted, to leave him any Hope

Hope of being able to deſtroy it. * Theſe thirty Tyrants filled the whole City with Murders and Proſcriptions; and while he had a Share in the publick Affairs, it came to this Point, that he muſt either be a Confederate in their Crimes, or a Victim to their Fury. The Preſſure of this Misfortune, which none but God himſelf could redreſs, gave a Check to his Ambition, and made him willing to wait for more favourable Times.

Fortune ſoon appear'd willing to ſecond his good Intentions; for the thirty Tyrants were expell'd, and the Form of the Government quite changed. This gave a little Revival to *Plato*'s Hopes, when almoſt extinguiſhed. But it was not long before he perceiv'd that this new Form of Government was no better than the former; and that the State every Day receiv'd new Wounds. Nay, *Socrates* himſelf was ſacrific'd upon this Revolution. The Laws were trampled under Foot, Order and Diſcipline were no more regarded, and all Authority was in the Hands of the People, who were always more formidable than any Tyrants could be. It was impoſſible to rectify this Diſorder, for a Man that ſhould undertake it had need of good Friends; and in ſo great a Confuſion, the Fidelity of old Friends becomes as ſuſpected as that of new ones is dangerous.

Plato knew not what to determine under theſe Circumſtances. He had no Expectation of Help from the neighbouring Cities, where Confuſion reigned no leſs than it did at *Athens*. In an Age wherein Philoſophy was advanc'd to its higheſt Perfection, Injuſtice was carried to the laſt Extremity: Which is the ordinary Effect of that Contempt of Truth which Men ſometimes manifeſt, when it ſhines upon them with the greateſt Evidence. This Inundation of Injuſtice and Violence augmented the Love which *Plato* bore to Philoſophy; he caſt himſelf into its Arms as into a ſafe Port, fully convinc'd that the Welfare of Cities, and of particular Perſons, depends on it; and that it is impoſſible to be

* See *Xenophon*'s Hiſtory of *Greece*, Lib. 2.

happy without it. At this Time he heard the Diſcourſes of *Cratylus*, who taught the Philoſophy of *Heraclitus*, and *Hermogenes*, who taught that of *Parmenides*. He afterward went to *Megara* to ſee *Euclid*, who founded the *Megarick* Sect. From *Megara* he paſs'd to *Cyrene*, to perfect himſelf in the Mathematicks under *Theodorus*, who was the greateſt Mathematician of his Time. He then viſited *Egypt*, and convers'd a long Time with the *Egyptian* Prieſts, who taught him a great Part of their Tradition, and made him acquainted with the Books of *Moſes*, and thoſe of the Prophets.

While he was at *Memphis*, there arriv'd a *Lacedemonian* who was ſent by *Ageſilaus* to deſire the Prieſt *Connuphis* to explain a certain Inſcription which was found on a Copper-Plate in the Tomb of *Alcmene*. This Prieſt, after he had ſpent three Days in looking over all Sorts of Figures and Characters, anſwer'd, That the Letters of this Plate were ſuch as were uſed in *Egypt* in the Time of *Proteus*; that *Hercules* had carried them into *Greece*; and that they contain'd an Admonition which God gave the *Greeks* to live in Peace, by inſtituting Sports in Honour of the Muſes, by the Study of Philoſophy, and other Parts of Learning, and by diſputing one againſt another with Reaſons, and Works of Juſtice, with a Deſign only to know the Truth, and to follow the Dictates of it. 'Tis probable this Prieſt was not able to read the Inſcription, but wiſely made uſe of ſo favourable an Occaſion to appeaſe the *Grecian* Wars, which was infinitely better than if he had read it.

This Stratagem of *Connuphis* was ſoon ſerviceable to *Plato* for a like Deſign; for when he was upon his Return with *Simmias*, and on the Coaſt of *Caria*, he met ſome Men that came from *Delos*, who intreated him to explain a very terrible Prediction which they had received from the Oracle of *Apollo*. The Purport of it was, that the Miſeries under which the *Greeks* labour'd ſhould not ceaſe, till they had doubled the Cubical Altar which was in his Temple. They told him they had attempted to put this Order in Execution, but that when they had doubled each Side of the Altar, inſtead of making it double

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as they hop'd to have done, and as the God requir'd, they made it eight-fold; which made 'em fear the Continuation of their Calamities. *Plato* calling to Mind what the *Egyptian* Prieſt had done, told 'em, that God did but mock the *Greeks* for their Contempt of Sciences; and by reproaching 'em of their Ignorance and Stupidity, exhorted 'em ſeriouſly to apply themſelves to the Study of Geometry, which alone would make 'em able to find two proportional Lines to double a Cubical Body, by equally augmenting all its Dimenſions: And added, that if they had a Mind to correct their Work, it was but to addreſs themſelves to *Eudoxus* or *Helicon*; but that God had no Deſign at all to have his Altar doubled, and that the only Thing he requir'd by the Oracle, was, that they ſhould lay down their Arms to converſe with the Muſes, and moderate their Paſſions by the Study of Letters and Sciences; in rendering mutual Love and Service, inſtead of hating and deſtroying one another. He went after this into *Italy*, where he heard *Philolaus* and *Eurytus*, who were *Pythagorean* Philoſophers. From thence he paſs'd into *Sicily*, to ſee the Wonders of that Iſland. By this Time he had arrived to forty Years of Age.

This Voyage, which was purely the Effect of his Curioſity, laid the firſt Foundations of the Liberty of *Syracuſe*, and made Way for thoſe great Things that were put in Execution by *Dion*, * the Brother-in-Law and Favourite of *Dionyſius* the Elder.

There was at that Time a young Man who was naturally couragious and magnanimous; but having had a ſervile Education under a Tyrant, and being accuſtomed to the Submiſſions and Slavery of a cringing and timorous Courtier, and which is yet more pernicious, brought up in Luxury, Opulence, and Lazineſs; woold have ſuffer'd thoſe precious Seeds of Virtue to die in his Soul, had not *Plato* reviv'd them by his Diſcourſes. He had no

See *Plutarch* in the Life of *Dion*.

* For he was the Son of *Hipparinus*, whoſe Daughter *Dionyſius* had married.

ſooner

ſooner heard the Precepts of this Philoſopher, but his Mind was ſo inflam'd with the Love of Virtue, that he deſir'd nothing ſo much as to embrace and follow it. And perceiving with what Facility *Plato* had chang'd his Mind, he believ'd he might produce the ſame Effect upon that of *Dionyſius* too, and could not reſt till he had engag'd this Prince to have a Conference with him. *Dionyſius*, who then enjoy'd a great deal of Leiſure, conſented to this Interview. Their Diſcourſe was wholly on Virtue, and they preſently fell into a Diſpute about the Nature of true Fortitude: *Plato* prov'd that this could by no Means be attributed to Tyrants, who are ſo far from being valiant and brave, that they are more weak and timorous than Slaves. They afterwards came to ſpeak of Utility, and of Juſtice. *Plato* ſhew'd that nothing could be properly ſaid to be uſeful, but that which is honeſt and juſt; and made it appear, that the Life of juſt Men was happy amidſt the greateſt Adverſity; and that of the unjuſt miſerable in the very Boſom of Proſperity. *Dionyſius*, who found himſelf convinc'd by his own Experience, could no longer hold the Diſcourſe, but, with a Pretence of making a Jeſt of his Morals, told him, *his Diſcourſes ſavour'd of Old Age*; to which *Plato* replied, *that his ſavour'd of Tyranny.* This Prince not accuſtom'd to hear ſuch odious Truths, aſk'd him very importunately *for what he came into* Sicily? *Plato* anſwer'd, That *he came thither to ſeek a good Man. And by thy Speech*, replied *Dionyſius, it ſeems thou haſt not yet found one.*

In another Conference, which was no leſs ſmart than the former, the Tyrant, to intimate to *Plato* that he ought to conduct himſelf with more Caution before him, and not to uſe ſo provoking a Liberty of Speech, mention'd theſe two Verſes to him:

——— * *In ev'ry Tyrant's Court,*
He a mere Slave becomes, who enters free.

* Theſe are two Lines of *Sophocles.*

Plato

Plato return'd him theſe two Lines, changing the latter thus;

——— *In ev'ry Tyrant's Court,*
Who enters free, ſhall ne'er become a Slave.

To ſignify, that a true Philoſopher can never loſe his Liberty. *Dion* fearing the Prince's Diſpleaſure hereupon would have ſome fatal Effect, aſk'd a Diſmiſſion for *Plato*, that he might take the Advantage of a Veſſel that was to carry back *Poluides* the *Lacedemonian* Ambaſſador. *Dionyſius* gave him Leave to go, but preſſed the Ambaſſador, with great Importunity, either to kill *Plato* by the Way, or at leaſt to ſell him; aſſuring him, this would do him no Injury: *For if he is a juſt Man* (ſays he) *he'll be as happy in Slavery as in the Enjoyment of Liberty.* 'Tis ſaid *Poluides* carried him to the Iſle of *Ægina*, where a Law had been publiſhed, by which all *Athenians* that ſhould come a-ſhore there, were order'd to be put to Death. *Plato* therefore was taken, and brought before the Judges. He expected his Sentence without ſhewing any Token of Fear; which made one of 'em think fit to ſay, that he was a Philoſopher, and not an *Athenian*. This Word, ſpoken after a jeſting Manner, ſav'd his Life. He was only condemned to be ſold, and was immediately bought for thirty * Mina's by a *Cyrenian* named *Anniceris*, who ſet him at Liberty, ſent him back to *Athens*, and would by no Means be reimburs'd; telling them, That as the *Athenians* were not the only Perſons who knew *Plato*'s Merit, ſo they were not the only Perſons who were worthy to render him Service. However, *Plato* ſays nothing of all theſe Particulars in his ſeventh Letter, where he ſpeaks of this Voyage into *Sicily*; and it's probable he would not have forgotten to ſpeak at leaſt of his Benefactor.

After the Death of *Dionyſius* the Elder, his Son *Dionyſius* the Younger ſucceeded, who had been very ill educated: For his Father, who was jealous even of his

* About ſixty Pounds Sterling, or ſomething more.

own

own Children, had always ſtrictly kept him from Company; leſt if he ſhould come to know himſelf, and to converſe with Men of Senſe, who were weary of Slavery, he ſhould conſpire againſt him. This young Prince was no ſooner upon the Throne, but he was ſo dazzled with his Grandeur, that he knew not where he was, and ſo became an eaſy Prey to his Courtiers, who forgot nothing that might corrupt him, and became the ingenious and induſtrious Miniſters of his Pleaſures. Nothing was to be ſeen in the Palace but horrible Corruption of Manners, and Exceſſes. They had Debauches that held for three Months together, during which Time, all wiſe and ſober Men, whoſe Preſence alone would have condemn'd or diſturb'd theſe ſhameful Divertiſements, were forbidden to enter. *Dion*, whoſe Concern for the State made him fear the Pleaſures of the young *Dionyſius* more than ever he had fear'd the Cruelty of his Father, loſt no Opportunity of letting him know what Precipices were before him, and how certain his Fall would be; and believing his Vices ſprang only from Ignorance and Idleneſs, he endeavoured to put him upon ſome honourable Exerciſes, and to make him in Love with the Sciences, eſpecially that which aims at the Reformation of Manners. He told him, nothing but Virtue could give him a ſolid Happineſs, which would extend its Influence to all his People: That his Father had in vain flatter'd himſelf, that he had left him an Empire bound with adamantine Chains, ſince theſe Chains would ſoon be ſoften'd by his Debauches: That Fear and Force were not the true Supports of a Throne, but the Affection and Love of Subjects, which, he ſaid, was always the Conſequence of the Virtue and Juſtice of Princes. He repreſented to him, that true Grandeur conſiſts not in having great Equipages, ſuperb Palaces, ſumptuous Furniture, and fine Clothes; but in having the Palace of the Mind royally adorn'd: And that none but *Plato* was capable of communicating to him all the Virtues that ought to embelliſh a Prince's Soul. By entertaining him with ſuch Diſcourſes as theſe, in which he always thus intermix'd the great Truths he had learn'd from this Philoſopher; he inſpir'd him with ſuch an ardent, or rather furious

furious Deſire to draw him to his Court, and to put himſelf under his Direction, that he ſent Couriers to *Athens* with very preſſing Letters of his own, accompanied with other Letters of *Dion*'s, and of all the *Pythagorean* Philoſophers that were in *Great Greece*; who intreated him very earneſtly to take the Advantage of the favourable Opportunity the Divine Providence offer'd him, to make a Philoſopher of a King; and conjur'd him to come with Expedition, before the Debauches of the Court had made this Prince alter his Reſolution, who at preſent was paſſionately in Love with Philoſophy.

Theſe great Promiſes did not immediately move *Plato*, who knew young People too well, to promiſe himſelf any Thing certain from the Flaſhes of a young Prince, whoſe Inclinations commonly are various and oppoſite, and frequently paſs ſuddenly off; and in whom the Love of Virtue does not always take Root deeply enough to reſiſt the Efforts of thoſe Vices which attack him on all Sides. So that *Plato* did not know how to reſolve on this Voyage; but at length, after he had conſider'd, that in curing only one Man, he ſhould make a whole Nation happy, and that perhaps God was opening a Way for him here, actually to ſet on Foot that perfect Government of which he had already given the Idea in the firſt Books of his Commonwealth: He reſolved to go, not out of Vanity, or to acquire Riches, as his Enemies have accuſed him; but was overcome only by the Reſpect he bore to himſelf, that he might not give the World an Occaſion to reproach him, that he only diſcours'd of Virtue, but never voluntarily put himſelf in a Condition to reduce it to practice.

To theſe Reaſons there was added another Motive much more preſſing; and that was, that it would be a Shame for him to abandon *Dion* in the dangerous Circumſtances he was in, attack'd on all Sides by the Calumnies of his Enemies; who becauſe they could not bear the Severity of his Manners, and the Wiſdom of his Conduct, endeavour'd to render him ſuſpected to *Dionyſius*, and who would infallibly deſtroy him, if this Prince had Time given him to relapſe into his former Diſorders.

Diſorders. This caſt the Ballance in determining *Plato* to quit his Employments at ſixty-four Years of Age, to go, it may be with too much Confidence, as himſelf confeſſes, to deal with the Caprices of a young Tyrant.

He was received in *Sicily* with all poſſible Marks of Honour. *Dionyſius* was not content only to ſend him a Galley adorn'd with Ribbands, as if he had been a God, but alſo went himſelf to receive him at the Port in a magnificent Chariot, into which he took him; and render'd Thanks to the Gods by a publick Sacrifice for his Arrival, as the greateſt Felicity that could happen to his Government

This ſo happy Beginning had yet happier Conſequence; for, as if ſome God had appear'd and taken Pleaſure in changing of Hearts, the whole Court became ſo reform'd, at leaſt in Appearance, that the Palace of *Dionyſius* was more like a School of Philoſophers, or a ſacred Temple, than the Place of a Tyrant's Reſidence.

Some Days after *Plato*'s Arrival, the Time of an Anniverſary Sacrifice came about, which was wont to be offer'd in the Caſtle for the Prince's Proſperity.

The Herald having, according to the Cuſtom, pronounced with a loud Voice the ſolemn Prayer in this Form, *May it pleaſe the Gods long to maintain the Tyranny, and to preſerve the Tyrant: Dionyſius*, who began to hate thoſe Names, cry'd aloud to him; *What wilt thou never leave curſing me?* By which Words 'twas judg'd the Diſcourſes of *Plato* had made a real and ſtrong Impreſſion on his Mind: This made all thoſe that favour'd this tyrannical Form of Government, believe 'twas beſt to loſe no Time, and that it was neceſſary to ruin *Dion* and *Plato* before they had acquir'd Authority and Power enough over the Tyrant, to render all their Efforts uſeleſs. They ſoon found an Occaſion very favourable to their Deſign, nor did they fail to make their Advantage of it. *Plato* had already perſuaded *Dionyſius* to diſmiſs ten thouſand Foreigners which compos'd his Guard, to disband ten thouſand Horſe, with

with the greateſt Part of his Infantry, and to reduce the four hundred Galleys, which he always kept equipp'd, to a very ſmall Number. Thoſe ill-deſigning Men miſrepreſented this Advice, and would have perſuaded *Dionyſius* that *Dion* had engag'd this Sophiſt to induce him to diſmiſs his Guards, and the reſt of his Troops, that ſo the *Athenians* finding him without Defence, might come and ravage *Sicily*, and revenge themſelves for the Loſſes they had ſuſtained under *Nicias*; or elſe with a Deſign to expel him, and take his Place himſelf in the Throne. This Calumny, which was plauſible enough to ſurprize a Tyrant, did not however produce half the Effect they expected from it. Only *Dion* became a Victim to the Anger of *Dionyſius*, who caus'd him to be put on board a Veſſel in his Preſence; and ſhamefully baniſhed him.

At the ſame Time it was reported at *Syracuſe*, that he had alſo put *Plato* to Death; but this Story had no Foundation: For *Dionyſius*, on the contrary, redoubled his Careſſes towards him, either becauſe he believed that he had been firſt deluded by the Artifices of *Dion*, or elſe becauſe indeed he himſelf could not tell how to live without ſeeing and hearing him.

The Love he had for *Plato* augmented every Day, and advanc'd to that Exceſs, that he became as jealous of him, as of a Miſtreſs, and us'd his utmoſt Efforts to oblige him to prefer his Friendſhip to that of *Dion*. But, as *Plato* ſaid, he took a wrong Courſe to obtain this Preference; for he endeavour'd to acquire it only by Demonſtrations of an ambitious and tyrannical Love, inſtead of meriting it, if that had been poſſible, by a Conformity of Manners, in making an Improvement of his Maxims, and uniting himſelf to him by the Bonds of Virtue. His Timorouſneſs, rather than his Ill-humour, hinder'd him from taking this Method: For tho' he paſſionately lov'd *Plato*, he ſcarce dar'd to ſee him but by ſtealth, for fear of irritating ſuch as were diſpleas'd with this Intimacy between them; ſo that he always fluctuated between Deſire and Fear, and thereby render'd all *Plato*'s Exhortations uſeleſs to him, and remain'd a Slave to his Vices. However, becauſe he fear'd he would

would leave *Sicily* without his Permiſſion, he ordered him to lodge in the Caſtle, on Pretence to do him Honour, but in Reality to ſecure his Perſon. There he endeavour'd to gain his Heart by the moſt magnificent Offers he could think of. He ſhew'd him his Treaſures, and told him all he deſir'd of him was to become Maſter of his Forces, and of all his Power, provided he would love him more than *Dion*. Few Philoſophers would have reſiſted ſuch powerful Temptations. But *Plato*, who could make Virtue give Place to Vice in his Soul, conſtantly told him, that he would love him as much as *Dion*, when once he was as truly virtuous as he. This threw the Tyrant into an horrible Rage; he threaten'd him with Death, and the next Moment begg'd Pardon for all his Violence. *Plato* would have found his Priſon more tolerable, if he had been the Object of his Hatred; for he was every Day oblig'd to uſe new Management, to make the Obligations of Hoſpitality agree with the Intereſts of Philoſophy. In fine, he had the good Fortune to be deliver'd from this Captivity. For a War broke out, which oblig'd *Dionyſius* to ſend him back into *Greece*. At his Departure he would have loaded him with Preſents, which *Plato* refus'd, contenting himſelf with the Promiſe he made him of recalling *Dion*, when the War ſhould be once ended. When he was ready to embark, *Dionyſius* ſaid to him; Plato, *when thou art in the Academy with thy Philoſophers, thou wilt ſpeak ill of me. God forbid (reply'd* Plato) *that we ſhould have ſo much Time to loſe in the Academy, as to talk of* Dionyſius. The Diſintereſtedneſs of *Plato* appear'd on many Occaſions, as his Rivals themſelves could not chuſe but grant. *Dionyſius* having a Mind to make Preſents to the Philoſophers of his Court, and putting it to their Choice what to have, *Ariſtippus* deſired Money, and *Plato* ask'd only for Books. Upon which *Ariſtippus* being rallied for his Avarice, made Anſwer, Plato *loves Books, and I love Money.*

As he return'd into *Greece*, he paſs'd by *Olympia* to ſee the Games; and there gave Marks of a Modeſty not much differing from deep Humility, and ſuch as deſerves

to

to be remark'd. He happen'd to lodge with ſome Strangers of conſiderable Note; he eat with them, paſs'd whole Days in their Company, liv'd after a moſt ſimple and ordinary Manner, without ever ſpeaking a Word to them either of *Socrates* or the Academy; and without letting them know any Thing more of himſelf than that his Name was *Plato*. Theſe Strangers were extremely pleas'd that they had found a Man of ſo ſweet and ſociable a Temper; but becauſe he ſpoke only of very common Matters, they never thought he was that Philoſopher, whoſe Name was ſo well known.

The Games being ended, they went with him to *Athens*, where he furniſhed them with Lodgings; they were no ſooner come thither, but they intreated him to carry them to ſee that great Man, who bore the ſame Name with him, and was the Diſciple of *Socrates*. *Plato* told them ſmiling, that himſelf was the Man. Theſe Strangers were ſurpriz'd, that they had ſo long poſſeſs'd ſo great a Perſon among them without knowing him; and could not ſufficiently admire that he had liv'd with them after ſo plain and ſimple a Manner, and that he had ſhown that by the Sweetneſs of his Manners alone, without the Help of his Wit and Eloquence, he could gain the Friendſhip of all Perſons with whom he convers'd.

Some Time after this, he gave the People * Plays, for which *Dion* furniſhed the Habits, and was at all the Charge: *Plato* being willing to let him have this Honour, that his Magnificence might acquire him a yet greater Intereſt in the Good-will of the *Athenians*. It is not known whether *Dion* made a long Stay at *Athens*; this only is certain, that *Plato* forgot nothing that might induce him to moderate his Reſentment, and not to attempt any Thing againſt *Dionyſius*. He repreſented to him, that the Injuſtice that had been done him, and the ill Conduct of that Prince, were not a lawful Occaſion of taking up Arms againſt him: That he ought to reduce him by Reaſon, or to wait for ſome Change of Fortune; that he could not have Recourſe to Force,

* They were Tragedies.

without

without doing himſelf a very great Injury, and bringing entire Ruin upon *Sicily* beſides. And to diſpoſe him the better to reliſh theſe Maxims, he endeavour'd to make him pleaſant and gay by innocent Diverſions; and above all, by the Converſation of his Nephew *Pſeuſippus*, which was very agreeable: And this ſucceeded for ſome Time.

After *Dionyſius* had ended the War, he fear'd the Treatment he had given *Plato* would give him Diſcredit among the Philoſophers, and make him paſs for their Enemy; therefore he ſent for the moſt Learned Men of *Italy*, and held Aſſemblies in his Palace, where he ſtrove by a fooliſh Ambition to ſurpaſs them all in Eloquence, and Depth of Knowledge, and impertinently utter'd what he had retain'd of *Plato*'s Diſcourſes: But theſe having Place only in his Memory, without reaching his Heart, the Source was ſoon exhauſted. He then became ſenſible of what he had loſt, in not making a better Improvement of that Treaſure of Wiſdom, and in not retaining it with him. So that he began to long for *Plato* again with extreme Impatience; which he ſignified to him by frequent Letters. *Plato* excus'd himſelf on account of his Age, and of the Failure of *Dionyſius* in not performing any Thing that he had promiſed. In fine, *Dionyſius*, not able to bear his Refuſal any longer, oblig'd *Archytas* to write to him, and to engage his Word, that he might come in Safety, and that *Dionyſius* would perform his Promiſe to him. At the ſame Time he ſent a Galley with ſome of his Friends, of which Number *Archidemus* the Philoſopher was one; they aſſur'd *Plato* of *Dionyſius*'s vehement Love to Philoſophy, and preſented the following Letter from him.

What I deſire with the greateſt Ardor, is, that thou wouldſt ſuffer thy ſelf to be perſuaded to come ſpeedily into Sicily. *I will do for* Dion *whatever thou ſhalt deſire; for I am perſuaded thou wilt deſire nothing but what is juſt, to which I will always very readily ſubmit: But if thou refuſe to come, I declare to thee, that I will never do any Thing that ſhall be agreeable*

agreeable to thee, either in the Affairs of Dion, *or in any Thing elſe wherein thy Intereſt is concerned,* &c.

This Letter, which ſavour'd more of a Tyrant than of a Philoſopher, would have had an Effect contrary to his Wiſhes, if *Dion* had not added his Sollicitations and Intreaties, conjuring *Plato* not to abandon him; and if all the Philoſophers of *Italy* and *Sicily* had not written to him, that if he refus'd to come, he would render them all ſuſpected in the Mind of *Dionyſius*, who would certainly imagine that he had inſinuated them into his Favour, only that they might betray him. And it was this that determin'd *Plato* to go the third Time into *Sicily*, when he was ſeventy Years of Age.

His Arrival rais'd the Hopes of all the People, who flatter'd themſelves that his Wiſdom would at laſt ſubdue the Tyranny they were under; and *Dionyſius* expreſs'd, on this Occaſion, a Joy not to be deſcrib'd by Words. He order'd him to lodge in the Apartment of the Gardens, and had ſuch Confidence in him, that he allow'd him Acceſs to his Perſon at all Times without being ſearch'd. *Plato* immediately uſed all the Addreſs he had, to know if he had a true Deſire of becoming virtuous. He * tells us himſelf, after what Manner he made the Trial of it; but he ſoon perceiv'd, that he was called thither only out of Vanity, and to deprive *Dion* of the Society of a faithful Friend. When he would have propos'd the recalling of this Exile, he was ſo far from accommodating his Affairs, that he entirely ruin'd them. *Dionyſius* forbad his Intendants to ſend *Dion* his Revenues, on Pretence that all his Eſtate belong'd to his Son *Hipparinus*, who was his Nephew; to whom by Conſequence he was the natural Guardian. *Plato* highly provok'd by this Act of Injuſtice, deſir'd Leave to be gone. *Dionyſius* promiſed to order him a Veſſel, but put it off from one Day to another; and after he had thus amus'd him for a conſiderable Time, he one Day

* In his 7th Letter, Tom. 3.

told

told him, *That if he would continue with him one Year longer, he would ſend* Dion *all his Eſtate, provided he would place it in* Peloponneſus *or at* Athens; *that he ſhould only enjoy the Revenue of it, and that he ſhould not have Power to take away the Principal, without the Conſent of* Plato *and his Friends. For,* ſaid he, *I cannot truſt him, but am jealous he would employ this Money againſt me.* *Plato* accepted this Offer, but *Dionyſius* deceiv'd him again; for after the Seaſon fit for his embarking was paſt, he ſaid he would reſtore but one half of *Dion*'s Eſtate, and would reſerve the other half for his Son: And ſome Time after he caus'd all he had to be publickly ſold, at any Rate, and without ſpeaking a Word of it to *Plato*; who at length, wearied with his Diſſimulation and Lies, and convinc'd that Philoſophy was too weak and tender a Thing to oppoſe to the Rigour of a Tyrant, thought of nothing elſe but how to quit *Sicily*. But it was impoſſible for him to go without Permiſſion, and a very difficult Thing to obtain Leave, new Obſtacles being every Day rais'd againſt it. *Dionyſius* continued ſtill in publick to ſhew him all Manner of Reſpect, and continually multiplied his Careſſes. But at laſt *Plato* having warmly eſpous'd the Intereſts of *Theodotus* and *Heraclides*, who were wrongfully accus'd of cauſing Troops to be levy'd, their Miſunderſtanding openly broke out. *Dionyſius* order'd *Plato* to leave the Apartment of the Gardens, on Pretence that the Ladies of the Court were to make a Sacrifice there, which was to continue ten Days; and appointed him a Lodging without the Caſtle in the midſt of his Guards, that ſo (as it was ſuppos'd) the Soldiers, who had been long incenſed againſt him, becauſe he was for having them disbanded, or their Pay diminiſhed, might ſacrifice him to their Reſentment. Some *Athenians* warn'd *Plato* of his Danger, and *Plato* inſtantly gave Advice of it to *Archytas*, who was at *Tarentum*. *Archytas* immediately diſpatch'd away a Galley with thirty Oars, and wrote to *Dionyſius*, to put him in Mind, that he had promiſed *Plato*, that he ſhould be entirely ſecure; and that he could neither detain him, nor ſuffer any Indignities to

be offer'd him, without an open Violation of his own Word, of which he desir'd both him, and all Men of Honesty and Honour, to be Guarantees. This awaken'd that Remainder of Shame which was in the Tyrant's Mind, so that he at last permitted *Plato* to return into *Greece*.

Thus much for the Occasion of *Plato*'s third Voyage, for which his Enemies have made so many Efforts to decry him; as if he return'd into *Sicily* only for the Sake of the delicious Table *Dionysius* kept, and to immerse himself in all the Pleasures that reign'd in this Prince's Court. *Diogenes*, who had a great deal of Wit, but a very satirical Genius, and who could not see the great State *Plato* liv'd in without Envy, was the first who thought good to throw this Reproach on him. For seeing him one Day eat nothing but Olives at a great Feast, he said to him, *Since the Love of Dainties made you go into* Sicily, *why do you despise 'em so much here? I assure you*, Diogenes, replied *Plato*, *I for the most part eat nothing but Olives when I was in* Sicily. *What need had you then to go to* Syracuse, says *Diogenes? Was it at a Time when* Attica *produced no Olives?*

Never was any Calumny more ill founded than this; therefore an * ancient Philosopher speaking of the Advantages of an active Life, made no Difficulty of commending *Plato* for this Voyage of his, of the true Motive of which he gives us an Account. For he says, *It was for one of his Friends, who was depriv'd of his Estate and banished, that* Plato *had the Courage to go and face a very formidable Tyrant, and to expose himself to his Hatred, and all the Dangers with which that threaten'd him.* In the † Letter which *Plato* wrote to *Dion*'s Friends soon after this Voyage, he takes Notice in express Terms, *That the splendid Tables of* Italy *and* Sicily *extremely displeas'd him; and that he could not without Horror look on the Custom these People had of*

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* Maxim. Tyr. ch 5.
† Tom. 3.

filling

filling themſelves with Wine and Meat twice a Day, and of abandoning themſelves to all manner of Debauchery. When a Man (ſays he) *has been accuſtomed to theſe Exceſſes from his Youth, 'tis hardly poſſible for him ever to be reclaim'd (how good ſoever his natural Diſpoſition may otherwiſe be) ſo as to become temperate and wiſe: How much leſs may he pretend to other Virtues?* He afterwards adds; *My Life would be inſupportable to me, if I were ſuch a Slave to thoſe Paſſions.*

As *Plato* paſs'd through *Peloponneſus*, he found *Dion* at the Olympick Games, and gave him an Account of all the Proceedings of *Dionyſius*. *Dion*, more touch'd with the Injuries *Plato* had receiv'd, and with the Riſque he had run, than with all the Acts of Injuſtice that had been offer'd to himſelf; ſwore he would attempt to be reveng'd. *Plato* did all he could to divert him from this Thought; but when he ſaw all his Endeavours were in vain, he predicted to him what Miſeries he was going to occaſion, and declar'd to him, that he muſt not expect either Aſſiſtance or Advice from him; and ſince he had had the Honour to eat at the Table of *Dionyſius*, to lodge in his Palace, and to participate of the ſame Sacrifices with him, he ſhould always remember the Obligations to which this engag'd him: And that on the other Hand, to anſwer the Friendſhip he had for *Dion*, he would ſtand neuter, always ready to perform the Functions of a good Mediator to reconcile 'em, and always equally oppoſite to their Deſigns, whenever they went about to deſtroy one another.

* *Dion* gather'd ſome Troops together, went into *Sicily*, deſtroy'd the Tyrannical Government, expell'd the Tyrant, and reſtor'd Liberty to his Country. 'Tis well known what Miſchiefs were occaſion'd by this Enterprize. It being a difficult Thing to preſerve Juſtice and Innocence long, amidſt the Diſorders of Arms, above all, thoſe of a Civil War; *Dion* had the Unhappineſs only by one Action to ſtain the Glory of all

* See *Dion*'s Life, in *Plutarch*.

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the reſt; for he permitted the Murder of *Heraclides*, which did not remain long unpuniſh'd; for *Dion* was aſſaſſinated by *Callippus* the *Athenian* in the midſt of his Succeſſes and Triumphs.

After the Death of *Dion*, his Relations and neareſt Friends wrote to *Plato*, to intreat his Advice in the deplorable Condition to which they were then reduc'd; ſome of 'em having a Mind to revive the Tyranny, and others uſing their utmoſt Efforts to re-eſtabliſh the Popular Government. *Plato* wrote to 'em, * *That a State would never be happy either under a Tyranny, or too great a Liberty; that the Medium was to yield Obedience to ſuch Kings as were themſelves ſubject to the Laws: That great Liberty and great Servitude were equally dangerous, and produc'd almoſt the ſame Effects; that the Obedience which was given merely to Men, was always exceſſive, and as exorbitant as their Luſts: That there could be no Moderation but only † in that Obedience which is render'd to God, who being always the ſame, always requir'd the ſame Things at the Hands of his Subjects; that it was only this that could make Nations happy, and that they who would obey God muſt obey the Law; that the Law was the God of Wiſemen, and Licentiouſneſs the God of Fools.* That he therefore adviſed 'em to conſtitute three Kings, the Son of *Dion*, the Son of *Dionyſius* who was expelled, and the Son of *Dionyſius* the Elder; to chuſe by their Order ſuch a Number of Old Men as they ſhould think fit, who ſhould take the Care of making Laws, and regulating the Government of the State; as the Kings ſhould have the Superintendence of Sacred and Religious Matters, and of all other Things fit to be left at the Diſpoſal of Benefactors. That it would after this be needful to create 35 Guardians or Conſervators of the Laws, who ſhould have the Diſpoſition of Peace and War, in Conjunction with the Senate and People. That criminal

* This is the 8th Letter, Tom. 3.
† God's Yoke eaſier than Man's.

Matters ſhould be judged by theſe 35 Conſervators of the Laws, to whom there might be joined four Commiſſaries, the moſt aged and moſt honeſt of thoſe Senators, that had laid down their Charge: That the Kings ſhould not aſſiſt at theſe Judicial Acts; becauſe being * Prieſts, they could not, without defiling themſelves, and derogating from their Character, condemn any one to Death, Exile, or Impriſonment. He alſo particularly enjoin'd 'em to drive out the *Barbarians* from all the Places they poſſeſs'd in *Sicily*, and to re-eſtabliſh the ancient Inhabitants in their Room.

Plato ſurviv'd *Dion* but five or ſix Years, which Time he ſpent in the Academy, not being willing in any Manner to intermeddle with the Government, becauſe he ſaw the Manners of the Citizens were very much deprav'd. The *Cyrenians* ſent Deputies to him, to intreat him, to go and give 'em Laws: Which he refuſed, telling 'em, *They were too fond of Riches; and that he did not believe it poſſible, that ſo rich a People could be ſubject to the Laws.* The *Thebans* made the ſame Requeſt to him, and he gave 'em the like Refuſal; *becauſe*, he ſaid, *he perceiv'd they were too great Enemies to Equality.* But he ſent his Diſciples into thoſe Places, where the People were in a Diſpoſition to conform themſelves to his Maxims.

Plato was naturally an Enemy to Pride and Oſtentation; and ſought for nothing but Truth, Simplicity, and Juſtice. His Behaviour was courteous and ſweet, temper'd with Gravity. He was never ſeen to laugh immoderately, nor to be extremely angry. One may judge of the Mildneſs of his Temper by the Courſe he took for the Reformation of his Nephew *Pſeuſippus*, who was exceſſively debauch'd. When his Parents had turn'd him out of Doors, he took him to his Houſe, and entertain'd him as if he had never heard a Word of his Debauches: His Friends, amaz'd and ſhock'd at a Proceedure that ſeem'd to them to carry ſo much Inſenſibility in it,

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* The Royalty joined with the Prieſthood.

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blam'd him for not labouring to reform his Nephew, and ſave him from utter Ruin. He told 'em he was labouring more effectually than they imagin'd; in letting him ſee by his Manner of Living, what an infinite Difference there is between Vice and Virtue, and between honourable and baſe Things. And indeed this Method ſucceeded ſo well, that it inſpir'd *Pſeuſippus* with a very great Reſpect for him, and a violent Deſire to imitate him, and to devote himſelf to the Study of Philoſophy, in which he afterwards made a very great Progreſs.

His Way of ſpeaking was ſo agreeable and inſinuating, that he never fail'd to make an Impreſſion on thoſe that heard him. One Day as he was walking a little Way out of the City, with ſome of his Diſciples and Friends, he met *Timothy* the *Athenian* General returning from the Army in the greateſt Height of his Fortune, and at a Time when the *Athenians* knew not how ſufficiently to honour his Merit, while they gave him the greateſt Teſtimonies how much they admired and reſpected him. The General making a Stop, would needs hear his Diſcourſes, in which he inſiſted, neither on Taxes, nor the Equipping of Fleets, nor the Subſiſtence of Troops, but on Virtue, and the Dominion a Man ought to have over his Paſſions; whereby he only aim'd at the Explication of the Nature of the chief Good. *Timothy*, ſtruck with the Truth and Elegancy of his Maxims, cry'd out, *O happy Life, O true Felicity!* by which Words he ſignified, he was convinc'd that all the Glory and Honour he enjoy'd were nothing in Compariſon of the Happineſs of a Philoſopher, and that without the Study of Wiſdom, no ſolid Good was attainable.

As Temperance is accounted the firſt Virtue of a Philoſopher, ſo 'tis ſaid of *Plato*, that he was always very grave and ſober, and always liv'd a ſingle Life: But there is Reaſon to doubt whether his Celibacy was the Effect of his Sobriety and Chaſtity; for there are yet in Being, ſome Verſes which he made on a certain Miſs of *Colophon*, nam'd *Archeanaſſa*, whom he lov'd, tho' ſhe was grown old. *I have* (ſays he) *with me* Archeanaſſa *the Miſs; Love ſtill lies in Ambuſh in her Wrinkles. How*

unhappy were you that were expos'd to her Glances in her Youth! amidſt what Flames have not you liv'd? He alſo lov'd another, call'd *Xantippe*. He requeſted her Favours in very preſſing Terms, and with thoſe fine Reaſons which are ſince become *the* * *common places of thoſe laſcivious Morals*, which now reign on one of our Theatres, from whence they inſenſibly glide into our Cities and Houſes, viz. *That Beauty is a Flower which very ſpeedily withers; that if perſons don't make haſte to love, they loſe their Youth to no purpoſe; and that Old Age comes ſwiftly towards us, to raviſh our pleaſant Days, and all our delights from us.*

'Tis true, 'tis ſaid, to excuſe *Plato*, that theſe Verſes are not his, but compos'd by *Ariſtippus*, who imputed 'em to him to degrade him, and to revenge himſelf on him for his Railleries. But there is not much got by this Apology, if it be true that he had yet more criminal Paſſions, and that he lov'd *Dion*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agathon*, and *Aſter*. In the Verſes he made on 'em he expreſſes himſelf in ſuch Terms, as the Heat of a poetick Fancy alone could not inſpire. He writes thus to *Dion*, *Thou makeſt my Soul love thee even to Folly.* He ſays to Aſter, *that he could wiſh himſelf to be the Sky, that he might be full of Eyes to look on him*; and expreſſes himſelf after a yet more licentious Manner, when he ſpeaks to *Agathon*. 'Tis true, after all, theſe Verſes may be ſuppoſititious; but if they are really his, there is Ground to believe they were only the Faults of his Youth, which are the leſs ſurprizing, becauſe committed in an Age wherein all *Greece* was tainted with horrible Enormities. *Socrates* and his Philoſophy ſoon drew him out of his miſerable State, by making him comprehend the horrid Evil of thoſe brutal Paſſions. He was not content to be cured of 'em himſelf, but alſo labour'd to make others partake of the ſame Advantage, and to furniſh 'em with Remedies againſt this mortal Poiſon: For he vehemently oppoſes them in all his Writings, and parti-

* M. *Deſpreaux* in his Satire againſt Women.

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cularly in his first Book of Laws, where he condemns the Government of *Lacedemonia*, and that of *Crete*, because of their publick Exercises, * *which produc'd and fomented those abominable Flames in Women towards Women, and in Men towards Men, by a perversion of their natural Use.* And he calls this detestable and infamous Crime, *one of the most audacious and execrable Sins, which Intemperance could cause to be committed against God.*

In the third Book of his Commonwealth, after he had prov'd that there is no Pleasure more furious than that which is caused by irregular Love, and that it is inseparable from Insolence and Intemperance; he adds, † *But true Love consists in loving that which is decent and becoming, and in loving according to all the Laws of Temperance and Musick.* *Plato* uses this Word to signify the perfect Accord with Reason and Harmony, which results from all the Virtues. *Nothing that is violent and furious, or that approaches Intemperance and Disorder, ought to be tolerated; and consequently no Man ought to propose to himself any criminal Pleasure. Therefore a Law should be made, permitting Men to love young People, provided they love them as a Father loves his Son; and that they have no other End but to incite them to every Thing that is honourable and comely; and that they never give the least Suspicion of any vicious Thought, or criminal Desire. And that if they make a default herein, they be look'd on as infamous Persons, who have renounced all Honour and Virtue.*

Plato deserves to be highly commended for having lov'd his Brothers with an extreme Tenderness: For as 'tis said of *Pollux*, that he would not be a God alone, but chose rather to be a Semi-Deity together with his Brother, and to share with him in a mortal State, that so he might make him partake of his Immortality; *Plato* in like Manner was willing to communicate to his Brothers the Glory which himself only was capable

* Tom. 2. † Tom. 3.

of acquiring by his Works. In his Books of a Commonwealth he aſcribes ſome very conſiderable Parts to *Adimantus* and *Glaucon*; and he makes *Antiphon*, the youngeſt of them all, ſpeak in his *Parmenides*, whereby he has render'd them all three as immortal as himſelf.

He never employ'd his Wit to revenge the perſonal Injuries he receiv'd, but to revenge thoſe that were offer'd his Friends, or the Truth. It can't be ſhown that he ſaid one Word of *Timon*, who had often attack'd him. And he anſwer'd *Diogenes*'s Witticiſms only in a jeſting Way, without ever ſpeaking of him in his Writings.

Plato one Day having made a Treat for the Friends of *Dionyſius*; *Diogenes* came into the Hall where the Feaſt was kept, and his Feet being very dirty, choſe to walk upon the fineſt Purple Carpets, ſaying, *I trample* Plato's *pride under my Feet*. *Plato*, ſmiling, made this Reply; *Thou trampleſt my pride under thy feet with greater pride of thy own.*

Diogenes once requeſted ſome Bottles of Wine of *Plato*, who ſent him three Dozen. When *Diogenes* met him the next Day, ſays he, *When one asks you how many twice two makes, inſtead of anſwering four, you anſwer twenty.* Thus under the Colour of returning him Thanks, he reproach'd him with being too prolix in his Dialogues.

Plato having defin'd Man to be *a two-legg'd Animal without Wings*; *Diogenes* got a Cock, cut off his Wings, and carried him to *Plato*'s School, telling his Scholars, *that was the Man their Maſter talk'd of.* This Jeſt made him change his Definition.

Diogenes being reproach'd of continual Begging, whereas *Plato* never aſk'd for any Thing, anſwer'd thus; *The only difference between* Plato *and me, is, that I beg aloud, and he whiſpers when he begs.*

As *Diogenes* one Day continued Abroad in a very great Snow mix'd with Hail, and Abundance of People that ſaw him were pitying him; ſays *Plato*, *If you have any Compaſſion for him, look on him no longer:* Thereby to reproach him, that what he did was not from any vir-

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tuous Principle, but out of Oſtentation and Vain-glory.

It being his Perſuaſion, that Men were not born for themſelves, but for their Country, for their Relations and Friends; he was far from authorizing the Opinion of thoſe that believ'd that Philoſophy had a Right of annihilating ſuch eſſential Obligations; and taught that the Life of a Philoſopher is the Life of a Man entirely devoted to the Publick; who endeavours to become better, only that he may be the more uſeful; and that he ſhuns the Hurry of Buſineſs then only, when his Country refuſes his Service, or when he is incapable of ſerving his Country to good Purpoſe. And his own Practice was ſuitable to this through the whole Courſe of his Life. For 'tis reported that he did not ſo much as excuſe himſelf from bearing of Arms, and that he behav'd himſelf bravely at the Battle of *Tanagra*, that of *Corinth*, and that of *Delium*, where he obtain'd a conſiderable Victory: But it is not known on what Occaſion; for this Battle of *Delium* is not to be confounded with that which was fought before in the ſame Place; in which *Socrates* was engag'd, and ſav'd the Life of *Alcibiades*, in the firſt Year of the 89th *Olympiade*, *Plato* being then but five or ſix Years old.

And he ſerv'd his Friends with as little Concern for his own Life; for he not only did all we have ſaid before for *Dion*, but alſo defended *Chabrias*, the *Athenian* General, when impleaded at the Bar: And when his Accuſer *Crobylus*, to put him out of Countenance, ſaid to him, *Thou comeſt hither to defend others, little thinking that* Socrates's *poiſon is ready for thee*; he made this Return, *When my Country formerly had Occaſion for my Life, I readily expos'd it; but there's no danger now before me to put me into a Conſternation, and to make me deſert my Friend.*

He would ſay there was nothing more unworthy of a wiſe Man, and which ought to trouble him more, than to have allow'd more Time for unneceſſary, trifling and uſeleſs Things, than they deſerv'd. Therefore he omitted no Occaſion of reproving ſuch as he ſaw were vainly puffed up on the Account of thoſe Qualities of which

they rather ought to have been aſham'd. And to this Purpoſe 'tis ſaid, the ſame *Anniceris* of *Cyrene* of whom we have ſpoken before, who was a conſiderable Perſon both for his Birth, and for his Ingenuity; but valued himſelf above all for being the beſt Charioteer in the World, having a Knack to guide a Chariot above thoſe of the beſt Reputation in that Art; had a Mind to ſhew his Dexterity in his Preſence. A Chariot was brought for this Purpoſe into a Cloſe belonging to the Academy, where he made ſeveral Turns with that Exactneſs, that the Wheels always ran in the ſame Track, and conſtantly deſcrib'd the ſame Line. All the Spectators were charm'd, and extoll'd *Anniceris* to the Skies by their Praiſes: But *Plato* ſeriouſly blam'd him, telling him it was not poſſible but that he who had ſpent ſo much Time in ſo vain and inconſiderable a Matter, muſt needs have neglected other Things that were very neceſſary and important; and that a Mind entirely taken up with ſuch Trifles, could not be capable of applying it ſelf to any Thing valuable, and truly worthy of Admiration.

He was ſo free from the Vice of Flattery, and the baſe and ſervile Submiſſions of the Orators of that Age, who made themſelves Maſters of the People only by a mean and cringing Complaiſance, and by conforming themſelves to their Paſſions, that he was compar'd to *Epaminondas*, and *Ageſilaus*; who tho' they travell'd to many Cities, and convers'd with Men whoſe Courſe of Life and Manners were very different, yet where-ever they were, ſtill retain'd, in their Habit, in their Diſcourſe, and in all their Behaviour, what was worthy of themſelves, and ſuitable to their Character. For *Plato* was the ſame Man at *Syracuſe* that he was in the Academy, the ſame with *Dionyſius* as with *Dion:* A certain Sign that the Maxims of his Philoſophy, which were full of Force and Virtue, had penetrated his Soul, like a deep Tincture, which nothing can either efface or tarniſh.

During his laſt Stay in *Sicily*, *Dionyſius* having a Mind to regale all Perſons of chief Note in his Court, and all his Philoſophers, *Plato* and *Ariſtippus* were invited among the reſt. In the midſt of the Feaſt the Tyrant order'd

order'd Purple Robes to be brought and given to all the Company, desiring to see them dance. *Plato* refus'd the Robe that was presented him, saying, *it would too much dash him out of Countenance to see himself apparell'd like a Woman.* *Aristippus* made no such Scruple, but took the Robe and fell a dancing, saying, *A very wise Woman would never be disrespected for her Dancing.*

Plato has been accused of three Things, first, that his Humour was too satirical, which render'd his Writings more piquant than the Strokes of ancient Comedy, and the more unworthy of a Man of Honour, in that he did not spare his best Friends; for Instance, when in his *Phædon* he is speaking of *Cleombrotus* and *Aristippus*, he says, *they* * *were not present at the Death of* Socrates, *because they were at* Ægina.

The second Thing with which *Plato* is reproached, is an envious and jealous Disposition; which made him uncapable of enduring an Equal or Partner in any Thing whatsoever, and engag'd him tacitly to contradict *Xenophon*, without ever giving one Word of Commendation to the Virtue of that great Man, notwithstanding his extraordinary Merit.

The third Thing objected against him, is, that many of his Disciples were possessed with a Spirit of Tyranny: *Euphræus*, for Instance, who was at the Court of *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia*, had as much Authority as that Prince himself, and would not suffer him to entertain any but Geometricians and Philosophers at his Table; which provok'd *Parmenion* to kill him after the Death of *Perdiccas*; and *Callippus*, who kill'd *Dion* to make himself King of *Syracuse*; and *Evagon* of *Lampsacus*, who having lent Money to his Country, upon the Citadel that was given him for his Security, would have employ'd this Fort against it to subject it to himself; and *Tymæus* of *Cyzicus*, who having made a free Distribution of Corn among the People, would have abus'd

* See *Plato*'s *Phæd.* at the Beginning.

the Favour and Authority which that procur'd him, to make himſelf their Tyrant: And, in fine, *Chæron* of *Pellene*, who having cruelly brought his Country into Subjection, drove away the beſt Citizens, and gave their Eſtates and Wives to his Slaves.

Plato defended againſt the Reproach of being too ſatirical.

Let's examine the firſt of theſe Reproaches. *Plato* is perhaps the only Perſon who was ever accuſed of two Faults directly oppoſite, and which are deſtructive to each other. *Athenæus* has accus'd him of being too ſatirical, and others have blam'd him for being too mild, and for having taught a very conſiderable Time without diſpleaſing any one; by which he would inſinuate that his Doctrine was not good, or that his Method was bad, ſince no Body either in hearing or reading him had felt that Trouble which naturally ariſes from the Senſe of one's having been vicious. But without troubling my ſelf to confute or reconcile theſe Contradictions, I ſhall only ſay, that *Athenæus* was himſelf in an ill Humour, when he caſt this Reproach upon *Plato:* And I ſhall make uſe of the ſame Words againſt him, which this Philoſopher us'd againſt *Anytus*, who accus'd him of having been guilty of Calumny. * *He knows not what it is to calumniate, for if he did, he would not accuſe me of that Vice.* And indeed *Plato* did no Ways ſlander *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, and *Thucydides*, when he made uſe of them as Inſtances to prove that Virtue could not be attain'd merely by Inſtruction; ſince theſe Men had not made their Children learn it. As for that Word he ſpoke againſt *Ariſtippus* and *Cleombrotus*, beſides that the Turn of it is very fine, it muſt be aſcribed to that Love and Gratitude *Plato* retain'd towards *Socrates*; which made him highly reſent it, that his two Friends had not attended their Maſter at his Death, becauſe they were at *Ægina*; which by the Manner of his Speech one would take to have been at a hundred Leagues diſtance,

* In Menon.

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tho' indeed it was near the Gates of *Athens*. And as Occaſion offers, we ſhall hereafter examine all the other ſatirical Touches *Athenæus* charges on him. Not that I pretend to croſs *Plato*'s Name out of the Number of ſatirical Writers: For, on the contrary, I am perſuaded that never any Man had a finer Knack at Raillery; that the moſt refin'd Satire is to be learned in his Works, and that none can teach it better than he. He may be compar'd to *Ariſtophanes* himſelf. But it will be no difficult Matter to make it appear, that as he never threw his Darts againſt any but Men of profligate Lives, who by abuſing their Character, corrupted Youth, and ruined Religion; he is ſo far from deſerving Reproaches on this Account, that he deſerves to be highly prais'd. Wiſe Men, as a Learned * Father of the Church obſerves, ought not to give ſoft and flattering Touches; but, on the contrary, to give Wounds and Pains to thoſe who are fallen into great Faults, and cannot be otherwiſe excited to Repentance and the Practice of Virtue. Thoſe Diſcourſes, which, inſtead of carrying Pungency and Reproof in them, are only calculated to ſooth and pleaſe, are not becoming a wiſe Man; ſince *Solomon* himſelf ſays, *The Words of the Wiſe are as Goads*. Beſides, does not every one know that Laughter is the juſt Recompence of Ignorance, when accompanied with Pride and Vanity?

Plato not juſtly accuſed of Jealouſy and Envy.

The ſecond Accuſation has no more Juſtice in it than the firſt, for 'tis chiefly founded on this, that *Xenophon* and *Plato* wrote on the ſame Subjects. For each of them made an Apology for *Socrates*, each made his Banquet and Treatiſes of Morality

* St. *Jerome* on that Paſſage of the 12th Chap. of *Eccleſ. The words of the wiſe are as Goads.* Simul & hoc notandum eſt, quod dicantur verba ſapientium pungere, non palpare, nec molli manu attrahere laſciviam, ſed errantibus & tardis pœnitentiæ dolores, & vulnus infigere. Si cujus igitur ſermo non pungit, ſed oblectationem facit audientibus, iſte non eſt ſermo ſapientis, verba quippe ſapientium ut ſtimuli.

and Policy. If to make Books on the ſame Subjects on which others have treated, were always a Sign of an envious and jealous Mind; this Reproach would rather fall on *Xenophon*, who did not write of the Education of *Cyrus*, till after he had ſeen the two firſt Books of *Plato*'s Commonwealth.

And it would be no very eaſy Matter entirely to juſtify *Xenophon* from the Spirit of Envy, when one reads the Fragment of a Letter, which he wrote to *Æſchines*, in which he extremely inveighs againſt *Plato*, and charges him with having corrupted the Philoſophy of *Socrates*, by intermixing that of *Pythagoras*; and makes the End of his going into *Sicily* to be the Enjoyment of the Delicacies of *Dionyſius*'s Table. To theſe Invectives of his, *Plato* makes no Anſwer, nor ſpeaks one Word of *Xenophon*; in which his Modeſty can ſcarce be enough commended: And perhaps this Silence was the chief Thing that incenſed *Xenophon*. For the greateſt Indignity one can offer a Writer, is (not to ſay ſome ill Thing of him, but) to ſay nothing at all to him. 'Tis true, *Plato* in one Place writes, that *Cyrus* was a good General, but that he never had a good Education; by which ſome pretend he deſign'd to deny *Xenophon*'s Treatiſe of the Education of *Cyrus*. But this being made only to give the Idea of a great Prince, and not to paſs for a true Hiſtory, *Xenophon* could not be offended at a Thing which he believed as well as *Plato*. In fine, that which yet more diſcovers with what Spirit *Xenophon* was animated againſt him, is the frightful Deſcription he makes of *Menon*, in the 11th Book of his Retreat; where he accuſes him of having betrayed *Clearchus*, and of having been the Cauſe of his Death. *Menon*'s Misfortune proceeded from the Intimacy of his Friendſhip with *Plato*, who had praiſed him, and inſcribed his Name on the Dialogue he compos'd, concerning Virtue; for his pretended Treachery is not at all well proved, and he was ſufficiently juſtified from it by his Death. Not that I pretend to accuſe *Xenophon* of Calumny and Impoſture: Theſe Vices are not to be found in a Man of Sobriety and Religion; but the Hatred or Jealouſy he conceived againſt

againſt *Plato*, diſpos'd him inſenſibly to receive all Reports, that were made againſt ſuch as were engaged in ſtrict Friendſhip with him. However, if *Menon* had been as bad as *Xenophon* deſcribes him to have been, ſince his Villainy was not known till after his Death, it can't be charg'd on *Plato* as a Crime, that he had ſpoken in his Praiſe.

Some moreover ſupport this Accuſation, in ſaying, that *Plato*, who ſpeaks of almoſt all the Philoſophers that preceded him, and refutes their Sentiments, ſpeaks not one Word of *Democritus*, tho' frequent Occaſions preſented, of ſaying ſomething of him. This is alſo built on the Teſtimony of *Ariſtoxenes*, who in his hiſtorical Commentaries wrote, that *Plato* would have burnt all the Books of *Democritus* which he could heap together, if he had not been prevented by *Amiclas* and *Clynias*, two *Pythagorean* Philoſophers, who repreſented to him, that it would ſignify nothing to burn them, ſince they were in the Hands of a great many other Men. And this is counted more than enough to make it believed that *Plato* hated *Democritus*, and was jealous of his great Reputation. For my Part, I confeſs this Fable of *Ariſtoxenes* ſeems to me to be very ill invented: A Man who has a Mind to commit his Rival's Books to the Flames, does not ſeek for Witneſſes to ſuch an Action. Beſides, this Silence of his, of which they ſpeak ſo much, ſeems a very doubtful Buſineſs. If the Glory of *Democritus* had touch'd *Plato* ſo ſenſibly, why did he not take the Advantage of ſo many Occaſions, that were fairly offer'd him to diminiſh it, or to caſt ſome Blot on it, by writing againſt him, and deſtroying ſome one or other of his Principles? An Author is ſeldom Maſter of that Reſentment with which the Glory of a Competitor inſpires him. 'Tis a very difficult Matter to come to a certain Determination of Things that depend on a thouſand Circumſtances, of which we are wholly ignorant. But that which appears to me moſt probable, is as follows: 'Tis affirm'd, that *Democritus* never went to *Athens*, or if he went thither, that he was always unknown, and never diſcover'd himſelf ſo much

as to *Socrates*. 'Tis moreover very well known, that when *Hippocrates*, who was now much advanc'd in Years, went to *Abdera* to confer with *Democritus* about the Folly that was imputed to him; this Philoſopher was not yet known in *Greece*, nor had his Works been brought thither. If they had been publiſhed, they would have ſav'd *Hippocrates* the Trouble of this Voyage; for they would have diſcover'd the great Wiſdom of their Author, and the Stupidity and Ignorance of the People, who founded this Accuſation of Folly only on thoſe Sentiments, which this Philoſopher explain'd in his Writings: Now the Death of *Democritus* was not long before that of *Plato*. In a word, I don't think any Paſſage of Antiquity will make it appear, that the Writings of the former were known at *Athens*, during the Life of the latter. Nay, I am of Opinion, that there are not wanting ſome Proofs among the Ancients, that ſhew they did not begin to make a Noiſe in the World, till after the Birth of *Epicurus*. Whence we may conclude, that *Plato* was ſo far from hating *Democritus*, that he never knew him, nor ever ſaw any of his Books.

It would not be ſo eaſy to juſtify *Plato*'s Proceedure towards *Æſchines*, if that with which he is reproach'd were true. 'Tis ſaid he was ſo jealous of the Reputation and Credit which *Æſchines* had acquired in the Court of *Sicily*, that he made it his Buſineſs to ſeek his Ruin by his Inſinuations to *Dionyſius*; and that he puſh'd this malicious and envious Humour ſo far, that he attributes thoſe Diſcourſes to *Criton*, which are pretended to have been held by *Æſchines* with *Socrates* in Priſon. But this being ſupported only by the Teſtimony of one *Idomeneus*, one of *Ariſtotle*'s Scholars, 'tis more juſt to guide our Judgment by *Plato*'s Virtue, than to ſuffer our ſelves to be prejudic'd againſt him by mere Calumnies. Would *Xenophon* have forgotten a Circumſtance that might have done ſo much Honour to *Æſchines*, and cover'd *Plato* with ſo much Shame? And have we not in *Plutarch* the Diſcourſe which *Plato* made to *Dionyſius*, to engage him to be kind to *Æſchines*, and to give him ſome Marks of his Eſteem? Nothing is more oppo-

oppoſite to that Magnanimity, for which *Plato* has been commended, than this Spirit of Envy. Let us ſee how he himſelf ſpeaks of the Envious, in the * 5th Book of Laws. *While the envious Man thinks to exalt himſelf above others by Detraction and Calumny, he wanders out of the path of true Virtue, and balks the Courage of his Competitors, when they ſee themſelves treated with ſo much Injuſtice; and as he by this Means extinguiſhes all that noble Emulation which the whole City appear'd to have in this glorious Contention of Virtue, he diſpirits it, and diminiſhes its Reſolution and Vigour, as much as in him lies, and renders it leſs ardent in the purſuit of Glory.* Can one accuſe a Philoſopher of Envy, who ſcarce names himſelf in his own Works, and who attributes all his own Inventions and Notions to his Maſter?

The Faults of *Plato*'s Diſciples ought not to be thrown upon him.

The third Accuſation is ſtill worſe founded than the two former. The Condition of a Philoſopher would be very deplorable, if he were to anſwer for all the Actions of his Diſciples. None of their Faults can be juſtly charg'd on him, but thoſe which they committed in purſuance of his Opinions. The Inſtance of *Dion* only may be ſufficient to acquit *Plato* of the Charge of a tyrannical Spirit. What could any one have done more than *Dion* did, to induce *Dionyſius* the Elder, and his Son after him, to govern juſtly, that they might firmly eſtabliſh their Dominion? And when he had taken up a Reſolution to expel the latter, could any one more vigorouſly oppoſe this Deſign than *Plato* did? Beſides, 'tis a great Piece of Injuſtice to make *Callippus* paſs for one of *Plato*'s Diſciples, contrary to what this Philoſopher himſelf ſays in his 7th Letter, in which he aſſures us that it was not by the Study of Philoſophy that *Callippus* acquir'd *Dion*'s Friendſhip; but, as it uſually happens, by civil Converſation, he having gone often in his Company to the Theatre, to Sacrifices and other religious

* Tom. 2.

Rites;

Rites; and they being both addicted to the ſame Kinds of Pleaſure.

There is not only Injuſtice in this Accuſation, but alſo either a great deal of Ignorance, or a great deal of Diſingenuity. Could *Athenæus*, who had read and collected ſo much, be ignorant after what Manner *Xenophon* defends *Socrates* againſt his Enemies, who charg'd him with all the Violences and Injuries of *Critias* and *Alcibiades*, laying the Guilt of 'em upon him, on Pretence that they had been his Diſciples? And if he knew this, ought not he to have made uſe of the ſame Maxims to juſtify *Plato*? As there is ſome Juſtice in imputing to Maſters the Miſcarriages of their Scholars, when they become guilty of them by following their Opinions and Principles; ſo on the other Side 'tis juſt to aſcribe to them their great and noble Actions, when they are the Fruit of their Precepts. *Plutarch* therefore is more juſt than *Athenæus*, when he places to *Plato*'s Account all the great Things his Diſciples had done. His Words are remarkable, and entirely overthrow all the Criticiſm of this Cenſor: * Plato (ſays he) *had left fine Diſcourſes of Laws, and the Government of States; but he had impreſt ſtill finer on the hearts of his Diſciples. Theſe curious Diſcourſes engag'd* Dion *to reſtore* Sicily *its ancient Liberty; and* Python *and his Brother* Heraclides *to deliver* Thrace *from Tyranny, by killing* Cotys. Chabrias *and* Phocion, *thoſe two great* Athenian *Captains, came out of the ſame School.* Plato *gave Laws to the* Arcadians *by his Diſciple* Ariſtonymus, *to the* Elians *by* Phormion, *to thoſe of* Pyrrah *by* Nemedemus, *to the* Cnidians *by* Eudoxus, *and to thoſe of* Stagira *by* Ariſtotle. *Nay, the Rules of governing well, which* Alexander *deſir'd of* Xenocrates, *were only* Plato's *precepts. And he that kindled that Prince's courage, and perſuaded him to make War with the King of* Perſia, *was* Delius *the* Epheſian, *an intimate Friend of this Philoſopher.*

Athenæus carried his Malignity and Envy yet farther; for he writes, that *Plato*'s *Timæus*, his *Gorgias*, and his

* In his Treatiſe againſt *Colotes* the *Epicurean*.

other

other Dialogues of the like Kind, in which he treats of the Mathematicks, and of Natural Philoſophy, are not ſo much to be admir'd, as 'tis commonly ſaid they are: For he ſays the ſame Things are to be found elſewhere, as well explained, if not better; and he aſſures the World, that *Theopompus* of *Chio* writes, that the greateſt Part of his Dialogues were falſe and uſeleſs, becauſe ſome of them were taken from *Ariſtippus*, others from *Antiſthenes*, and others from *Bryſon*. He adds, that *When one expects in his Writings the Morals and Wiſdom of a Philoſopher, one finds nothing but Banquets, and Diſcourſes about Love, which have a great deal of Indecency, and very little Chaſtity in them, which he compos'd to the great undervaluing of the Judgment of his Readers.*

I will not now ſay, the Judgment of *Theopompus* ought to be ſuſpected, becauſe the Ancients have accus'd him of Malice and Calumny; and therefore *Plutarch* ſays of him, 'tis ſafer to believe him when he praiſes, than when he accuſes any one. Let *Plato*'s Dialogues be taken as much as he pleaſes from *Ariſtippus*, *Bryſon*, and *Antiſthenes*, ſince their Works are not now extant, the Teſtimony of *Theopompus*, contrary to *Athenæus*'s Intention, proves that theſe very Dialogues which he has ſo much condemn'd, are now the beſt, and moſt conſiderable Work on thoſe Matters, that is to be found among the Ancients.

And if *Athenæus* paſſes a Judgment on them only of his own Head; I'll venture to ſay, 'tis not the firſt Fault this Author has committed, who is more to be commended for his vaſt Learning, and great Collections which were the Product of a prodigious Reading, than for his Accuracy and Wiſdom in his critical Reflections, and for the Solidity of his Judgment. Is a Man well qualified to judge of *Plato*'s Writings, when he dares to write, that he can't ſee what Advantage can be drawn from the Immortality of the Soul, ſince, after its Separation from the Body, it has no more any Remembrance or Senſation?

As

As to what he ſays of the indecent Diſcourſes *Plat* has made of Love, to the great undervaluing of th Judgment of his Readers; his Aim was to decry th Dialogue of the *Banquet:* But by this he diſgraces him-ſelf more than he does that Dialogue. For beſide that he diſcovers the Corruption of his Heart, he make it appear that he was ignorant of the Beauty and Deſig of that Dialogue; the End of which is only to di engage us from the Love of earthly Beauties, and to rai us to the Love of the ſovereign Beauty, which is Go himſelf. No one, I believe, will heſitate in his Choic between the Judgment of *Athenæus*, and that of *Origen* who in his excellent Preface of the Song of Song ſpeaks of *Plato*'s *Banquet* in theſe Terms: *Diver learned perſons among the* Greeks, *who were deſiro to penetrate into Truth, have written Dialogues abou Love, to ſhow that 'tis this only that can raiſe our Soul from Earth to Heaven, and that 'tis only by the Hel of this, that true Felicity is attainable. The Queſtion that are ſtarted at Table on this Subject, are made b perſons not ſo greedy of Dainties, as curious to occaſio fine Diſcourſes. Nay, ſome of them have taught in Wri ting, the Ways and Arts of producing or augmentin this Love in the Soul. But Men of carnal Inclination perverting theſe Arts, have employ'd them to ſatisfy thei Luſts, and abus'd them to promote an infamous Con verſation. Therefore it is not to be wonder'd at, i with us, among whom there are ſo many more igno rant perſons, as there are more illiterate, a Treatiſe o Love has ſome danger attending it; ſince among th* Greeks, *who are ſo Learned and Wiſe, there have ye ſome been found, who have miſtaken theſe Dialogues and interpreted them in a ſenſe quite different fro that in which they were written; and who, taking Oc caſion from what is ſaid in them of Love, have falle into a Snare, whether they truly found in theſe Writing any Thing that incited to Sin, or whether the Corrup tion of their Hearts hinder'd them from underſtandin them.*

Thi

This Apology ſtrikes at *Athenæus*, whom *Origen* without Doubt had in his Eye. When we publiſh *Plato*'s *Phædrus*, we ſhall examine whether that Cenſure paſt on it by *Dicearchus*, *Ariſtotle*'s Diſciple, in affirming (as *Diogenes Laertius* reports) that the Queſtion handled in this Dialogue is puerile, and the Character of it extravagant, ought to be received; and whether *Cicero* had Reaſon to embrace the Sentiment of this Critick, and to tax *Plato* with having given too much Authority to Love.

Let us then, without ſtopping at what has been written againſt *Plato*, endeavour to know him by his own Works.

Before the Age in which *Pythagoras* liv'd, Morality was treated on only in Sentences and Enigma's: Therefore *Solomon* ſays, a wiſe Man will * *underſtand the words of the Wiſe, and their dark Sayings*. *Pherecydes*, and his Diſciple *Pythagoras*, who had brought Treaſures of Knowledge with them when they return'd from their Travels, from *Babylon*, *Egypt* and *Perſia*, were the firſt that open'd a Door to good Literature among the *Greeks*. It was from them, and eſpecially from *Pythagoras*, that the firſt Beams of Truth ſhin'd out in *Greece*. Morality was then conſiderably improv'd, yet it conſiſted only of Precepts wrap'd up in Obſcurity. The Method of reaſoning and demonſtrating was not yet in Uſe. This dry Way (if I may ſo term it) of handling Morality, was occaſion'd by the Application of Men's Minds then only to the Knowledge of Numbers, Natural Philoſophy, and Aſtronomy. *Socrates* was the firſt, who upon the Reflection he made, that that which happens without us, does not nearly concern us; and that the Study of it is more curious than uſeful; applied himſelf more particularly to the Study of Morality, and handled it more methodically in his Diſcourſes. *Plato*, his Diſciple, being convinced of how great Importance it was to preſerve to Mankind ſo precious a Treaſure, attempted to write of it. And that he might do this to the greater Advantage, and might the better

* Prov. 1. 6.

retain

retain the Air of him who had revived this Science, pre-fer'd the Way of writing in Dialogues, to all other Methods of treating a Subject: For beſides that it is the moſt diverting Manner of writing, in that, as it were, it expoſes a Scene, in which all the Actors are ſeen to perform their Parts; one may ſay it is the beſt fitted to attain the End which is to perſuade and inſtruct; that it is animated with the moſt Life, and hath all the Force of contrary Opinions; wherein the two Parties defend themſelves as much as they will, or can: And conſequently the Victory obtain'd by one over the other can be no longer conteſted, at leaſt when the Dialogue is made by a Man of great Senſe and who makes it his only Buſineſs to enquire after Truth. Before *Plato*'s Time this Manner of writing was very little known in the World: None had practiſed it but *Zeno* of *Elea*, and *Alexamenes* of *Teos*. But the Politeneſs, Elegancy, and Beauty, which *Plato* gave to this Way of Diſcourſe, occaſion'd the Glory of this Invention to be aſcribed to him, ſo that he has been look'd upon in all Ages as the firſt that ever made Dialogues.

There are two Sorts of Truth, that which is already known, and that which is yet unknown to us, and after which we are ſearching. This Difference conſtitutes two principal Characters of *Plato*'s Dialogues. Thoſe of them that treat on known Truths, are called, * *Explicatory, or Inſtructive Dialogues*; and thoſe that handle ſuch Truths as are yet unknown, but enquired after, are called † *Inquiſitive Dialogues*. Each of theſe two Kinds is divided into divers Species, according to the Subject of which they treat, or the Manner of treating of it. For the Inſtructive Dialogues either have Speculation for their End, and then they are divided into ‖ *Phyſical* and ** *Logical*; or Action, and then they are divided into †† *Politick* and ‖‖ *Moral*; and the Inquiſitive Dialogues are deſtin'd, either to *† *Exerciſe* or *‖ *Conteſt*.

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* ὑφηγηματικοί. † ζητητικοί. ‖ φυσικοί. ** λογικοί. †† πολιτικοί. ‖‖ ἠθικοί. *† γυμναστικοί. *‖ ἀγωνιστικοί.

Thoſe

Thoſe that are made for Exerciſe, are again of two Sorts; in ſome of them *Socrates* exerciſes the Mind after ſuch a Manner, that he cauſes all Sorts of Truths to be produced in it, which 'tis capable of finding out it ſelf when well aſſiſted. Therefore he calls himſelf the *Midwife of Minds*, jocoſely alluding to the Employment of his Mother, who was a Midwife; and theſe Dialogues are called * *Obſtetrical Dialogues*. Or elſe he exerciſes it only in making it ſound, and juſt perceive the Truths in which he is willing to inſtruct it; and theſe are called † *Dialogues of Eſſay*. In fine, thoſe that are deſtin'd to conteſt, are alſo of two Sorts: The one Kind are framed to accuſe certain Perſons, and to expoſe certain Vices, and are therefore called *Dialogues of* ‖ *Demonſtration, or of Accuſation*. Theſe are properly ſatirical Dialogues, made for the Reader's Diverſion; exciting in his Mind, at the ſame Time, a juſt Contempt of thoſe whoſe Vices are diſcover'd to him; and others are calculated to refute and overthrow Errors, and are therefore call'd ** *ſubverting Dialogues*. And this is the Diviſion that has given a third Title to theſe Dialogues; for they have three. The firſt is the Name of the principal Perſon. The ſecond is taken from the Subject, and the third is what I have been juſt mentioning, and expreſſes the Method and Turn of the Dialogue, and of what Kind it is. 'Tis only the firſt of theſe at moſt which is *Plato*'s, the laſt of them was impos'd by the Platonick Philoſophers, and is very ancient, as we ſee by *Diogenes Laertius*, who knows only this and the firſt. The ſecond is altogether modern. It was given by ſome that were but little acquainted with the Doctrine of this Philoſopher, and were often miſtaken. For Inſtance, at the Head of *Gorgias*, they place this Title, *Gorgias of Rhetorick*; whereas the Ancients cite it only under the Name of †† *Gorgias Subverſive*. And 'tis ſo far from being true, that *Gorgias* was made to teach

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* μαιευτικοί. † πειραστικοί. ‖ ἐνδεικτικοί
** ἀναιρετικοί. †† γοργίας ἀναιρετικός.

Rhetorick,

Rhetorick, that on the contrary the Deſign of it is to ex-
poſe and overthrow the ill Principle by which the Ora-
tors were conducted, who then governed all the Cities
of *Greece*; and 'tis a Dialogue purely Moral. But this
Subject ſhall be treated more at length in the Argument
which ſhall be placed at the Head of every Dialogue.

Having explained the Titles of theſe Dialogues, 'tis
needful to ſay ſomething of the different Diviſion which
the Ancients have made of 'em. Some have put 'em in-
to Fours, being of Opinion that *Plato* had Reſpect to the
Tetralogies of the ancient Tragical Poets, who compos'd
four Pieces on one and the ſame Subject for the four great
Feaſts of the *Athenians*: But I can't imagine that a great
Philoſopher ſhould have ſo frivolous a Reaſon. Others
have divided 'em into Threes; and 'tis certain, that in
his Works there are three Dialogues found, that pro-
perly make but one and the ſame Treatiſe, as his *Thea-
tetus*, *the Sophiſt*, and *the Politician*. In the firſt, *So-
crates* examines and refutes various Definitions of Sci-
ence. In the ſecond he eſtabliſhes divers Definitions of
the Sophiſt, which ſerve to ſhew the Art of dividing
and defining, and, at the ſame Time, of making the So-
phiſts ridiculous. And in the third he defines a Politician
or Stateſman; and there is nothing wanting in this Trea-
tiſe, becauſe the Stateſman can't be well qualified with-
out being tinctur'd with Philoſophy. The ten Books of
a Commonwealth, which are look'd upon as only one
Dialogue, are yet apparently one and the ſame Treatiſe
with his *Timæus*, *Atlanticus*, or *Critias*. In the firſt,
that is, in the long Converſation about a Commonwealth,
Socrates gives the Idea of a perfect State. In *Timæus* he
ſupports his Rules and Principles by the Knowledge of
Nature which he communicates; and in *Critias* he con-
firms this Knowledge of Nature, and thoſe Rules of
Morality and Policy, by the Authority of ancient Hiſtory;
or, that I may uſe *Plato*'s own Words, the Books of his
Commonwealth from good Citizens: His *Timæus* diſ-
covers to them the Creation of the World, that this
Knowledge may fortify in their Minds the Principles
he has given 'em; and his *Critias* proves to 'em by an-
cient

cient Hiſtory, that ſuch was the Life of their firſt Anceſtors, that is, of the firſt *Athenians*, who liv'd before the Deluge, whoſe Example he recommends to their Imitation. And it was after this Manner, that the greateſt of Legiſlators compos'd the Lives of the ancient *Hebrews* and Patriarchs. Excepting theſe ſix Dialogues, the three firſt of which make a Treatiſe of Logick, and the three laſt a very methodical Treatiſe of Morality; I don't think any others of 'em can be connected together by the Continuance of the ſame Subject: They are all ſeparate and independent, in reſpect of the Matter of 'em; and have no mutual Correſpondence or Reſemblance, but by the Method or Manner of treating their Subjects, which has been already ſufficiently explained.

Plato affirms that which is certain, refutes that which is falſe, examines that which is doubtful, and does not pronounce any Thing on that which is uncertain, or has but little Probability.

The Maxims of *Plato*.

His firſt Maxim is, not to give one's Conſent, but only to evident and certain Truths, and to diſengage one's Mind from all kinds of Prejudice.

The ſecond is, never to attempt to handle Queſtions which 'tis impoſſible to decide.

The third is, to diſtinguiſh well between what we know, and what we are ignorant of; and not to believe we know what indeed we don't underſtand.

From theſe Maxims it follows, that *Plato* believed there were certain Truths, and, conſequently, that there were ſuch Principles as might be term'd *Dogmata*. That is, he affirm'd ſome Things to be abſolutely true; but becauſe he entirely follow'd *Socrates*'s Manner of diſputing, and all along avoided the deciſive Air of the Sophiſts and Dogmatiſts, who affirm'd every Thing, almoſt continually taking ſimple Probabilities for Truth, he ſeems poſitive in nothing in his Writings, in which by his Doubts he endeavours to convince his Adverſaries of the Errors he deſigns to refute, and to make 'em of themſelves diſcover the Truths he has a Mind to teach.

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And thus that Paſſage of *Cicero* ought to be underſtood who in the firſt Book of his Academick Queſtions, ſays *In* Plato's *Books many things are ſaid* pro *and* con, *but every thing is doubted, and nothing ever affirmed.*

The Ancients inform us, that *Plato* follow'd *Heraclitus*, in Things that fall under the Cognizance of the Senſes, that is, in natural and ſenſible Objects: *Pythagoras* in intellectual Things, which can't be comprehended but by the Underſtanding; and *Socrates* in thoſe which are only dictated by Reaſon, that is, in Morality and Policy. And this deſerves to be explained.

Plato followed *Heraclitus* in natural and ſenſible Things; that is, he believed with *Heraclitus*, that there was but one World, that all Things were produced of their Contraries; that Motion which he calls War, cauſes the Production of Beings, and Reſt their Diſſolution; and, in fine, that our Senſes are very ſubject to be deceived, and that there is no certain Truth in their Depoſitions.

He followed *Pythagoras* in intellectual Truths; that is, he taught, as this Philoſopher did, that there is only one God, the Creator of all Things; that the Soul is immortal; that Men ought continually to labour to purify themſelves from their Paſſions and Vices, that they might be united to God; and that after this Life there is a Reward for good Men, and a Puniſhment for the Wicked; that between God and Men there are different Orders of Spirits, who are the Miniſters of that firſt Being. Seeing he drew his Notions from the ſame Fountains, namely, from the *Egyptians* and *Hebrews*, 'tis not to be wonder'd at, if he had the ſame Doctrine.

But if *Plato* followed *Pythagoras* in his Sentiments, he alſo imitated him in the Manner of explaining them: For he deliver'd 'em only in Enigma's, and under the Veil of Myſteries, Figures and Numbers, that he might not expoſe ſuch ſublime Truths to the Raillery of wicked and profane Men, and might diſcover 'em only to ſuch as were worthy to learn 'em, and who would give themſelves the Trouble of unfolding them. * *'Tis not read-*

* Tom. 3.

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ing of Books, ſays he, *that will communicate this great Knowledge, it muſt be attained by profound Meditation; and every one muſt for himſelf draw this celeſtial Fire from its true Source. For by this Union with its Object, as a divine Flame, (kindled on a ſudden, as from a Fire that ſpreads it ſelf round) illuminates the Mind, and feeds and preſerves it ſelf therein. And for this Reaſon, as I have never yet written, ſo I am reſolved never to write on theſe Matters*; that is, to explain them after a clear and intelligible Manner. † *Whoever undertakes it, will never do it to any purpoſe; and all the Good he'll reap by his Labour will be, that, excepting a ſmall Number of Men whom God has endowed with Underſtanding, capable of unravelling thoſe celeſtial Truths of themſelves, he'll cauſe ſome to deſpiſe 'em, and fill others with a vain and raſh Confidence, as if they underſtood wonderful things, when indeed they are unacquainted with 'em.*

This Method often cauſes great Obſcurity in the Writings of this Philoſopher, which he has indeed taken Care to augment, in chuſing to make uſe of ſome Terms that ſignify contrary Things. And this is the Reaſon why he can't pleaſe young People, who have not yet attain'd Judgment enough to diſcern the Beauty and Solidity of his Dialogues; nor grown Men neither, who have not had the Preparation of thoſe Studies that were neceſſary, before they attempted to read him, and who are not capable of Reflection and Meditation. For this Reaſon *Antiphanes*, one of *Plato*'s Friends, jocoſely compar'd his Writings to a City, in which Men's Words freez'd in the Air as ſoon as they were pronounced, and the following Summer, when they came to be warm'd and melted by the Beams of the Sun, the Inhabitants underſtood what had been ſaid in the Winter; for *Plato*'s Diſcourſes

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* This is what *David* ſays in the 35th Pſalm, *In thy Light we ſhall ſee Light*. There is none but God, that can enlighten the Minds of Men.

† A remarkable Paſſage. *Plato* is not for writing on the Myſteries of Religion, and thoſe of Nature.

ought to be warm'd, and as it were melted by the Rays of an Underſtanding well exercis'd, if one would know the true Senſe of 'em.

In fine, he imitated *Socrates* in what relates to Morals and Politicks; that is, he reduc'd every Thing to Morality, and made it his whole Buſineſs to engage Men to fill up the Duties they ow'd to the State in which Providence had caſt their Lot.

'Tis pretended that *Plato* to his Natural Philoſophy and Morality added Dialectick; but this ought only to be underſtood of his bringing it to Perfection: For *Socrates* had the Uſe of Dialectick before *Plato*; as appears by his proving and refuting ſo ſolidly in Converſation whatever he had a Mind to eſtabliſh or overthrow. How can it be imagin'd that Truths were diſcover'd and prov'd before *Plato* and *Socrates*, without the Help of Dialectick? 'Tis impoſſible.

Theſe are then the three Parts of the Philoſophy of the Academicks, Morality, Natural Philoſophy, and Dialectick; and theſe three Parts make Philoſophy compleat, in which one can't ſo much as imagine a fourth. Natural Philoſophy reſpects Speculation, Morality Action, and Dialectick is uſeful both for one and t'other. For 'tis by Means of this that we diſtinguiſh Truth from that which has only the Appearance of it, both in Morality and Natural Philoſophy. And many Ages before *Plato* the Philoſophy of the *Hebrews* was likewiſe divided into three Parts, Reaſoning, the Knowledge of Nature, and Morality.

The Morality of the *Platonicks*.

The *Platonicks* make the Perfection of Morality to conſiſt in living in Conformity to Nature, that is, to the Will of God, the only Author of Sovereign Happineſs; and they teach that the Scope of all our Deſires ſhould be to obtain of him thoſe good Things that are neceſſary for Soul and Body, and for our State of Life. Thus they divide Good, into that which is divine, and that which is human.

Human Goods are diſtinguiſhed into Goods of the Body, and Goods of Life. The Goods of the Body

are Health, Beauty, Good-Humour, Strength, &c. The Goods of Life are Friends, Riches; in fine, every Thing that ſerves to advance Virtue, and ſet it on Work. For they teach that a Man is not born for himſelf alone; but is united to all other Men by Society, which renders him a Member of one and the ſame Body, to the Advantage of which he ought to refer all his Actions and Thoughts.

Divine Goods are the Goods of the Soul, that is, every Thing which renders the Soul capable of knowing, loving, and embracing that which is good and lovely, &c. And they divide theſe Goods into thoſe of Nature, and thoſe of Morality. The Goods of Nature are the Imagination and the Memory, which properly depend on the Mind; and the Goods of Morality are thoſe that are procur'd by Study and the Habit which is form'd by Exerciſe and Reaſon. That which has made but a ſlight Impreſſion, they call a certain Motion toward Virtue: And that which is finiſhed they term Virtue; which is the Perfection of Nature, and the moſt excellent of all Goods.

Human Goods are ſubordinate to Divine; and when once a Man has theſe, he has all the other. The firſt of 'em all is Prudence, the ſecond is Temperance; from theſe two mix'd with Courage, ſprings Juſtice, which is the third, and Valour is the fourth. They teach that Divine Goods can't be given by Men, and that they are not to be acquired by our Labour; that they are given only by the Favour of God, and that they ought to be ſought at his Hand alone.

So that they do not equally eſteem theſe three Sorts of Goods, but prefer thoſe of the Soul before the two others, as infinitely more conſiderable, and which alone ought to be ſought for themſelves. Hence it comes, that they make the Happineſs of Life to conſiſt only in Virtue, tho' at the ſame Time they maintain, that it cannot be very happy without the Goods of the Body, and the other that are neceſſary for the Uſe of Virtue; and from thence ariſes an indiſpenſible Obligation to Labour, and to fill up the Duties which Nature impoſes: An Obli-

gation which engages us to avoid Idleneſs, and to contemn criminal Pleaſures; and which neceſſarily diſpoſes us to ſuffer all ſorts of Labour and Pain too, for that which is juſt and honeſt. From whence Friendſhip, Juſtice, and Equity, reſult, which they prefer to all the Pleaſures and Advantages of Life.

There is nothing more ſolid and ſublime than theſe Morals, which make the chief Good to conſiſt in being united to God, in obeying his Commands, and in receiving with Submiſſion whatever comes from his Hand; becauſe all God's Acts towards Men are uſeful to 'em, if they know how to make an Improvement of 'em.

Plato every where inſinuates a diſintereſted Frame of Mind, and the Contempt of Riches; and teaches to poſtpone all the Gold in the World to the leaſt Virtue. He is for a Man's expoſing himſelf to Death in the Defence of Juſtice, and in maintaining Laws, Order, and the publick Good; and would have us avoid, not only all criminal Pleaſures, but Delicacy, Idleneſs, and too much Sleep. We find his Writings full of Precepts of Truth, Chaſtity, Temperance, Modeſty, Patience, Meekneſs, and Humility: But theſe Precepts are accompanied with Proofs. For he utterly overthrows the Principles of ill Morals, after he has propos'd 'em in their full Strength; and this is the Way of Perſuaſion that becomes a Philoſopher.

Almoſt every Thing in his Doctrine is worthy of Chriſtianity. That which he ſays of the Duty of honouring Parents, deſerves to be recited. * *The Fear of God is the Foundation of that Duty which Children owe their Parents; and if the Gods are pleas'd with the Reſpect which is render'd to their Images, which are only dead Repreſentations of the Deity, how much more do they rejoice in thoſe Honours which are given to Parents, who are the living Images of God? And the older they are, the more Force and Efficacy have theſe living Ima-*

* Precepts of the Honour due to Parents, 11th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

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ges of the Deity (who are kept in the Houſe like the moſt precious Jewels) to make all ſorts of Bleſſings deſcend on their Children, who give 'em the Reverence which is due to 'em; and to bring upon their Heads the moſt dreadful curſes, when they refuſe it? For God hears the Prayers which Parents addreſs to him either for or againſt their Children. So that there is no ſurer Way to pleaſe God, than to honour our Parents: And whenever they are reſpected, 'tis very grateful and acceptable to God himſelf. The Way of honouring them duly, is to love them more than our own Children, or our ſelves. And they who fail in this Duty, ſhall be brought to the Magiſtrates conſtituted for this purpoſe, who ſhall take care to puniſh 'em.

Revenge forbidden.

He every where maintains, and particularly in his *Gorgias* and *Criton*, that no Injury is to be offer'd to any Man, no not to ſuch as deal injuriouſly with us; and makes it appear, that to introduce this Maxim into civil Converſation, That 'tis lawful for a Man to revenge himſelf and render Evil for Evil, is to pretend to lay a Foundation for Juſtice in innumerable Acts of Injuſtice, and to open an inexhauſtible Source of Crimes, and Acts of Violence. What Bank would be ſtrong enough to ſtop ſuch an Inundation of Wickedneſs, and what End would there be of Injury and Revenge? He carries his Proofs of this Matter ſo far, that his Diſciples aſſure us, that he that revenges an Injury, is more criminal than he that offers it.

The Neceſſity of Prayer.

He teaches, that if a Man have any Degree of Wiſdom, he will never undertake the leaſt Thing without the Invocation of God; and that if Prayer is neceſſary before every ordinary Action, 'tis much more ſo when we are about to ſpeak of God, becauſe 'tis God that illuminates our Minds, 'tis he that aſſiſts us, and without him we can do nothing. He well underſtood the Neceſſity and Beauty of that Precept of *Pythagoras*; * *Begin all thy*

* *Pythagoras* his Precept.

Actions with Prayer, that thou mayeſt be able to accompliſh 'em. Prayer and Action ought to be inſeparable; want of Prayer renders Action uſeleſs, and want of Action renders Prayer ineffectual. We ought to aſk what we do, and to do what we aſk. But at the ſame Time he affirms that Men are ſo blinded by their Paſſions, that they know not how to pray well, unleſs God inſtructs 'em; and therefore the trueſt Prayer, and that which alone can be agreeable to him, is to requeſt of him to perform his own Will in us, and not ours.

The moſt conſiderable Thing in Morality is the political Part of it, the true Uſe of which *Plato* endeavours to ſhew, and to re-eſtabliſh it in that Perfection from whence it fell by the Corruption of Men. In the Time of this Philoſopher, Injuſtice had overturn'd all the States of *Greece*; ſo that there was not one Government left that deſerv'd to be approv'd. *Plato*, in Oppoſition to this Diſorder, gave a perfect Model of a moſt juſt Form of Government, that all States might correct the Vices of their Way of Government by this Pattern. To this Purpoſe he employs his Books of a Commonwealth, and thoſe of Laws; in which he after a wonderful Manner reconciles Policy to Religion, which is the very Baſis of it.

Princes can't govern well, but as they imitate God.

He ſhews that Princes and Governours of States can never conduct the People well, but by imitating the King of Kings, the Sovereign Lord of the World, the only and perfect Model of all Wiſdom and Juſtice. For as a Sheep is not capable of guiding the whole Flock, which ought to be under the Conduct of a Shepherd; ſo one Man is not capable alone of conducting others, who all together ought to be ſubject to God. One would think he had read that Complaint made by the People of God by the Mouth of * *Iſaiah*, as the greateſt of all Miſeries; *O Lord our God, other Lords beſides thee have had Dominion over us.*

* Iſa. 26.

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* He renders this Truth ſenſible by a Fable in which the Veſtiges of the Truth of ancient Hiſtory are eaſily diſcern'd. *The Memory of the happy Courſe of Life the firſt Men led, is preſerved to our Time. They were abundantly provided for, without any Labour; the Earth ſpontaneouſly furniſhed them with all Neceſſaries: And the Cauſe of their Happineſs was this;* Saturn *well knowing that there was no Man that could have an abſolute Empire over others, without abandoning himſelf to all ſorts of Violence and Injuſtice, ſubjected the Nations not to Men, but to more noble and excellent Beings, as their Lords and Kings; namely, to intelligent Spirits (or Angels) after the ſame Manner as we deal with our Cattle: For as we don't ſet a Bull over a whole Herd of his own kind, nor a Goat to govern a Flock of Goats, but put thoſe of one kind and another under the Conduct of a Man; ſo God, who loves Mankind, plac'd us at firſt under the Conduct of Angels, who with marvellous Facility, and without any Trouble to them, took a great deal of care of their Affairs; and by making Peace, Chaſtity, Liberty and Juſtice reign among them, kept all ſorts of Troubles and Seditions at a Diſtance from them, and render'd their Lives very happy.* This Fable, which is founded on † Truth, clearly ſhews us, that *thoſe Societies which yield Obedience to Men, and not to God, can never be happy, and will never find the End of their Miſeries: And farther intimates, that if we will be happy, we muſt with all our Might imitate that manner of Life Men led under the Reign of* Saturn; *and that according to that immortal Principle which is in us, we ſhould govern our Families and Cities according to its Dictates; taking this wiſe Diſpenſation of the Under-*

The Cauſe of the happy Life of the firſt Men.

What the reign of *Saturn* is.

* In the 4th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

† For the Nation and Kingdom that will not ſerve thee ſhall perish, *Iſa.* 60. 12.

ſtanding for our firſt and chief Law. For if a King, if Nobles who govern in an Oligarchy, or if the People who are ſupreme in Republicks, think of nothing but how to ſatiate their paſſions, and drown themſelves in Senſuality, and run like mad Men after ſuch pleaſures as only irritate their inſatiable Intemperance; 'tis impoſſible they ſhould forbear to trample on the Laws, and there can be no Safety to ſuch as obey 'em.

The Choice of Prieſts and Magiſtrates.

He gives admirable Precepts for the Eſtabliſhment of Prieſts and Magiſtrates; he would not have ſuch choſen, who have nothing to recommend 'em but their Birth, their Riches, Credit, or Power, but would have the Choice of 'em regulated only by their Merit and Piety * *Thoſe are the beſt* (ſays he) *who yield the greateſt Obedience to the Laws, and excel all the reſt of their Fellow-Citizens in that Reſpect. The firſt place ought to be given to thoſe of the firſt Rank, the ſecond to thoſe of the ſecond Degree, and ſo of the reſt in proportion, as every one diſtinguiſhes himſelf, and is diſpoſed to look on himſelf, not as Maſter of the Laws, but as their Servant. For where-ever the Law is Miſtreſs, and the Magiſtrates its Servants, there States are obſerv'd to proſper, and abound with all the Bleſſings one can expect from the Hand of God: Whereas in all places where the Magiſtrate is Maſter, and the Law his Servant and Slave, there nothing is to be expected but Ruin and Deſolation.*

† He would have none made Prieſts till they are ſixty Years of Age. He ſays, *They ſhould be lawfully begotten, and without any bodily Imperfection; that they ſhould be ſuch as have been educated in chaſte Families, and have their Hands free from the Stain of Blood; that they ſhould not be tainted with any of thoſe Pollutions that are offenſive to God, and are incompatible with the Sanctity of their Character; and that their*

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* Tom. 2.

† Book IV. Tom. 2.

Parents

Parents ſhould be ſuch as have liv'd with the ſame Purity of Converſation.

He proves, that thoſe Laws which are made ſolely for the Profit of the Legiſlator, and not for the Publick Good, are not properly Laws, but the Product of Self-Love and Injuſtice.

He ſhews, that of all Governments the Monarchical is the moſt perfect, becauſe it approaches neareſt to the firſt Model; but that the Power of it ought to be mitigated by the Law, which is to govern as the ſupreme Reaſon.

Monarchy the moſt perfect of all Governments.

After having ſhewn the Good and Evil of all known Governments, he maintains, that all Political Schemes which tend to render the Ruler powerful to the Detriment of the Subject, and which make all the Virtue of the Sovereign to conſiſt in confirming and augmenting his Power, leaving Juſtice, Patience, Goodneſs, Fidelity, and Humanity to private Perſons, as Virtues only becoming Slaves, are no better than open Tyranny; and that the End of true Policy is to make all the Members of the Community live together in Society as ſo many Brothers, after the moſt happy Manner that can be, without either Poverty, or very great Riches, according to the Rules of Juſtice and Holineſs. To engage Princes to employ Men according to the different Talents they diſcern in them, he * relates this Fable, which he calls a *Phœnician Lie*, becauſe 'tis † taken out of the Books of the *Hebrews*: *Hear* (ſays he) *this Fable, you who are the Inhabitants of this City; you are all Brethren, but God who created you mingled*

The End of his true Policy.

To employ Men according to their Talents.

* Third Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

† *Euſebius* ſhews that *Plato* deriv'd this Fable from what God ſays in the Prophecy of *Ezekiel*, ch. 22. v. 18. *Son of Man, the Houſe of Iſrael is to me become droſs; all they are Braſs and Tin, and Iron and Lead.*

Gold in those who are worthy to command; therefore th are the most excellent and honourable. He mingled Silv in those who are capable of assisting them in their Function and Iron and Brass in those who are fit for nothing b to be Husband-men and Artificers: And as we are a Parents, we have ordinarily Children that resemble u but it also sometimes happens, that he who is mix'd wit Gold, has Children who are only mix'd with Silver; o he who is mix'd with Silver, hath Children mix'd wi Gold, and so of the rest. That therefore which God in special Manner recommends to Princes, is to take strict Notice of their Children than of any Thing else, that th may well discover what was mix'd with them in the first Formation; that if they perceive Iron or Brass in t they may not shew them any pity, but place them in t Rank to which they were destin'd by Nature, and ma 'em Husband-men, or Artificers; and as for such as c found to be temper'd with Gold or Silver, that th should destine some of them to govern, and the rest to o and ease them by their Ministry: There being an Ora which predicts, that the City shall perish when under t Government of Iron or Brass.

This Treatise is full of admirable Maxims, and such as are worthy to be engraven on the Hearts of all Ma kind. 'Tis true, there is one very co siderable Defect in it, in that *Plato*, take away *Meum* and *Tuum* from th Government which he forms, institut a Community, not only of Estates, but also of W men and Children. This Notion was not entire chimerical, since it had already been put in Practice part among the *Lacedemonians*, and some other N tions; but that does not excuse it from being a m vicious Usage: For the Authority of Custom can't re der that Good, which is in its own Nature Evil. Th Community of Things and Persons can't conduct th Law-giver to the End he proposes, but, on the contra sets him at a greater Distance from it, and makes hi lose the Advantage of all he has before established; f

A Defect in *Plato*'s Politicks.

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inſtead of uniting his Citizens, this divides them, by breaking aſunder all Relations, and all the moſt ſacred Ties of Nature, and trampling on Laws, and Religion, Honour and Decency. Before the Chriſtians ſhew'd their indignation againſt a Maxim ſo full of Wickedneſs and Error, the Pagans diſcerned the Falſhood of it; for *Ariſtotle* attacks it in the 2d Book of his Politicks. Nay, *Plato* himſelf abandons it in his 6th Book of Laws, where he reſtores all that Honour to Marriage of which he had before diveſted it.

Beſides this Fault, there is another taken Notice of, and that is the Education of Women, to whom he aſſigns the ſame Employments as Men, committing to them the Command of Armies, and the Government of States. He founded this Notion on a Maxim of *Socrates*, who held that Women were capable of the ſame Virtues as Men, tho' they can't carry them to the laſt Perfection. Excepting theſe two Things, which yet occaſion very ſolid and very uſeful Reflections, there is nothing among the Writings of the Pagans, which better deſerves to be read and retained, than *Plato*'s Book of a *Republick*, and thoſe of *Laws:* They have a Beauty on them that may be called Divine; and indeed they appear to be a Copy of a truly divine Original. For this * Republick, of which *Plato* gives an Idea, is the true Draught of the Commonwealth of the *Hebrews* under the Conduct of *Moſes*. We ſee in both the ſame Simplicity of Manners, the ſame Way of living, and the ſame End propos'd. The Miſeries of both proceed from the ſame Cauſes; that is, only from the Diſobedience of the People, and their Forgetfulneſs of their principal Duties: And their Proſperity always ſprings from their diligent Attendance on the ſame Duties, and their Readineſs to obey. But here is one Thing that ſeems to be very remarkable. *Plato* will have his wiſe Man to be of a wonderful Genius and Temper; he muſt have had a miraculous and di-

Moſes the Model on which *Plato* forms his wiſe Man.

* *Plato*'s Republick, the Draught of that of the *Hebrews*.

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vine Education; he muſt from his Youth have given Marks of his great Zeal for the publick Good; he muſt be fit both for a contemplative and active Life; he muſt be an Enemy of Grandeur, and attain it only by Obedience; this Obedience muſt be the Occaſion of his taking the Conduct of a People; he muſt govern them according to the Inſtitutions of God, to whom he is only a Vicegerent; Religion muſt be the Principle and End of all his Enterprizes; he muſt have both Severity and Meekneſs; he muſt be arm'd with Courage and Temperance, with Juſtice and Wiſdom; and muſt make it his Buſineſs to render thoſe whom he governs the Friends of God. And theſe are the principal Strokes in *Moſes*'s Picture; ſo that if the Idea of our Philoſopher does Honour to this Legiſlator, and his People whoſe Grandeur he repreſents; one may ſay, the Truth accompliſhed in one and t'other does yet more Honour to the Philoſopher, by ſhewing his great Wiſdom, and the Extent of his Mind. If *Plato* had had this Idea without any Knowledge of the Hiſtory of *Moſes* (which yet I do not believe) nothing can be imagined greater; he would be more than a Man And if he form'd it only on this Hiſtory, which he had read, or learn'd by Tradition in *Egypt*; it was a very great Demonſtration of his Wiſdom, that he diſcern'd the Beauty of it, and follow'd it as a Pattern.

Religion founded on Revelation.

As *Moſes* regulated the People of God, ſo *Plato*'s wiſe Man regulates thoſe under his Conduct. Firſt, he inſtructs them in Religion, about which he eſtabliſhes nothing without having conſulted God; that is, nothing but what is conformable to true Traditions, and ancient Oracles. He fortifies them againſt the Poiſon of the Theology of the Poets, who intermix Lies with the Truth, and againſt the Religion of credulous and ſuperſtitious People. He * teaches them to believe there is one only true God, who being infinitely good, loves

* Fourth Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

Man-

Mankind, and is willing to render them happy; and who as he is alſo infinitely juſt, makes none happy but thoſe who reſemble him, and puniſhes ſuch as diſhonour the ſacred Character he had imprinted on them. He tells them that *God, as we are taught by ancient Tradition*, having in himſelf the Beginning, the Middle and the End of all Things, always goes on his Way according to his Nature without ever ſtepping aſide: He is followed by Juſtice, which never fails to puniſh the Tranſgreſſions committed againſt his Law. Thoſe who would be happy, conform to this Divine Juſtice with † Humility; whereas he that becomes proud becauſe of his Riches, Honours, or Beauty (for Beauty often betrays young People into Extravagancy and Folly) and who has preſumption enough to think he has no need of a Guide, but is capable of conducting both himſelf and others, is entirely abandon'd of God for his Pride. A Man in this condition joins himſelf to others who are tainted with the ſame Vice; and ‖ turning all Things upſide down with extreme boldneſs, and moſt horrible preſumption, he comes to be look'd upon by the people as ſome great perſon: But ſoon after, by the juſt Judgment of God, he is ſeen to deſtroy himſelf, to ſubvert his own Houſe, and to involve the whole State in his ruin.* He explains to them the Puniſhments that are reſerved for the wicked. *They are not limited* (ſays he) *to the miſeries of this*

The Recompence of Humility.

The Puniſhment of Pride.

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* This is what God ſays, in *Iſa.* 41. 4. *I the Lord, the firſt, and with the laſt, I am he.*

† *Plato* here employs the ſame Term, which the ſacred Writers uſe, to expreſs one who is of a humble Spirit, ταπεινὸς; ſo that the Pagans not only knew the Name of the Virtue, but the Virtue it ſelf.

‖ *Plato* here admirably well repreſents the Miſery and Littleneſs of ſome Men, who think themſelves great, and appear ſo in the Eyes of the People: And ſhews, that there are no Men truly great but ſuch as humbly ſubmit to the Divine Law.

Life,

Life, nor to Death it ſelf, from which even good Men are not exempted; for theſe are penalties too light, and ſhort; but they are horrible Torments which ſhall never have an End. He encourages them by the Hope of Rewards, and an everlaſting State of Felicity. He takes ſo great Care of them, that he obviates every Thing that might occaſion them to call in Queſtion the Divine Providence, and throw them into Impiety. One would think he had copied out of *David*'s Pſalms; for thus he ſpeaks to a young Man not well inſtructed in the divine Conduct. * *You have in you a Nature, which having ſomething divine in it, leads you to believe the Gods; but the Proſperity of the Wicked, whoſe Happineſs is ſo much boaſted of, tho' they are indeed very miſerable, is ready to lead you into Impiety: You can't ſee profligate Perſons arrive at extreme Old Age without meeting with any remarkable Calamity, and leave their Children's Children after them, Heirs to their Eſtates and Fortune; you can't ſee all this (I ſay) without being ſhaken by it. You have often heard ſay, and have often ſeen with your own Eyes, that the meaneſt Perſons have aſcended Thrones by their Crimes; and upon this you dare not down-right deny the Gods, nor accuſe them of being the cauſe of this; for there is ſomething in you, that reſtrains you from this, and oppoſes it: But you are ſo far ſeduced and deceived by your Folly and Ignorance, that while you confeſs there are Gods, you reduce your ſelf to ſay they are regardleſs of human Affairs. A Remedy ought to be ſpeedily applied to remove this Diſtemper, before it has Time to grow upon you, and ſo to precipitate you into the Abyſs of Impiety. Perhaps it will be no difficult Matter to prove, that the Gods extend their Care and Regard to the ſmalleſt Things as well as the greateſt; and that the divine Nature being Virtue it ſelf, extends its Providence over all.*

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* 2d Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

And

And indeed he proves this with wonderful Solidity. I'll only give an Abridgment of these Proofs, which have yet more Force in the Original. * *If God* (says he) *should take no Care of Men, it would be either through Malice, or Ignorance, Weakness, Negligence or Laziness: But none of these Vices, which are in us, can be found in God, who is infinitely perfect; who is Goodness, Knowledge, Wisdom, Power, Providence, and Activity it self. He takes care of all Things, for he created them, and they are his. How then can he neglect Men, who belong to him in a more particular Manner? Has God less Capacity, or is he less diligent than Artificers? By how much the more knowing these are, by so much the more perfect are their Works, whether small or great, they forgetting nothing that may conduce to the Improvement of them. And shall God, who is most wise, most knowing, and has a Power proportionate to his Will, regard only the greatest Things, and neglect others which may be still more easily mended; as if he was idle, and afraid of giving himself Trouble?* This is followed with other admirable Proofs, which it would be too long to relate. In fine, he * shows, that *sooner or later God renders to every Man according to his Works. The Righteous, who have been expos'd to Troubles in this Life, are recompensed in the other; and the Wicked, who have always enjoy'd the Pleasures of the World, are punished in Hell. This is necessarily inferr'd from the Justice of God: 'Tis impossible to avoid this Judgment, which the Gods have fix'd by that Providence which you oppose, and of which you shall one Day be fatally convinced; don't suppose that it will negligently pass you by.* ‖ *Tho' you should*

Proofs of Providence.

God at the last Judgment renders to every Man according to his Works.

* Tom. 2. † Ibid.

‖ This is what *David* says in almost the same Terms, *Psal.* 139. 7, 8. *Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? whither shall I flee from thy Presence? if I ascend up into Heaven, thou art there; if I make my Bed in Hell, behold thou art there.*

seek

ſeek a Shelter by hiding your ſelf in the deepeſt Caverns of the Earth; tho' you ſhould have Wings, and could fly into the Heavens to hide your ſelf there; the Divine Providence would ſeize you every where, and you ſhall never avoid the puniſhments you deſerve, whether in this World, or in Hell, or in ſome other place yet more terrible.

The Puniſhment of impious Perſons ſtated.

He afterwards ſhews, that not only they ſhall be puniſhed who deny the Divine Being, diſpute againſt Providence, or blaſpheme God, by ſaying he ſuffers himſelf to be bribed by the Offerings of the Wicked, but alſo ſuch as have heard theſe Blaſphemies, and yet neglect to bring the Authors of them before the Judges who are ſet to puniſh them. He alſo inſtitutes Penalties for thoſe who by their own private Authority teach or practiſe in their Houſes particular Forms of Worſhip; and to prevent this Inconveniency, he applies himſelf to diſcover the Cauſe of it. * He ſays, this commonly proceeds from Women, and weak Minds, when they find themſelves in any Danger, or under any adverſe Circumſtances; or when, on the contrary, they meet with unexpected Proſperity, or are in ſome Tranſport of Joy; or, in fine, when their Imagination is diſturb'd by ſome Fright, ſo that they fancy they have ſeen Spectres, either waking or ſleeping. † For ſuch People as theſe, when in this Condition, are wont to vow to offer the firſt Thing that comes into their Heads: They promiſe Sacrifices and Images, and fill their Houſes with Chappels and Altars; or ſet up particular Forms of Devotion, which by Degrees degenerate into dreadful Superſtitions, or impious Novelties, which entirely ruin both Religion and good

The Puniſhment of ſuch as hear Blaſphemy without diſcovering it.

Particular Forms of Worſhip condemned.

The Origin of Superſtitions.

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* In the 10th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

† They are mad, when they are merry, *Wiſd.* 14. 27.

Man-

Manners: For what is it that can't enter into the Head of a Man or Woman, that is weak or perverted? And 'tis for this Reaſon *Plato* forbids Innovations in Worſhip, and makes this Law, *That no private perſon ſhould have either a Chappel or Altar in his Houſe, but when he has a Mind to offer Sacrifices he muſt go into the publick Temples; he is to put his Victims and Offerings into the hands of the Prieſts and Prieſteſſes, to whoſe care the ſacred Altars are committed; there he muſt make his Prayers, where thoſe that come to worſhip may join with him. For it does not belong to every Man to conſecrate Altars; but 'tis the work of a very enlighten'd Mind.*

Domeſtick Chappels and Altars forbidden.

To cure Men of Superſtition and Idolatry, which then reigned ſo much in the World, *Plato* forgets nothing that might induce them to render God a rational Worſhip. For this Purpoſe he endeavours to raiſe their Minds, in giving them an Idea of God, which might in ſome ſort agree with his Eſſence, which mortal Eyes can't ſee but very imperfectly. The Strokes with which he forms this Idea, are ſcatter'd up and down in all his Works. The principal of them which I have collected, are theſe that follow:

God is one, eternal, immutable, incomprehenſible Being. He created and diſpos'd all Things by his Wiſdom; he maintains and preſerves all Things by his providence; he is in all places, and no place can contain him. He is all Things, and yet he is none of thoſe things which are by him, and have received their Being from him. For he is greater than Eſſence it ſelf: He ſees all Things, knows all Things, and penetrates the moſt ſecret Thoughts; he fills the Capacity of the Deeps, and the Immenſity of the Heavens; all Knowledge, Good, Virtue, Light, Life are only in him, and are Himſelf. He is at the ſame Time infinitely Good, and infinitely Juſt. He loves Men with a ſingular Affection; and created them only to render them happy: But as he is Holineſs and Juſtice it ſelf, he makes none happy

What God is.

happy but those who reſemble him in Righteouſneſs and Holineſs; and puniſhes thoſe who have corrupted the ſacred Character he had impreſs'd on them, by creating them after his own Image.

He ſays, none but God can cure all the Infirmities of Men.

Lies, Perjury and profane Swearing, abhorr'd of God.

He teaches that God not only hates Liars, and perjur'd Perſons, but alſo ſuch as ſwear vainly and unneceſſarily, and who debaſe and profane the Majeſty of his Name, by uſing it raſhly on all Occaſions, whereas it ought to be mentioned with all poſſible Sanctity and Purity of Mind.

The generality of Philoſophers were divided about the Nature of the chief Good: Some made it conſiſt in the Knowledge of Arts and Sciences, others in Pleaſures, and others in Authority and Power. *Plato* oppoſes all theſe Errors, and ſhews that the ſupreme Good is not to be found in the Sciences; ſeeing theſe and Vices often appear together in the ſame Perſons, and 'tis very common for Men to abuſe them: He proves that Power can't render a Man happy without Juſtice; and ſhews that what Men call Pleaſures, namely, ſenſual Delights, are by no Means of the Nature of that Pleaſure which can give us the ſupreme Happineſs: For they are the Conſequence of human Weakneſs and Infirmity, and may be called the Daughters of Sorrow; they are always hatching, but never exiſt. 'Tis therefore a ridiculous Thing to make the chief Good conſiſt in that which has no Eſſence of it ſelf, but only ſprings from our Miſeries and Neceſſities. He moreover proves it by other Reaſons no leſs ſolid, which may be ſeen in their proper Place.

What Pleaſures are.

He does not content himſelf to ſhew wherein the chief Good is not to be found; * he alſo teaches where

* In his *Phileb.* which is entirely employ'd on this Subject. And in the 6th Book of his Republick.

it is; and the Force of his Reaſoning is preciſely this: The chief Good muſt be perfect, ſelf-exiſtent, ſelf-ſufficient, the firſt and laſt End of all Things, and the only Scope of all Mankind in general. Knowledge or Pleaſure are the only Things in which one can with any Shadow of Reaſon make the chief Good conſiſt; but it can neither be found in Knowledge without Pleaſure, nor in Pleaſure without Knowledge: It muſt therefore of Neceſſity conſiſt in that which unites theſe two Things together, and poſſeſſes them in the higheſt Degree; and that is God.

Nay, ſays he, * That Knowledge and Truth of which God is the Cauſe, can't be the chief Good, *for they are infinitely leſs beautiful and leſs perfect than God, whoſe Image they do but very imperfectly repreſent; as Light is but a very imperfect Repreſentation of the Sun. So that the ſupreme Good being greater, more auguſt, and more perfect than Truth and Knowledge, can be no other than God himſelf.* † Therefore it is not to be found but in God, who is the ſole Treaſure and Perfection of Light, and the Author of true and ſolid Pleaſures. Whence he infers, that while we are on Earth, we can't acquire this chief Good but after an imperfect Manner, and ſhall not enjoy it fully till after Death; becauſe we can't till then know clearly what we knew only obſcurely during this Life: And this is one of his Proofs for the Immortality of the Soul; namely, becauſe it is capable of Action and Knowledge after Death.

But 'tis not enough for a Philoſopher to point out the ſupreme Good, unleſs he alſo ſhew the Way of obtaining it; and this is what *Plato* does with marvellous Solidity. For he proves that to be Happy, we muſt be united to God; that in order to be united to him, we muſt reſemble him in Holineſs and Righteouſneſs; that to obtain theſe Gifts at his Hand, we muſt aſk them in Prayer, and that our Prayers ought to be animated with Love;

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* In the 6th Book of the Republick, Tom. 2.
† In his *Phædon*.

which

* which he calls the ſureſt and moſt effectual Courſe Men can take to lead them to Happineſs: For a bleſſed Immortality is the Fruit of Love. Therefore a learned Interpreter of *Plato* highly commends *Socrates* for having known, that to raiſe our Souls to the Enjoyment of God, we muſt take Reaſon and Love for our Guides. Reaſon teaches us the right Way, and hinders us from wandering out of it, and Love by its ſweet Perſuaſions, and inſinuating Graces, makes us find all Things eaſy, and ſoftens the Labour and Toil, which is inſeparable from the Conflicts we muſt go through.

Maximus Tyrius.

† He ſhews, there is nothing more natural to Mankind than Love. They naturally love every Thing that is fair and beautiful, becauſe their Souls are deriv'd from the very Source of Beauty. But every Thing that in ſome ſort reſembles this primitive Beauty, moves them more or leſs, according as their Souls are more or leſs ſtrictly united to their Bodies. So that thoſe whoſe Souls are moſt diſingaged in every Beauty, adore that Sovereign Beauty whoſe compleat Idea they have, and for which indeed they were born. And this Adoration produces in them Temperance, Fortitude, Wiſdom, and all other Virtues. But thoſe who ſink down and wallow in Matter, and no longer preſerve any Idea of the Sovereign Beauty, run furiouſly after imperfect and tranſitory Beauties; and without Fear or Wit plunge themſelves into all Sorts of Filthineſs and Impurity.

I can't here ſtand to remark on each Subject the great Truths which are taught by this Philoſopher, and deſerve our Attention: What I propos'd to my ſelf, was only to relate a few of them; to give ſome Idea of them, and hereby to excite the Curioſity of the Reader: The reſt will be more advantagiouſly ſeen in their Source.

Plato regulates all the Civil Actions of Life.

After he has with wonderful Accuracy eſtabliſhed all that relates to religious Worſhip, he in like Manner provides for what concerns civil Matters

* In his Banquet. † In his *Phædon*.

He

He creates Magiſtrates, propoſes Laws, and forgets nothing that may augment and ſecure the Welfare of the Commonwealth: For he is not content only to regulate Marriages, Divorces, the Education of Children, Wills, Guardianſhips, War, Peace, and other principal Matters; but deſcends into a ſurprizing Particularity. And as we may obſerve that God has not left ſo much as one Part of the Univerſe, without imprinting on it the Characters of his Godhead, that Men might by no Means be ignorant of it; ſo *Plato* has not left any part of human Life, whether private or publick, without a Regulation by ſome Precept or Law, to prevent the Commiſſion of Faults and Injuries in it.

* He determines what ought to be done with any Thing one finds, which another has loſt. He ſays, *If he ſhould find a Treaſure, he would not touch it, till he had conſulted the Diviners, and they had aſſured him he might appropriate it to himſelf. This Treaſure* (ſays he) *has ſome Owner; we muſt therefore wait till this Owner, or his Heirs, come to demand it; for we ought to obey the Law which ſays, Thou ſhalt not take away that which thou haſt not laid down, and that other Law which is no leſs ancient, Thou ſhalt not take another Man's Goods. This Treaſure in our Coffers is not ſo valuable as the progreſs we make in Virtue and Juſtice, when we have the courage to deſpiſe it. Beſides, if we appropriate it to our own uſe, 'tis a Spring of Curſes to our Families.*

The Duty of ſuch as find a Treaſure.

Becauſe Injuſtice reigns chiefly in Trade, he is unmindful of nothing that may prevent it; and goes ſo far as to forbid the Seller † *to make two Words, and falſly to commend what he is about to ſell*

Trade.

* Eleventh Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

† *Solomon* condemn'd the ſame Abuſe in the Buyer who ſlights what he is buying and after he has got it, boaſts as if he had out witted the Seller. *It is naught, it is naught* (ſaith the Buyer) *but when he is gone his way, then he boaſts*, Prov. 20. 14.

To

Travelling.

To prevent the Manners of Foreigners from corrupting those of his Citizens, and that when these are corrupted the Laws may not be render'd useless by them, he does not permit every one to travel indifferently; but is for having the State make Choice of those to whom this Liberty shall be granted. They must be above 40 Years of Age; they must be Men of Sobriety and Wisdom, and capable of remarking what is good in other Commonwealths; and they must make a faithful Report of Things at their Return; that the Laws that are received may be augmented or corrected by their Memoirs, and the Government by this Means be brought to greater Perfection.

The Origin of Feasts, Shows, Musick, &c.

Men rejoice when they are happy, and think themselves happy when they rejoice. Hence it is that they have such a Propension to Pleasure. God compassionately accommodates himself to this so natural Inclination, and extracting Good out of Evil, makes use of it as a very proper Means to confirm Men in what is Good, and that they might never lose Sight of the Religion which he established. So that to hinder them from throwing themselves into those Excesses to which Nature when abandon'd to it self carries them, he was pleased to institute Feasts for his People by *Moses*, and order'd him to regulate every Thing to be observ'd in them. Tradition had preserv'd some Remembrance of these Institutions, for some Vestiges of them are found in *Plato* who attributes them to the *Egyptians* in his 2d Book of *Laws*, where he complains of the too great Liberty that was allow'd the Poets in all the Cities of *Greece*, to keep young People under the Conduct of very pernicious Maxims by their Verses. He affirms that it was otherwise in *Egypt*, where there were very wise Laws to

* Tom. 2.

hinder this Corruption. "The ancient *Egyptians* (ſays he) knew that "Children ought to be early accuſtom'd "to ſuch Geſtures, Looks and Motions, "as are honeſt and decent; and that "they ſhould not be ſuffer'd, either to "hear or learn any other Verſes or Songs, but ſuch as "were fit to inſpire them with Virtue. Therefore they "took Care to regulate the Dances and Songs that be-"long'd to their Feaſts and Sacrifices. Nay, they "puſh'd this Matter yet farther; for they never ſuffer'd "any Painters or Statuaries to innovate any Thing in "their Art, to invent any new Subjects, or any new "Habits. And hence it is (ſays he) that in reſpect of "what concerns theſe Arts and Muſick, you ſhall find "no Work throughout all *Egypt* that has been made "for ten thouſand Years paſt, which is form'd any other-"wiſe than thoſe Pieces which are made at preſent. "They are all alike, they are neither fairer, nor more "deform'd. The Art remains ſtill the ſame, the Rules "of it the ſame. And there is nothing more admi-"rable, or more worthy of a good Lawgiver, and of a "wiſe Adminiſtrator of Governments, than to have "regulated and fixed all theſe Matters that have a regard "to Pleaſure, and particularly that which reſpects "Muſick: And to do this, is the Work either of God "himſelf, or of ſome divine Man. So that all their "Dances, all their Poeſy, all their Songs were ſancti-"fied; and not the leaſt Thing was ſuffer'd which did "not anſwer the Deſign of the eſtabliſhed Religion, and "which was not worthy of the Feaſts that were cele-"brated by them." This indeed is a very remarkable Tradition; and *Plato* does not fail to make a very good Improvement of it; for he purſues the ſame Deſign, and inſtitutes Feaſts for his People, that during the Time of their Relaxation from Labour, they might render Homage to God, and teſtify their Gratitude to him for all the Benefits they received from his divine Hand. He ſuffers nothing to be acted at theſe Feaſts, but what was ſacred or Innocent. He forbids all ſuch Poetry and Muſick

The care which the ancient *Egyptians* took to prevent all ſorts of Novelties.

Muſick as might be injurious to the Honour of God, or dangerous to the Manners of Men; and only receives ſuch as might tend to rectify and inſtruct the Minds of the People. The ancient *Hebrews* uſed only Lyrick Poeſy, which in ſinging the Praiſes of God, and thoſe of virtuous Men, raiſes the Courage, and excites Devotion. And this was alſo the only kind of Poeſy in uſe among the firſt *Greeks*, as appears by a Paſſage of *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe of Muſick. *The ancient* Greeks (ſays he) *were unacquainted with the Muſick of the Theatre, they employ'd this Art only in honouring the Gods, and in inſtructing of Youth; for there were then no Theatres in their Cities, Muſick was reſerv'd for the Temples, where the Gods were honour'd in Songs, and where the praiſes of virtuous Men were ſung.* While *Plato* authorizes this Lyrick Poeſy, he alſo receives other Poems which were already eſtabliſhed, and which 'twas impoſſible to extirpate and deſtroy: But we ſhall ſee what Precautions he takes to purge and to diſcharge them of that Poiſon which render'd them ſo dangerous.

The Poeſy of the ancient *Hebrews*.

The Poeſy of the firſt *Greeks*

The *Greeks* being extremely addicted to the Pleaſure of Muſick, this inordinate Paſſion had made them receive all the Works of Poets and Muſicians; which had at laſt ſo alter'd and transform'd the ancient * Poeſy and Muſick, that inſtead of that Wiſdom, Gravity, and Sanctity, that reign'd in the Pleaſures of their Anceſtors, nothing was found in theirs but Folly, Effeminacy, and Impiety. *Plato* therefore ſeeks to re-eſtabliſh this ancient Purity, and is for a perpetual Prohibition of any Alteration in Muſick. *It is not to be imagin'd* (ſays he) *what a Weight and Force there is in Plays and other Pleaſures, either for the Support or Ruin of Diſcipline and Laws. If Alte-*

Of what Importance it is to regulate Plays, and the Pleaſures of the People.

* Seventh Book of Laws, Tom 2.

rations

rations be ſuffer'd continually to be made in them; and young People be continually accuſtom'd to new pleaſures, every day to have new pieces, new ornaments, and dances; and to eſteem none but thoſe who can furniſh this unlimited Variety: There can be nothing more pernicious to a State, for this inſenſibly changes the Manners of young People; ſo that they can no longer endure any Thing that is ancient, and only value Novelties; and this opens a Door to all the moſt dangerous Errors both in reſpect of Politicks and Religion.

The pernicious conſequences of the Guſt Men have for Novelties.

Theſe Alterations are dangerous in every Thing, but eſpecially in Muſick, becauſe all Muſick being an Imitation, that only ought to be ſuffer'd, which imitates what is good and uſeful; the other being rather a Plague than a Play, which he explains after a ſenſible Manner by this Example, which appears to me to deſerve our Attention.

The Way *Plato* takes to illuſtrate the Horror of pernicious Plays.

* *If we ſhould ſee* (ſays he) *at our Sacrifices, after the Victims were conſumed in the Fire, a Man approach the Altars, and extravagantly utter Blaſphemies and Impieties; ſhould we not think all his Family would look upon this as a great Misfortune, and a very fatal Omen? That which is done in our Time in the publick Shows and Plays, is not much different from this. For after the Magiſtrates have ſacrificed, we ſee divers Choirs of Muſick come, and in the View of our Temples and Altars they utter moſt execrable Things againſt theſe very Altars, contradict the Principles of Religion by their impious Maxims, and affect the Souls of their Auditors by their indecent Expreſſions, laſcivious Dances, and their effeminate and voluptuous Tunes. Ought not this then to be aboliſh'd, and the Poets oblig'd to ſubmit to other Rules?* † *And ſince all Poets are not capable of*

* Tom. 2.

† This Paſſage is taken out of the 3d Book of his *Repub.*

knowing what is truly excellent and good; ought we not to make choice of such, who in their Imitations can follow the Idea of Beauty and Decency? That young People may receive Improvement by every thing, as being in a very advantageous place, and that all which strikes their Eyes and Ears arising from a good Fund, that is, from a Subject which is excellent in it self, may be like a good Air, which having pass'd through wholesome places, carries Health along with it, and may insensibly accustom them to love and imitate those Discourses, and conform all the Actions of their Lives to them.

To this Purpose he makes the following Law. * *Let none be so insolent as to sing any thing besides our sacred Hymns, or to alter and vary the received Dances any more than our other Laws. And if any one disobey this Statute, let the Conservators of the Laws, together with the Priests and Priestesses, take cognizance of it.*

To this Law he added another: † *Let no Poet in his Imitations depart from any of the Maxims which the City has received as Good and Just; nor let him presume to shew his Compositions to any private Man,* ‖ *till they have been seen and approv'd by Judges establish'd for that purpose, and by the Conservators of the Laws.*

Judges established to judge of them.

Judges appointed to judge of Fables.

In the second Book of the Republick, he had made the same Law for those Poets who compos'd the Fables that were taught to Children: He was for having Judges to approve the Good, and reject the Evil.

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* The 7th Book of Laws about Songs and Dances.

† Tom. 2. A Law about Poetry, and Poetical Imitations.

‖ *Plato* took this too from the Tradition of the ancient *Hebrews*, for they had Judges appointed to try all new Pieces which were made either in Prose or Verse; and these received only such as were conformable to Religion, and rejected the rest. They also prohibited the singing of Hymns and Songs by any other than the common and received Tunes. *Euseb. Præparat. Evangel.* XII. 22. & 23.

He

* He uſes the ſame Precautions about Comedies and Tragedies, as he does about Songs, Dances, and all other Imitations. He thinks Comedies neceſſary to make Men know what is ridiculous, and to expoſe Vices that are repreſented in them. *For* (ſays he) *one can't know what is comely and ſerious, unleſs one knows what is indecent and ridiculous. And to acquire Prudence and Wiſdom, we muſt know their Contraries. Not that any Man who has any Tincture of Virtue can equally do what is good and evil, decent and indecent, but it's needful he ſhould know theſe Things, for fear he ſhould through Ignorance fall into what is ridiculous, and ſhould do or ſay any thing unbecoming him. But we'll make uſe only of Slaves or mercenary Strangers, to make theſe Imitations, and all free Men and Women ſhall be forbidden to be concern'd in them, or to learn them.*

Comedies judg'd neceſſary, and why.

As for Tragical Poets (ſays he) *who boaſt of imitating great and ſerious Actions; when any of them come into our City, and ask if we are willing to receive them among us, and ſee their Tragedies, what anſwer ſhall we make theſe divine Men? Methinks we ought to make them this Return: Friends, we are employ'd in Tragedies as well as you, and we make the beſt and fineſt we can, for our Policy is only an Imitation of the moſt refin'd and excellent way of living; this is the true ſort of Tragedy, with which we are acquainted. So if you are Poets, we pretend to the ſame Thing, and declare our ſelves your Rivals in that noble Imitation which can be perfected only by the Law. Therefore do not hope to be ſo eaſily permitted to build Theatres in our publick places, and to introduce ſkilful Actors that ſhall extend their Voices beyond ours, and tell our Wives and Children, and all the people on the ſame Subjects, things directly oppoſite to our Inſtructions. We muſt be quite*

Tragedies, how received.

Thoſe Poets, who in their Writings contradicted receiv'd Maxims, condemned.

* Seventh Book of Laws.

deſtitute of common Senſe, before we can give you permiſſion to act, till the eſtabliſhed Judges have determined whether what you ſay is good and uſeful, and whether it ought to be made publick or not. Therefore, you tender Darlings of the ſoft Muſes, put your Compoſitions into the Hands of the Judges, who will compare them with ours; and if what you ſay is better than what we ſay, we'll give you Leave to act; otherwiſe it can't poſſibly be done, and therefore 'tis in vain to expect it.

Plato has treated this Buſineſs of Plays and Shows thoroughly, becauſe 'tis a very important Matter in Relation to States; all he ſays of it is admirable, and deſerves to be carefully recollected. What I have recited is ſufficient to give a juſt Idea of it: Wiſe Men may make on it what Reflections they think fit. My Scope has been only to ſhew that *Plato*, after the Example of *Moſes*, would permit only ſuch Divertiſements as were decent, and tended to ſupport Religion, or at leaſt were not contrary to it. They who are for advancing farther, and for particularly examining the Conformity the Laws of *Plato* have in many Things with thoſe that were given the People of God, will ſtill better diſcover this Reſemblance; which made *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſay, that *Moſes* aſſiſted *Plato* in making his Laws; and that *Plato* was only *Moſes* ſpeaking the *Attick* Language. Not but that ſome Laws are to be found in *Plato* very remote from the Spirit of *Moſes*, and very contrary to Equity: But the Number of them is but ſmall.

The Emperor *Marcus Aurelius* had Reaſon to ſay, That *ſuch a Commonwealth as* Plato's *is not to be expected in this World.* Not but that there had already been one which was ſtill better, and more wiſely conſtituted; and when *Antoninus* ſaid this, there was one infinitely more perfect, of which the former was but a Shadow: But it was the Work of God; and none but God can put this Idea into Act, becauſe 'tis only he that can change the Hearts of Men: Of which we have a very evident Proof. A great Emperor had a Mind to eſtabliſh *Plato*'s Republick in his Territories, to which Purpo

Purpoſe he employ'd divers Philoſophers whoſe Knowledge was very extenſive, and their Eloquence very perſuaſive: But all his Efforts were in vain, he could never gain his End ſo much as to eſtabliſh it in one ſingle Village; whereas the Chriſtian Religion was eſtabliſhed by the Miniſtry of illiterate Men, and that in ſpite of the Emperors themſelves.

As for Phyſicks, in which alſo Metaphyſicks are comprehended; *Plato* in the firſt Place acknowledges that ſince we are but Men, we muſt not hope perfectly to gain the Knowledge of Nature, and that all a Philoſopher can do, is to find out Probabilities; pure and ſimple Truths being only known to God, who alone can diſcover 'em to Men. After this Acknowledgment he divides Nature into two Parts, *Spirit* which acts, and *Matter* upon which it acts. Phyſicks.

He calls the Spirit which acts, a Being eternal, infinite, very good, immutable, which hath neither Beginning nor End, but is always the ſame; and he calls Matter, a Maſs without Form and void, which is always ready to be produc'd, and never exiſts. His * Words are remarkable: *Firſt* (ſays he) *all theſe things ought to be well diſtinguiſhed, and we muſt well eſtabliſh what it is that always exiſts, and is never produc'd; and what it is that never exiſts, and is always producing. The firſt is not conceived but by the Underſtanding aſſiſted by Reaſon. This we diſcern to be always one and the ſame. And the other is only opinable, that is, known by Opinion, aſſiſted by the Sentiment diveſted of Reaſon; which we ſee to be always producing, and dying without ever exiſting.* Therefore he gives Matter the Name of *Other*, becauſe of the continual Changes it undergoes: He alſo gives it the Name of *Neceſſity* becauſe it only follows the Order and Determination of the Spirit which governs it. Matter, how known. Why called *Other* and *Neceſſity*.

* In *Timæus*, Tom. 3.

He alſo ſometimes calls Matter *Eternal*, which has given Occaſion to ſome to accuſe him of believing it to have been with God from all Eternity. But a Philoſopher who in ſo many Places maintains the Unity of God, could not fall into ſo groſs an Error: If Matter were Eternal, it muſt then be God, and ſo there would be two Gods, contrary to what he had laid down. When therefore *Plato* calls Matter *Eternal*, he would not be underſtood as if it viſibly ſubſiſted from all Eternity, but that it ſubſiſted intelligibly in the eternal Idea of God; and in this Reſpect the World is ſometimes ſaid to be *Eternal*. Let us ſee the very Terms *Plato* uſes, which will leave us no Room to doubt what his Thoughts were. *The pattern of the World* (ſays he*) *is from all Eternity; and the World, this viſible World, is from the beginning of Time, and will always thus ſubſiſt alone.* *Plato* could not think Matter to be Eternal, ſeeing he affirms the Soul to be older than the Body; for if the Soul is older than the Body, the Body muſt needs have been created, and conſequently cannot be Eternal. And for this Reaſon he calls God the Father, or Creator, and Former of the World. By the Quality of Creator he ſignifies that he made the World out of nothing, and by that of Former he ſignifies, that God, after he had created it, gave it its Form and orderly Diſpoſition. *Plato* derived this Idea from the Tradition of the *Hebrews*, of which the *Greeks* had ſome Knowledge long before him; as appears from *Heſiod*'s ſpeaking of the Birth of the Chaos. Perhaps alſo he had read theſe Words in the Prophecy of † *Iſaiah*; *God himſelf that formed the Earth and made it, he hath eſtabliſhed it.*

How ſaid to be Eternal.

The World made out of nothing.

Of this created Matter, God formed the World, by ſeparating and diſpoſing the Elements; which having ſimple Qualities of themſelves, form by their different

* In his *Timæus*, Tom. 3.
† Chap. 45. 18.

Union,

Union, and various Figures, an infinite Number of compounded Qualities: For Matter is divisible to Infinity.

The Universe must necessarily comprehend all sensible Things; from whence *Plato* draws three Consequences: The first is, that it can be but one; for there can be nothing beyond All. The second is, that it is of a Spherical Figure; because, besides that *that* is the most perfect of all Figures, 'tis the only one that can agree to a Being that comprehends any Thing. And the third is, that it can have no End but only by the Will of him who form'd it; for since the Change of all Beings can never proceed but from that which is without 'em, and since there is nothing out of the World, there is by consequence nothing that can destroy it but God, in whom alone the World is contained.

Seeing the two first Qualities of the World are to be visible and palpable; and since there is nothing visible without Fire, nor solid without Earth; *Plato* says God at first created Earth and Fire. In which one may discern some Vestiges of those Words in *Genesis*, *In the Beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth.* For by the Heavens here most Interpreters understand the Empyrean Heaven, and not the Firmament.

It was very difficult, or rather impossible, that two Things so contrary should be long united. Therefore * God contriv'd a Way to hold them together by a *Medium*, which partaking of the Nature of them both, should make one *Whole* of them together with it self. But if one *Medium* is sufficient to join plain Points and Numbers, two are necessary to join solid Numbers. For Example; the Numbers Six and Twenty-four, which are alike plain Numbers, may be united by one sole *Medium*, which is Twelve; that is to say, Twelve is the proportional Number, or *Mean*, between Six and Twenty-four: In like manner between Nine and Sixteen, the proportional Number is Twelve.

The Numbers Eighteen and Fifty-four are alike solid Numbers, which cannot be united by one *Medium*; that

* In *Timæus*, Tom. 3.

is, one cannot find one ſole proportional Number or Mean to 'em: So that there's Need of two; as Twenty-four and Thirty-ſix: For Fifty-four is to Thirty-ſix, as Thirty-ſix is to Twenty-four, and as Twenty-four is to Eighteen.

'Tis the ſame with plain and ſolid Dimenſions. If the World could have been plain, one *Medium* would have been ſufficient for it; but being round, it has Need of two to unite it. And 'tis for this Reaſon that *Plato* ſays God put Air and Water between Fire and Earth; for the ſame Proportion that is between Water and Earth, is between Air and Fire: This proportional Bond is the Divine Bond that renders the World ſo ſolid, that it can never have an End but only by the Will of him who is the Author of it; on the contrary, the Alteration and Age of its Parts, ſerve to ſupport and renew it.

But though the World in this State was ſolid, yet it ſtill wanted Perfection, for no Body is perfect without Intelligence. Therefore God, who deſign'd the Univerſe ſhould be as perfect as it could be, gave it a Spirit, which *Plato* calls the Soul of the World, which governs in it, and preſerves Harmony in it, maugre the Diſcord of the Elements. He ſays this Soul was created before the World; and perhaps he imagin'd this from a Miſconſtruction of thoſe Words in *Geneſis*, *And the Spirit of God moved upon the Face of the Waters.* 'Tis true, he alſo calls this Soul Proportion and Symmetry; which might induce one to ſuppoſe that he means nothing elſe by it, but the juſt Temperament of the Elements themſelves: But the Definition he gives of the Soul, will not ſuffer his Words to be taken in this Senſe; for he ſays 'tis a Subſtance that participates of the indiviſible Subſtance, a Compoſition of *the ſame* and *the other*; that is, of the firſt Matter, and the Univerſal Spirit: and hereby he would ſhew that Matter was a *Medium* that contained an Immortal, Immaterial, and conſequently Indiviſible Spirit, and an Animal and Corporeal Spirit: Juſt like our Bodies, which are compos'd of three Things, of *the ſame*, of *the other*, and of *Subſtance*, which he explains by very obſcure Examples taken from Numbers

and

and Muſick. And herein *Plato*'s Error conſiſted, namely, in giving the World a Soul like ours, and ſtill more perfect. Therefore he calls the World God, but a *God that is created and diſſoluble*. So that he was ſo far however from confounding Nature with God himſelf, that he has thoroughly diſtinguiſhed them: For he calls God alone *the efficient Cauſe or Power*; and he calls Nature *the Conſequent, which obeys the firſt Cauſe for the Creation of Beings*; and * ſubjects it entirely to the Government of that firſt Cauſe. *Plato* did not content himſelf in giving the World a Soul, he alſo gives one to the Heavens and to the Stars. And perhaps this falſe Idea of his, was occaſion'd by his miſunderſtanding of ſome Paſſages of the Prophets; for Inſtance, that which God ſays in *Iſaiah* †, *I have commanded all the Hoſt of the Heavens*. Or it may be, this Language of *Plato*'s is only poetical; and being *Homer*'s Scholar and Rival, he was willing to animate every Thing like his Maſter, who inſpires Life into the moſt inſenſible Beings, inſomuch that he gives a Soul to a Spear. And the Holy Prophets ſometimes ſpeak after the ſame Manner.

Thus Time and Motion had a Beginning.

All the Pagan Philoſophers before *Plato* had taught that Motion, and conſequently that Time was Eternal; and it was on this Principle that *Democritus* founded his Arguments, when he maintain'd that all could not be created, and thence inferr'd the Eternity of the World. *Plato* was the firſt who by a Beam of Truth diſcover'd through this thick Darkneſs, that Time and Motion had a Beginning as well as the Univerſe. For it being impoſſible that Matter ſhould be of it ſelf, as one muſt be forc'd to acknowledge, neither is it any more poſſible for Motion either to exiſt of it ſelf, or to be a Quality affix'd to Matter, which then would never reſt: Motion therefore muſt proceed from without, and was imprinted on Matter by the ſame Spirit that created it. *Plato* was ſo deeply ſenſible of this Truth, that he made

* In his *Phileb.* Tom. 2. † Chap. 45. 12.

uſe of it to diſſipate the Errors of that ſenſeleſs Philoſophy which had reign'd to his Time: Now he ſays, when God had created the World, and communicated to it the Motion that was moſt ſuitable, * *He was extremely pleaſed to ſee his Work move, live, and almoſt reſemble the Immortal Gods themſelves.* (And for this Reaſon *Plato* calls it God.) *And he would have render'd it more conformable to his eternal Idea, but that it was impoſſible to communicate Eternity to a created Being; therefore he took this Expedient to create as it were a moving Image of Eternity. And in diſpoſing the Heavens he made this Image of Eternity, which is permanent in Being only; this Image, which goes on by Numbers, that is to ſay, Time, which did not ſubſiſt before the Creation of the World.* Time not being capable of ſubſiſting but with Motion, whereas Eternity ſubſiſts alone by it ſelf, without being either old or young; and 'tis only of this that one can properly ſay *it is:* The Terms of paſt, preſent, and future, cannot agree to it, becauſe they are fluid parts of Time, whoſe Property it is to be always juſt producing, but never exiſting.

The improper Language Men uſe about the Eternal Being.

We don't perceive (continues he) *that we very unfitly attribute to the Eternal Being theſe parts of Time, and the Terms* IT WAS *and* IT SHALL BE, *for we ſay of this true Being,* It was, is, and is to come. *But we ought always to ſay,* It is; *for this only agrees to it according to true Reaſon:* It was, *and* it ſhall be, *ought never to be ſaid but of that which is produced in Time. Theſe are but Motions, that which always is, and is always the ſame, without any Change, can't be called either Old or Young at any Time, nor receive any of the Modes which Birth or Production affixes to Things that are moveable, and the Objects of Senſe; theſe are the parts of Time which imitate Eternity, and proceeds by Number and Meaſure, &c. So that Time was created with the Heavens, that a*

* In his *Timæus*, Tom. 3.

the

they were produc'd together, ſo they might end together, if ever they come to be diſſolved.

This Truth is confirm'd by the Writings of the Saints, who teach that Time and Motion had a Beginning, and muſt have an End. The Beauty of this Diſcovery, and the Strength of this Proof, which may be called a Demonſtration, did not hinder *Ariſtotle* from contradicting his Maſter in this Point, and from maintaining his Error by the following Argument, which has nothing of Solidity in it. *If it be altogether impoſſible* (ſays he) *that there is, or can be imagined a Time without a preſent Inſtant; and if it be true, as it cannot be denied, that the preſent Inſtant is a ſort of* Medium *which has a beginning and end, a beginning of the Future, and an end of the Paſt; Time muſt neceſſarily be from all Eternity, becauſe the moſt remote Time one can take, is in ſome preſent Inſtant; for in Time one can only take the preſent Inſtant: So that ſeeing the preſent Inſtant is a beginning and end, Time muſt needs have been from all Eternity; no perſon being able to aſſign a Time which has not been preceded by Time, and ſo* ad infinitum. *And if Time is eternal, Motion muſt be ſo too, ſince Time is only a paſſion of motion.*

Ariſtotle's very ſubtile and falſe way of arguing, in the 1ſt Chap. of his Phyſicks.

This is the Language of a Philoſopher, ſo blind that he could not conceive that the World was created, and that before the Creation there was neither Time nor Motion, but Eternity, in which nothing ran from the preſent to the paſt, but all was preſent and ſtable: God alone being before Time, in whom there is no ſucceſſive Courſe either of Time or Motion.

Eternity admits of neither Time nor Motion.

Before we purſue this Matter, we muſt explain what *Plato* means, when he ſays God created the World according to that Eternal Pattern which he had conceived in himſelf, as an able Workman has in his Head the whole Diſpoſition and Form of his Work before he begins it; ſo that he works according to his Idea after ſuch a Manner that what he performs is (if I may ſo

What *Plato*'s Ideas were.

ſay) only the Copy of that Original which he has imagined; the whole Work that ſubſiſts being a mere Imitation. After the like Manner, God in creating the World only executed that eternal Idea he had conceived of it; for the World and all that it contains exiſted intelligibly in God, before it exiſted really in Nature. This is the Meaning of *Plato*'s Ideas which the *Pythagoreans* and he had taken out of the Hiſtory of the *Hebrews*; where we ſee God gives *Moſes* the Models of all thoſe Works he would have him make: But it ought to be remember'd, that theſe Ideas are univerſal, and not particular; that is, they comprehend the Species, as *Man*, and not the Individuals, as *Alexander*: And it muſt farther be minded, that they are not a Being ſeparate from God, but are in God. This is the Immaterial and Eternal Original upon which every Thing was made, and indeed is nothing but the Divine Knowledge, the firſt Cauſe of all created Beings; for thoſe Ideas are in God his Notions, which are eternal and perfect of themſelves: And as *Alcinous* ſays, *Idea with reference to God is the Eternal Intelligence, and with reſpect to us, it is the firſt Intelligible; in reference to Matter it is Meaſure, in reference to the Univerſe, 'tis the Exemplar, and in reſpect to it ſelf it is Eſſence.* If *Ariſtotle* had rightly underſtood this Doctrine, he would not have oppos'd it, nor have given ſo raſh a Deciſion as he has done, affirming, that to eſtabliſh theſe Ideas as the Exemplars of ſenſible Things, is *to ſpeak to no purpoſe, and to amuſe one's ſelf in imagining poetick Metaphors.* * *Euſebius* was better acquainted with the Excellency of it; for he ſays in expreſs Terms, that this Doctrine, which teaches that there is an Intelligence which has taken all Things from incorporeal Ideas, which are their Patterns, was conceived by *Plato* with a great deal

The Origin of thoſe Ideas.

Ariſtotle conceived thoſe Ideas as Eſſences ſeparate from God.

* In *Præpar. Evang.* Lib. 3. Cap. 6.

of

of Reaſon, and by very juſt and neceſſary Conſequences.

When God was pleas'd to create Time, he created the Sun and Moon, whoſe Courſe is the Meaſure of Days, Nights, Months, Years, and Seaſons, and gave Motion to the other Celeſtial Spheres. He afterward proceeded to the Creation of Animals, without which the World could not be perfect; and of theſe he was pleas'd to make as many Species as the World had Parts; that is, Celeſtial, Aerial, Aquatile, and Terreſtrial.

The Creation of Angels.

And God created the Dæmons (or Angels) thoſe inferior Intelligences, to whom he gave Order to create three other ſorts of Animals, becauſe if he had created them himſelf they would have been Immortal: For all that proceeds immediately from God, muſt neceſſarily be immortal in its Nature. So that theſe Intelligences created Man, that is, they form'd the human Body, God having reſerved to himſelf the right of giving it a Soul, which he made of the ſame Nature with that of the World, only he made it leſs perfect. *For* (ſays he) *it was not juſt that Man, who was but a part of the Univerſe, ſhould be more perfect than the Univerſe it ſelf, or ſo perfect.* Theſe were *Plato*'s Thoughts on the Creation of Man, and 'tis not difficult to know the Source of this Opinion, in which there is ſuch a Miſture of Truth and Error; for it ſprings from a Miſinterpretation of the Words of *Moſes*. After God had created the Heavens, the Earth, the Stars, and the Celeſtial Intelligences, that is, the Angels; he ſays, *Let us make Man after our own Image.* Upon this the *Egyptians* and *Pythagoreans*, not underſtanding the Myſtery hid under the plural Number, thought God ſpoke to the Intelligences he had created, and ſaid to them, *Let us now make Man after our Image; you in forming that part of him which muſt be mortal, and I in creating that which ſhall be of an immortal Nature.*

He

The Air fill'd with good and evil Angels.

He * maintains as a moſt certain Truth, that as there is an infinite Number of good Angels in the Heavens (that is, in the Air) ſo there is alſo a Multitude of evil ones, that ſeek nothing elſe but how to do Miſchief to Mankind. *Seeing we are agreed* (ſays he) *that the* † *Air is fill'd with good and bad Genii, which are entirely oppoſite to each other,* ‖ *this occaſions an immortal Combat, and requires a continual Attention on our part: The Gods and the Good Angels are ready to help us, for we are their poſſeſſion.*

Plato adds, that God at once created the Souls of all Mankind, who were to live in all Ages of the World, and that he diſtributed them into all the celeſtial Spheres, teaching them the Nature of all Things, and giving them his Eternal Laws which he calls *Deſtiny*, and to which he alſo gives the Name of *Neceſſity*, and ſometimes that of *Fortune*; not that any Thing is fortuitous, but only to denote, that this Deſtiny brings to paſs an infinite Number of Things, which are unforeſeen by us, and which are commonly imputed to Chance, altho' their Cauſe is deſigned and fixed. The Poets underſtood this, when they call'd Deſtiny, ** *that which has been once ſaid.* In which they ſeem to have had ſome Knowledge of what *David* ſays in the 65th Pſalm,

Deſtiny, why call'd Neceſſity and Fortune.

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* In his tenth Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

† *Euſebius* amaz'd and ſurpriz'd at the Beauty of this Paſſage, ſhews that *Plato* could not have it but out of the Book of *Job*, who many Ages before him relates that the Devil appear'd before God with the Good Angels.

‖ A very ſurprizing Truth to be found in the Writings of a Pagan, and the ſame which is admirably explain'd by St. *Paul*, when he ſays, Eph. 6. 12. *For we wreſtle not againſt Fleſh and Blood, but againſt principalities, againſt powers, againſt the Rulers of the Darkneſs of this world, againſt ſpiritual wickedneſs in high places.*

** Quod ſemel dictum eſt. *Horat.*

God

God hath ſpoken once: That is to ſay, he has ſpoken with an immutable Word; for Deſtiny is nothing but that Law which flows from the Will of God. What Deſtiny is.

From this Creation of Souls before their Bodies, *Plato* draws his Opinion of *Reminiſcence*. For if the Soul exiſted before the Body, it muſt have had in it all Notions; and by Conſequence all that we learn through the Courſe of our Life, is only the Remembrance of what we had forgotten. For *to learn* is nothing elſe but to recover the Knowledge we had before we came into the World, and which the Paſſions of the Body made us forget. Reminiſcence.

However *Plato* in his *Menon* ſeems not to be entirely convinc'd of the Truth of this Opinion of *Reminiſcence*; but to perceive that it might be reaſonably objected, that God actually illuminates the Soul, and that by the Light he communicates to it, he renders it capable of ſeeing and learning that which he never ſaw or knew before. And this in all Appearance is the Reaſon, that he does not eſtabliſh it as an abſolute Certainty, but only makes uſe of it to ſhew that we ought not to deſpair of learning that of which we are ignorant.

From the Union of the Body and Soul reſult the Paſſions and Senſations. When the Soul is Miſtreſs, ſhe leads a Life of Temperance and Juſtice; and when ſhe leaves the Body, ſhe returns to the Star to which ſhe was formerly aſſigned; but when ſhe becomes a Slave, and plunges her ſelf into all ſorts of Corruption, ſhe ſuffers a Puniſhment tenfold more than all her Pollutions and Impurities, and after a thouſand Years has the Liberty to chuſe what kind of Life ſhe likes beſt: If ſhe ſtill chuſes to live irregularly, ſhe goes to animate Beaſts, that is, ſhe becomes from Day to Day more and more vile and vicious, which continues till at laſt ſhe comes to acknowledge the Empire of Reaſon, and follows this Guide which is given to her; and ſo by purging her ſelf from The Paſſions and Senſations.

from all the Filth of the Elements, returns to her firſt State.

The Origin of falſe Opinions, Errors, Knowledge and Wiſdom.

Moreover from the ſame Source *Plato* draws the Origin of the falſe Opinions, Errors, and all the Follies of Men, as alſo of their Knowledge and Wiſdom. When the Soul is, as it were, delug'd by the Torrent of Matter, it can no longer diſtinguiſh Truth; and is like a Man going with his Head down, and his Heels up, to whom all Objects are inverted.

When ſhe moderates the Courſe of this Torrent, ſo that what is *the ſame* is neither ſurmounted nor obſcur'd by the Miſts of what he calls *the other*; then ſhe ſees all Things as they are: And being fortified by Study and Experience, penetrates their Cauſes, and by thoſe Means arrives at true Knowledge, and perfect Health, as much as 'tis poſſible in this Life.

Plato afterwards deſcends to the Conſideration of all the Parts of a human Body, to ſhew with what Exactneſs they anſwer the Deſign of Providence. And the Deſcription he makes of it is ſo fine, that *Longinus* calls it divine.

Plato not much skill'd in Anatomy.

The Excellency of this Deſcription does not conſiſt in the Truth of his *Anatomick Diſcoveries*; for, on the contrary, *Plato* ſeems to have been leſs skill'd in *Anatomy* than his Predeceſſors; but it conſiſts in the Elegancy of his Expreſſions, in the juſt Relation he finds between all the Parts of the Body of Man, and in the Reaſons he gives of their different Uſe. One of the great Faults of which he has been reproach'd, was, for having ſaid, that Drink paſſes through the Lungs. *Plutarch* has made an expreſs Treatiſe to juſtify him in this, by the Authority of the Poets, and that of Phyſicians. That of the Poets is too weak; for when a Poet ſpeaks of *watering the Lungs* for *drinking*, he conforms himſelf to the vulgar Opinion and Language: And that of Phyſicians is not ſtrong enough to make an Error paſs

Plato juſtified.

for

for Truth. But indeed *Plutarch* is miſtaken when he affirms this to have been the Sentiment of *Plato*, and of *Hippocrates* too; for neither one nor t'other ever fell into this Error. On the contrary, *Hippocrates* ſays, that Drink does not paſs through the Lungs, but goes into the Stomach, and thence runs into the Bowels: He only aſſerts, that a ſmall inſenſible Part of it ſlides into the *Aſpera Arteria*, only to help to cool the Air which goes into the Lungs; and this likewiſe is what *Plato* means: Nor could he have any other Thought, ſeeing he often in the ſame Treatiſe teaches, that the Stomach is made to receive all that we eat and drink; and that the natural Heat, after it has mix'd, diſſolv'd, and divided the Meat and Drink, ſends the Liquor into the Veins, which carry it to the Heart, and from thence into all the Body by the Pipes that proceed from that Part. And the Diſtribution of this Liquor of the Chyle, which paſſes from the Stomach into the Veins, he calls *Irrigation*. So that 'tis but a ſmall inſenſible Part of what we drink that goes into the Lungs; as *Hippocrates*, and, after him, *Galen*, have juſtified by Experience.

The wonderful Things that belong to the Sight and Hearing, and the Uſe of both.

Plato afterwards treats of the wonderful Things to be obſerv'd in the Sight and Hearing, which are the moſt perfect Senſes. And in explaining the admirable Conſtruction of the Eyes, he diſcovers the Cauſes of Waking and Sleep, and deſcends even to that of Dreams, which may be ſaid to be material. For he ſays they that are in a deep Sleep have either no Dreams, or very ſhort ones; becauſe all their Senſes are at reſt: But they who are but half aſleep, if one may ſo ſpeak, do not fail of having Dreams; becauſe their Senſes being ſtill in Motion, preſerve the Veſtiges of thoſe Things that have mov'd them, and imprint them on the Imagination.

The true Uſe of the Eyes.

He ſays, that the Eyes firſt taught us Philoſophy, which is the greateſt Favour Men can receive from the Hand of God: And he is ſo well perſuaded that they are given us only for this End, that he makes no Difficulty

ficulty of affirming, that if a Man, who does not uſe them to this Purpoſe, becomes blind, he has no Reaſon to complain, becauſe his Eyes having been always uſeleſs to him, he has no Loſs in loſing them. *In truth* (ſays he *) *God has form'd our Eyes only to contemplate the Works of his Providence, and to ſee the regular Motion of the Heavens, which ſo conſtantly obey the Spirit that guides them, that ſo we might accuſtom our ſelves to love that which is Comely and Regular: And that we might learn to regulate all the Motions of our Souls, which are of the ſame Nature with that Divine Intelligence, but are diſorder'd by our paſſions.*

The true Uſe of the Voice and of the Hearing.

He ſays the ſame of the Voice and of the Hearing; that the Tongue and the Ears are given us particularly that we might declare and hear the Wonders to be remark'd in the Works of God; and that Muſick was invented only to furniſh us, if we may ſo ſay, with Rule and Harmony. For becauſe it has a wonderful Relation to all the Motions of our Souls, he ſays, *Wiſe* † *Men make uſe of it, not as 'tis now us'd, for fooliſh, nay, pernicious Mirth; but to calm and moderate the paſſions, and to correct the horrible Diſcords which they occaſion.*

The Formation of the Heart, and its Uſe.

He ſays ‖, the Heart is the Source of the Veins, and the Fountain of the Blood, which runs from thence with a rapid Courſe into all the other Parts; and that it is as it were in a Fort guarded on all Sides; that ſo when the Choler comes to be inflam'd, when Reaſon gives it Notice that it is threaten'd with ſome Miſchief from without by external Cauſes, or from within by the Diſorder or Tumult of the Paſſions; it may ſpeedily warn the whole Body of what paſſes, and diſpoſe it to obey its Orders to prevent the Danger impending. *And becauſe God knew that the unexpected Sight of any terrible thing, and the Motion of the Choler, would make the Heart*

* Tom. 3. † Ibid. ‖ Ibid.

heat violently, he contriv'd a very uſeful Remedy for this ſort of Inflammation, and put the Lungs under it; the ſubſtance of which being ſoft, and not furniſh'd with much Blood, and having little holes within it like a Spunge, ſerves as a pillow to the heart, inceſſantly refreſhes it with the Air and Moiſture which it attracts, and moderates that violent Heat which would otherwiſe conſume it.

The Functions of the Spleen and Liver.

In * the lower Ventricle, where the Nouriſhment is made, are the Spleen and Liver: The Spleen is a hollow and ſoft Subſtance, and conſequently very proper to perform thoſe Functions which it has pleas'd God to aſſign it. For he thought fit, that it ſhould be (not the *Kitchen*, as 'tis expreſs'd in a corrupt Copy, but) *the Spunge to wipe and cleanſe the Inteſtines, and to take off all the Filth which gathers about the Liver in Time of Sickneſs; and this ſwells and puffs it up: As it on the contrary flags, and returns to its former State, when the Body is cleans'd.*

Some have falſly read μαγειρεῖον a Kitchen, for ἐμμαγεῖον, a Spunge.

As for the Liver, he ſays * it was deſtined to a Uſe which deſerves to be related for its Singularity: He tells us, that becauſe God knew when the Spirit was buſy in diſtributing the Aliment in this lower Part of the Belly, it would be but little concern'd in what paſſed in the upper Region, and in the Seat of Reaſon, whoſe Orders it would never hear; he to provide againſt this Inconvenience, made the Liver of a hard Subſtance, having a Mixture of Sweetneſs and Bitterneſs; and of a ſmooth and even Superficies, like a Looking-Glaſs. When the Soul would adviſe this Animal Spirit of what paſſes, ſhe, by means of the Thoughts, imprints in this Superficies the Image of all Things of which ſhe would give it Information; and by theſe Images gives either Joy or Sorrow. When the Soul does not act

* Tom. 3. † Ibid.

upon

upon this Part, but leaves it at Reſt, as during the Time of Sleep, thoſe Gods who form'd the Body, or the great God himſelf, imprints on this ſmooth Superficies the Images of ſuch Things as muſt come to paſs; and theſe Images being carried to the Imagination, produce Divination or Prophecy, the Seat of which the Ancients for this Reaſon plac'd in the Liver: But *This* (ſays he) * *never happens, unleſs it be when that part of the Soul is not in a Condition to obey the Spirit, which ought to guide it; for God has joined Prophecy with Madneſs: And 'tis eaſy to convince any one of this Truth, who conſiders that no Perſon propheſies truly but when he is out of his Senſes, that is, when God, or Sleep, or ſome Diſeaſe, deprive him of the Uſe of Reaſon. And becauſe 'tis only by Reaſon that Men can judge of Things, therefore Prophets never* † *underſtand what they ſee; and we are therefore obliged to have Recourſe to Interpreters, who not being tranſported with paſſion, are capable of explaining what the Prophets have ſeen, by Reaſonings founded on Experience.* But all this Conſtruction of the Liver looks more like one of *Pythagoras*'s Enigma's, than a Phyſical Explication; and ſeems much leſs proper to prove that Prophecy comes from God, than to diſcover that it is the Effect of ſome Vapours of the lower Ventricle, which darken and ſtain the Imagination.

He endeavours to ſhew that God knowing Man would be intemperate in Eating and Drinking, and that nothing would be more capable of deſtroying him before he advanc'd to Ripeneſs of Age, he made, as it were, a Labyrinth of || Bowels in the lower Ventricle, that by their Turnings and Windings the Food might be hinder'd from

Why the Bowels wind about.

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* In his *Timæus*, Tom. 3.

† This is one of *Plato*'s Errors, who abſurdly confounds Prophets divinely inſpir'd, with falſe Prophets, and thereby gave Occaſion to the Error of the *Montaniſts*. True Prophets did not ſpeak by Extaſy, but ſaw and underſtood what they declar'd, and were therefore call'd *Seers*.

|| Tom. 3.

paſſing

paſſing off too ſoon; for if the Bowels were all ſtreight, the Food would be continually paſſing; and Men, by this Means render'd inſatiable, would think of nothing elſe but eating, which would make them uncapable of applying themſelves to Learning and Philoſophy, and would ſpeedily occaſion their Death: The natural Heat not being ſufficient to digeſt ſo much Food, beſides that it would want Time to do it.

After this he explains the Nature and Production of the Fleſh, Blood, Bones, Muſcles, Sinews, Brain, Marrow, and all the other Parts of which our Bodies are compos'd; he calls the Blood *the Food of the Fleſh*, and ſays the whole Body is encompaſs'd with Fleſh, like ſo much ſoft Wool, laid cloſe together, which ſerves to fortify it againſt the Injuries of the Air, and all other Accidents, as Falls, *&c.*

The Conſtruction of the Head.

In ſpeaking of the Conſtruction of the Head, he ſays*, 'tis both the moſt beautiful and weakeſt of all the Parts of the Body. That God indeed could have given Man a Head much better fortified with Bones, Sinews, and Fleſh, which would have extremely prolong'd his Life, as well as made him lead it more commodiouſly: But becauſe it was not poſſible that a Part cover'd over with a very hard Bone, a great many Sinews, and very thick Fleſh, ſhould have a very quick Senſe; and the Head was to be the Seat of Senſe, Reaſon, and Prudence; God having well weigh'd the Advantages of a very ſtrong and robuſt, but ill-contriv'd Body, that is, heavy, and uncapable of Senſe and Prudence, againſt thoſe of a Body more feeble, but more elegant, that is to ſay, lively and ſightſome; he preferr'd this to the other, and choſe to give us a ſhort, rather than a long Life: For the Spirit was not created for the Body, but the Body for the Spirit.

He goes on to ſpeak of Sanguification, Nutrition, Reſpiration, Tranſpiration, natural Heat, the Diminution and Augmentation of the Body, which leads him

* Tom. 3.

to

to ſpeak of Old Age, Diſeaſes, and Death, which happens *when the Machine is worn out, and the Strings that hold it together grow ſlack, and give the Soul liberty to fly out of her priſon with extreme pleaſure.*

As for Diſeaſes, he explains the Cauſes of them by the ſame Principles which *Hippocrates* had eſtabliſh'd before him. For he ſays *, Man being a Compound of the four Elements, Fire, Air, Earth, and Water, or which is the ſame Thing, Cold, Hot, Moiſt, and Dry; the juſt Proportion and even Temperament of theſe four Qualities preſerve Union and Peace, from whence Health reſults; and, on the contrary, their unequal Mixture, which proceeds from Exceſs, Defect, or the Change of the Situation of ſome or other of 'em, produces Diſorder and Diviſion, the only Source of Diſeaſes. For then that which was Cold becomes Hot, that which was Dry, Moiſt; and that which was Heavy, Light; and the Blood being corrupted by this Alteration, as well as the Spirits, and overcharg'd with Acid or Salt Particles; inſtead of producing new to nouriſh the Fleſh, breeds nothing but Choler, Phlegm, and Water, which generate divers ſorts of Fevers and other Diſtempers.

The Diſeaſes of the Soul.

From theſe Diſeaſes of the Body ſpring thoſe of the Soul, which *Plato* divides into two Sorts, that of Folly, and that of Ignorance or Stupidity. Ignorance is properly the Soul's Forgetfulneſs: And when great Pleaſure, or exceſſive Sorrows, take away Knowledge from the Soul, ſo that ſhe is not in a Condition to underſtand any Thing, this is Folly. For Example, a Man whoſe Temper inclines him to Love, is always mad while the Rage of this Paſſion laſts; he is therefore call'd a profligate Perſon, or a Debauchee, as if he willingly plung'd himſelf into this Diſorder: But he ought to be call'd a Fool, and look'd upon as a diſeas'd Perſon; for, according to *Socrates*, no Man is vicious but againſt his Will. This Man is carried away by his

* Tom. 3.

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Conſtitution, and the ill Education he has had. And the ſame may be ſaid of all other ſorts of Senſuality.

The Cauſe of Sorrow.

Sorrow likewiſe proceeds from the Intemperature of the Body; for it is caus'd by an acrimonious Phlegm, and bilious Humours which diſperſe themſelves through the Body, and not finding Vent, obſcure the Soul with their Vapours, diſturb her Motion, and bring grievous Diſtempers upon her, but different according to the Parts on which they fix.

The moral Intemperature of Cities.

To this Intemperature of the Body he joins the Intemperature of whole Cities, which by the pernicious Example of their corrupt Manners, and the wicked Diſcourſe which they ſuffer both in publick and in private, and, in fine, by the little Care they take to have young People well educated, frequently precipitate us into all theſe Miſchiefs. Thus our Corruption comes properly from two Cauſes that are abſolutely involuntary; which render us wicked againſt our Wills, and inſtead of accuſing us, there is Reaſon only to accuſe our Parents and Teachers.

How this Opinion of *Plato*, *That we are wicked againſt our wills*, ought to be underſtood.

What *Plato* ſays of the ill Education of Youth, and the fatal Examples which whole Cities give them, is but too true: But what he adds, that our Corruption is involuntary on our own Part, ought not to be taken in a ſtrict literal Senſe. For as *Ariſtotle* has very well obſerv'd, 'tis a great Error to ſay we are only vicious againſt our Wills. Sound Philoſophy and Religion teach us, that God has given Men a Liberty of chuſing between Good and Evil, and that all virtuous or vicious Actions are purely voluntary. If it were not ſo, it would be unreaſonable to blame Vice, or commend Virtue, nor could any Reaſon be aſſign'd for the Eſtabliſhment of Rewards and Puniſhments, for none can be juſtly praiſed or diſpraiſed only for what he did whether he would or no. How then did *Plato* underſtand this Notion of *Socrates*, to embrace it as he did? Without doubt he underſtood

(and

(and 'tis what *Ariſtotle* did not comprehend) that God has given Men all that Light that is neceſſary to direct 'em to obey the Law of Nature which he has engrav'd in their Hearts; and to inform 'em of certain fundamental Truths, which enlighten the Univerſe like ſo many Torches: But Men have deſpiſed theſe Helps, and by this voluntary Contempt are juſtly fallen into Blindneſs, which hinders 'em from diſtinguiſhing Truth from Error, or at leaſt from obeying it. And thus all the vicious Actions of Men are at the ſame Time voluntary and involuntary; voluntary in their Origin and Source: For 'tis their own Choice that they have thrown off the Yoke of Virtue and Righteouſneſs; and involuntary often in the Execution: For in ſpite of the Remorſe of their Conſciences, they are led away by the miſerable Propenſion of their Hearts, which induces 'em to commit the Evil which they would not do. They are the Slaves of Sin, which rules over 'em, and to the Service of which they have engag'd their Liberty.

Remedies for the Diſeaſes of the Soul.

Plato comes next to ſhew the Remedies that are to be applied againſt theſe two Sorts of Diſeaſes of the Soul and Body; and firſt eſtabliſhes this inconteſtible Maxim, That whatſoever is Good, is Beautiful; that Goodneſs conſiſts in Proportion and Meaſure; and that if this be true in all ſenſible Things, 'tis much more ſo in the Union of the Soul and Body: For from their juſt Proportion ſpring Health and Virtue; as Diſeaſes and Vices are produc'd by the contrary. If the Soul be too ſtrong for the Body, ſhe weakens it, wears it out, and very often cauſes ſuch Maladies as baffle the Art of Phyſicians.

On the other Side, if the Body is ſtronger than the Soul, becauſe it takes Care only of it ſelf, it grows, and fortifies it ſelf daily, and leaves the Soul in an Oblivion and, as it were, in a Lethargy, which brings on her Stupidity and Ignorance which ſhe cannot diſſipate. Therefore to preſerve the Health of both Parts, they both of 'em ought to be equally exerciſed. He that applies himſelf to Study, ought not to deſpiſe the Exerciſes of the Body

Body; and he who makes bodily Exerciſes his principal Buſineſs, ought not to neglect Meditation and Study. But in theſe two States we muſt take great Care not to go from one Extreme to another; not to paſs ſuddenly, for inſtance, from great Reſt to great Labour. We ſhould imitate Nature, whoſe Motions are always equal, without Catches, and Shocks. Now of all Motions the moſt ſalutary is that which is made of one's ſelf in one's ſelf; becauſe 'tis natural. That which comes from another Body, is detrimental; and the moſt miſchievous of all is that which by means of external Bodies removes by Parts a Body which was at Reſt.

Hence it follows, that the beſt Remedy, and moſt wholeſome Purgative, is Exerciſe, that is to ſay, that which they call * *Gymnaſtick:* After this comes the Exerciſe of the Horſe, or that of being carried any other Way, as in a Litter or Boat, which the Ancients call'd *Vectatio*; for this Exerciſe is compos'd of Motion and Reſt. The third Sort is not good, but in preſſing Neceſſity, and no Man of Senſe will ever uſe it but in an Extremity; ſuch are medicinal Purges: For we ſhould never irritate thoſe Diſeaſes that are not dangerous, by ſuch kind of Medicines. The Formation of Diſeaſes is like that of Animals, they require a certain Space of Time to bring 'em to Perfection; they have their Periods, and if we attempt to oppoſe 'em by violent Remedies before the Time of their Declenſion, we often make many Diſtempers of one, or of a ſlight Diſeaſe an incurable one. We ought to prevent or attack them by a good Regimen, as much as Opportunity will permit.

Plato divides the Soul into three Parts; the Reaſonable Part, the Iraſcible Part, and the Concupiſcible Part. He places the firſt in the Brain, the ſecond in the Heart, and the third in the Liver. He alſo compares it to a Flying-Chariot having two Horſes and a Charioteer; one of the Horſes is headſtrong and unruly, and the other is gentle and governable. The Charioteer is Reaſon, which is to command and guide; the unruly

The Soul divided into three Parts.

* Such as Wreſtling, Leaping, Running, &c.

Horſe is the concupiſcible Part, for the Appetites know no Bridle or Reſtraint of Reaſon; and the gentle Horſe is the iraſcible Part, becauſe it obeys the Reaſon, and is ſerviceable to it on urgent Occaſions. When a Man does not moderate theſe two latter Parts, and purge their Paſſions to reduce them to a uſeful Mediocrity, and ſubmit them to the former, he can have no other than earthly and mortal Opinions; and he renders himſelf mortal, becauſe he fortifies in himſelf thoſe Parts that are mortal: Whereas he that makes the firſt Part reign over the two other, becauſe he has in a ſpecial Manner adorn'd and cultivated that God which was given to him, that is, his Underſtanding or Mind, and becauſe the Mind comes immediately from the only true God, he is hereby united to the Source of Life, and already taſtes the Firſt-Fruits of Immortality.

An Explication of this Diviſion.

This Diviſion of the Soul deſerves to be explain'd, for ſome have been mightily miſtaken to think that *Plato* made the Soul diviſible, or that he imagin'd there were divers Souls; as if he put as many Souls in the Body of Man, as there were *Grecian* Officers (if I may ſo ſpeak) in the famous *Trojan* Horſe. This Philoſopher did not fall into ſuch an Error as this; but on the contrary attacks it, and oppoſes all the Abſurdity of it, and with marvellous Strength of Argument eſtabliſhes the Simplicity and Indiviſibility of the Soul: But his Deſign was to ſhew (as he explains himſelf in his *Theætetus*, and the fourth Book of his *Republick*) that there are ſome Things that depend only on the Soul, ſuch are all the Acts of the Will; and that there are others which depend on the corporeal Faculties: And theſe corporeal Faculties or Powers compoſe thoſe two Parts, that may be call'd the two corporeal and mortal Parts of the Soul, *viz.* the *concupiſcible* and *iraſcible*, which cauſe all our Paſſions, the Seat of which he places in the Heart and Liver, which he looks upon as the two Sources of the Blood and Spirits, on which alone the corporeal Faculties depend, and which alone excite all the Motions and Paſſions of the Body. Thus, according to *Plato*, there is but one ſim-

ple Soul without any Diverſity of Parts, the Seat of which is in the Brain, whence it irradiates the whole Body by means of the Nerves, Blood, and Spirits; but its Motions, that is, the Acts of the Will, may be oppoſed by the Motions and Impulſions of the Body: And 'tis this which makes theſe Combats between the ſuperior and inferior Soul, (that is, betwixt the Soul and the Body) mention'd in the fourth Book of the *Republick*. This, I ſay, is *Plato*'s Doctrine, by which 'tis eaſy to explain all the Faculties of the Soul, and to give the Reaſons of its Vices and Virtues, and to diſcover the Remedies that ought to be uſed to fortify the one, and weaken the other, and to correct all the Paſſions, in reducing them to a uſeful Mediocrity; for there are none of 'em but what are good by Nature, and may be uſed to good Advantage, when the Soul is Miſtreſs of 'em, and ſo regulates and conducts 'em.

The Creation of the firſt Woman, and of all Animals.

He next explains the Production of the firſt Woman, and that of Animals. Having underſtood by the Hiſtory of *Moſes*, that the firſt Man being caſt into a deep Sleep, God extracted the Woman from him: This gave riſe to all thoſe Imaginations, which he expoſes in his *Timæus*; where he teaches, that the firſt Woman and all Animals ſprang from Man, but through that thick Darkneſs he had ſpread upon this Work of God, in explaining it after a myſterious and poetical Manner, the Foot-ſteps of ancient Truth are to be diſcovered; and one may perceive, that he thus obſcur'd and conceal'd 'em, only that he might thence draw a Doctrine uſeful to regulate the Manners of Men. His Deſign is to engage Man always to render his Creator that Worſhip which is due to him; and to do nothing that may render him unworthy of that great Advantage of having been form'd by the Hands of God himſelf: Therefore he repreſents to him, not only that he degenerates into a Woman, when he is unjuſt, timorous, and voluptuous; but moreover, that he ſinks into the Condition of Animals. For when he is inconſtant, raſh, and unſteddy, and amuſes himſelf about penetrating the Heavens by a

vain Curioſity, imagining that only by the Organ of his Sight he is able to judge of all that appears there, he becomes a Bird: If he has no Reliſh of true Philoſophy, but inſtead of contemplating the Heavens, that by the marvellous Workmanſhip of 'em he might ſeek the Knowledge of him that made them, he only thinks on earthly Things, and how to gratify his ſenſual Deſires, he degenerates into a brute Beaſt, and is always fix'd to the Earth: If he be yet more corrupted, he becomes a Reptile, and always touches the Earth with all the Parts of his Body; and, in fine, if he puſh his Folly and Ignorance to the laſt Extremity, he becomes a Fiſh, unworthy to breathe in the Air; and conſequently plung'd in the moſt filthy and troubled Element of all. This is the Metempſychoſis of which *Plato* ſpeaks, and I make no Doubt but this was the Sentiment of *Pythagoras*, and of the *Egyptians*, which has been made ridiculous in taking it very unjuſtly in a literal Senſe. For what Probability is there that Philoſophers, who never ſpoke without Enigma's, ſhould with ſo much Simplicity explain ſo wonderful a Secret as that of the Paſſage of Souls into various Bodies of a different Species? And perhaps it would be no ill-founded Opinion, that this Idea came into the Head of *Pythagoras*, upon what happen'd in his Time to King *Nebuchadnezzar*, who for his Sins was turn'd out among the Beaſts, and for ſeven Years grazed like an Ox.

What gave Occaſion to the opinion of a Metempſychoſis.

A Philoſopher who explain'd his Doctrine only by enigmatick Expreſſions, could not but be taken with this Idea, which naturally informs us, that Vice degrades us from our Dignity, and transforms us into Beaſts, more or leſs ſavage, according as we are more or leſs vicious, and a certain Sign that this was his Senſe of this Metempſychoſis, is, that the *Pythagorean* Philoſophers conceiv'd it juſt after this Manner; and prov'd that Man in his Eſſence is inferior to God and Angels, and ſuperior to Animals, Plants, and other terreſtrial and mortal Natures: And that as that Man who ſhould flatter himſelf that he ſhould become a God, or an Angel, would be infinitely miſta-

miſtaken, not underſtanding the Limits of Nature; he that ſhould think he ſhould become a Beaſt for his Wickedneſs, or a Plant becauſe of his heavy and ſluggiſh Temper, would likewiſe be deceiv'd, * *being ignorant of the eſſential Form of the Soul, which can never alter; but being and continuing always Man, is ſaid to become a God or a Brute by Virtue or Vice, although by Nature it cannot be either the one or the other, and therefore is ſo only by reſemblance.*

Moreover, *Pythagoras* might take this Idea from the ancient *Hebrews*, who gave Men ſuch Names as were deſcriptive of their Nature, calling them Wolves, Dogs, Swine, Serpents, Fiſhes, *&c.* as they remark'd in 'em ſuch Vices as render'd 'em very like thoſe Animals. Therefore the firſt Man that was celebrated for Piety, and began to call on the Name of the Lord, was call'd *Enos*, that is to ſay, *a True Man*; as if there had been no true Man before him, † becauſe there was no pious Man. This is all the Myſtery of *Pythagoras*'s Metempſychoſis; which has been turn'd into a Monſter by a low literal Explication of it. *Plato* underſtood it in Part, but he alter'd it in connecting it with an Error into which he fell, about the Return of Souls into this Life after a certain Space of Time. As I take it, he conceiv'd that a Soul came divers Times to animate the ſame Body: Thus it was rather a Reſurrection ſeveral Times repeated, than a Metempſychoſis. But of this Matter we ſhall treat more largely in its Place.

Whence Evil comes, and whether it ſubſiſts of it ſelf.

Some of *Plato*'s Interpreters have ſaid that in the Creation of Man, God order'd the inferior Deities to make the Body, that ſo, becauſe all Evil was to proceed from Matter, he might not be charg'd with it, and that it might not be ſaid, that Evil came from God himſelf. But this Expedient would have

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* *Hierocles* on the Verſes of *Pythagoras*.

† I ſuppoſe the Author means in that Generation; for otherwiſe 'tis evident that *Abel* was a pious Man.

been very uſeleſs: For if Evil were a Quality adherent to Matter, God having created this, the other muſt needs have come from him, though the Body had been created by inferior Deities; which is impious, and very remote from *Plato*'s Thoughts. When this Philoſopher ſays Evils could not be baniſh'd from Nature, and that they aroſe from Neceſſity, that is, from Matter; he had no Deſign to ſignify that Matter was evil of it ſelf: But he meant to ſhew, that as it is always oppoſite to the Nature of God, it cauſes all the Paſſions and all the Miſeries of Men; who by how much the more they approach it, by ſo much the more diſtant they remove from God. For Matter does not only corrupt thoſe who immerſe themſelves in it, but alſo ſuch as look on it; becauſe every Thing that inclines or turns it ſelf towards it, neceſſarily turns away from God, and leaves Light for Darkneſs, which is a Principle confirm'd equally by Religion and Experience, ſo that 'tis unneceſſary to bring Proofs to ſupport it. It will be ſufficient to cite here * *Plato*'s own Words: *It is impoſſible, my dear* Theodore, *that Evils ſhould be entirely expell'd human Society: For 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be always ſomething oppoſite to Good, Yet it muſt not be thought that Evil can ever approach the Deity, 'tis only annex'd to mortal Natures, and is always about the Earth which we inhabit, becauſe it ſprings only from Neceſſity. Therefore we ſhould endeavour to fly from hence as ſwiftly as we can. Now to fly away, is to labour to unite our ſelves to God, as much as poſſible; and we can't be united to him, but by Wiſdom, Righteouſneſs, and Holineſs.*

Evil does not ſpring from Matter.

In this Book of a *Republick*, he ſhews that Evil does not ſpring from Matter, but from Motion, which brings it to its firſt Confuſion and Diſorder. *The World* (ſays he) *had all good Things from its Maker; but from the External Habitude, which it had before, it had all that is evil, wicked, and vicious in Nature, and*

* In his *Theætetus*, Tom. 1.

commu-

communicates it to Animals. So that by his Account, Evil is properly only a Return to the firſt Diſorder, an Irregularity, a Diſlocation, and Diſobedience, and conſequently ſubſiſts not by it ſelf: Whereas Good ſubſiſts, independently of the Things that poſſeſs it; for it ſubſiſts in God, who is the Author of all Good, and is Goodneſs it ſelf. But whence comes this Motion that leads to Diſorder? It proceeds not from Matter, ſeeing that is without Quality. It comes, according to *Plato*, from the raſh and diſordered Spirit which heated and animated the firſt Matter, before God, by framing the World, had render'd it capable of Order and Harmony by an Underſtanding.

By this we are to underſtand, that Evil is a Privation of Order and Harmony, which proves true in all ſorts of Evil, and above all in thoſe of the Soul; that is, in Vices which are the only proper Evils. When a Man diſobeys the Law, one can't ſay his Diſobedience is a Being which exiſts and ſprings from the Law, but 'tis an Alienation from what the Law commands. The Law is holy, and the Commandment is juſt and good, but Concupiſcence has produc'd Sin. When a Son loves not his Father who has done him nothing but Good, one can't ſay this Averſion proceeds from the Father; on the contrary, 'tis only a Refuſal of Love and Submiſſion which he owes him, and which the Law of Nature teaches him. Juſt ſo the Evils of the Soul, are not a Fault of Nature, but a Fault of the Will; which being free, uſes its Liberty to reject that which is good. So that Vices are only voluntary Averſions, which alienate us from right Reaſon, in which alone Order and Harmony conſiſt; and conſequently, as the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts* knew very well, there is no Neceſſity of eſtabliſhing a Principle of Evil, whether we make it ſpring from Matter, or derive it from without, we need only one Principle of Good which truly exiſts, and this is God. By his Eſſence he is ſeparated from Rational Subſtances, but he communicates and unites himſelf

Evil does not exiſt of it ſelf.

What Good and Evil, Virtue and Vice, are.

ſelf to them by Reaſon: To obey this Reaſon, is Virtue; and to diſobey it, Vice. Thus our Bodies are neither the Cauſe of our Vices, nor that of our Virtues; * but our Souls are the Cauſe of both, as *Plato* very ſolidly proves in his Xth Book of *Laws*.

* In what Senſe *Plato* calls Creatures Gods.

It has been charg'd on *Plato* as a Crime, that he gives the Name of God to Creatures: But beſides that he has done nothing in this but what we find done in the Holy Scripture, where Men and Angels are called *Gods*; never did any one better obſerve the infinite Sovereignty of the true God over mortal Creatures to whom he has given this Name, than *Plato* has done. Thus he † feigns God ſpeaking to 'em as their Supreme Lord: *Children of the Gods, all the Works that have gone out of my Hands are indiſſoluble as much as I pleaſe, and as long as I ſhall ſuſtain 'em. Not but that whatſoever has been join'd together is of a Nature capable of being diſunited, but it becomes not an infinitely good Creator to deſtroy his Work, when this Work has nothing of Evil in it. You have been created, and conſequently you can't be entirely immortal and indiſſoluble; however, you ſhall never be deſtroy'd, and Death ſhall have no Dominion over you; my Will being a ſtronger Bond to aſcertain your Immortality, than all that wherewith you have been bound at your Birth. We have yet three Sorts of Animals to form of mortal Matter, without which the World could not be perfect, for to make it perfect it ought to contain Animals of every Species; but if I ſhould create them my ſelf, they will be equal to the Gods. Therefore that they may be mortal, and that the World may be compleated, do you form them your ſelves according to your Nature, by imitating the power I diſplay'd in forming you: And ſeeing the moſt ex-*

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* Therefore the Holy Scripture commonly ſpeaks of the Soul with reference to Vices and Virtues: *The Soul that ſinneth, it ſhall die*, &c.

† In his *Timæus*, Tom. 3.

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cellent of 'em ought to have ſomething Divine to render 'em worthy to rule the reſt, and to engage them to obey Laws and Juſtice, I will provide that Divine Seed which is the Soul. Do you finiſh this Compoſition, by adding that which is to be mortal; and by furniſhing it with neceſſary Aliments, raiſe them up and make 'em grow, and when they are deſtroyed receive them again into your Boſom.

Plato here, after a very magnificent and poetical Manner, deſcribes how God created Man and the other Animals by Means of ſecond Cauſes, which he calls Gods; and it is no difficult Matter to find in his Words the Beams of thoſe eternal Truths which *Moſes* teaches us. *Plato* (after *Moſes*) brings God in as if ſpeaking to other Gods when he is about to create Man; though he did not comprehend the Myſtery hidden under thoſe divine Words. In *Plato*, as well as in the Writings of *Moſes*, we ſee Man was form'd after the Image of God; not as to his Body, but as to his Mind; that he was to rule over other Animals; and that he only is capable of rendering God true Worſhip. *Plato* teaches us after *Moſes*, that theſe very Animals ſerve to perfectionate the Univerſe; contrary to the Opinion of certain Hereticks, who accuſed God for having made many Animals that were either dangerous or uſeleſs. In fine, we ſee in *Plato*, as well as in the Holy Scriptures, that important Truth, * That the Immortality of the Angels is not an Effect of their Nature, but a Privilege of mere Grace, which depends only on the Divine Will.

Whether God can make himſelf viſible to Men.

'Tis ſurprizing that ſuch a Man as *Plato*, who underſtood theſe Great Truths, and ſpoke of God after ſo admirable a Manner, as we ſhall ſee in divers Places of this Treatiſe, ſhould not-

* This is what St. *Ambroſe* ſays in expreſs Terms, in his 3d Book *De fide: Nec & Angelus immortalis eſt naturaliter, cujus immortalitas eſt in voluntate Creatoris.* Angels themſelves are not immortal by Nature, but their Immortality depends on the Will of their Creator.

withſtanding maintain, as he has done in the * 11th Book of his *Republick*, that God being Perfection it ſelf, cannot ſhew himſelf to Men under any viſible Figure: And he reaſons thus; *If God ſhould metamorphoſe himſelf, he would aſſume a Form more perfect than his own, or a Form leſs perfect. Now 'tis ridiculous to ſay he changes for the better, for then there would be ſomething more perfect than he, which is abſurd; and 'tis impious to admit that he changes himſelf into ſomething leſs perfect, for God can't degrade himſelf: Beſides, if he ſhould appear under any other Form than his own, he would lie, becauſe he would appear to be what he is not. Hence therefore it muſt be concluded, that he continues in his ſimple Form, which alone is Beauty and Perfection it ſelf.* And upon this he condemns *Homer* for having attributed to God thoſe viſible Forms.

Plato's falſe Reaſoning.

If *Plato* had only employ'd this Argument of his to beat down the ridiculous Metamorphoſes which the Poets attributed to the Gods, he would have had Reaſon; but to make uſe of it to oppoſe the Manner by which God has often render'd himſelf viſible, *viz.* under the Form of an Angel or Man, whom he created after his Image, and whoſe Figure he might take, without deceiving Men, or laying aſide his Perfections, is an Error. And this did not eſcape the Knowledge of his Diſciple *Ariſtotle*, who though otherwiſe leſs illuminated in what belongs to the Divine Nature, underſtood better than *Plato* the Beauty and Truth of that Sentiment of *Homer*, who in the XIVth Book of his *Odyſſes* ſays, *that the Gods, who can eaſily clothe themſelves with all ſorts of Forms, ſometimes take the Figure of Travellers and go into Cities, to be Witneſſes both of the Sins of Men and of their good Actions.* Inſtructed by this great Poet, he underſtood that it is not unworthy of God to aſſume Human Nature, to deliver Men from their Errors. Upon which his too zealous Admirers have advanc'd, that he had ſome Preſage of the Incarnation of the Meſſiah. But what an

* Tom. 2.

Honour

Honour is it to *Homer*, that his Notions agree better with the Truths contain'd in the Holy Scriptures, than thoſe of the greateſt Philoſophers? When God appear'd to Men under a viſible Form, he had both what was viſible and what was inviſible.

What Judgment may be made of *Plato*'s Phyſicks.

But to return to *Plato*'s Phyſicks. One may very well diſſent both from thoſe who will have 'em very perfect, and from the Sentiment of thoſe that account 'em very defective. The former have too good an Opinion of 'em, ſeduc'd perhaps by the great Pleaſure they have found in penetrating the great Obſcurities of his *Timæus*; and others ſpeak too meanly of 'em, becauſe they have not given themſelves Time to ſound thoſe Deeps, having been diſcourag'd by the Drineſs of his Principles, which he does not give himſelf the Trouble of unfolding, but leaves others the Labour of explaining and finding out the Meaning of 'em. But in this there is a Medium to be obſerv'd. 'Tis certain *Plato* knew the chief Principles of true Natural Philoſophy. This ſufficiently appears by what has been already ſaid on this Subject. We find in his *Timæus* an Explication of the Nature of the Elements only by the Diſpoſition and Configuration of the Parts of Matter, which alſo cauſe the different Senſations and Affections of the Body. There we find the Explication of Colours, which are only the Reflection of Light. By the different Mixture, by the diverſified Figure and Motion of the Elements, each of which has many different Qualities or Forms, he explains the Production and Nature of Minerals, Metals, Oils, Salt, Liquors, Meteors, *&c.* For example, ſpeaking of the Loadſtone and Amber, he ſays, *Their Virtue comes from the Motion of the Matter which goes out of their pores.* But all this together can't make a well-methodiz'd Syſtem of Phyſicks: Nor is it his Deſign to give the World a Treatiſe of Phyſicks. He ſwiftly runs through that which is tranſitory, to find that which is permanent, and to dwell upon it; he forgets nothing that is neceſſary, but rejects whatſoever is uſeleſs or ſuperfluous; he ſo little Deſigns to enter into a deep Reſearch of this Matter,

Matter, that he lets us know, that if any one has a Mind to break off his Meditation from Things that truly exiſt and abide; to apply himſelf to a more particular Knowledge of ſuch as are only tranſitory and momentary, and finds Pleaſure in ſo doing, it will not be difficult for him to ſatisfy himſelf in following his Principles; *and to give himſelf a Divertiſement of Life*, which he calls *Wiſe and Moderate*.

Natural Philoſophy conſidered by *Plato* as a Divertiſement.

By theſe Words *Plato* gives us to underſtand, that he look'd upon this Part of Natural Philoſophy rather as a Play, than an Employment; and this oblig'd him to give only a ſuperficial Account of it, that he might more uſefully employ his Time in ſearching for more important and ſolid Truths. And one may ſay, that in this again he imitates *Moſes*, who in the Hiſtory of the Creation has wiſely ſuppreſs'd whatſoever might flatter the Vanity and Curioſity of Men, to inſiſt only on that which was proper to augment their Humility and Piety. Therefore we ſhould be ſo far from wondering that Natural Philoſophy was not rais'd to its Perfection in thoſe ancient Times, when it was look'd upon at beſt but as an Amuſement more curious than uſeful, and when the greateſt Men applied themſelves only to Morality, which is concern'd only about our true Happineſs and Miſery; that I know not whether we ſhould not have more Reaſon to be ſurpriz'd that it ſhould be ſo much eſteem'd in Ages wherein we ought even to make leſs Account of it than *Plato* does *Solomon* does not adviſe Men to *acquire Natural Philoſophy*, but *to get Wiſdom*. For 'tis Wiſdom only that teaches us to know God; and that is *Plato*'s Language, who to promote his Deſign, always reaſons morally in his Phyſical Diſcourſes: And inſtead of inſiſting on the Conſideration of Mechanick Reaſons taken from the Motion and Succeſſion of Bodies, applies himſelf, as *Socrates* did before him to diſcover the firſt Cauſe, and to penetrate the Deſigns of the Sovereign Spirit which governs the World; and endeavours to explain whole Nature by Harmony and Proportion; ſeeking not ſo much

much to teach Men Phyſicks, as to give 'em great Proſpects, and to elevate their Minds. Nay, *Socrates* formally ſays in *Phædon*, that the Manner of teaching Phyſicks by the Succeſſion and Motion of Bodies is very defective, and cauſes more Errors than it cures: Becauſe by detaining the Mind too much upon Matter, and that which is but a ſecond Cauſe, it hinders it from raiſing it ſelf up to God, who is the only true and firſt Cauſe of all Things: And he blames *Anaxagoras*, who tho' he knew this Truth, diſſembles it in his Practice, and deceives the Expectation of his Readers. 'Tis ſuch a Reſearch as this that *Solomon* repreſents as *a very evil and dangerous Employment*; and the Truth of this has been but too much confirm'd by Experience.

The Order of the Celeſtial Spheres.

Before we quit this Subject, let us ſee how he ranges the Celeſtial Spheres, and what Vertues he ſuppoſes them to diſplay by their Influences. Firſt, he places the Earth as the Center of the World. 'Tis true, *Theophraſtus* writes, that in his Old Age he repented that he had given it that Place, which is not ſuitable to it. He ſays, it is the Boundary of the Riſing and Setting of the Sun, and conſequently the Inſtrument of Time, as the Planets are, and Guardian or Mother of the Day and Night. After the *Earth* he places the Sphere of the *Moon*, then that of the *Sun*, that of *Venus*, and that of *Mercury*; after *Mercury* he places *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*.

The Influences of the Stars.

He ſays that in the Beginning after God had created the Souls of Men, he diſtributed them into all the Planets; by which he would ſignify, that the Bodies which thoſe Souls animated in the Time mark'd out by Providence, ſhould be ſubject to the Influences of thoſe Stars. Which he explains more ſenſibly, when he feigns that there are Three *Parcæ*, the Daughters of Neceſſity, which turn a great Spindle, that is the Axletree of the World, with its eight Spheres, whoſe Motions and Revolutions produce all Things. Neceſſity

An Explication of the Three *Parcæ*.

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is Deſtiny, which is nothing but the Order and Concatenation of Cauſes, which ought to produce ſuch or ſuch Effects. This Neceſſity has three Daughters, which denote the three Differences of Time, which is either paſt, preſent, or future. The firſt, which is the eldeſt, is nam'd *Lacheſis*, that is, *a Lot*, becauſe the Lots of all Things have been regulated from all Eternity, that is, before Time. The ſecond is *Clothon:* This is ſhe that executes, and adds the preſent to the paſt. And the third is *Atropos*, which ſignifies that the future is no leſs certain or invariable than the two others; but is the Conſequence of one and the ſame Law, which never alters. Theſe *Parcæ* are cloth'd in White, and ſeated on Thrones with Crowns on their Heads, to ſignify on one Hand their Purity and Innocence, and on the other the Dominion they exerciſe over all that is ſubjected to them; they are plac'd at equal Diſtances over theſe eight Spheres, upon each of which there is a *Siren*, which ſings with all her Might, and the *Parcæ* anſwer this Singing after ſuch a Manner, that all theſe different Voices make but one Harmony. *Plato* would hereby ſignify that all Things obey the Divine Law, and concur to produce thoſe Effects, which are Conſequences of the Cauſes God has eſtabliſhed.

The Soul is not ſubject to Deſtiny.

But if our Bodies depend on theſe Planets, and obey the Laws of this fatal Neceſſity, our Souls may preſerve themſelves independent, and only obey God, who is Maſter of Neceſſity it ſelf. The Planets may by their Influence produce in us ſuch or ſuch Manners, and by theſe ſuch or ſuch Actions or Paſſions; but if our Souls will, they have Power to moderate and regulate them. And when the Soul does the contrary, and ſuffers her ſelf to be carried down the Stream; ſhe deprives her ſelf of her own Liberty, and loſes all her Privileges. For this is that in which that Free-will, that God has left her to denote her Origin, conſiſts: She can neither ſubmit her ſelf to that fatal Neceſſity which *Zoroaſter* calls an *augmenting the Power of Deſtiny*, or ſubject that to her ſelf, by uniting her ſelf to him,

to

to whom all Things are ſubject, and in whom alone ſhe can enjoy her Liberty; and this is what *Plato* means, when he ſays a Prophet having taken the Lots out of the Lap of the firſt *Parcæ*, aſcended a Throne, and addreſſing himſelf to all the Souls that had been created, ſpoke to them in theſe Terms: *Hear* * *what* Lacheſis, *the Daughter of Neceſſity, ſays. O Mortal Souls, here is the beginning of a new Period, or Life, you are going to animate Bodies that are deſtin'd to Death: Your Dæmon (or Angel) ſhall not make choice of you, but you ſhall chuſe your Dæmon (or Angel) your ſelves. Let that Soul therefore that has the firſt Lot, firſt chuſe the kind of Life which ſhe will lead by the Laws of Neceſſity, and ſo of the reſt. There is nothing but only Virtue that does not acknowledge her Laws; ſhe is free, and gives not her ſelf to any but ſuch as know how to honour her: Thus the Fault is in the Soul which chuſes, and God is not to be blamed.* After this Proclamation, all imaginable Ways of living are propos'd, and the Soul chuſes.

How the Choice of a Dæmon or Genius ought to be underſtood.

We cannot finiſh this Matter without ſpeaking ſomewhat of theſe Dæmons, aſſign'd as Guides to each Soul; and this Article would indeed require a long Chapter of it ſelf, or rather an entire Volume, if we would ſound the Bottom of this Doctrine: But 'tis ſufficient for us here to know in general, that when *Plato* ſays the Soul immediately after her animating the Body, chuſes her Dæmon or Genius; his Deſign is only to ſignify the Liberty of the Soul, and that ſhe is able to chuſe between Good and Evil. That is, that as we are compos'd of two different Natures, by one of which we partake of this groſs and terreſtrial World, and by the other of the intelligible World, by which we are raiſed to that which is moſt ſublime and ſpiritual; if the Soul immerſes her ſelf in Matter, ſhe has a material Dæmon, that hinders her from raiſing her ſelf up to Ce-

* In the 10th Book of his Repub. Tom. 2.

leſtial

leſtial Things; and if, on the contrary, ſhe keeps her ſelf pure, and lives only by the Underſtanding, ſhe has a good Dæmon, or perfect Genius, which ſupports and hinders her from deſcending to that which is material and corruptible: If ſhe changes her Life, ſhe alſo changes her Dæmon; and after Death, the Dæmon that ſhe choſe, leads her either to her Reward or Puniſhment. This was *Plato*'s Doctrine, which he frequently delivers in Allegories very difficult to be underſtood, but by which he ſeems to have known, or at leaſt had ſome Glances of very great Truths concerning the Nature and Difference of thoſe Spirits, which are between God and Men, Truths which the Chriſtian Religion has conſecrated without diveſting them of their Obſcurity. For who is it that underſtands thoſe different Orders of Spirits which St. *Paul* deſcribes by thoſe different Names, of Powers, Thrones, Principalities, and Mights? St. *Auguſtine* confeſſes he does not underſtand them, and St. *Irenæus* aſſures us that they cannot be underſtood. It is probable, *Plato* had received almoſt the ſame Ideas from the Theology of the *Hebrews*, which we ſhall ſpeak of in the Argument of *Socrates*'s Apology; and 'twas without Doubt out of Reſpect to their Books, that he advanc'd that excellent Maxim, That in thoſe Matters we ought to receive nothing for Truth, but what is found conformable to the Word of God, and the Divine Oracles.

None ever prov'd the Immortality of the Soul better than *Plato*. His Proofs of it are to be ſeen in his *Phædrus*, in the 10th Book of his *Republick*, and in his *Phædon*. In the mean Time I can't chuſe but ſpeak here of a ſeeming Contradiction which is found in his Writings. In *Phædrus* he ſays in expreſs Terms, *That the Soul is eternal, and that it can't periſh, becauſe it was not begotten:* And on the contrary he ſays in *Timæus*, *That the Soul was created before the Body, and that it was begotten by the beſt of intelle ual and eternal Cauſes, as it is alſo the beſt of all Things that are generated and temporal.*

A ſeeming Contradiction in *Plato*.

Plu-

Plutarch, to reconcile this Contradiction, into which he is ſure *Plato* never fell, aſſures us, that by this unbegotten and eternal Soul he underſtands that void and diſorderly Spirit which mov'd all Things irregularly before the Conſtitution of the World; and, on the contrary, that he calls that the begotten Soul, which God compos'd of that firſt Spirit, and of the permanent and eternal Subſtance; of which he made a wiſe and regular Soul, becauſe he put ſomething of his own into it, and added Underſtanding to Senſe, and Order and Harmony to Motion.

Plutarch endeavours to reconcile this Contradiction.

But at this Rate the Soul would be a Compound of a fooliſh Thing and a wiſe, which is the groſſeſt of all Errors. It would likewiſe be a Compoſition of two Things equally eternal, which by their Union would conſtitute one entire begotten Subſtance, which is a Contradiction. In fine, this void and precipitant Spirit which animated the firſt Matter is not eternal in *Plato*'s Opinion, for he makes it a Creature, and calls it eternal only in reference to Time, the Birth of which it preceded. Therefore to reconcile theſe two different Ideas which he gives of the Soul, I ſuppoſe when he calls it begotten, he has Regard ſimply to the Eſſence of it, which began to exiſt by the Will of God; and when he calls it Eternal, 'tis with Reſpect to the Principle of it which is God, who communicates to it all its Qualities, and in whom it is properly Eternal.

The Errors of *Plutarch*.

The Way of reconciling theſe two Ideas.

Plato not only proves the Immortality of the Soul, but alſo knew all the Conſequences of it, as the Reſurrection, and final Judgment, when all good Men ſhall be rewarded, and the Wicked puniſhed. Nay, he penetrated ſo far into theſe Divine Truths, that his Expreſſions are entirely conformable to thoſe of the Holy Prophets, and even to thoſe of the Evangeliſts and Apoſtles. For he expreſly obſerves, that at

The Conſequences of Immortality known to *Plato*.

at the Time of this Judgment *good* * *Men ſhall be at the Right Hand of God, and the wicked at the left, from whence they ſhall be thrown down into the Abyſs, and into outward Darkneſs, bound Hand and Foot*; where they ſhall be tormented, and torn by Spirits, which he calls Fire, and where nothing ſhall be heard but horrible groaning and howling.

That the Dead know what paſſes here in this World.

He taught as a certain Truth, that the Dead know what paſſes in this Life; for he ſays in expreſs Terms, *That Souls, after they are ſeparated from their Bodies, have ſtill ſome power by which they take care of human Affairs. This* † *Truth is prov'd by a long Train of Reaſons. We ought therefore to believe theſe ſo certain and ancient Traditions; and to credit the Teſtimony of thoſe Legiſlators who have tranſmitted them to us, unleſs we will reproach them as ſo many Fools.* And in another ‖ Place he ſays, *Hence I conclude, that the Dead retain ſome knowledge of what paſſes here below. Good Men have ſome Sentiment before-hand of this Matter; and the Wicked deny it: But the preſages of divine Men are more certain than thoſe of ſuch miſerable Wretches as are always immers'd in Vice.*

The Source of theſe Traditions.

Plato received all theſe Ideas from the Traditions of the *Egyptians*, who had them from the People of God, and the ancient Patriarchs. But in proceſs of Time, theſe Traditions were ſo corrupted by thoſe Idolaters, and mix'd with ſo many Errors, that 'tis not to be wonder'd at that *Plato* has explain'd one and the ſame Truth by Deſcriptions ſo different and fabulous as thoſe of his *Phædon*, his *Gorgias*, and the laſt Book of his *Republick*.

Thoſe who have carefully read the Writings of this Philoſopher, diſcover yet more ſurprizing Truths in

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* In the 10th Book of his Republick, Tom. 2.
† In the 11th Book of Laws, Tom. 2. ‖ Tom. 3.

them;

them; for they find that he * believ'd the Divinity of the Son of God, which he explain'd by Enigma's, that thoſe ſublime Truths might not be expos'd to the Raillery of the Profane.

The Divinity of the Son of God known to *Plato*.

In his *Epinomis*, after he had ſpoken of the Honour due to the Sun and other Planets, as they were the wonderful Works of God on which he had printed the Character of his Omnipotence, and which in performing their Revolutions in the Time preſcrib'd to them, contribute to the Perfection of the Univerſe by this Obedience of theirs: He adds, *The moſt Divine WORD fram'd this Univerſe, and render'd it viſible. And that Man that is truly happy, firſt admires this WORD, and is afterward inflam'd with a Deſire of learning all that can be known by a mortal Nature, being convinc'd that this is the only Way to lead a happy Life here below, and after Death to arrive at thoſe places that are prepar'd for Virtue; where he ſhall be truly initiated and united with Wiſdom, and always enjoy the moſt wonderful Diſcoveries.* Here *Plato* very exquiſitely maintains that the Knowledge of the WORD leads to all ſublime Diſcoveries: *For none knows the Father but by the Son.* And 'tis only by him that we can attain a Life of Bliſs.

In the Letter he † wrote to *Hermias*, *Eraſtus* and *Coriſcus*, to exhort them to live in Peace, he ſays, *You muſt read my Letter all three together; and that you may profit by it, you ought to implore the Aſſiſtance of God, the Sovereign Lord of all Things that either are or ſhall be; and the Father of this Sovereign, who is the Cauſe of Beings. If we are truly Philoſophers, we ſhould know this God as clearly as bleſſed Men are capable of knowing him.*

Does not *Plato* in this manifeſtly follow the Opinion of the *Hebrews?* For whence could he receive this Knowledge of God, the ‖ Father, and the Lord; of God the

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* Tom. 2.

† Letter VI. Tom. 3.

‖ Euſeb. Præpar. Evang. XI. 16.

Cauſe

Cauſe of Beings, but from their Writings, who taught him to give the Son the Name of *Lord*, of which none of the *Greeks* before him had ever heard, or had the leaſt Idea?

Plato had ſome Idea of the Holy Trinity.

Nor is it only pretended, that he had ſome Knowledge of the *Word*, the Eternal Son of God; but ſome farther maintain, that he had ſome Diſcovery of the Holy Spirit, and ſo had a certain Idea of the moſt Holy Trinity: For thus he writes to young *Dionyſius*; *I muſt* * *declare to* Archedemus, *that which is much more precious and divine, and which you have a very ardent Deſire to know; ſince you ſent expreſly to me on that Account. For, as far as I underſtand by him, you don't believe I have ſufficiently explain'd what I think of the Nature of the firſt principle; I muſt write of this to you in Enigma's, that if my Letter ſhould be intercepted by Sea or Land, he that reads it mayn't be able to comprehend any Thing. All Things are round about their King; they exiſt by him, and he alone is the Cauſe of good Things: Second for ſecond Things, and third for third.*

In his *Epinomis*, and elſewhere, he eſtabliſhes for Principles, the firſt Good, the Word, or Underſtanding or Soul. The firſt Good is God; and when he calls God Goodneſs, or the firſt Good, he had an Idea of this Truth, that Good is nothing but the Nature of God, and his Infinite Goodneſs. This Good he explains in Terms very well worth the reading. *As the Sun* (ſays he) *gives to viſible Things, not only the Faculty of being ſeen, but alſo their Birth, Nouriſhment, and Growth, juſt ſo this* † Good *not only makes intelligible Things knowable, but alſo gives them Being, although that is not Eſſence, but ſome other Thing that infinitely ſurpaſſes Eſſence by his Power and Majeſty.*

The Word or Underſtanding is the Son of the firſt Good, who hath begotten him like himſelf. And the

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* Letter II. Tom. 3.

† Book VI. of his Repub. Tom. 2.

Soul,

Soul, which is the Term between the Father and the Son, is the Holy Spirit.

I don't know whether without having Recourſe to theſe great Truths, we could by *Plato*'s Philoſophy explain theſe Paſſages which ſeem ſo ſtrange, ſo as to give them another Senſe that ſhould be natural, and agreeable to his Principles. I muſt ſay, I very much doubt it. Nay, I am perſuaded it would be a very great Temerity, or rather Impiety, to interpret them after any other Manner, after the Deciſion of ſo many Fathers of the Church and * Eccleſiaſtick Writers. For they tell us in expreſs Terms, that *Plato* had this Knowledge of the Father and the Son, and of him that proceeds from them both, namely, the Holy Spirit.

Origen is not content to aſſure us of the ſame Thing, but accuſes *Celſus* for having purpoſely overlook'd the Paſſage of the 6th Letter, becauſe Jeſus Chriſt is plainly ſpoken of in it. Which proves, that the Chriſtians were not the only Perſons who found theſe great Myſteries in *Plato*'s Writings; but that the Enemies of Chriſtianity found them there as well as they, and were uneaſy at the Sight of them.

Let us not by our Darkneſs caſt a Shade over thoſe Rays of Light which proceed from the Fountain of Light it ſelf; but let us acknowledge that *Plato* not only knew all that Natural Reaſon could diſcover concerning God to a Philoſopher, but was illuminated by ſupernatural Reaſon too. Having been inſtructed in the Books of the *Hebrews*, in thoſe of the Prophets, and in the Traditions of the *Egyptians*, he became favourably diſpos'd to receive the Seeds of theſe Eternal Truths; and was aſſiſted by Grace, for St. *Auguſtin* aſſerts, that Jeſus Chriſt revealed them to him. That which is deplorable, is, that he has corrupted them by his Reaſonings. For he ſpeaks of the Three Perſons of the Deity as of Three Gods, and Three different Principles. Thus while the ſupreme Reaſon enlighten'd him on one

How *Plato* has corrupted the Truths with which he was illuminated by God.

* St. *Juſtin*, St. *Auguſtin*, St. *Jerome*, St. *Cyril*, *Euſebius*, *Theodoret*, St. *Clement*, &c.

one Side, Philoſophy ſeduc'd him on the other: The common Unhappineſs of thoſe who merely by human Reaſon go about to explain the Myſteries of God, which are not to be known but from himſelf, and from thoſe he has truly inſpir'd.

That *Plato* had a particular Knowledge of the ſacred Writings, appears by many Paſſages in his Works, and by his Errors themſelves; for the greateſt Part of his moſt erroneous Opinions proceed in ſome ſort from that Source of Light which dazled him, and on which he has ſpread ſo much Darkneſs. This ſeveral have obſerved before now. That of the Creation of Souls before Bodies, ſeems to have had no other Foundation than that Paſſage of *Jeremiah*, where God ſays to this Holy Prophet, * *Before I formed thee in the Belly, I knew thee.* This Philoſopher not underſtanding that God calls Things that are not as if they were, and that he knows not only all that is, but alſo all that ſhall ever be, built on this Text that Error of his, that Souls exiſted before Bodies.

From the ſame Divine Writings he extracted all the great Truths which he teaches; as when he ſays the *Name* of God is *he that is*, for there's none but God that truly is. This Name of God, as St. *Auguſtin* obſerves, is not found in any profane Book more ancient than *Plato*; and this Philoſopher could not have it from any other Books than thoſe of *Moſes*.

Who is it that does not diſcern the Stile of the Prophets in that Place of *Phædon*, where he deſcribes a pure Earth which is above this of ours in Heaven, and in Compariſon of which this we inhabit is no better than Dirt? In this every Thing is corrupt, and we are encompaſs'd with Darkneſs; or if we ſee any Light, 'tis through great Clouds, and very thick Miſts: Whereas in the other, the true Light is to be ſeen, and every Thing in it is admirable. All Things there ſhine with the glittering Luſtre of Gold, Jaſpers, Saphires, and Emeralds;

* Jer. 1. 9.

and

and thoſe that inhabit it enjoy a long Life, which is not croſs'd with any incommodious Accident. The Ancients who diſcover'd the Truth hid under theſe Images, ſhew that they were extracted out of the Books of the Holy Prophets, who call Heaven the City of God, and the Land of the Righteous; and prove, that the Names of theſe precious Stones are taken from the 54th Chapter of *Iſaiah*, where God promiſes to lay the Foundation of his Church with * Saphires and Jaſpers.

I ſhould be too prolix, if I ſhould here relate all that *Plato* has drawn from this Fountain. 'Tis ſufficient to know, that what we find in him of this kind, is ſo conſiderable, that it ought to render his Writings very precious to us; and that of all the Works of the Pagans, there is none more uſeful, or that can be more ſerviceable to eſtabliſh eternal Truths, to raiſe the Soul to the ſolid Contemplation of the divine Eſſence, and to manifeſt the Beauties of the ſacred Scriptures. And 'tis on theſe Accounts that he merited that great Encomium, given him by *Proclus*: *Truth* (ſays he †) *is ſpread through all* Plato's *Dialogues, more obſcurely in ſome, and more clearly in others. We find in them every where grave, ſenſible, ſupernatural Thoughts of the firſt Philoſophy, which carry thoſe up to the pure immaterial Eſſence of God, who are in ſome ſort in a Condition to participate of it. And as he who has created every Thing in the World by his power, has in every part of this Univerſe plac'd Images of the Gods, which are ſo many Proofs of their Exiſtence, that all Things in the World might turn towards the Deity, becauſe of the Union, and, if I may ſo ſay, natural Relation that is between them; ſo the Mind of* Plato *being fill'd with the Deity, has diſperſed his Thoughts of God through all his Works. He would not ſuffer any ſingle Tract to be deſtitute of this Character, and without any Thing ſpoken of God; that ſuch as are truly inflam'd with*

* So the LXXII render it.
† Book 1. Chap. 5.

the

the Love of Divine Things might receive ſome Knowledge of the ſupreme Being from all his Writings, and ſo might have a juſt Idea of every Thing which cannot be known but in God, who is Truth it ſelf.

Dialectick. Having ſpoken of Natural Philoſophy and Morality, let us paſs to the third Part, which is *Dialectick*. The Ancients write, that *Plato* perfected Philoſophy, by adding this Part to Phyſicks and Ethicks: But by this they only mean he brought *Dialectick*, which is true Logick, to its Perfection. Indeed *Plato*'s Logick is more natural, more exact, and more ſolid than that which was in Uſe before him, and than that, the Rules of which have been publiſh'd after him. For he teaches more by Examples, than Precepts: He always chuſes Subjects that are familiar and uſeful to Morality, and treats 'em not as a Doctor, and as they do in the Schools, by methodical Diſcourſes and ſtudied Syllogiſms, but like a Man of Converſation, by free Diſcourſes, which properly make the Character of Dialectick. Therefore *Plato* preſerv'd *Socrates*'s Method of Dialogue, being fully convinc'd that Sciences ought to be taught by Word of Mouth, and not by Writing, becauſe Men are better perſuaded by the Tongue than the Pen: Becauſe the Anſwers, and Objections of the Learner, not only ſhew what Progreſs Truth makes in his Mind; but beſides give an Occaſion of clearing up many Difficulties that lie in his Way, and which can't all be foreſeen in Writing. *Plato* teaches better than any Man how to ſpeak with Juſtneſs, to anſwer preciſely to what is aſked, to lay down the State of a Queſtion exactly, and lead on the Argument directly. He ſhews perfectly well how to make accurate Diviſions, to define well, and to examine Definitions aright, that none may be ſuffer'd to eſcape that are not true.

He not only brought this Science to Perfection, but alſo regulated the Study of it; for to avoid the unhappy Inconveniences that befal thoſe who apply themſelves to it too young, and who commonly make uſe of it rather to contradict than to inveſtigate Truth, he would have none

none apply themſelves to it, till they were above thirty Years of Age, and then would have them employ five Years in it; being perſuaded that on this alone depends all the Progreſs a Man is capable of making in the Sciences, and in the perfect Knowledge of true and ſolid Good. And indeed, *Dialectick* being the Art of Reaſoning, 'tis not only the Foundation of all the Sciences, but the only Guide that can conduct Men to true Happineſs, by making them diſtinguiſh Truth from Error. And for this ſame Reaſon, near ſix hundred Years before *Plato*, the Holy Spirit exhorted Men to learn *Dialectick*, when he ſignifies by the Mouth of *Solomon*, *that all Science without Examination and Proof ſerves only to deceive Men.* And alſo *that the Knowledge of a Fool, is but a Diſcourſe in the Air without Examination and Proof.* And for the ſame Reaſon St. *Paul* ſays, * a Biſhop ought to *hold faſt the faithful Word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by ſound Doctrine, both to exhort, and to convince Gainſayers, who* by their falſe Principles *ſubvert whole Houſes, teaching Things which they ought not.* And this is the Work of Dialectick.

At what Age *Plato* would have Men ſtudy Dialectick.

For 'tis properly a Habitude, a Science which teaches to define what every Thing is, in what it differs from another Thing, or in what it reſembles it; to ſearch it out where it is, to know what makes the Eſſence of it, how many true Beings there are; what thoſe Things are which are not; and in what they differ from thoſe that are: It treats of the true Good, and of that which is not ſo; it ſhews us how many Things enter into the firſt Good, and how many are rank'd under its contrary; and leads us to diſtinguiſh that which is Eternal, from that which is but Temporal and Tranſitory; and this not by Reaſonings founded on Opinion, but by Proofs drawn from Science. For it hinders the Mind from

The Definition of Dialectick.

* Tit. 1. 9, and 11.

wandering after ſenſible Things, and thereby fixes it on that which is intelligible; and by diſſipating all ſorts of Errors by its Light, feeds it as it were in the Field of Truth. *Plotinus* ſays very well, that this is the moſt eſtimable Part of Philoſophy; and is not to be conſidered as the Inſtrument of a Philoſopher, but as that which is eſſential to him. For it does not ſtop at ſimple Propoſitions and Rules, but paſſes on to Things, and has all Beings for its Matter and Object; and by the Truth that is in it, diſcerns Error which is always a Stranger to it.

Plato took the Principles of true Dialectick from the *Hebrews*.

If the Writings of the ancient *Hebrews* aſſiſted *Plato* in laying the Foundations of good Ethicks and Phyſicks, they have not been leſs ſerviceable to him in eſtabliſhing the Principles of good Logick. Theſe Principles conſiſt in a right Impoſition of Names, which ought to denote the Nature of Things. For when the Nature of a Thing is known, 'tis eaſy to reaſon juſtly, and to eſtabliſh the Truth. No Nation ever follow'd better Rules in this than the *Hebrews*, as appears by the Books of *Moſes*, and the Writings of the Prophets. And therefore *Plato* confeſſes that the *Greeks* borrow'd the greateſt Part of the Names of Things from the *Barbarians* (that is, from the *Hebrews*) and acknowledges that this right Impoſition of Names proceeds from a more Divine Nature than that of Man.

The Character of a good Dialectician.

Plato ſays, that Man will never be a good Dialectician, who is not in a Condition (they are his own Words) *To give and receive Reaſon*. He means that to be a Dialectician, a Man ought to be able, not only to know the Truth, but to make it known to others, and perſuade them to embrace it. And for this Reaſon there are indeed two Parts of Dialectick, namely, Logick and Rhetorick. By the firſt we know, and by the ſecond we perſuade.

The true Uſe of Logick and Rhetorick.

Since Logick and Rhetorick are the two Parts of Dialectick, 'tis eaſy to ſee they ought only to be employ'd for

Juſtice

Juſtice and Truth. If us'd to ſupport Error, 'tis no longer Rhetorick nor Logick; as a Rule is no longer a Rule, when it is bent to make an ill Uſe of it. For a crooked Rule can no longer judge either of it ſelf, or that which is ſtrait. Logick and Rhetorick teach us truly to reaſon and diſcourſe for and againſt. Not that two Contraries can be equally true: But this is to put us in a Condition of anſwering thoſe who would abuſe 'em in favour of Injuſtice. None doubts that the ſole Object of Logick is Truth: And this is no leſs true of Rhetorick: And * *Plato* very well ſays, that *a wiſe Man will never labour to render himſelf dextrous to pleaſe Man, but to pleaſe the Gods. For* (he adds) *Prudence requires that we ſhould rather ſeek the Favour of our Maſters, than of thoſe who are only our Companions in the Service we owe them.*

Never did any one exceed *Plato* in ſhewing the Uſe of true Rhetorick, of which he gives admirable Precepts: To ſhew the Difference between this and its Counterfeit, he compares the firſt to the medicinal Art, and the other to Skill in Cookery. The Phyſician ſeeks only ſuch Things as may conduce to the Health of the Body, Health being the Thing he deſigns to procure: But the Cook is concern'd only for what may pleaſe the Taſte, without troubling his Head, whether it be healthful or hurtful. In like Manner the true Orator, he ſays, ſeeks only to make thoſe to whom he ſpeaks, better; and the counterfeit Orator has no other Deſign than that of perſuading 'em, whatever Damage they ſuffer by it.

The Difference between the true and counterfeit Orator.

'Tis objected to him, that a Man ought to make uſe of his Eloquence at any Rate to acquire Reputation and Authority in his Country; and to bring it into Subjection to him, if poſſible; to advance his Friends, to bring down his Enemies, and, in fine, (when great Calamities happen) to ſecure himſelf or others from Danger. *Plato*

* In *Phædrus*, Tom. 3.

anſwers all theſe Objections after an admirable Manner, and by Principles that cannot be conteſted.

Firſt he makes it appear, that thoſe who have the greateſt Authority in their Country are the moſt unhappy, if they have not acquir'd it by juſt Means, and do not employ it to juſt Purpoſes.

He ſhews that Tyrants are ſo far from being Happy, and from having Dominion over others, that they are very Miſerable, and ſo many vile Slaves; who never do what they deſire, even then when they do what they pleaſe.

He proves that 'tis much better to ſuffer Wrong, than to do it; and that when a Man has once done it, 'tis much happier for him to be puniſh'd for it, than to eſcape the Penalty he has deſerv'd.

As for what reſpects a Man's ſaving himſelf, or ſecuring others from great Danger; he ſhews 'tis not ſo conſiderable a Thing as to deſerve ſo much of our Eſteem: For there are a great many Things which often conduce to ſave Life, which are yet very inconſiderable in themſelves. For example (he ſays *) the Art of Swimming is a Thing very little eſteem'd, and yet on many Occaſions it preſerves a Man from certain Death. The Art of a Pilot ſaves whole Families, and the whole Eſtates of divers Perſons; yet a Pilot is not ordinarily much puff'd upon the Account of this Advantage: He does not think himſelf a very conſiderable Man in the State, but contents himſelf with a moderate Salary, as 'tis reaſonable he ſhould, becauſe he does not know whether he has done thoſe whom he has preſerv'd any great Service; for beſides that he returns 'em juſt as he found 'em, it often happens that it might have been better for ſome of 'em to have periſh'd in their Voyage.

The like may be ſaid of the Art of Engineers, that of Carpenters, Bricklayers, Coachmen, and many others; who often preſerve the Lives of Abundance of People, and yet there is no Government wherein the

* In *Gorgias*, Tom. 1.

Laws

Laws allot any very great Honours, or eſtabliſh any very conſiderable Rewards for thoſe that exerciſe 'em: So true is it, that notwithſtanding the Love Men naturally bear to Life, it muſt be confeſs'd that the Art of preſerving our ſelves or others is no ſuch wonderful Thing, as to be preferr'd to every Thing beſides.

What that Art is which alone merits our Eſteem.

The only Art which merits our Eſteem, and which alone can make a Man conſider'd as a God, is that of ſaving Souls; and to ſave 'em, they muſt be purg'd from their Vices: For 'tis the greateſt Unhappineſs in the World for a Man to paſs into the other Life with his Soul loaded with Sins. Therefore a good Man ought to employ all his Logick and Eloquence both to make himſelf better, and to render others ſo; and to put both himſelf and others in a Condition to appear before that Judge from whom nothing can be hid; who viewing Souls quite naked, diſcovers the leaſt Scars that are left on 'em by Perjury, Injuſtice, Vanity, Lying, Cruelty, Debauchery, and all other Sins; and who, as he renders to every Man according to his Works, puniſhes thoſe for a Time who have committed only ſuch Sins as are curable, that is, which may be expiated; and condemns thoſe to eternal Torments, who have been guilty of mortal Sins; and by puſhing their Wickedneſs to Extremity, have render'd themſelves incurable, and have no ſound Part in 'em. This is the Danger from which 'tis ſo noble a Thing to ſecure Men. This is the beſt Combat in the World, and the only one that deſerves to be undertaken even with the Peril of one's Life: For is it fit we ſhould fear Men, who can do no more than kill the Body?

Thoſe Legiſlators, Orators, and Miniſters of State, who have not employ'd their Eloquence to meliorate the People that are ſubject to 'em, were not true Orators, and conſequently were not truly righteous. This *Plato* proves by the Examples of *Pericles*, *Timon*, *Miltiades*, and *Themiſtocles*, who were ſo far from making the *Athenians* good Men, that they render'd them yet more brutiſh and ſavage; and, in fine, bore the Puniſh-

ment of that little Care they took of 'em. For all that befel 'em from the Hands of the People, came on 'em through their own Fault; like that which happens to an ill Groom, who ſuffers his Horſes to become more unlucky than when they were firſt committed to his keeping, and ſo at laſt is kick'd by 'em, and can no longer rule 'em. This is the Idea *Plato* had of Rhetorick, of which he gives excellent Precepts in his *Phædrus*, and *Gorgias*, Dialogues which can never be ſufficiently commended, and which furniſh us with the Maxims of which we have been diſcourſing.

When I ſay Rhetorick is one Part of Dialectick, I don't forget that this is ſometimes oppos'd to the other; as we find in *Plato*'s own Writings in the Beginning of *Gorgias*, where *Socrates* ſays to *Polus*, that he exercis'd himſelf more in that which is call'd Rhetorick, than in Dialectick. But 'tis eaſy to ſee, that *Socrates* there, by Rhetorick, means that Art which has no Regard to Truth, but aims only at a plauſible Appearance of Truth, and the Scope of which is only to adorn and embelliſh any Subject. When *Iſocrates* makes a Panegyrick on *Helena*, he only employs the Figures of Rhetorick, and never troubles himſelf about the Proofs and Arguments of Dialectick. In a Word, an Orator is one who labours to excite or appeaſe the Paſſions, and to obtain his End, ſeeks magnificent Words, and ſpecious Figures, and employs falſe Arguments as if they were true; and the Dialectician applies himſelf to Art, only to prove the Truth, as the Sophiſt has Recourſe to Art only to put off Falſhood.

We now come to the Manner in which *Plato* handles the Subject of which he treats; and ſhall endeavour to diſcover the Beauties and Defects of his Stile.

After what Manner *Plato* handles the ſubjects of which he treats.

He is accus'd of never propoſing his Queſtions ſimply and clearly, and of caſting by this Means a great deal of Obſcurity on his Dialogues. But to judge whether this Reproach is well or ill founded, 'tis neceſſary to examine what belongs to Method.

Method. There are two ſorts of Method: The firſt may be call'd ſimple and dry; ſuch is that of Geometricians, who endeavour only to propoſe the naked Truths, and to draw juſt Concluſions from their Propoſitions. This Method is very good, and extremely uſeful, when we have to do with Minds that are rational, and free from all ſorts of Prejudice: But is worth nothing when we deal with People prepoſſeſſed or unattentive, impatient or obſtinate.

The ſecond Method which may be call'd *compounded* or *florid*, is that of Orators: 'Tis properly the firſt Method extended and diſguiſed by all the Ornaments that can render Arguments agreeable, and takes away that Rudeneſs and Drineſs from Precepts, which commonly hinder the Reception of them. If we examine *Plato*'s Works with reference to the firſt of theſe, 'tis certain he does not at firſt Daſh diſtinctly propoſe the Queſtion on which he treats. But inſtead of being reproached, he ought to be commended for this: For he purpoſely rejected this Method to follow the other, which is infinitely more uſeful, and has more of Art in it. By this Means he cures a great many Paſſions, and deſtroys an infinite Number of Prejudices, before they to whom he ſpeaks know what he aims at; and 'tis by this Courſe he convinces them with ſo much Strength of all the Truths he has a Mind to teach.

Plato's Preambles.

But ſay ſome, to what Purpoſe ſerve thoſe great Preambles, which he ſets at the Head of his Dialogues? Theſe are neceſſary to accompany his Deſign; and as *Plutarch* ſays, when he ſpeaks of the Dialogue which *Plato* made of the Atlantick Iſland, on *Solon*'s Memoirs, *Theſe are ſuperb Gates, and magnificent Courts, with which he purpoſely embelliſhes his great Edifices; that nothing may be wanting to their Beauty, and that all may be equally ſplendid.* He acts like a great Prince, who when he builds a fine Palace, *adorns the Porch with golden Pillars*, to uſe the Words of *Pindar*. For 'tis proper that what is firſt ſeen ſhould be

ſplendid and magnificent, and ſhould promiſe all that Greatneſs which is to be ſeen afterwards.

His frequent Digreſſions.

If *Plato*'s Preambles ſhould be excus'd for the ſake of their great Beauty, and for the genuine and admirable Deſcriptions with which they abound; yet how can any one excuſe the frequent Digreſſions in which he engages himſelf? This is what is ſaid by thoſe who never had the Patience to read *Plato*; or elſe have read him very careleſly. 'Tis true, there are frequent Digreſſions in his Dialogues; but theſe Digreſſions never carry him entirely from his Subject: For he always employs them either to eſtabliſh ſome great Truth which he ſhall have Occaſion for in the Sequel of his Diſcourſe; or to prevent the Reader's Mind with Authorities and Examples; or, in fine, to divert and refreſh him after a painful and ſerious Reſearch: And in this *Plato* may be ſaid to be the greateſt Inchanter that ever was in the World; for when he is giving you the Proofs of the moſt neceſſary and ſolid Truths, he takes Care at the ſame Time to lead you into the ſweet Meadows, Groves, and Vallies, which the Muſes frequent.

Beſides, 'tis an inconteſtible Maxim, that the Operations of the Mind are not like the Motions of an Arrow. An Arrow does not go well, unleſs it flee ſtreight forward; but the Mind makes no leſs Progreſs when it turns aſide, or ſtops at a Subject, to conſider it well on every Side, and by the different Relations it has to other Things, than when it goes on directly to its End. 'Tis for an Arrow to go, without turning, to the Mark we aim at; and it always miſſes its Stroke, how little ſoever it diverts from it. But the Mind of Man is not oblig'd to proceed ſo directly; but is often engag'd to conſider ſuch Objects as are nearly allied to that it deſires to know; and to take a Turn about them, to examine them on all Sides. This circular Motion is no leſs ſtreight than that of an Arrow; and theſe Turnings and Windings, inſtead of leading us from the End, conduct us to it. This is ſo true, that when we have been thinking

thinking *Plato* was wandring from his Deſign by frequent Digreſſions, we are ſtrangely ſurprized to ſee, that *that* which ſeem'd to carry him from it, does indeed, after a wonderful Manner, lead him to it; and that the Truths he has explain'd in different Places, being laid together, form and compleat his Demonſtrations, which would have been neither certain nor right, if he had approach'd them by a direct Line.

He muſt never have read *Plato*, who accuſes him of being ignorant of the Method of Geometricians. He knew it perfectly well, and deſignedly forbears the Uſe of it. A learned Man *, who is very well acquainted with *Plato*, has obſerv'd before me, that no Man can more accurately propoſe the State of a Queſtion, more exactly divide a Subject, and examine Definitions more nicely than he. He never forgets any of the Things on which he has propos'd to treat: He always returns to his Subject, the Sight of which he has never loſt, what Digreſſion ſoever he makes. He often marks out the Beginning and End of each Part, and of every Digreſſion, by Propoſitions and Concluſions; he often uſes Recapitulations; and when he keeps his Proof at a Diſtance, he always takes Care to make you remember the State of the Queſtion: So that his Diſcourſe has at once the Liberty of Converſation, and the Accuracy of the moſt methodical Treatiſe. An ancient Philoſopher † has given this Commendation to *Plato*; that *of all the Philoſophers, he is the moſt excellent and admirable for dividing and defining; which Qualities denote him to be a very expert Logician.*

As for his Stile, 'tis ſublime without being impetuous and rapid. 'Tis a great River, the Depth of which makes it ſmooth. The principal Cauſe of that Elevation which reigns in it, is, that he imitates *Homer* more than any other Writers; and has drawn from his Poeſy, as from a

Plato's Stile.

* The Abbot *Fleury* in his Treatiſe of Studies.
† Alcin. Ch. VI.

living Spring that which has furniſh'd an infinite Number of Rivulets, which he has made to run from it: Nay, he is *Homer*'s Rival; and indeed ſeems to have heap'd up ſo many magnificent Things in his Treatiſes of Philoſophy, and to have fallen ſo often upon poetical Matters and Expreſſions, only to diſpute the Prize with this great Poet with all his Might; like a new Wreſtler, who enters the Liſts againſt one that has already receiv'd all the Acclamations, and is the Admiration of all Mankind. This is the Judgment which *Longinus* makes of him; but ſince he goes not deep enough into the true Character of *Plato*, and underſtood but a Part of it, that it may be better known, I hope I ſhall be permitted to explain it a little more thoroughly, by adhering to what our ancient Maſters have ſaid of it.

There * are ſo many different Manners of compoſing, that indeed they are innumerable. For one may ſay, the Countenances of Men are not more different than their Ways of Writing. 'Tis with this Art as 'tis with that of Painting; the Profeſſors of which make very different Mixtures with the ſame Colours, and paint the ſame Subjects after a very different Manner. But though thoſe Differences are ſo very numerous when they are examin'd nicely and by Detail, yet they may be reduc'd to three principal ones; which go under borrow'd Names, for want of proper ones. The firſt is auſtere or rude Compoſition. The ſecond is florid or ſmooth. And the third intermediate, which is compos'd of the other two.

Auſtere or rude Compoſition.

Auſtere * or rough Compoſition reſembles thoſe ancient Buildings, the Stones of which are neither poliſh'd, nor artificially plac'd; but yet are well fix'd, and have more Solidity than Beauty. It has more of Nature than Art in it, and depends more on the Paſſion than Manners and Civility: It has nothing florid, 'tis great and

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* *Dionyſius Halicarn.* in his Treatiſe of Compoſition.

† *Dionyſ.* pag. 22, &c.

rigid,

rigid, if I may be permitted to uſe ſuch a Term; 'tis without Ornament, and all the Graces of it ſavour much of Antiquity. This is the true Character of *Pindar*, *Æſchylus*, and *Thucydides*.

Smooth or florid Compoſition.

The * ſecond, which is ſmooth and florid, is almoſt entirely oppoſite to the other. It ſeeks the ſweeteſt and ſmootheſt Words, and avoids ſuch as are harſh and rough, with all imaginable Care. This ſavours more of Art than Nature, and depends more on polite Manners than on the Paſſion. This is the Character of *Heſiod*, *Sapho*, *Anacreon*, *Simonides*, and *Euripides* among the Poets, and of *Iſocrates* among the Orators. For of all that have written in Proſe, none ever ſucceeded better than this laſt.

Mix'd Compoſition made up of the two former.

The † Third is made up of both together, 'tis compounded of what is beſt in the two former, and therefore excels them both; for the Perfection of Arts always conſiſts in a Medium, as well as that of Manners and Actions, and the whole Courſe of Life.

The Writers of this kind differ more among themſelves than thoſe that have follow'd the two former Methods, becauſe of the different Mixture they have made of thoſe two Characters; for ſome have fallen more on the rough Way, and others more on the florid.

Homer, *Sophocles*, *Herodotus*, *Demoſthenes*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*, wrote in this laſt kind; but without Contradiction *Homer* is the moſt to be admired. There is no Part of his Poems but is wonderfully diverſified by theſe two Sorts of Compoſition. They who have follow'd him are more or leſs excellent, according as they more or leſs approach this great Model. And as *Plato* comes nearer to him than others, 'tis this that gives him his greateſt Beauty.

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* Ib. pag. 25, 26.
† Ib. pag. 27.

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The Foundation of theſe three Ways, as well as of all others, is, Firſt, the Choice of Words; Secondly, the regular placing of 'em, from which there reſults a different Harmony; and, in fine, the Uſe of Figures, and all the other Ornaments of Diſcourſe.

The foundation of theſe three ways.

The Choice of Words is firſt in Order, but the regular Diſpoſition of 'em is firſt in Beauty. This is ſo true, that the beſt-choſen and nobleſt Words, if thrown at a Venture, without Method and Art, will quite ſpoil the Elegancy of the Thought; whereas the worſt-choſen, and moſt vulgar Words, will make an indifferent Thought paſs, when Art has taken Care to put them in good Order. To be thoroughly convinc'd of this Truth, a Man need only pick out ſome of the fineſt Paſſages to be found in the Orators and Poets, and alter the Order and Harmony of 'em without making any Alteration in the Words, and he'll deſtroy the Beauty and Force of 'em; for by this Means the Figures, Colours, Paſſions, and polite Manners that appear in 'em, will be loſt. Hence it is, that the Beauties which ſhine in the Writings of theſe great Men can't be diſcern'd but by thoſe that know all theſe Differences. *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus* with a great deal of Reaſon compares the Diſpoſition of Words to * *Homer*'s *Minerva*: For as this Goddeſs by touching *Ulyſſes* with her Ring, made him appear one While little, deform'd, and like a Beggar depreſs'd with Miſery and Age, and another While very great and marvellouſly beautiful; ſo the different placing of the ſame Words makes the Thoughts appear one While poor and low, and another While rich and ſublime.

The Choice of Words, and the regular placing of 'em.

Plato may be call'd divine for this part, and if he were as happy in the Choice of Words, as in the Diſpoſition of 'em, he would equal *Homer*, and exceed all other Writers: But he ſometimes fails in his Choice, when he quits his ordinary Stile, to fall upon extraordinary and ſub-

Plato term'd *Divine* for the Diſpoſition of words, and leſs happy in the Choice of 'em.

* *Dionyſ. Halicarn.* gives Examples of it in his Treatiſe of Compoſition, pag. 4, 5.

lime

lime Expreſſions. While he keeps in a ſimple and natural Way, nothing has more Gracefulneſs, Purity, and Smoothneſs, than his Diction: 'Tis like the chryſtal Stream of a clear River. He then uſes the moſt common Terms, he only ſtudies Accuracy and Perſpicuity, and contemns all foreign Ornaments; he only preſerves a little Air of Antiquity, which is almoſt inſenſible, and ſerves to ſet off his Elegancy; and by Numbers varied with wonderful Art, he every where ſpreads a charming Harmony. But when he would exceed himſelf, and affects to be great, the quite contrary ſometimes befals him: For beſides that his Diction is leſs agreeable, leſs pure, and more embaraſs'd; he falls into Circumlocutions, which being ſcatter'd up and down without Choice, and without Meaſure, have no Elegancy or Beauty, and only make a vain Show of luxuriant Richneſs of Language. Inſtead of Words that are proper, and in common Uſe, he ſeeks only for ſuch as are novel, foreign, and antique; and inſtead of employing only ſuch Figures as are wiſe and grave, and eaſily underſtood, he is exceſſive in his Epithets, hard in his Metaphors, and extravagant in his Allegories. When I ſay this, I don't pretend that this always happens to him; one muſt be either blind or ſtupid, not to be touch'd with an infinite Number of Paſſages, in which he is as great and ſublime as poſſible, and his Stile riſes up to the Character of wonderful. But I ſpeak this to ſhew that when he falls, 'tis only in that kind of Stile in which 'tis impoſſible for a Man always to ſupport himſelf equally. For the great and magnificent Way is ſlippery and dangerous; and he that will attain it muſt expoſe himſelf to Falls. And indeed none but a great Genius is capable of this noble Effort; and the Falls Men have had, ſignify that they were led by a kind of divine Ardour, which they could not govern. Therefore the ſublime Method, tho' it has very little Foundation, always carries the Prize from the middle Way, tho' it be never ſo happy and perfect.

It muſt moreover be ſaid to the Praiſe of *Plato*, that the Places wherein he may be ſaid to fall, are very few in Compariſon of thoſe in which he has ſucceeded to a Wonder;

Wonder; and if we take Notice of 'em, 'tis not ſo much to cenſure them, as to admire that a Man rais'd ſo high above the ordinary Pitch of human Nature, ſhould not be able to preſerve himſelf from Faults in thoſe Places where he might ſo eaſily have avoided them, and where he ſeems to have known 'em. For he ſometimes confeſſes, that what he ſays is not ſo much like a wiſe and orderly Diſcourſe, as a Dithyrambick Poem; and that he ſpeaks like a Man poſſeſs'd. This extravagant Enthuſiaſm is vicious, eſpecially in Matters of Philoſophy; and he ought to have corrected it, ſeeing he diſcern'd it; and he was ſo careful and jealous of his Stile, that at fourſcore Years of Age he did not ceaſe to give new Touches once and again to his Dialogues, and took ſo much Pains with 'em, that after his Death, the Beginning of his Books of a *Republick* was found on his Writing-Tables, alter'd twenty ſeveral Ways.

But it may be ſaid, this Fault pleas'd him; or that, becauſe he fear'd the Simplicity of *Socrates* would not be always reliſh'd, he had a Mind to raiſe it by the Sublimity of *Thucydides* and *Gorgias*, however in imitating their Virtues he did not take ſufficient Precaution againſt their Vices. This is the Judgment which *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus* makes of him in his Treatiſe of the ancient Orators; and he ſupports it in the Anſwer which he makes to the great *Pompey* who took *Plato*'s Part. In his Anſwer he proves to him the Truth of this Cenſure, and makes it appear, that he is of the ſame Mind himſelf; and farther ſhews, that the Ancients, as *Demetrius Phalereus*, and ſome others, had paſſed the ſame Judgment before him.

Longinus, who is ſo fine, ſo ſure, and ſo exact a Critick, was of the ſame Opinion ſome Ages before *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus*. He acknowledges, as well as this latter, that *Plato* writes after a divine Manner in Abundance of Places; and at the ſame Time proves, like him too, by palpable Inſtances, that he is ſometimes too figurative in his Expreſſions; and that by a certain Fury of Diſcourſe he ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported to harſh and extravagant Metaphors, and to a vain allegorical Pomp, which can't chuſe but frequently languiſh. This

is a Defect which he might have avoided, as *Demetrius* ſays, if he had uſed proper Terms more frequently than Metaphors.

But to finiſh this Character in few Words, by reſuming what has been already ſaid. In general there is nothing more harmonious and touching than *Plato*'s Diction; he joins the Force of the greateſt Orators, with the Graces of the greateſt Poets; he is very fruitful and luxuriant: He ſo perfectly deſcribes Manners and Paſſions, and forms Characters ſo well, that all the Perſons he brings in every where appear what they ſeem'd to be at firſt View. There is nothing more perfect when he keeps himſelf within the Bounds of ordinary Language; but he ſometimes falls, when he ſtrives to ſoar very high, tho' his Falls are not common, and yet the Places wherein he ſhews himſelf pompous and magnificent, are very frequent: So that even in this kind of Writing there are a thouſand Things to be admir'd in his Books, where there is one to be condemned.

Having ſpoken of *Plato*'s Stile, we come to ſpeak a Word or two of his Commentators and Interpreters.

We have but two *Latin* Tranſlations of this Philoſopher's Works, that of *Marſilius Ficinus*, and that of *John de Serres*, who compos'd the Hiſtory of *France* under the Title of an Inventory, (or Regiſter.) Neither of 'em will ever make *Plato* to be well underſtood. However, the former ſeems to me the beſt for the literal Senſe, and 'tis certain that it has fewer Faults. *Marſilius Ficinus* was a learned and laborious Man; but being too ſpeculative and abſtracted, he loſes all the Advantages of his Tranſlation by his Explication, in which he ſtrains Allegories and Myſteries to an exorbitant Degree. It would have been a great Uneaſineſs to him to underſtand any Thing ſimply, tho' *Plato* often ſpeaks with great Simplicity; and by this Means he endeavours to juſtify a great many Errors into which *Plato* fell; for he every where finds a Senſe, not only commodious and excuſable, but orthodox; he always looks on him with a profound Reſpect as a Man inſpir'd with God; and is perſuaded there is no Myſtery in the Chriſtian Religion, but he knew it:

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I don't ſay in the Writings of the Prophets only, but in thoſe of the Evangeliſts and Apoſtles.

John de Serres was a Man of leſs Ability than *Marſilius Ficinus*, nor did he underſtand *Greek* near ſo well as he; ſo that his Tranſlation abounds with * Faults, and eſſential Faults too, which corrupt the Senſe: But he is yet more to blame for entirely changing the Order of the Dialogues, and diſpoſing 'em into different Claſſes; not according to the Subjects, but the Titles of 'em, which are commonly falſe: Which makes the Reader, when he ſeeks for that in the Dialogue which is promiſed in the Title, and does not find it, accuſe *Plato* of being very defective in his Proofs, and of wandering from his Subject; ſo that he has not the Patience to hear him. The only Thing in his Work, that ſeems to me worthy of any great Commendation, is his ſmall marginal Notes, in which he gives a naked Diſcovery of *Plato*'s Method: For tho' *Plato* was willing to conceal it, to render his Dialogues the more diverting; it was fit ſome Perſon ſhould give himſelf the Trouble of unfolding this Art thoroughly, which the Readers would not always unravel of themſelves. This is a very great Help, and indeed is very uſeful to make the Beauties of the Method *Plato* follow'd appear to good Advantage. In fine, if *Marſilius Ficinus* errs in running every where too fa into Myſteries, *John de Serres* runs into the contrary Fault in taking Things too ſimply: For 'tis by this Means he charges a great many very innocent Things, and which may receive a good Senſe, to *Plato*'s Account, as ſo many Crimes.

The Commentators of *Plato*.

Plato explains his Thoughts ſo clearly himſelf, that a Man needs nothing but Attention, not to loſe the Train of his Reaſon; the Obſcurities we find in 'em reſult either from the Cuſtoms of his Time, or the Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers; into which Commentators give very little Light. The Knowledge of 'em ought to be ſought in the reading of ancient Authors,

* See the Abbot *Fleury*'s Treatiſe of Studies, pag. 297.

which

which are more uſeful to make a Man underſtand *Plato*, than all that have labour'd to explain his Doctrine. Theſe Commentators, however, are not to be ſlighted, but deſerve to be read for their own Sake, without any Regard to *Plato*'s Philoſophy. At leaſt there are five of 'em, of which I may make this Account: *Maximus Tyrius* under the Emperor *Marcus Aurelius*, in the ſecond Century; *Plotinus* in the third; *Porphyrius* the Scholar of *Plotinus*; and *Jamblichus*, the Scholar of *Porphyrius*, in the fourth; and *Proclus* in the ſixth.

The laſt was a very great Philoſopher, and ſo ſkilful in the Mechanicks, that he equall'd, and even ſurpaſs'd *Archimedes* himſelf in divers Things: But his Vanity was yet more remarkable than his Ingenuity; when to encourage the Emperor *Anaſtaſius*, to whom it had been predicted, that he ſhould be kill'd with a Clap of Thunder, he built a Tower for him that was to be Proof againſt the Artillery of Heaven; for this Tower prov'd uſeleſs, and the Emperor was kill'd with Thunder, which he was ſo deſirous to eſcape. We have, moreover, ſix Books of this *Proclus* on *Plato*'s Theology, and Theological Inſtitutions. His Words are very difficult to be underſtood, becauſe he is very abſtracted. But when a Man can penetrate 'em, he'll find 'em very profound, and full of admirable Things. As when he explains what *Plato* ſays, that *that* which unites us to God is Love, Truth, and Faith; and ſhews Faith to be the only Cauſe of Initiation. *For* (ſays he) *this Initiation is made neither by Knowledge nor Diſcerning, but by a Medium which is ſingle, and ſtronger than all Knowledges; that is, by the Silence which Faith inſpires in raiſing up our Souls to God, and plunging them into that Sea, which can never be comprehended.* But he muſt be read with a great deal of Judgment and Precaution; for theſe Things that are ſo admirable, are mix'd with a great many Errors, into which he was thrown by that Hatred with which he was always animated againſt the Chriſtians.

Jamblichus is conſiderable in that he perfectly well explains the Opinions of the *Egyptians* and *Chaldeans* about divine Things. Beſides, in explaining theſe Myſteries

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he often gives great Diſcoveries that may be uſefully employ'd to elucidate Abundance of Difficulties in the Holy Scriptures, and is full of Maxims that may be of great Uſe. The greateſt Fault of *Jamblichus* is, that in treating of theſe very ſublime Subjects he often ſhews himſelf credulous and ſuperſtitious.

Porphyrius was of *Tyre*, he was call'd *Malcho*. And therefore *Longinus*, in his Letters, calls him *the King of Tyre*; becauſe *Malcho*, in the *Phœnician* Language, ſignifies a King: For the ſame Reaſon he is nam'd *Porphyrius*, i. e. *one cloath'd with Purple*; that is to ſay, a King. The Ancients have preſerved to us many Things he wrote on the Philoſophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*: But he was a Man of a wicked Mind, and very ſatirical; and was moreover ſo inclin'd to Magick, that this ſacrilegious Curioſity of his obſcur'd the greateſt Diſcoveries of Truth which he had receiv'd from *Plato*. His Treatiſe of Abſtinence is the beſt and moſt uſeful Thing he compos'd.

Plotinus, in my Opinion, excels all the reſt: Not but that he is often very abſtracted, and hard to be underſtood; but in general he is more intelligible than *Proclus*: And for Morality, much Advantage may be reap'd from his Writings; and 'tis happy that his fineſt Treatiſes are the moſt plain and intelligible. *Longinus* ſays of him, that he has more clearly explain'd the Principles of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, than any Philoſopher before him. He ſays, his Writings are worthy of the Eſteem and Veneration of all Men; and adds, that tho' the greateſt Part of the Matters on which he treats ſeem to him incomprehenſible, and do not affect him, he can never be weary in admiring his Stile, the Solidity of his Thoughts and Conceptions, the Depth of his Reſearches, and the truly philoſophical Manner in which he handles his Subjects.

When *Longinus* ſays, he is not always affected with the Subjects which *Plotinus* handles, he principally reſpects what he wrote in Ideas. For *Longinus* had labour'd to refute *Porphyrius*, who was brought over to the Sentiments of *Plotinus* after having written againſt him; that is, *Longinus* could not conceive the Doctrine of Ideas, and was of *Ariſtotle*'s Sentiment, who took what *Diogenes* had

had ſaid to ridicule this Opinion, too literally: For *Diogenes* being one Day at Table with *Plato*, and being fallen in Converſation upon immaterial and eternal Exemplars, ſays he to *Plato*, *I ſee very well there is a Goblet and a Table, but I ſee neither Gobleity nor Tableity.* To which *Plato* anſwer'd, *'Tis becauſe thou haſt bodily Eyes, which can ſee a Goblet and a Table, but not thoſe of the Mind, which alone ſee Gobleity and Tableity.*

Never did any Diſciple do more Honour to his Maſter than *Plotinus* did to *Plato*, both by his Manners and Doctrine.

It was he that firſt ſaid, *God was mov'd merely by his Mercy to give our Souls only mortal Chains.* By which he ſignifies that it was an Effect of his Compaſſion that he gave us Bodies ſubject to Death, that ſo we might not always be expos'd to the Miſeries of this Life.

He was convinc'd that our Souls draw all their Light and Sagacity only from that intelligible Light which created 'em; that the Soul has no Nature ſuperior to it but that of God alone; and that the Angels and other celeſtial Spirits derive their Happineſs and Knowledge from no other Source than that which enlightens us, and renders us happy. His Manners were yet more admirable than his Doctrine. He all his Life deſpis'd Vain-Glory, Riches, and Pleaſures, and his Probity was ſo generally known, that the moſt conſiderable Perſons of both Sexes, when they died, entruſted him with their Eſtates and Children, as not being able to find a more faithful Depoſitory, or more ſacred Aſylum.

Maximus Tyrius wrote in *Homer*'s Doctrine, and on the Matters of Philoſophy; almoſt all the Diſcourſes which we have of his do either directly or indirectly reſpect *Plato*'s Philoſophy. The Reading of 'em is very agreeable, and very uſeful: But they ſupply us with no more Aid for the underſtanding of the Difficulties of *Plato*, than all the reſt. And in this Reſpect one may ſay the Uſeleſſneſs of theſe Commentaries proves the Truth of one of *Plato*'s Sentiments, who held, that it ſerves to very little Purpoſe to write on thoſe ſublime Sciences, and that

that the true Manner of teaching 'em is by Converſation, which is the only Way to perſuade a Man after ſuch a Manner, that he ſhall not have the leaſt Difficulty remain upon his Mind, and that he ſhall be capable of convincing another of the ſame Thing: For we never well underſtand a Truth, if we are not in a Condition on all Occaſions to make it known to ſuch as have all neceſſary Diſpoſitions to receive it. And this was likewiſe the Reaſon that *Plato* was more known, and better underſtood at *Rome* in *Cicero*'s Time, than he is now: Becauſe he was read in the Company of Philoſophers, and nothing ſhortens Difficulties ſo much as living Commentaries. Unhappily for us theſe living Commentaries are now very rare, or to ſpeak more plainly, are not to be found. For of all our Philoſophers there is not one who has cloſely apply'd himſelf to the reading of *Plato*, a Negligence not to be excus'd. If the reading of *Plato* ſhould not render us more learned, 'tis certain, however, that it might make us better, leſs proud, and more wiſe; not only with that human Wiſdom which qualifies us externally to fill up all the Duties of our civil Life; but alſo with that ſovereign Wiſdom which diſpoſes us to obey God, and to ſubject our ſelves to the Truths of Religion, and which alone makes up the true Character of a Philoſopher.

Being therefore deſtitute of all Help from living Commentaries, for the underſtanding of *Plato*; I apply my ſelf to *Plato* himſelf, and ſhall endeavour to give a faithful Tranſlation, accompanied with ſome Remarks, in thoſe places which are moſt difficult, and of greateſt Importance. It may be the Facility of reading him in this Dreſs will attract ſome Readers. But however the Succeſs be, I ſhall never repent of having employ'd my Time in tranſlating ſome Treatiſes of a truly divine Philoſopher, ſince he had the glorious Privilege of being in the Hand of God an Inſtrument of Light and Grace for the Converſion of St. *Auguſtine*; and perhaps may be ſo to ſome of us.

End of the Life of Plato.

PLATO's

PLATO's

Select Dialogues.

THE First *ALCIBIADES*: OR, Of the NATURE OF MAN.

The ARGUMENT.

IN this Dialogue, which is intitled OF THE NATURE OF MAN, Plato *attempts to cure our Pride and Self-love, by ſetting the Infirmities and Defects of human Nature in the cleareſt Light; and by preſcribing the Means which ought to be us'd to reform it, with the Care we ought to take of our ſelves. The Matter in Queſtion therefore is to know what* We our Selves *are; and above all, that part of the Dialogue which treats of this, appears to be divine. For here* Plato *teaches, that* Man is the reaſonable Soul, which participates of Underſtanding, and makes uſe of the Body. *The Soul, as reaſonable,*

ble, makes use of her Reason to reflect on her self, and to know her own Necessities: As she participates of Understanding, she makes use of this to raise her up toward God, and to know her self in that resplendent Light, in which only we can be able perfectly to view our selves; and to know what is good, profitable, lovely, just, in a word, the true Good, of which that is the Fountain: And 'tis this Knowledge alone that sets us right; and which by directing our Actions, renders them useful both to our selves and others. But that it may not be thought that it absolutely depends on us to acquire this perfection, he assures us, that all our Efforts will be useless without the Assistance of God. We shall find here, besides this, other Truths as surprizing in a Pagan: *For instance, that which he says of the two sorts of Ignorance, one of which is good, and t'other evil: And what he teaches us concerning particular Things, that the Knowledge of these is not sufficient to produce the Peace and Union of States and Families; and that we have Need of the Knowledge of universal Things, which alone produces Charity, the Mother of Union. 'Tis not necessary here to set off all the Beauties of this Dialogue. I shall only remark in general, that all these Dialogues are as so many pieces of the Theatre: Comedy reigns in some of 'em, and Tragedy in others. This is of the latter kind, and in some sort resembles* Sophocles's Oedipus. *For as in that Piece we see a Prince who from the highest Pinacle of Grandeur, and after he had been look'd upon as a God, falls into a most deplorable State of Misery; we here in like manner see* Alcibiades, *after having been counted worthy of the greatest Honours, obliged to acknowledge that he deserves only to be a Slave. They who are shock'd at the passionate Manner in which* Socrates *speaks to* Alcibiades *at the beginning of this Dialogue, will cease to be offended when they have read it out; for they'll then see 'tis a very innocent passion, designed only for the Advancement of Virtue. Young People would be very happy, if they always found Friends that lov'd 'em as truly and piously as* Socrates *loved* Alcibiades: *For as* Plutarch *says,* He did not seek

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with him an effeminate Pleaſure unworthy of a Man, but cured the Corruptions of his Soul, fill'd the Void of his Mind, and repreſs'd his extravagant Vanity. *He endeavour'd to lead him out of Darkneſs, and conduct him to the true Light. 'Tis not difficult to fix the Time in which* Plato *ſuppoſes this Dialogue to have been made, ſince he tells us* Alcibiades *was then in the 20th Year of his Age; it muſt have been therefore in the 3d Year of the* LXXXVII*th* Olympiad, *one Year before the Death of* Pericles

This Dialogue is μαιευτικὸς; *that is,* Socrates *ſo manages the Matter, as to make* Alcibiades *of himſelf find out the Truths which he has a Mind to teach him.*

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates. O Son of *Clinias*, you are without Doubt ſurpriz'd, that ſince I was the firſt that lov'd you, I ſhould likewiſe be the laſt; and that whereas others have purſued you with their importunate Viſits, I have been ſo many Years without ſpeaking to you. 'Tis no human Conſideration that has retain'd me; but a Regard altogether * Divine; which I'll explain to you hereafter. At preſent, while that God who conducts me lays me under no Reſtraint, I make uſe of the Permiſſion he gives me to accoſt you; and I hope our Converſation for the Time to come will not be diſagreeable

* *A Regard altogether Divine.*] He means he was not willing to ſpeak to him without the Permiſſion of God, under whoſe Conduct he is; and that God would not ſuffer him to ſpeak during the great Tenderneſs of *Alcibiades* his Youth, which would have render'd all his Inſtructions uſeleſs. See the Argument of the Apology about the Genius that conducted Socrates.

to him. I have hitherto obſerv'd with Joy, how you have conducted yourſelf towards my Rivals: Among that great Number of proud and haughty Men who have adher'd to you, there is not one whom you have not ſhock'd by your lofty Carriage. And I am now willing to tell you the Cauſe of the Contempt you have had for 'em. You think you have no Need of any Man; ſo liberally has Nature, as you ſuppoſe, indulged you with all the Goods both of Body and Mind. For firſt of all, * you think yourſelf to be one of the fineſt and beſt-made Men in the World: And 'tis very certain, in this you are miſtaken. In the ſecond Place, you are ſenſible of the Advantage of † your Birth; for you are of the moſt illuſtrious Houſe of *Athens*, which is the moſt conſiderable of all the Cities of *Greece*. On your Father's Side, you have a great many very powerful Relations and Friends to ſupport you on all Occaſions. You have no leſs Number, nor leſs conſiderable in Quality, on your Mother's Side. And that which you think yet more augments your Reputation, is, that your Father left you *Pericles* for your Guardian; whoſe Authority is ſo great, that he does what he pleaſes not only in this City, but likewiſe in all *Greece*, and among the moſt powerful of the barbarous Nations. I might alſo ſpeak of your Riches, if I did not know that theſe are the leaſt Occaſion of your Vanity. ‖ All theſe great Advantages have inſpired you with ſo much Pride, that you have deſpis'd

The Pride of *Alcibiades*, and the Reaſon of it.

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* *Plutarch* reports, that the Beauty of *Alcibiades* kept in a florid State through all the Ages of his Life; and that the Saying of *Euripides*, that *The Autumn of handſome Men is gay*, was verified in him.

† On the Side of his Father *Clinias*, he deſcended from *Eurysaces*, the Son of *Ajax*; and on the Side of his Mother *Dinomache*, he was *Alcmæonides*, and deſcended from *Megacles*.

‖ The moſt noted and ſtrongeſt Paſſions *Alcibiades* had, were a boundleſs Vanity, which made him endeavour to carry all before him with an Air of Haughtineſs, and an unlimited Ambition, which made either a Superior, or Equal, always ſeem intolerable to him: This made *Archeſtratus* ſay, *Greece* could not bear two *Alcibiades*'s. *Plutar.*

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all your Admirers as ſo many Inferiors, not worthy of loving you. Accordingly they have all left you, and you have very well obſerv'd it; therefore I am very ſure you can't ſufficiently wonder what Reaſons I can have to continue in my former Paſſion; and are conſidering what Hope I can have yet to follow you, after all my Rivals have retired.

Alcibiades. But one Thing which without Doubt you don't know, *Socrates*, is, that you have prevented me but a Moment, and that I deſigned to ſpeak to you firſt, to aſk the Reaſon of your Obſtinacy What do you mean? Or what is it you hope for, that you trouble me after this Manner, uſing your utmoſt Diligence continually to attend me in every Place whither I go? For, in fine, I can't enough wonder at your Deportment; and you'll do me a Pleaſure to tell me once for all, to what you pretend.

Socrat. That is, you'll freely hear me, ſeeing you have a Mind to know my Thoughts. I ſhall therefore now ſpeak to you, as to one who will have Patience to hear me, and will not take Occaſion to get away from me.

Alcib. Yes, you may ſo

Socrat. Conſider well to what you engage your ſelf; that you may not be ſurpriz'd, if I find it as hard for me to make an End, as it has been to begin.

Alcib. Speak, *Socrates*; I'll give you as much Time as you pleaſe.

Socrat. Well, then, I'll obey you; and tho' it be a very difficult Thing for a Man to ſpeak to a Perſon he loves, who yet does not love him, I muſt take the Courage to tell you my Thoughts. For my Part, *Alcibiades*, if I had always ſeen you devoted to your Vanity and Grandeur, and in the Deſign of living, as you have hitherto done in your Luxury and Softneſs, I ſhould alſo have long ago renounc'd my Paſſion for you; at leaſt, I flatter myſelf that I ſhould have done ſo. But now I am going to diſcover to you your own Thoughts, which are very different from thoſe you have had formerly; and by this you'll know that the Reaſon of my obſtinate perſiſting in following you up and down, was, to ſtudy

you. I am ready to think, that if ſome God ſhould all on a ſudden ſay to you, *Alcibiades*, would you rather chuſe to live with all the Advantages you have at preſent, than to die; if you were withal forbidden to aſpire to the Poſſeſſion of yet greater for the future: I am ready to think, I ſay, that you would chuſe to die. So that this appears to be the Hope with which you flatter your ſelf, and which makes you in Love with Life. You are perſuaded, that you ſhall have no ſooner harangued the *Athenians*, and that will be within a very little Time, but you'll make 'em ſenſible you deſerve to be honour'd more than *Pericles*, or any of our greateſt Citizens; that you ſhall ſoon be Maſter of this City; and that your Power ſhall extend over all the Cities of *Greece*, and over the barbarous Nations that inhabit our Continent. And if this God ſhould farther ſay, *Alcibiades*, you ſhall be King of all *Europe*, but you ſhall not extend your Dominion over the Provinces of *Aſia*; I believe you would not be willing to live for ſo ſmall an Empire, unleſs you could fill the whole World with the Noiſe of your Name. You eſteem none but *Cyrus* and *Xerxes*; and as you are charm'd with their Glory, you propoſe them as Patterns for your Imitation. Theſe are the Views you have. I know it, and 'tis not mere Conjecture. You very well know, I ſay nothing but the Truth; and therefore perhaps you'll ask me, What Reſpect, *Socrates*, has this Preamble of yours to that you had a Mind to ſay, to explain to me the Reaſons you have to follow me every where? I'll immediately ſatisfy you of that, O Son of *Clinias*. 'Tis becauſe the * great Projects you form in your Head can never be put in Execution without my Aſſiſtance; ſo much Power have I over all your Affairs, and over your ſelf too. And hence it is, without Doubt, that the God who governs me, has never ſuffer'd me to ſpeak to you till now, and I have been long waiting for his Permiſſion. Now therefore, as you hope

* The Deſigns of the Ambitious can't ſucceed but by the Counſels of the Wiſe.

that

that when you have convinc'd your Fellow-Citizens that you are worthy of the greateſt Honours, they will make you Maſter of their Fortunes; I alſo hope you will make me Maſter of your Conduct, when I have convinc'd you, that I am more worthy of this Honour than any other Perſon, and that you have neither Guardian, Friend, nor Brother, that can give you that great Power to which you aſpire: There is none but I that can do it, with the Help of God. While you were younger, and had not this great Ambition, God was not pleas'd to ſuffer me to ſpeak to you, that my Words might not be thrown away. Now he gives me Leave to break Silence; and you are indeed in a better Diſpoſition to hear me.

Alcib. I confeſs, *Socrates*, * you ſeem to me a more ſtrange Perſon ſince you have begun to ſpeak, than while you were ſilent; tho' indeed I have always taken you for an odd ſort of a Man. It ſeems then you know my Thoughts perfectly well; ſo let it be: If I ſhould tell you the contrary, I ſhould have enough to do to convince you. Yet I pray tell me, how you will be able to prove that with your Aſſiſtance, I ſhall effect the great Things I am projecting, and that I can do nothing without you?

Socrat. Do you ask me if I am capable of making a long Diſcourſe, † as they do whom you are wont to hear? You know that is not my Manner. But if you would (tho' ever ſo little) comply with my Way, I'll do all I can to convince you, that I have advanced nothing but what is true.

Alcib. I am willing to comply with it, provided 'tis not very difficult.

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* The Wiſdom of *Socrates* cou'd not but ſeem mere Folly to *Alcibiades*, eſpecially while *Socrates* promiſes him ſuch great Things, which he could not tell how to comprehend.

† He reproaches him for abuſing himſelf too much in hearing the long Diſcourſes of the Sophiſts. For *Alcibiades* pretended much to Eloquence, which made him ſo much reliſh thoſe ſtudied Diſcourſes.

Socrat. Is it ſo difficult a Matter to anſwer a few Queſtions?

Alcib. No; if that be all, I am willing to do it.

Socrat. Anſwer me then.

Alcib. Well, interrogate me as ſoon as you pleaſe.

Socrat. May we not ſuppoſe that you have always thoſe great Thoughts which I have attributed to you?

Alcib. I agree to it: I ſhall at leaſt have the Satisfaction of hearing what you have to ſay to me.

Socrat. I believe I am not miſtaken; you are preparing to go in a few Days to the Aſſembly of the *Athenians*, to make them participate of the Knowledge and Skill you have acquired. And if I ſhould meet you at that Inſtant, and aſk you, *Alcibiades*, what are the Matters about which you are going to adviſe the *Athenians?* Are they not ſuch Things as you know better than they? What would you anſwer me?

Alcib. Without doubt, I ſhould anſwer, 'tis about ſuch Things as I know better than they.

Socrat. For you would not know how to give good Counſel but in Matters that you know.

Alcib. How ſhould any one give it in other Things?

Socrat. And is it not certain, that you know nothing but what you have either learn'd of others, or what you have found out yourſelf?

Alcib. What can one know otherwiſe?

Socrat. But have you learnt any Thing of others, or found out any Thing your ſelf, when you have neither been willing to learn nor ſearch into any Thing?

Alcib. That cannot be.

Socrat. Have you ever thought it worth your While to endeavour to find out, or learn, what you believ'd you already underſtood?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. There was a Time, then, in which you thought yourſelf ignorant of what you now know?

Alcib. That is very true.

Socrat. But I pretty well know what are the Things you have learn'd. If I forget any one of 'em, mention it to me. You have learnt (if my Memory don't deceive

deceive me) to read and write, to play on the Harp, and to wreſtle: * But as for the Flute, you did not value it. This is all you underſtand, unleſs you have learn'd ſome other Thing that I never knew of. And yet † I don't think you have gone Abroad either Day or Night, but I have been a Witneſs to the Steps you have taken.

Alcib. 'Tis very true, theſe are the only Things I have learn'd.

Socrat. Will you then, when the *Athenians* enter into a Deliberation about Writing, to know how that Art ought to be practis'd, riſe up to give them your Advice?

Alcib. No, ſurely.

Socrat. Shall it be when they conſult about the different Tunes in Muſick?

Alcib. A fine Conſultation indeed!

Socrat. Nor are the *Athenians* us'd to deliberate on the various Turns us'd in Wreſtling?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. What is it then you expect they will conſider, wherein you may give them Advice? It muſt not be about the Manner of building a Houſe neither; the meaneſt Bricklayer would be able to adviſe them how to do that better than you.

Alcib. He would ſo.

Socrat. Nor muſt it be about any Point of Divination, you are not ſo well acquainted with that Buſineſs as every Diviner is, let him be ſmall or great, handſome or ugly, of high or low Birth.

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* He look'd upon it as an ignoble Inſtrument, and unworthy the Application of a Freeman. But the principal Cauſe of his Averſion was, becauſe it ſpoil'd the graceful Air of his Countenance.

† *Alcibiades* was Night and Day beſieg'd by a corrupt Sort of Men, who made it their conſtant Endeavour to ſeduce him. But *Socrates*, like a good Father, kept him always in his Sight, to ſecure him from all thoſe Dangers, well knowing that none but himſelf was capable of preſerving him from ſo great Perils.

Alcib. What does all that ſignify?

Socrat. Nor is it any Matter whether he be rich or poor, for good Counſel proceeds from Knowledge, and not from Riches.

Alcib. That's eaſily granted.

Socrat. And if the *Athenians* ſhould take into Conſideration the Ways and Means of recovering their Health; do you think they would not ſend for a Phyſician to conſult him, without giving themſelves any farther Trouble?

Alcib. No Doubt of it.

Socrat. When is it then, d'ye think, that you'll riſe up with any Colour of Reaſon to give them good Advice?

Alcib. When they deliberate on their Affairs.

Socrat. What, when they conſult about the building of Ships; to know what ſort of Veſſels they ſhould make?

Alcib. No, not that neither.

Socrat. For you never learnt to build Ships; that's the Reaſon I ſuppoſe you will not ſpeak of that Matter; is it not?

Alcib. To be ſure, I'll ſay nothing on that Subject.

Socrat. When is it then that their Affairs will be ſo deliberated, that you'll put in with a Speech?

Alcib. When they have before them the Buſineſs of Peace and War, or any other Thing belonging to Government.

Socrat. You mean, when they conſider with what Nations 'tis proper for them to make War or Peace; and when and how it ought to be made?

Alcib. You hit it.

Socrat. Peace or War ought to be made with thoſe Nations with whom 'tis beſt to make either the one or the other; and when the beſt Occaſion offers, and alſo after the beſt Manner; and as long as it continues to be beſt.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. If the *Athenians* ſhould conſult with what Wreſtlers 'tis beſt to take the Lock, and what others 'tis beſt

beſt to deal with * at Arms-end without cloſing in to them, and when and how theſe different Exerciſes ought to be perform'd, ſhould you give better Advice in theſe Matters than the Maſter of the Wreſtling-ground?

Alcib. No queſtion but he would give the beſt Counſel in this Caſe.

Socrat. Can you tell me what this Wreſtling-Maſter would principally regard in giving his Inſtructions, with whom, when, and how theſe different Exerciſes ought to be perform'd? Would he not have Reſpect only to what is beſt?

Alcib. Without Doubt he would.

Socrat. Then he would order them to be perform'd as often as it ſhould be beſt ſo to do; and on ſuch Occaſions as ſhould be moſt proper.

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. He that ſings ought ſometimes to join his Voice with the Harp; and ſometimes to dance as he plays and ſings, and in all this he ſhould conduct himſelf by what is beſt.

Alcib. That is moſt certain.

Socrat. Seeing then there is a Beſt in ſinging, and in playing on Inſtruments, as well as in Wreſtling, how will you call this Beſt? For as for that of Wreſtling, all the World calls it the moſt *Gymnaſtick.*

Alcib. I don't underſtand you.

Socrat Endeavour to follow me; for my Part I ſhould anſwer, that this Beſt is that which is always the Beſt; and is not that which is always the beſt, that which is moſt according to the Rules of the Art it ſelf?

Alcib. You have Reaſon.

Socrat. What is this Art or Wreſtling? Is it not the *Gymnaſtick* Art?

Alcib. Yes.

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* 'Tis a kind of Wreſtling *Hippocrates* ſpeaks of in his 11th Book of *Diet.* Chap. XI. *To wreſtle only with the Arms, without taking hold of the Body, makes one lean, and draws the Fleſh upward.*

Socrat. What I have been ſaying, is, that which is beſt in the Art of Wreſtling, is call'd the moſt *Gymnaſtick*.

Alcib. This is what you have already ſaid.

Socrat. And this is right.

Alcib. Very right.

Socrat. Come then, do you alſo endeavour to give me a right Anſwer. How do you call that Art, which teaches to ſing, to play on the Harp, and to dance well? Can't you tell me that?

Alcib. No, indeed, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Try if you can't hit on't in this Way. How do you call the Goddeſſes that preſide over this Art?

Alcib. You mean the Muſes.

Socrat. Very well. Let us ſee then what Name this Art has deriv'd from them.

Alcib. O, 'tis Muſick you ſpeak of.

Socrat. Very right: And as I told you that which was perform'd according to the Rules of the Art of Wreſtling, or of the *Gymnaſium*, is call'd *Gymnaſtick*; tell me alſo how you call that which is according to the Rules of this other Art?

Alcib. I call it *Muſical*, and ſay ſuch a Thing is done *Muſically*.

Socrat. Very good. And in the Art of making War, and in that of making Peace, what is that which is beſt, and how do you call it? Seeing as to thoſe two other Arts you ſay that which is beſt in the one, is that which is moſt Gymnaſtick, and that which is beſt in the other, is that which is moſt Muſical; try now in like Manner to tell me the Name of that which is beſt in the Arts we are now upon.

Alcib. Indeed, *Socrates*, I can't tell.

Socrat. But if any one ſhould hear you diſcourſing, and giving Advice about ſeveral ſorts of Food, and ſaying that is better than this, both for the Seaſon and Quality of it; and ſhould ask you, *Alcibiades*, what is it you call better? Would it not be a Shame, if you could not anſwer, that you mean by better, that which is more wholeſome? Yet 'tis not your Profeſſion to be a Phyſician.

And

And is it not a yet greater Shame that you know not how to give an Anſwer in Things you profeſs to know, and about which you pretend to give Advice, as underſtanding them better than others? Does not this cover you with Confuſion?

Alcib. I confeſs it does.

Socrat. Apply your Mind to it then; and endeavour to give me an Account what is the Deſign of that better Thing, which we ſeek in the Art of making Peace or War with thoſe with whom we ought to be either in War or Peace.

Alcib. I know not how to find it out, what Effort ſoever I make.

Socrat. What, don't you know, that when we make War we complain of ſomething that has been done to us by thoſe againſt whom we take up Arms? And are you ignorant of the Name we give to the Thing of which we complain?

Alcib. I know on ſuch Occaſions we ſay, they have deceived us, they have inſulted us, they have taken away our Property.

Socrat. Very well, when one of theſe Things befals us, I pray explain to me the different Manner in which they may happen.

Alcib. You mean, *Socrates*, that they may befal us juſtly or unjuſtly.

Socrat. I do ſo.

Alcib. And that makes an infinite Difference.

Socrat. Againſt what People then ſhall the *Athenians* declare War by your Advice? Shall it be againſt thoſe who follow the Rules of Juſtice, or ſuch as act unjuſtly?

Alcib. A pretty Queſtion, *Socrates!* if any one ſhould be capable of thinking it needful to make War with thoſe that follow the Rules of Juſtice, do you think he would dare to own it?

Socrat. Becauſe, you'll ſay, that is not conformable to the Laws.

Alcib. No, doubtleſs; 'tis neither juſt, nor honourable.

Socrat. You'll always then have Juſtice in View in all your Counſels?

Alcib. That is very neceſſary.

Socrat. But is not that a better Thing about which I was juſt now enquiring of you on the Subject of Peace or War, *viz.* to know with whom, when, and how War and Peace ſhould be made, * always the moſt juſt?

Alcib. I am of that Mind.

Socrat. How comes this to paſs then, my dear *Alcibiades?* Is it that you perceive not that you are ignorant of what is juſt, or is it that I perceive not that you have learn'd it, and that you have ſecretly attended ſome Maſter who has taught you to diſtinguiſh well between what is moſt juſt, and what is moſt unjuſt? Who is this Maſter? I pray tell me, that you may put me under his Care, and recommend me to him.

Alcib. Theſe are your common Ironies, *Socrates.*

Socrat. No, I ſwear it by that God who preſides over our Friendſhip, and whom I would leaſt offend by Perjury, I very ſeriouſly intreat you, if you have a Maſter, tell me who he is?

Alcib. And what if I have none, do you think I could not otherwiſe know what is juſt and unjuſt?

Socrat. You know it, if you have found it out your ſelf.

Alcib. Do you think I have not found it out?

Socrat. I am perſuaded you have found it if you have ſought for it.

Alcib. D'ye think I have not ſought for it?

Socrat. You have ſought for it, if you have believed yourſelf ignorant of it.

Alcib. Do you then imagine there was not a Time when I was ignorant of it?

Socrat. You ſpeak better than you think; but can you then preciſely aſſign me the Time, when you believed you

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* It is not ſufficient to know what is juſt, we ſhould know what is moſt juſt; and this Point is very difficult to be found. This is not within the Reach of little Politicians. *M. Le Fevre.*

did

did not know what was juſt and unjuſt? Let us ſee; was it the laſt Year that you ſought for the Knowledge of this, being thoroughly convinced of your Ignorance in this Matter? Or did you then think you knew it? Tell the Truth, that our Converſation may not appear vain and trifling.

Alcib. The laſt Year I believed I knew it.

Socrat. And did you not think the ſame, three, four, or five Years ago?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And before that Time you were no more than a Child, were you?

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. And at that Time when you were but a Child, I am very ſure you thought you knew it.

Alcib. How are you ſo ſure of that?

Socrat. Becauſe during your Childhood, when you were with your Maſters and elſewhere, and * when you play'd at Dice, or any other Play; I have very often obſerved you did not heſitate to determine what was juſt or unjuſt; and to tell the firſt of your Play-fellows that offended you, with a great deal of Plainneſs and Aſſurance, that he was baſe and unfair, and did you a great deal † of Injuſtice. Is not this true?

Alcib. What ſhould I have done then, do you think, when any Injuſtice was done me?

Socrat. If you were ignorant that what was offer'd you was unjuſt, you might then have ask'd what you ſhould have done.

Alcib. But I was not at all ignorant of that; for I very well knew the Injuſtice that was done me.

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* See what *Alcibiades* did one Day as he was playing at Dice, as 'tis reported by *Plutarch* in the Beginning of his Life.

† When Children trick'd one another in their Play, the ordinary Term they us'd at *Athens* was ἀδικεῖς, you do me Injuſtice; or, as we ſay, You do me Wrong. There is a very expreſs Inſtance of it in *Ariſtophanes* his Clouds. *M. Le Fevre.*

Socrat.

Socrat. By this you ſee then, that when you were but a Child, you thought you knew what was juſt and unjuſt.

Alcib. I thought I knew it; and ſo I really did.

Socrat. At what Time did you find this out? For it was not when you thought you knew it.

Alcib. No, doubtleſs.

Socrat. At what Time then do you think you were ignorant of it? Conſider, reckon. I am much afraid you'll not be able to find that Time.

Alcib. Indeed, *Socrates*, I can't give you an Account of it.

Socrat. Then you have not found out of yourſelf the Knowledge of what is juſt or unjuſt.

Alcib. So it ſeems, *Socrates.*

Socrat. You juſt now acknowledg'd that you had not learned it of others neither: And if you have neither found it out yourſelf, nor learnt it of others, how came you to know it? Whence had it you?

Alcib. But perhaps I miſtook myſelf, and did not anſwer you well, when I told you I had found it out myſelf.

Socrat. How did you learn it then?

Alcib. I learn'd it as others did.

For it muſt be enquir'd how, and of whom others learn'd it, and that goes *ad infinitum.*

Socrat. Then we are to begin again: Tell me of whom you learnt it?

Alcib. I learnt it of the People.

Socrat. Now you quote a bad Maſter.

Alcib. What, is not the People capable of teaching it?

Socrat. So far from that, that they are not capable of teaching one to judge right * of a Game at Tables; and

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* This Play was neither our Draughts, nor Cheſs; but a more philoſophical Game: For it taught the Motions of the Heavens, the Courſe of the Sun, that of the Moon, the Eclipſes, &c. *Plato* ſays, in his *Phædrus*, it was invented by the *Egyptians.*

that

that is much leſs important, and leſs difficult, than to underſtand Juſtice: Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. Yes, without Doubt.

Socrat. And if they know not how to teach you Things of little or no Conſequence, how ſhould they teach you Things of this Importance and Solidity?

Alcib. I am of your Mind: Yet the People are capable of teaching a great many Things much more ſolid than any Thing that belongs to this Play.

Socrat. What are thoſe?

Alcib. Our Language, for inſtance: I learn'd that only of the People; I can't name you any one ſingle Maſter I had for it; I am altogether oblig'd to the People for it, whom yet you account ſo bad a Maſter.

Socrat. This is a very different Caſe. * In this the People are a very excellent Maſter; and we have always Reaſon to apply our ſelves to 'em on this Account.

Alcib. Why?

Socrat. Becauſe they have every Thing that the beſt Maſters ought to have.

Alcib. Why, what have they?

Socrat. Ought not they that would teach others any Thing, firſt to know it well themſelves?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. Ought not they who know any Thing well, to agree about what they know, and never diſpute about it? For if they ſhould diſpute about it, would you believe 'em to be well inſtructed in it? And could they be able to teach it to others?

Alcib. By no Means.

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* This was true at *Athens*, eſpecially, where all the Citizens ſpeaking perfectly well, and there being no different Uſe of Words, as now-a-days among us, the People were an excellent Maſter for the Ground of the Language. Therefore *Ariſtophanes* ſays, The firſt Comer was a Child's Maſter.

Socrat.

Socrat. Do you ſee the People diſagree about what a Stone and a Stick is? Ask all our Citizens that Queſtion, they'll anſwer you alike: And when they go about to take up a Stone or a Stick, they'll all run to the ſame Thing; and ſo of the reſt. For I underſtand this is what you mean by knowing the Language: All our Citizens conſtantly agree about this, both with one another, and with themſelves. Of all our *Greek* Cities, there is not one that diſputes about the Signification and Uſe of Words. So that the People are very good to teach us the Tongue; and we can't do better than to learn of 'em: But if inſtead of deſiring to learn what a Horſe is, we would know what a good Horſe is, would the People, do you think, be capable of informing us?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. For one certain Sign that they don't know it, and that they know not how to teach it, is, that they can't agree about it among themſelves. In like manner, if we deſire to know, not what a Man is, but what a ſound or unſound Man is; would the People be in a Condition to teach us this?

Alcib. Still leſs than the other.

Socrat. And when you ſhould ſee 'em agree ſo little among themſelves, would you not judge 'em to be very bad Inſtructors?

Alcib. Without any Difficulty.

Socrat. And do you think the People agree better with themſelves, or others, about what is juſt and unjuſt?

Alcib. No, indeed, *Socrates*.

Socrat. You believe then they agree leaſt of all about that?

Alcib. I am thoroughly convinc'd of it.

Socrat. Have you ever ſeen or read, that to maintain that a Thing is ſound or unſound, Men have taken up Arms againſt each other, and knock'd one another o' th' Head?

Alcib. What a Folly muſt that be!

Socrat. Well, if you have not ſeen it, at leaſt you have read, that this has happen'd to maintain that a Thing is juſt or unjuſt. For you have read *Homer*'s *Odyſſee* and *Iliad*.

Alcib. Yes, certainly.

Socrat.

The Cauſe of the *Trojan* War, and of all other Wars, is Ignorance and Injuſtice.

Socrat. Is not the Difference Men have always had about Juſtice and Injuſtice, the Foundation of thoſe Poems? Was it not this Difference that cauſed ſo many Battles and Slaughters between the *Greeks* and *Trojans?* Was it not this that made *Ulyſſes* undergo ſo many Dangers, and ſo much Toil, and that ruin'd *Penelope*'s Lovers?

Alcib. You ſay right.

Socrat. Was it not this ſame Difference that deſtroy'd many *Athenians*, *Lacedemonians*, and *Bœotians*, at the famous * Battle of *Tanagra*, and after that again at the † Battle of *Coronea*, where your Father was kill'd?

Alcib. Who can deny this?

Socrat. Shall we then dare to ſay, the People know a Thing well, about which they diſpute with ſo much Animoſity, that they are carried to the moſt fatal Extremities?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Very good! and yet are not theſe the Maſters you cite, when at the ſame Time you acknowledge their Ignorance?

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. What Probability then is there that you ſhould know what is juſt and unjuſt, about which you appear ſo uncertain and fluctuating; and which you confeſs you have neither learned of others, nor found out your ſelf?

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* This great Battle was fought the laſt Year of the 80th *Olympiad*. The *Athenian* Captain, who gain'd it, was nam'd *Myronides*. *Socrates* was then 12 Years of Age, or thereabouts. *M. Le Fevre.*

† This Battle of *Coronea* was fought the ſecond Year of the 83d *Olympiad*. Here the brave *Tolmides* was kill'd: After which the *Athenians* were driven out of *Bœotia*. *Socrates* was then 22 Years of Age. This Battle of *Coronea* has often, through Miſtake, been confounded with that of *Cheronea*. *M. Le Fevre.*

Alcib.

Alcib. According to what you ſay, there is no Probability of it at all.

Socrat. How! according to what I ſay? You ſpeak not right, *Alcibiades:* Say rather, 'tis according to what you ſay yourſelf.

Alcib. How! is it not you that ſay, I know nothing at all of what belongs to Juſtice and Injuſtice?

Socrat. No, indeed, 'tis not I.

Alcib. Who then? Is it I?

Socrat. Yes, 'tis your ſelf.

Alcib. How ſo?

Socrat. I'll tell you how ſo; and you will agree with me. If I ſhould aſk you which is the greateſt Number, One, or Two? You would immediately anſwer, Two. And if I ſhould again ask you, how much greater this Number is than the other? You would likewiſe anſwer, that 'tis greater by One.

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. Which of us two would it be then that would ſay Two is more than One? Would it be I?

Alcib. No, 'twould be I.

Socrat. For it was I that ask'd, and you that anſwer'd. Is it not the ſame Thing in the preſent Queſtion?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. If I ſhould ask you, what Letters compoſe *Socrates*'s Name, and you ſhould tell 'em me one after another; which of us two would tell them?

Alcib. I ſhould do it, without Doubt.

Socrat. For in a Diſcourſe which is ſpent in Queſtions and Anſwers, he that asks never affirms, but always he that anſwers. 'Tis I that have ask'd you, and 'tis you that have anſwer'd: 'Tis you therefore that have affirm'd the Things you have ſaid.

This proves the uſefulneſs of this Method.

Alcib. This muſt be granted.

Socrat. 'Tis yourſelf that have ſaid that the fine *Alcibiades*, the Son of *Clinias*, not knowing what is juſt and unjuſt, and yet thinking he knows it very well, is going to the Aſſembly of the *Athenians*, to give them his Advice

vice about ſuch Things as he knows nothing of: Is it not ſo?

Alcib. 'Tis even ſo.

Socrat. One may then apply to you, *Alcibiades*, that Saying of *Euripides*; *'Tis thyſelf that has named it.* For it is not I that have ſpoken it, but yourſelf; and you are to blame to charge it on me.

'Tis in the Tragedy of *Hippolytus.*

Alcib. You have Reaſon.

Socrat. Believe me, *Alcibiades*, 'tis a wild Enterprize to have a Mind to go teach the *Athenians* that which you do not know yourſelf, and about which you have neglected to inform yourſelf.

Alcib. I fancy, *Socrates*, the *Athenians*, and all the reſt of the *Greeks*, very rarely examine in their Council, what is moſt juſt or unjuſt; for they are ſatisfied that is very evident. And therefore, without amuſing themſelves with this vain Enquiry, they only conſider what is moſt advantagious and uſeful: And Utility and Juſtice are very different Things; ſince there have always been People in the World that have found themſelves very proſperous in the Commiſſion of great Injuſtice; and others who have ſucceeded very ill in the Exerciſe of Juſtice.

Socrat What do you * think, then, that if what is uſeful, and what is juſt, are very different, as you ſay they are, you know what is uſeful to Men, and why it is ſo?

Alcib. What ſhould hinder me, *Socrates*; unleſs you would ask me of whom I learn'd this too? Or how I found it out myſelf?

Socrat. Is your Proceeding juſt, *Alcibiades*, ſuppoſing what you ſay is not right, as that may very well be;

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* If what is uſeful, and what is juſt, were different Things, yet if one knew what is uſeful, one might alſo know what is juſt: For we know Contraries by their Contraries. But they are not different, and *Socrates* is going to prove it. *Alcibiades* knows no more what is uſeful, than what is juſt.

and

and that 'tis very eaſy to refute you by the ſame Reaſons which I have already employ'd? You would have new Proofs, and freſh Demonſtrations, and treat the former as old Clothes, which you are not willing to wear any longer. You are ſtill for having ſomething entirely new: But, for my Part, without following you in your Stragglings and Eſcapes, I ſhall ask you, as I have already done, whence you came to know what Utility is? And who was your Inſtructor? In a word, I ask you all I have ask'd you before. 'Tis very certain you'll anſwer me too after the ſame Manner you have done, and that you'll not be able to ſhew me either that you have learned of others to know what is uſeful, or that you have found it out yourſelf. But becauſe you are very nice, and don't love to hear the ſame Thing twice, I am willing to drop this Queſtion, whether you know what is uſeful to the *Athenians* or no. But if what is juſt, and what is uſeful, are one and the ſame Thing; or if they are very different, as you ſay; why have you not prov'd it to me? Prove it me, either by interrogating me, as I have dealt with you; or in making me a fine Diſcourſe, which may ſet the Matter in a clear Light.

Alcib. But, *Socrates*, I know not whether I am capable of ſpeaking before you.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, imagine me to be the Aſſembly; ſuppoſe me to be the People: When you are among them, muſt you not endeavour to perſuade every one of 'em?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And when a Man knows a Thing well, is it not equal to him to demonſtrate to this and that Perſon one after another, or to prove it to divers Perſons all at once? As one that teaches Reading or Arithmetick, can equally inſtruct one or more Scholars together.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And conſequently, of whatſoever you are capable of perſuading many, you may very eaſily perſuade one ſingle Perſon. But of what can a Man perſuade

ſuade others? Is it not of that which he knows himſelf?

Alcib. Without Doubt.

Socrat. What other Difference is there between an Orator that ſpeaks to a Multitude of People, and a Man that diſcourſes with his Friend in familiar Converſation; but that the former perſuades a great Number of People at once, and the latter perſuades but one?

Alcib. 'Tis likely there may be no other Difference.

Socrat. Come, then: Since he who is capable of proving what he knows to many, is by a much ſtronger Reaſon capable of proving it to one ſingle Perſon; diſplay here all your Eloquence to me, and endeavour to ſhew me that what is juſt is not always uſeful.

Alcib. You are very urgent, *Socrates*.

Socrat. I am ſo urgent, that I'll preſently prove to you the contrary of that which you refuſe to prove to me.

Alcib. Do ſo.

Socrat. Only anſwer me.

Alcib. Ha! nothing but Queſtions: Let me intreat you to ſpeak yourſelf alone.

Socrat. What are you not willing to be convinc'd?

Alcib. Yes, with all my Heart.

Socrat. When you your ſelf ſhall grant, and affirm to me, that what I advance is true, will you not be convinc'd?

Alcibiades is afraid of *Socrates*'s Queſtions; which ſhews this to be the beſt Method to convince and refute.

Alcib. I think I ſhall.

Socrat. Anſwer me then; and if you yourſelf don't ſay that what is juſt is always uſeful, never believe any Man living that ſhall tell you ſo.

Alcib. Agreed; I am ready to anſwer you, for I ſhall receive no Damage by it.

Socrat. You are a Prophet, *Alcibiades:* But tell me, do you think there are ſome juſt Things which are uſeful, and others which are not ſo?

Alcib. Yes, certainly.

Socrat.

Socrat. Do you think too that ſome of them are comely and honourable, and others the quite contrary?

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. I ask you, for inſtance, if a Man who does an Action that is ſhameful, does an Action that is juſt?

Alcib. I am very far from ſuch a Thought.

Socrat. You believe then that whatſoever is juſt is comely.

Alcib. I am entirely convinc'd of that.

Socrat. But is every Thing that is comely and honourable, good? Or do you think there are ſome comely and honourable Things that are good, and others that are evil?

Alcib. For my Part, *Socrates*, I think there are ſome honourable Things that are evil.

Socrat. And by Conſequence that there are ſome ſhameful Things that are good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. See if I underſtand you well. It has often happen'd in Battles, that one Man in attempting to ſuccour his Friend, or Relation, has receiv'd a great many Wounds, or has been kill'd; and another by abandoning his Relation, or Friend, has ſav'd his Life: Is not this your Meaning?

Alcib. 'Tis the very Thing I would ſay.

Socrat. The Succour a Man gives to his Friend is a comely and honourable Thing, in that he endeavours to ſave one whom he is oblig'd to ſave: And is not this what we call Valour?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And this very Succour is an evil Thing, in that it is the Cauſe of a Man's receiving Wounds, or of being kill'd?

Alcib. Yes, without Doubt.

Socrat. * But is not Valour one Thing, and Death another?

* *Socrates* means, that Valour and Death being two very different Things, 'tis ridiculous to judge of one by the other: But each of 'em ought to be examin'd by it ſelf. The former of theſe is the Thing under Debate, and not the latter. This is extremely ingenious; and *Alcibiades* did not expect ſuch a very quick Repartee.

Alcib.

Alcib. Yes, certainly.

Socrat. This Succour, then, which a Man gives to his Friend, is not at the ſame Time an honourable and an evil Thing in the ſame Reſpect.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But obſerve, if that which renders this Action comely, is not that which alſo renders it good: For you have your ſelf acknowledg'd, that in reſpect of Valour, this Action was comely. Let us now examine whether Valour is a Good or an Evil: And I'll ſhew you the Way to make this Examen aright. Do you deſire for your ſelf Goods or Evils?

Alcib. Goods, without Doubt.

Socrat. And the greateſt?

Alcib. Yes, you may be ſure on't.

Socrat. And you would not ſuffer any one to deprive you of 'em?

Alcib. Why ſhould I ſuffer that?

Socrat. What do you think of Valour? At what Rate do you value it? Is there any Good in the World for which you would be depriv'd of it?

Alcib. No, not Life it ſelf. What to be a Coward! I would a thouſand Times rather chuſe to die.

Socrat. Then Cowardice ſeems to you the greateſt of all Evils?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And more to be feared than Death itſelf?

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat Are not Life and Valour the Contraries to Death and Cowardice?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. You deſire the former, and by no Means wiſh for the latter; is it not becauſe you find thoſe very good, and theſe very evil?

Alcib. Yes, doubtleſs.

Socrat. You have your ſelf acknowledg'd, that the Succour a Man gives to his Friend in Battle, is a comely and honourable Action; if it be conſider'd with Reſpect to the Good that is in it, which is Valour.

Alcib.

Alcib. I have acknowledg'd it.

Socrat. And that 'tis an evil Action, when conſider'd with Reſpect to the Evil that attends it; that is, Wounds and Death.

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. * Then it hence follows, that we ought to call each Action according to what it produces; we ought to call it Good, if Good ſprings from it; and Evil, if Evil ariſe out of it.

Alcib. So it ſeems to me.

Socrat. Is not an Action comely in that it is Good, and ſhameful in that it is Evil?

Alcib. That's beyond Contradiction.

Socrat. When you ſay then that the Succour a Man gives his Friend in a Battle is a comely Action, and at the ſame Time an evil Action, 'tis as if you ſhould ſay, 'tis Evil tho' it be Good.

Alcib. Indeed I think what you ſay is true.

Socrat. Then there is nothing comely and honourable, which is evil, ſo far as it is comely and honourable; nor is any Thing which is ſhameful good, ſo far as it is ſhameful.

Alcib. So I think.

Happineſs is always the Fruit of good Actions.

Socrat. Let us ſeek for another Proof of this Truth. Are not all that do good Actions happy? Can they be happy, unleſs it be by the Poſſeſſion of Good? Is not this Poſſeſſion of Good, the Fruit of a good Life? And, conſequently, is not Happineſs neceſſarily for them that do good Actions?

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. † Then Happineſs is a comely and honourable Thing. Hence it follows that what is comely, and what is good, are never two different Things, as we juſt now agreed; and that whatſoever we take to be comely, we ſhall alſo take to be good, if we look narrowly into it.

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* This Maxim is falſe in *Alcibiades* his Senſe, but very true in that of *Socrates*: For nothing can ever ſpring from a good Action but Good; as nothing but Evil can ſpring from an evil one.

† And conſequently Happineſs can't be the Fruit of an ill Life, and of ill Actions.

Alcib.

Alcib. This is abſolutely neceſſary.

Socrat. What do you ſay then, is that which is good uſeful, or not?

Alcib. Yes, it is uſeful.

Socrat. Do you remember what we ſaid when we ſpoke of Juſtice, and about what we agreed?

Alcib. I think we agreed that all Men that do juſt Actions, muſt needs do what is comely and honourable.

Socrat. Then that which is comely is good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Then that which is good is uſeful?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And conſequently whatſoever is juſt is uſeful?

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. Take good Notice that 'tis your ſelf who affirm theſe Truths; for I, for my Part, only ask Queſtions.

Alcib. I acknowledge it.

Socrat. If any one then thinking he well underſtood the Nature of Juſtice, ſhould go into the Aſſembly of the *Athenians*, or *Parthians*, if you pleaſe, (to lay the Scene more remote) and ſhould tell them he certainly knows that juſt Actions are ſometimes evil; would not you laugh at him, who have juſt now granted and acknowledg'd that Juſtice and Utility are one and the ſame Thing?

Alcib. I ſolemnly proteſt to you, *Socrates*, that I know not what I ſay, nor where I am; for theſe Things appear to me ſometimes one Way, and ſometimes another, according as you interrogate me.

Socrat. Don't you know the Cauſe of this Diſorder?

Alcib. No, I know nothing at all of it.

Socrat. And if any one ſhould ask you if you have three Eyes, or four Hands, do you think you ſhould anſwer ſometimes after one Manner, and ſometimes after another? Or would you not anſwer him always after the ſame Manner?

Alcib. Tho' I begin to be diffident of my ſelf, yet I think I ſhould always anſwer the ſame Thing.

Socrat. And is not this becauſe you know very well you have but two Eyes, and two Hands?

Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. Since then you anſwer ſo differently whether you will or no about the ſame Thing, 'tis a certain Sign that you are ignorant of it.

Alcib. So one would think.

Uncertainty always comes from Ignorance.

Socrat. You confeſs then that your Thoughts are uncertain and fluctuating about what is juſt and unjuſt, honourable or diſhonourable, good or evil, uſeful or the contrary. And is it not evident from hence, that this Uncertainty ſprings only from your Ignorance?

Alcib. 'Tis evident.

Socrat. Then 'tis a certain Maxim, that the Mind is always fluctuating and uncertain about every Thing it does not know?

Alcib. It cannot be otherwiſe.

Socrat. * But do you know how to mount up to Heaven?

Alcib. No, I proteſt.

Socrat. Are you in any Doubt, or does your Mind fluctuate about this?

Alcib. Not in the leaſt.

Socrat. Do you know the Reaſon of this, or would you have me tell it you?

Alcib. Tell it me.

Socrat. 'Tis becauſe as you don't know how to mount up to Heaven; ſo you don't think you know it neither.

Alcib. How is that?

Socrat. Let you and I examine this. When you are ignorant of a Thing, and you know you are ignorant of

* After he had ſhewn *Alcibiades*, that Ignorance is the Cauſe of all the Errors of Mankind; he goes about to prove to him that Men ought not to be accus'd of Ignorance in general, for if one kind of it is Evil, there is another kind Good, and this he maintains very ſolidly.

it, are you uncertain and fluctuating about this? For example, about the Art of Cookery? Don't you know you are ignorant of it? Do you then amuſe your ſelf in reaſoning about the Manner of dreſſing Meat, and ſpeak ſometimes one Way, and ſometimes another? Don't you rather ſuffer the Cook to take his own Way?

Alcib. Yes, certainly.

Socrat. And if you were on board a Ship, would you concern your ſelf to give Advice to turn the Helm to the right or left? And when you don't underſtand the *Art of Navigation*, would you ſpeak about it ſometimes after one Faſhion, and ſometimes after another? Would you not rather be quiet, and leave the Pilot to ſteer?

Alcib. To be ſure I ſhould leave that to him.

Socrat. Then you are never fluctuating and uncertain about Things you don't know, provided you know that you don't know them?

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. By this then you very well diſcern that all the Faults we commit proceed only from this ſort of Ignorance, which makes us think we know that, of which we are indeed ignorant.

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. I ſay that which induces us to attempt a Thing is the Thought we have that we know how to do it; for when we are convinc'd that we don't know it, we leave it to others.

Alcib. That is certain.

Socrat. Thus they who are under this laſt ſort of Ignorance never commit any Fault, becauſe they leave to others the Care of ſuch Things as they know not how to do themſelves.

Alcib. That's true.

Socrat. Who are they then that commit Faults? 'Tis they that know Things?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Seeing 'tis neither they that know Things, nor they who while they are ignorant of them, know that they are ignorant; it neceſſarily follows, that 'tis they

who while they are ignorant of them, yet think they know them: Can it be any others?

Alcib. No, 'tis only they.

Socrat. Well then, this muſt be the Ignorance which is ſhameful, and the Cauſe of all Evils.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. And when this Ignorance happens to be about Things of very great Conſequence, is it not very pernicious, and very ſhameful?

Alcib. It cannot be denied.

Socrat. But can you name me any Thing that is of greater Conſequence, than what is juſt, what is honourable, what is good, and what is uſeful?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Is it not about theſe Things that you your ſelf ſay you are fluctuating and uncertain? Is not this Uncertainty a ſure Sign, as we have ſaid already, not only that you are ignorant of theſe Things that are ſo great and important; but alſo that while you are ignorant of them, you think you know them?

Alcib. I am afraid this is but too true.

Socrat. Oh *Alcibiades!* in what a deplorable Condition then are you! * I dare not mention it, yet ſeeing we are alone, 'tis neceſſary I ſhould tell it you. My dear *Alcibiades*, you are under a very ſhameful kind of Ignorance, as appears by your Words, and your own Teſtimony againſt your ſelf. And this is the Reaſon you throw your ſelf with ſo much Precipitancy into the Government, before you are inſtructed in what belongs to it. But you are not the only Perſon who has fallen under this Unhappineſs; 'tis common to you with the greateſt Part of thoſe who have intermeddled with the Affairs of the Commonwealth. I can except but a ſmall

* He does not mention it immediately. *Alcibiades* is not yet in a Condition to bear the Horror of it. But he'll mention it at length, when he has diſpos'd and prepar'd the young Man to receive his Thunder-Clap.

Number. Nay, it may be your Tutor *Pericles* is the only Perſon that ought to be exempted.

Alcib. And, *Socrates*, 'tis likewiſe ſaid, he did not become ſo accompliſhed of himſelf; but that he had a great deal of Converſation with many great Men, ſuch as *Pythoclides*, and *Anaxagoras*; and to this very Day, as old as he is, he ſpends whole Days with * *Damon*, to inform himſelf ſtill more and more.

Socrat. † Did you ever ſee any one, who perfectly knew a Thing, and yet could not teach it another? Your Reading-Maſter taught you what he knew; and taught it whom he pleas'd. And you that have learn'd it of him might teach it another. The ſame may be ſaid of a Muſick-Maſter, and of a Maſter of Exerciſes.

Alcib. This is certain.

Socrat. For the beſt Sign that one knows a Thing well, is to be in a Condition to teach it others.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But can you name me any one whom *Pericles* has accompliſhed? Let's begin with his own Children.

Alcib. What does this prove, *Socrates*, if *Pericles*'s Children were Blockheads?

Socrat. And your Brother *Clinias?*

Alcib. A fine Proof indeed! You talk to me of a Fool.

Socrat. If *Clinias* is a Fool, and the Children of *Pericles* were Blockheads; how came it to paſs that

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* This is he of whom *Plutarch* ſpeaks in the Life of *Pericles*; under the ſpecious Veil of Muſick he hid his Profeſſion, which was to teach Politicks. The People perceived this, and baniſhed him with the Sentence of the Oſtraciſm.

† Upon what *Alcibiades* had juſt ſaid, that *Pericles* had render'd himſelf accompliſh'd by the Converſation of Philoſophers and Sophiſts, *Socrates* would intimate to him, that this Converſation was very uſeleſs for the acquiring of Virtue, in which true Accompliſhment conſiſts. And this he ingeniouſly proves by the Example of *Pericles* himſelf, who had not been able to teach his own Children any Thing; a ſure Sign that he had learn'd no great Matter of his Sophiſts.

Pericles neglected ſuch good natural Parts as yours, and taught you nothing?

Alcib. I am the only Cauſe of it my ſelf, in not attending at all to what he ſaid to me.

Socrat. But among all the *Athenians* and Strangers, whether Freemen or Slaves, can you name me one whom the Converſation of *Pericles* has render'd more accompliſh'd? As I'll name you a *Pythodorus*, the Son of *Iſolochus*, and a *Callias*, the Son of *Calliades*, who became very great Men in *Zeno*'s School, at the Expence of *a* * *hundred Minas*.

Alcib. I can't name you one.

Socrat. † That's very well; but what will you do with your ſelf, *Alcibiades?* Will you continue as you are, or will you at laſt take ſome Care of your ſelf?

Alcib. 'Tis a general Affair, *Socrates*, and concerns me no more than others. For I underſtand all you ſay, and agree with you. Yes, all that concern themſelves with the Affairs of the Republick, are a Company of ignorant People, excepting a very ſmall Number.

Socrat. And what then?

Alcib. If they were ‖ Men of great Accompliſhments, it would be neceſſary for one that ſhould pretend to equal or ſurpaſs them, to learn, and exerciſe himſelf, and after that to enter the Liſts as Wreſtlers do; but ſeeing they don't fail to intermeddle with Government, tho' endu'd with very indifferent and common Qualities, what Need is there for a Man to give himſelf ſo much Trouble in Learning and Exerciſe? I am well aſſur'd, that with the Aſſiſtance of Nature alone, I ſhall excel them all.

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* About 200 *l.* Sterling.

† *Socrates* is not willing now to puſh on this Queſtion which he has ſtarted, whether Virtue may be taught. The Queſtion is too general, and he'll treat of it elſewhere; here he keeps cloſe to his Subject, which is to confound the Pride of *Alcibiades*.

‖ This Sentiment of *Alcibiades* is that which ſtill to this Day ruins moſt young Men.

Socrat.

Socrat. Ah my dear *Alcibiades*, what have you now ſaid? What Sentiment is this ſo unworthy of that noble Air, and all the other Advantages which you poſſeſs!

Alcib. What do you mean, *Socrates*, when you ſpeak thus?

Socrat. Alas! I am inconſolable, both on your Account and my own, I have ſo great an Affection for you, if..———

Alcib. If what?

Socrat. If you think you have only ſuch kind of People to conteſt with, and to ſurpaſs.

Alcib. Whom then would you have me ſtrive to ſurpaſs?

Socrat. Again! Is this a Queſtion becoming a Man of a good Spirit?

Alcib. What do you mean? Are not thoſe the only Perſons I have to deal with?

Socrat. If you were to guide a * Man of War, which was to fight in a little Time; would you be content if you were more expert in *Navigation*, than all the Sailors you had on board you? Would you not rather propoſe to your ſelf to acquire all neceſſary Qualities, and to ſurpaſs all the greateſt Pilots on the Enemy's Side, without meaſuring your ſelf as you do now with thoſe of your own Party, above whom you ſhould endeavour to raiſe your ſelf to that Degree, that they ſhould not have ſo much as a Thought of diſputing any Advantage with you, but finding themſelves abſolutely inferior to you, ſhould only think of fighting under your Command? Theſe are the Sentiments that ſhould animate you, if you deſign'd to do any Thing great, and worthy, both of your ſelf, and your Country.

Alcib. Why this is all I deſign.

Socrat. This muſt needs be a glorious Thing indeed, *Alcibiades*, to be a braver Man than our Soldiers! Ought you not rather conſtantly to ſet the Generals of our Ene-

* An admirable Leſſon, which *Socrates* gives *Alcibiades*.

mies before your Eyes, that you may excel them in Capacity, and Greatneſs of Courage? And ſhould you not ſtudy and labour to this End, always endeavouring to equal the greateſt Perſons?

Alcib. Who then are theſe great Generals, *Socrates?*

Socrat. Don't you know our City is almoſt continually in War, either with the *Lacedemonians*, or with the * Great King?

Alcib. I know it.

Socrat. If then you think to put your ſelf at the Head of the *Athenians*, you muſt alſo prepare your ſelf to receive the Attacks of the † Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and of the King of *Perſia*.

Alcib. You may be in the right.

Socrat. No, alas! No my dear *Alcibiades.* || You have only to think of excelling a *Midias*, who is ſo accompliſh'd a Man for feeding of Quails, and others of the ſame Rank, that ſeek to intrude themſelves into the Government; who by their Stupidity and Ignorance ſhew (as our good Women would ſay) that they have not yet quitted the Slave, but retain him ſtill under their long Hair; and who with their barbarous Language are come rather to corrupt the City by their ſervile Flatteries, than to govern it. Theſe are the People you muſt ſet before you without thinking of your ſelf; that when you are to engage in ſuch great Battles, you may go, without having ever learn'd any Thing of what you ought to know, without being exercis'd at all, without making any Preparation; in a word, that without having ever given your ſelf the leaſt Trouble, you may

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* The King of *Perſia.*

† For there were two at a Time.

|| *Plutarch* is of uſe to make us underſtand the bitter Satire that is hid under theſe Words, for he informs us that *Alcibiades* applied himſelf to feed Quails, like this *Midias*; witneſs that which he let fly out of his Boſom in an open Place, and which was caught again by a Maſter of a Ship, nam'd *Antiochus*, who had the Favour of *Alcibiades* ever after, inſomuch that he left him the Command of a Fleet in his Abſence, which had like to have ruin'd the Affairs of the *Athenians.*

go in this Condition to put your ſelf at the Head of the *Athenians*.

Alcib. Socrates, I believe all you ſay is true. Yet I fancy the Generals of *Lacedemonia*, and of the King of *Perſia*, are like other Generals.

Socrat. Ah my dear *Alcibiades*, pray obſerve what an Opinion that of yours is.

Alcib. Why ſo?

Socrat. * In the firſt Place, which of theſe two Opinions do you think will be moſt advantagious to you, and will engage you to conduct your ſelf with the greateſt Care; whether to form to your ſelf a great Idea of thoſe Men, which may render 'em formidable, or to take them, as you do, for ordinary Men, that have no Advantage above you?

Alcib. Doubtleſs that of forming to my ſelf a great Idea of them.

Socrat. Do you think then 'tis an Evil for you to conduct your ſelf with Care?

Alcib. On the contrary, I am perſuaded it will be a very great Good.

Socrat. Then this Opinion which you have conceived, already appears to be a very great Evil.

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. But beſides this 'tis falſe, and I'll preſently demonſtrate this to you.

Alcib. How ſo?

Socrat. Whom do you account the beſt Men; thoſe who are of high Birth, or ſuch as are of mean Extraction?

Alcib. Without Doubt, thoſe who are of high Birth.

Socrat. And don't you think, they that have had as good Education join'd to their high Birth, have every Thing that is neceſſary for the Perfection of Virtue?

Alcib. That is certain.

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* What *Socrates* is now going to ſay, is one of the fineſt Things Antiquity has left us.

Socrat. By comparing therefore our Condition with theirs, let us ſee firſt of all if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Perſia*, are of meaner Birth than we: Don't we know that the former deſcend from *Hercules*, and the latter from * *Achemenes*, and that *Hercules* and *Achemenes* deſcend from *Jupiter?*

Alcib. And does not our Family, *Socrates*, deſcend from *Euryſaces*, and does not *Euryſaces* carry his Line up as far as *Jupiter?*

Socrat. † And does not ours, my dear *Alcibiades*, if you take it that Way, deſcend from *Dedalus?* And does not *Dedalus* likewiſe carry us back as far as *Vulcan*, *Jupiter*'s Son? But the Difference between them and us is, that they reaſcend as far as *Jupiter* by a continual Gradation of Kings without any Interruption: The former have been the Kings of *Argos* and *Lacedemonia*, and the latter have always reign'd in *Perſia*, and have often poſſeſs'd the Throne of *Aſia*, as they do now, whereas our Anceſtors were only private Perſons like us. And if to do Honour to your Anceſtors, you were oblig'd to ſhew *Artaxerxes* the Country of *Euryſaces*, or that of *Æacus*, which is ſtill more remote; what Occaſion of Laughter would you not give him in pointing out to him two little ‖ Iſlands not much bigger than one's Hand? Since then we are oblig'd to give Place in point of Birth, let us ſee if we are not likewiſe inferior to them in reſpect of Education. Have you never been told what great Advantages the *Lacedemonian* Kings have in this, whoſe Wives are kept publickly by the *Ephori*, that they may be certain, as much as 'tis poſſible, that they produce no Princes but of the Race of *Hercules?* And the King of *Perſia* is ſo far beyond the Kings of *Lacedemonia* in this Reſpect, that it has never yet been ſo much as ſuſpected, that the Queen could have a Child that might

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* *Achemenes*, the Son of *Perſeus*.

† This is a Piece of Raillery of *Socrates*, as we ſhall ſee when we come to his *Euthyphron*.

‖ *Egina* and *Salamina*.

not

not be the King's Son. Therefore ſhe is not guarded; all the Guards ſhe has are Terror and Majeſty. When ſhe is deliver'd of her firſt Son, who is to ſucceed to the Crown, all the Nations that are ſpread over that great Empire celebrate his Birth; after which, that Day is annually one of their greateſt Feſtivals; in all the Provinces of *Aſia* there are then nothing but Sacrifices and Feaſts: Whereas when we are born, my dear *Alcibiades*, that Expreſſion of the Comick Poet may be applied to us:

The News ſcarce to our neareſt Neighbours comes.

When the young Prince is wean'd, he is not left in the Hands of Women, but is committed to the Care of the moſt virtuous Eunuchs of the Court, whoſe Buſineſs it is to form and faſhion his Body, that he may be brought to the beſt Shape that can be; and this Employ brings them abundance of Honour. When the Prince is ſeven Years old, he is put into the Hands of the Gentlemen of the Horſe, who begin to carry him a Hunting: At fourteen Years of Age, he comes under the Charge of thoſe who are called the King's Preceptors: Theſe are the four greateſt Lords, and the moſt accompliſh'd Men of all *Perſia*; they are taken in the Vigour of their Age; one paſſes for the moſt Learned, another for the moſt Juſt, the third for the Wiſeſt, and the fourth for the moſt Valiant. The firſt teaches him the Magick of * *Zoroaſter* the Son of *Oromazus*, in which is comprehended all the Worſhip of the Gods: He teaches him likewiſe the Laws of the Kingdom, and all the Duties of a good King. The ſecond teaches him always to ſpeak the Truth, tho' againſt himſelf. The third inſtructs him, not to ſuffer himſelf at any Time to be overcome by his Paſſions; that he may always maintain his Freedom, and his Royalty, in having conſtantly an abſolute Dominion over himſelf, as well as over his People: And the fourth teaches him not to fear either Dangers,

* *Zoroaſter* was a Magus, and King of *Baſtriana*; he wrote divers Volumes on Magick, which contained Religion, Phyſick, and Aſtrology. He liv'd in the Time of *Ninus*, and of *Noah*.

Socrat. By comparing therefore our Condition with theirs, let us ſee firſt of all if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Perſia*, are of meaner Birth than we: Don't we know that the former deſcend from *Hercules*, and the latter from * *Achemenes*, and that *Hercules* and *Achemenes* deſcend from *Jupiter?*

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or Death; becauſe if he ſhould become timorous, from a King he would degenerate into a Slave. Whereas, *Alcibiades*, for your Part what Preceptor have you had? *Pericles* left you in the Hands of *Zopyrus* a vile *Thracian* Slave, who was indeed unfit for every Thing beſides, becauſe of his old Age. I would here recount to you all the conſequent Matters relating to the Education of your Antagoniſts, but that I ſhould be too long; and the Specimen I have given you is ſufficient to make you eaſily judge of the reſt. * No Perſon took Care of you at your Birth more than of any other *Athenian*: No Body takes any Pains about your Education; unleſs you have ſome one who concerns himſelf with it, becauſe he ſincerely loves † you. And if you conſider the Riches of the *Perſians*, the Magnificence of their Habits, the prodigious Expence they make in Perfumes and Eſſences, the Multitude of Slaves that ſurround them, all their Luxury, Finery, and Politeneſs, you'll ſee your ſelf ſo little, that you'll be quite aſham'd of your ſelf. Will you but caſt your Eyes on the Temperance of the *Lacedemonians*, on their Modeſty, Eaſineſs, Sweetneſs, Magnanimity, their good Diſpoſition of Mind under all the Accidents of Life, their Valour, Firmneſs, and Conſtancy, in Labours, their noble Emulation, and Love of Glory; in all theſe great Qualities you'll find your ſelf a Child in Compariſon of them. Again, if you would have us take Notice of their Riches, and think your ſelf ſomething under this Head; I am willing to ſpeak to it, to make you remember who you are, and whence you came: There is no Compariſon between us and the *Lacedemonians*, they are abundantly more wealthy. Shall any of us dare to compare our Lands with thoſe of *Sparta*, and *Meſene*; which

The Qualities of the *Lacedemonians*

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* 'Tis certain, the *Athenians* gave their Children no Governors, but Slaves, or ſuch as were enfranchis'd; this appears by the *Greek* Comedies which are left us, and by the Comedies of *Plautus* and *Terence*. *M. Le Fevre.*

† *Socrates* means himſelf.

are

are much larger and better, and maintain an infinite Number of Slaves, without counting the *Ilotes?* Who can number that excellent Race of Horſes, and thoſe other ſorts of Cattle which feed in the Paſtures of *Meſene?* Whereas we inhabit a dry and barren Country. But I paſs by all theſe Things. Would you ſpeak of Gold and Silver? I tell you, all *Greece* together has not near ſo much as *Lacedemonia* alone; for the Money of all *Greece*, and very often that of the *Barbarians* too, has for ſeveral Ages gone into *Lacedemonia*, and never come out again. So that one might very well ſay, in Alluſion to what is ſaid by the Fox to the Lion in *Æſop*'s Fables, *I ſee the Track of all the Money that is gone into* Lacedemonia, *but I ſee no Track that ſignifies there's any gone out from thence.* 'Tis certain, the Commons of *Lacedemonia* are richer than any other Commons in *Greece:* And the Kings are richer than all the reſt of the *Lacedemonians* put together; for theſe pay their Kings immenſe Taxes, which extremely augment their Revenues. But if the Wealth of the *Lacedemonians* appears ſo great in Compariſon of that of the other *Greeks*, 'tis nothing when compar'd with that of the King of *Perſia*. I heard a Man worthy of Credit, who had been one of the Ambaſſadors that was ſent to that Prince, ſay, he had travell'd a great Way in a very fine and fruitful Country, which the Inhabitants call'd *the Queen's Girdle*; that he made another large Journey in another Country as pleaſant, which they call'd *the Queen's Veil*; and that he paſs'd through a great many other fine Provinces, that were deſtin'd only to furniſh that Princeſs with Clothes, and had their ſeveral Names from the Things they were to provide. So that if any ſhould go, and ſay to *Amaſtris*, the Wife of *Xerxes*, the King's Mother; *There is at* Athens *a Citizen whoſe whole Eſtate is not above* 300 *Acres of Land which he poſſeſſes in the Town of* Erquies, *und who is the Son of* Dinomache; *whoſe Clothes and Jewels all together are ſcarce worth fifty* * Minæ; *this Citizen is preparing to make War*

* About 100 *l.* Sterling.

with

with your Son. What do you think ſhe would ſay? *This Man founds the Succeſs of his Deſigns on his Application, Experience, and great Wiſdom; for theſe are the only Things that make the* Greeks *eſteem'd in the World.* But if one ſhould ſay to her, *This* Alcibiades *is a young Man, not yet twenty Years of Age, who is very ignorant, has no manner of Experience, and who, when a certain Friend of his whom he paſſionately loves, repreſents to him, that he ought above all Things to cultivate himſelf, to labour, meditate to exerciſe himſelf; and after having acquir'd the Capacity that is neceſſary, might engage in War with the great King; will not believe a Word of the Matter, and ſays he's fit enough for this as he is already.* How great would be the Wonder of this Princeſs? Would ſhe not ask, *On what then does this young Giddy-brains depend?* And if we ſhould tell her, *he depends on his Beauty, his fine Shape, his Nobility, and fortunate Birth*; would ſhe not take us for Fools, conſidering the great Advantages the Kings of *Perſia* have in all this above us? But without going any higher, do you think *Lampyto*, the Daughter of *Leotichydas*, the Wife of *Archidamus*, and Mother of *Agis*, who were all born Kings of *Lacedemonia*, would be leſs aſtoniſhed, if one ſhould tell her, that as ill educated as you have been, you don't ſcruple to trouble your Head with a Deſign of making War with her Son? Alas! is it not a horrible Shame, that the very Women among our Enemies know better than we what we ought to be, to undertake to make War with them with any Likelihood of Succeſs? Follow my Advice then, my dear *Alcibiades*, and obey the Precept which is written on the Gate of the Temple of *Delphos*, *Know thy ſelf.* For the Enemies you have to deal with are ſuch as I repreſent them to you, and not ſuch as you imagine them to be. The only Means of conquering them are Application, and Skill: If you renounce theſe ſo neceſſary Qualities, renounce the Glory too, of which you are ſo paſſionately ambitious.

Alcib. Can you then explain to me, *Socrates*, how I ought to cultivate my ſelf? For no Man whatever ſpeaks more truly to me than you.

Socrat.

Socrat. I can, without Doubt, but this does not reſpect you alone; this concerns us all, how many ſoever we are. We ought to ſeek the Means of making our ſelves better; and I ſpeak no more on your Account than on my own, who have no leſs Need of Inſtruction than you, and have only one Advantage above you.

Alcib. What is that?

Socrat. 'Tis this, my Tutor is wiſer and better than *Pericles*, who is yours.

Alcib. Who is this Tutor of yours?

God the beſt Tutor of Men.

Socrat. 'Tis God, who never permitted me to ſpeak to you before this Day; and 'tis in Purſuance of his Inſpirations that I now tell you, that you'll never arrive at the Reputation you deſire, but by me.

Alcib. You jeſt, *Socrates*.

Socrat. It may be ſo. But in fine, 'tis ſtill a great Truth, that we have great Need to take Care of our ſelves. All Men need this, and we yet more than others.

Alcib. You ſpeak no Untruth, ſo far as it concerns me, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Nor in what concerns me neither.

Alcib. What ſhall we do then?

Socrat. Now is the Time to throw off Lazineſs and Softneſs.

Alcib. 'Tis very true, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Come then, let us examine what it is we would become. Tell me, Would we not render our ſelves * very good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. In what ſort of Virtue?

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* But there are many different Sorts of Goodneſs, and upon this *Socrates* is going to enlarge. For the Word *Good* in *Greek* ſignifies, accompliſh'd, excellent, improv'd in any Art or Science, or virtuous. And the Word *Evil*, by the Rule of Contraries, has as many Significations. This Remark is neceſſary for the underſtanding of what follows. *M. Le Fevre.*

Alcib.

Alcib. In that Virtue that renders a Man good and fit.

Socrat. For what?

Alcib. For Buſineſs.

Socrat. What Buſineſs? The managing of a Horſe? It can't be for that, for that belongs to Queries. Is it Navigation? Not that neither, for that belongs to Pilots. What Buſineſs is it then?

Alcib. The Buſineſs in which our beſt *Athenians* are employ'd.

Socrat. What do you mean by our beſt *Athenians?* Are they the Prudent or Imprudent?

Alcib. The Prudent.

Socrat. So that, according to you, when a Man is prudent in any Thing, he is good and fit for that Thing; and the imprudent are very bad for it.

Alcib. Without Doubt.

Socrat. A Shoemaker has all the Prudence neceſſary for making Shoes; and therefore he is good for that.

Alcib. 'Tis right.

Socrat. But he is very imprudent for making of Clothes, and conſequently is a bad Taylor.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. That ſame Man then is both good and bad?

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. It follows from this Principle, that your *Athenians* whom you call Good and Honeſt Men are bad too.

Alcib. That is not what I mean.

Socrat. What do you mean then by the good *Athenians?*

Alcib. They that know how to govern.

Socrat. To govern what, Horſes?

Alcib. No.

Socrat. Men?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. What ſick Men, Pilots, or Mowers?

Alcib. No, none of theſe.

Socrat. Whom then? Thoſe that do ſomething, or thoſe who do nothing?

Alcib.

Alcib. Thoſe that do ſomething.

Socrat. Thoſe that do what? Endeavour to explain your ſelf, and make me underſtand your Meaning.

Alcib. Thoſe that live together, and make uſe one of another, as we live in Cities.

Socrat. According to you, then, the good *Athenians* are ſuch as know how to command ſuch Men as make uſe of Men.

For the Politicians command the Magiſtrates, and theſe the reſt of the Citizens.

Alcib. I mean ſo.

Socrat. Is it thoſe that know how to command the Maſters of Gallies, who make uſe of Rowers?

Alcib. No.

Socrat. Becauſe this belongs to Pilots. Is it then thoſe that know how to command the Players on the Flute, who make uſe of Muſicians and Dancers? No, doubtleſs, for this belongs to the Maſters of the Choirs.

The Maſters of the Choirs regulated the Muſicians, and in their Place it was the Players on the Flute.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. What do you mean then by knowing how to command ſuch Men as make uſe of other Men?

Alcib. I mean, 'tis to command Men that live together under the ſame Laws and Polity.

Socrat. What is this Art then that teaches to command 'em? If I ſhould ask you what is the Art which teaches to command all the Rowers of the ſame Veſſel, what Anſwer would you give me?

Alcib. That 'tis the Pilot's Art.

Socrat. And if I ſhould ask you what is the Art that teaches to command Muſicians and Dancers?

Alcib. I would anſwer you, 'tis the Art of the Maſters of the Choirs.

Socrat. How then do you call this Art, which teaches to command thoſe who make the ſame Politick Body, and live together under the ſame Government?

Alcib. 'Tis the Art of giving good Counſel.

Socrat.

Socrat. How! what then is the Art of Pilots the Art of giving bad Counſel? Is it not their Deſign to give good?

Alcib. Yes, certainly, to ſave thoſe that are in the Ship.

Socrat. You ſay very well: Of what good Counſel then do you ſpeak? And to what does it tend?

Alcib. It tends to preſerve the City, and to make it better policied.

Socrat. But what is it that preſerves Cities, and makes 'em better policied? What is it that ought or ought not to be in 'em? And if you ſhould ask me what it is that ought or ought not to be in a Body to make it ſound and in good Health, I would immediately anſwer you, That that which ought to be in it, is Health; and that which ought not to be in it, is Sickneſs: Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I think the very ſame.

Socrat. And if you ſhould ask me the ſame Thing of the Eye, I ſhould anſwer you after the ſame Manner, That the Eye is in a good Condition, when it has all that has neceſſary for Sight, and when nothing hinders it from ſeeing. And the very ſame of the Ears, that they are very well, when they have every Thing they need to hear well, and no Diſpoſition to Deafneſs.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. And now for a City, what is it which by its Preſence or Abſence makes it to be in a better Condition, better policied, and better govern'd?

Alcib. I think, *Socrates*, 'tis when Amity is well eſtabliſh'd among the Citizens, and Hatred and Diviſion are baniſhed out of the City.

Socrat. What do you call Amity? Is it Concord or Diſcord?

Alcib. 'Tis Concord, certainly.

Socrat. What Art is that which makes Cities accord for example, about Numbers?

Alcib. 'Tis Arithmetick.

Socrat. And is it this that makes particular Perſons accord one with another, and each one with himſelf?

Alcib.

Alcib. Without Doubt.

Socrat. And how do you call that Art which makes each one agree with himſelf about the Length of a Span or Cubit? Is it not the Art of Meaſuring?

Alcib. Yes, doubtleſs.

Socrat. Then Cities and particular Perſons accord by Means of this Art. And is it not the ſame Thing about Weight?

Alcib. The very ſame.

Socrat. And what is that Concord of which you ſpeak, in what does it conſiſt, and what is the Art that produces it? Is the Concord of a City the ſame that makes a particular Perſon accord with himſelf and others?

Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. What is it? Don't be weary in anſwering me, but charitably inſtruct me.

Alcib. I think it is this Amity and Concord that makes Parents agree with their Children, one Brother with another, and the Wife with her Husband.

Socrat. But do you think a Husband can agree well with his Wife, and that they will accord perfectly about the Tapeſtry which ſhe works, and he knows not how to make?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Nor is there any Need of it; for 'tis Women's Work. No more is it poſſible that a Woman ſhould agree with her Husband about the uſe of Arms; for ſhe knows not what belongs to it, this being a Science which appertains only to Men.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. You agree then that there are ſome Sciences which are deſtin'd only for Women, and others which are reſerv'd for Men.

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. It is not poſſible that Women ſhould accord with their Husbands about all theſe Sciences?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And conſequently there will be no Amity, ſeeing Amity is nothing but Concord.

Alcib. I am of your Mind.

Socrat.

Socrat. So that when a Woman does what she ought to do, she will not be loved by her Husband; and when a Husband does what he ought to do, he will not be loved by his Wife.

Alcib. This is a certain Consequence.

Socrat. Then that which makes Cities well policied, is not, for every one to follow his own Employment in 'em.

Alcib. However, *Socrates*, methinks ——

Socrat. How do you say? Can a City be well policied without having Amity in it? Are we not agreed that it is by Amity that a City is well regulated; and that otherwise there is nothing but Disorder and Confusion?

Alcib. But yet, methinks, 'tis this very Thing that produces Amity, namely, That every one mind his own Business.

Socrat. You said the contrary but just now. But I must endeavour to understand you; what do you say? That Concord well established produces Amity? What, can there be Concord about Things which some know, and others don't understand?

Alcib. That's impossible.

Socrat. When every one does what he ought to do, does every one do what is just, or what is unjust?

Alcib. A pretty Question! every one then does what is just.

Socrat. Hence it follows, that when all the Citizens do what is just, yet they can't love one another.

Alcib. * The Consequence is necessary.

Socrat.

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* This Consequence is very certain; *Alcibiades* acknowledges it, but he does not yet understand the Reason of it. I have given a Hint of it in the Argument; but 'tis fit to explain *Socrates* his Thought here at Length. His Design is to shew, that when Men precisely do only their own Business, they only take Care of what belongs to themselves, and so limit themselves to the Knowledge of particular Things, and do not rise up to that of the Essence of universal Things, which is the only Knowledge that produces Union and Concord; whereas the

Socrat. What then is this Amity or Concord, that can accompliſh and make us capable of giving good Counſel; ſo that we may be of the Number of thoſe whom you call your beſt Citizens? For I can't comprehend what it is, or in whom 'tis to be found. Sometimes 'tis to be found in certain Perſons, and ſometimes 'tis not to be found in 'em, as it ſeems by your Words.

Alcib. Socrates, I ſolemnly proteſt to you, I know not what I ſay my ſelf; and have run a great Riſque in being a long Time in an ill Condition, without perceiving it.

Socrat. Don't be diſcourag'd, *Alcibiades*, if you ſhould not perceive in what Condition you are till you are fifty Years of Age; it would be a difficult Matter for you to recover your ſelf out of it, and to take Care of your ſelf: But now at your Years, 'tis the fitteſt Time for you to feel your Diſtemper after the Manner you do.

Alcib. But when a Man feels his Diſtemper, what muſt he do?

Socrat. You need only anſwer to ſome Queſtions, *Alcibiades*; which if you do, I hope by the Help of God, both you and I ſhall become better than we are; at leaſt, if my Prophecy is to be believ'd.

Without the Help of God, Men can't reform.

Alcib. If there needs nothing but to anſwer you to bring it about, I'll promiſe you your Prophecy ſhall prove true.

Socrat. Come then: What is it to take Care of one's ſelf ſo, that when we think we take Care of our ſelves the moſt, it may ſo happen to us without our Know-

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the Knowledge merely of particular Things produces Diſorder and Diviſion. Therefore to make Concord reign in a State, 'tis not enough for every one to take Care of what he has; he muſt take Care of himſelf too. This Care will teach him to love his Neighbour as himſelf; and 'tis only this Love which has God for its Principle, that can produce Concord and Union.

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ledge, to take Care of quite another Thing? What muſt a Man do to take Care of himſelf? Does he take Care of himſelf, when he takes Care of the Things that belong to him?

Alcib. * I think ſo.

Socrat. How! does a Man take Care of his Feet, when he takes Care of the Things that belong to his Feet?

Alcib. I don't underſtand you.

Socrat. Do you know nothing that properly belongs to the Hand? To what Part of the Body do the Rings appertain? Is it not to the Fingers?

Alcib. Yes, doubtleſs.

Socrat. And in like Manner, the Shoes belong to the Feet.

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. Do we then take Care of our Feet, when we take Care of our Shoes?

Alcib. Indeed, *Socrates*, I don't yet underſtand you.

Socrat. What do you mean then by taking Care of a Thing? Is it not to make it better than it was? What Art is it then that makes our Shoes better?

Alcib. 'Tis the Shoemaker's Art.

Socrat. † 'Tis by the Shoemaker's Art then that we take Care of our Shoes: Is it by the ſame Art too that we take Care of our Feet, or is it by ſome other Art that we make our Feet better?

Alcib. Without Doubt that's done by another Art.

Socrat. Don't we make our Feet better by another Art, which meliorates the whole Body? And is not this the Gymnaſtick Art?

For Exerciſe ſtrengthens all the Parts of the Body.

Alcib. Yes, certainly.

Socrat. 'Tis then by the Gymnaſtick Art that we take Care of our Feet; and

* *Alcibiades* anſwers according to the Principles that are almoſt generally receiv'd. Men think they take Care of themſelves, when they take Care of the Things that belong to 'em, but they are groſly miſtaken; and *Socrates* is going to confound this Error with great Solidity. That which is *mine*, is not *myſelf*.

† In *Greece* the Shoemakers mended Shoes as well as made 'em.

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by the Shoemaker's Art, that we take Care of the Things that belong to our Feet. 'Tis by the Gymnaſtick Art we take Care of our Hands; and by the Goldſmith's Art that we take Care of the Things that belong to our Hands. 'Tis by the Gymnaſtick Art that we take Care of our Bodies; and by the Weaver's Art, and many other Arts, that we take Care of the Things that appertain to our Bodies.

Alcib. This is beyond all Doubt.

Socrat. And conſequently the Art by which we take Care of ourſelves, is not the ſame with that whereby we take Care of the Things that belong to us.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. Hence it follows, that when you take Care of the Things that belong to you, you do not take Care of yourſelf.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. For 'tis not by the ſame Art that we take Care of our ſelves, and of the Things that belong to us.

Alcib. I acknowledge it.

Socrat. By what Art is it then that we take Care of our ſelves?

Alcib. I cannot tell.

Socrat. We are already agreed, that it is not that by which we can make any of thoſe Things that belong to us better; but that by which we can meliorate our ſelves.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. Can we know the Art of making Shoes better, if we don't firſt know what a Shoe is? Or the Art of taking Care of Rings, if we don't know firſt what a Ring is?

Alcib. No, that can't be.

Socrat. Can we then know what Art it is that makes us better, if we don't firſt know what we our ſelves are?

Alcib. 'Tis abſolutely impoſſible.

Socrat. But is it a very eaſy Thing to know one's ſelf? And was it ſome ignorant Perſon that wrote that trivial Precept on the Gate of *Apollo*'s Temple at *Delphos*? Or

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is it on the contrary a Thing of great Difficulty, and which is not given to every Man?

Alcib. For my Part, *Socrates*, I have often thought it was given to all Men; and yet it has often ſeem'd to me to be a Thing of very great Difficulty.

Socrat. But, *Alcibiades*, let it be eaſy or difficult, 'tis ſtill certain, that when once we know it, we immediately and eaſily know what Care we ought to take of our ſelves: Whereas while we are ignorant of it, we ſhall never come to the Knowledge of the Nature of this Care.

Alcib. That is beyond all Doubt.

Socrat. Come on, then: By what Means ſhall we find out the * Eſſence of Things to ſpeak univerſally? By this we ſhall ſoon find what we are our ſelves; and if we are ignorant of this Eſſence, we ſhall always be ignorant of our ſelves.

Alcib. You ſay right.

Socrat. Follow me cloſe then, I conjure you in the Name of God: With whom are you now diſcourſing? Is it with ſome other Perſon, or with me?

Alcib. No, 'tis with you.

Socrat. And I in like manner diſcourſe with none but you: 'Tis *Socrates* that now ſpeaks, and *Alcibiades* that hears.

Alcib. True.

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* This univerſal Eſſence of Things, αὐτοδοαυτὸ, is the Divine Intelligence, the Eternal Idea, the only Cauſe of Beings: And the ſingular Eſſence, αὐτοέκαστον, is the Thing form'd on this Idea. So that there are two Ways of knowing one's ſelf; the firſt is to know the Divine Intelligence, and to deſcend from that to the Soul, by following the Deſigns which the All-wiſe Creator had in creating it: And the other is ſimply to know the Soul as a Being different from the Body, and to be convinc'd that that alone is the Man. The firſt is the moſt perfect: However *Socrates* leaves this at preſent, and applies himſelf only to the ſecond, which is more eaſy: But he afterwards reſumes it, and from the Knowledge of the Soul raiſes *Alcibiades* to the Conſideration of the Eternal Idea, in which alone, as in the true Light, a Man may perfectly ſee his Soul, and all that belongs to it. The whole Argument of *Socrates* is worthy the moſt Divine Theology. *Socrat.*

Socrat. 'Tis by uſing Words that *Socrates* ſpeaks; for to ſpeak, and to uſe Words, is one and the ſame Thing.

Alcib. 'Tis ſo, without Doubt.

Socrat. Are not he who uſes a Thing, and the Thing which he uſes, different?

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. For example, a Shoemaker who uſes Knives, Laſts, and other Tools, cuts with his Knife, and is different from the Knife with which he cuts. A Man that plays on the Harp, is not the ſame Thing with the Harp, on which he plays.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. This is what I asked you juſt now; whether he that uſes a Thing, and the Thing he uſes, always ſeem to you two different Things?

Alcib. So they ſeem to me.

Socrat. * But the Shoemaker does not only uſe his Tools, but his Hands too.

Alcib. That's beyond all Doubt.

Socrat. He alſo uſes his Eyes.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. We are agreed that he who uſes a Thing, is always different from the Thing he uſes.

Alcib. That is agreed between us.

Socrat. So that the Shoemaker and the Harper are ſome other Thing than the Hands and Eyes, which they both uſe.

Alcib. That's plain.

Socrat. Man uſes his Body.

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. That which uſes a Thing, is different from the Thing which is uſed.

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Man then is a different Thing from his Body?

Alcib. I believe it.

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* He deſigns to prove, that the Body is no leſs an Inſtrument of the Soul, than all the other remoter Inſtruments which it uſes.

Socrat. What is Man, then?

Alcib. Indeed, *Socrates*, I can't tell.

Socrat. You can at leaſt tell me that Man is that which uſes the Body.

Alcib. That's true.

Socrat. Is there any Thing that uſes the Body beſides the Soul?

Alcib. No, nothing elſe.

Socrat. 'Tis that *that* governs.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. I believe there's no Man but is forc'd to confeſs———

Alcib. What?

Socrat. That Man is one of theſe three Things, either the Soul, or the Body, or the Compound of 'em both. Now we are agreed that Man is that which commands the Body.

Alcib. That we are.

Socrat. What is Man then? Does the Body command it ſelf? No. For we have ſaid 'tis the Man that commands that. So that the Body is not the Man.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. Is it then the Compound that commands the Body? And ſhall this Compound be the Man?

Alcib. That may be.

Socrat. Nothing leſs. For ſince one of 'em does not command, as we have already ſaid, * 'tis impoſſible they both ſhould command together.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Seeing then neither the Body, nor the Compound of Soul and Body are the Man; 'tis abſolutely neceſſary either that Man is nothing at all, or that the Soul alone is the Man.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

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* For beſides that this is a Contradiction, ſeeing that which does not command would then command, there is not a third Thing for theſe two to command together. If the Soul and the Body both command, what is it that is under their Command?

Socrat.

Socrat. Shall I demonſtrate to you yet more clearly that the Soul alone is the Man?

Alcib. No, I proteſt, this is ſufficiently prov'd.

Socrat. We have not yet ſounded this Truth with all the Accuracy it deſerves; but 'tis ſufficiently prov'd, and that may ſerve. We ſhall ſound it farther, and penetrate it better, when we have found out what we juſt now quitted, becauſe it requir'd a longer Inveſtigation.

Alcib. What is that?

Socrat. 'Tis what we ſaid but now; that 'tis neceſſary we would firſt ſeek to know the very Eſſence of Things, to ſpeak univerſally; inſtead of which, we have ſtopp'd to examine and know the Eſſence of a particular Thing; and perhaps that is ſufficient. For we can find nothing that is more properly and preciſely ourſelves, than our Souls.

Alcib. That's very certain.

Socrat. So then this is a Principle very well eſtabliſh'd, that when you and I converſe together, by making uſe of Diſcourſe, 'tis my Soul that converſes with yours. And this is what we ſaid juſt now, that *Socrates* ſpeaks to *Alcibiades*, by addreſſing Words not to the Body which is expos'd to my Eyes, but to *Alcibiades* himſelf, whom I do not ſee, that is, to his Soul.

Alcib. This is evident.

Socrat. He then who requires us to know our ſelves, requires us to know our Souls.

Alcib. I believe it.

Socrat. He who knows his Body only, knows that which belongs to him, but does not know himſelf. Thus a Phyſician, as a Phyſician, does not know himſelf, nor a Wreſtling-Maſter as a Wreſtling-Maſter, nor a Husbandman as a Husbandman. All Perſons of theſe Profeſſions, and thoſe of the like Nature, are ſo far from knowing themſelves, * that they do not know parti-

* Phyſicians and Maſters of Exerciſe indeed apply themſelves to know the Body; but they know it only to a certain Degree: For as *Hippocrates* ſays in his Treatiſe of the ancient Art of Medicine, they content themſelves with knowing what Man is, with reſpect

particularly what belongs to 'em; and their Art makes 'em adhere to what is yet more foreign to 'em than that which properly belongs to 'em. For they know only those Things that appertain to the Body, and by which they cure, and preserve it in Health.

Alcib. All this is very true.

Socrat. If therefore it be a Piece of Wisdom to know one's self, there is no Man of any of these Professions who is wise by his Art.

Alcib. I am of the same Mind.

Socrat. * And 'tis for this Reason all these Arts appear vile and sordid, and consequently unworthy of a good Man.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Well, then, to return to our Principle, every Man that takes Care of his Body, takes Care of that which belongs to him, and not of himself.

Alcib. I grant it.

Socrat. Every Man that loves Riches, loves neither himself, nor that which belongs to him, but loves a Thing which is yet more foreign to him, *and which only respects that which belongs to him.*

Alcib. I think so.

To labour only to heap up Treasure, is to manage one's Affairs ill.

Socrat. Then according to this Principle one may affirm, that he who employs his Care to heap up Riches, does not manage his Affairs well.

Alcib. 'Tis most certainly so.

Socrat. If any one has been in Love with the Body of *Alcibiades*, that Person has not been in Love with *Alcibiades*, but with one of the Things that appertain to him.

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respect to what he eats and drinks, and to the Exercises he performs: And what may occur to him from any of these Things. So that they only know some certain Qualities of Matter, but not the Essence of it. 'Tis more easy to know the Essence of the Soul, than that of the Body.

† The only Art truly worthy of a good Man, is that of knowing, and labouring to perfectionate himself.

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Alcib. I am convinc'd of it.

Socrat. That Perſon who is in Love with *Alcibiades*, muſt be one that is in Love with his Soul.

Alcib. That's a neceſſary Conſequence of your Principle.

Socrat. And this is the Reaſon that *that* Perſon who only loves your Body, retires when the Beauty of this Body begins to decay.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. But one that loves your Soul never retires * while you make any Progreſs in Virtue, and every Day make your ſelf ſtill a better Man.

Alcib. That is very likely.

Socrat. And this likewiſe is the Reaſon that I am the only Perſon that does not leave you, but continue conſtant after the Flower of your Beauty is faded, and all your Admirers are retir'd.

Alcib. You very much oblige me, *Socrates*; and I intreat you not to abandon me.

Socrat. Labour then with all your Might to become every Day more and more beautiful.

By beautiful he means virtuous.

Alcib. I'll labour to become ſo.

Socrat. As Matters ſtand with you, 'tis eaſy to judge that *Alcibiades*, the Son of *Clinias*, never had nor has yet more than one true Lover; and this faithful Lover is the † lovely *Socrates*, the Son of *Sophroniſcus* and *Phænareta*.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. But did you not tell me when I met you, that I prevented you but one Moment, and that you had a Deſign to ſpeak to me, to know why I was the only Perſon that had not left you?

Alcib. I told you ſo, and 'tis true.

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* So this Paſſage ought to be tranſlated. The *Latin* Interpreters have made a Miſtake here, not remembring ἕως has often the Signification of the preſent Time. *M. Le Fevre.*

† He jokes on his own Deformity and low Birth, which he prefers to the Beauty, fine Air, and Nobility of his Rivals.

Socrat. You now know the Reaſon of it; 'tis becauſe I always lov'd you, and others only lov'd what belongs to you. The Beauty of that which belongs to you begins to decay, whereas your own Beauty begins to flouriſh. And if you don't ſuffer your ſelf to be corrupted by the People, and become more deform'd, I'll not forſake you as long as I live. But I very much fear, ſince you are ſo much * in Love with the Applauſe of the People, that you'll deſtroy your ſelf by this unhappy Diſpoſition, as it has been the Lot of a great many of our beſt *Athenians*. For the People of the magnanimous † *Erectheus* have a fair Outſide; but we ought to look into 'em, and remove that fair Covering which hides 'em from us. Believe me, then, *Alcibiades*, and take the Precautions I give you.

More deformed, that is, more vicious.

Alcib. What Precautions?

Socrat. To exerciſe your ſelf, and be inſtructed in what is neceſſary to be known, before you intermeddle with the Affairs of the Commonwealth; that you may be always fortified with an Antidote; and that you may not periſh in ſo contagious and fatal a Converſation.

Alcib. All you ſay is very well, *Socrates*; but endeavour to explain to me, by what Means we may be able to take Care of our ſelves.

Socrat. That's done already: For firſt of all we have prov'd what Man is, and that with good Reaſon; becauſe we fear'd, if that were not well known, we ſhould take Care of ſomething quite different from our ſelves, without perceiving it. We afterwards agreed that we ought to take Care of our Souls; that this is the only End we ſhould propoſe to our ſelves; and that the Care of the Body, and of that which appertains to it, as Riches, ſhould be left to others.

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* He was ſo in Love with the People, that he did not ceaſe to beſtow Gifts on 'em, and to preſent 'em with Shows and Plays. *Plutarch* ſpeaks of a Diſtribution of Money, which he made when he was very young, and carried Quails in his Boſom.

† *Erectheus* was one of the firſt Kings of *Athens*.

Alcib.

Alcib. Can any one deny this?

Socrat. How can we underſtand this Truth * more clearly, and evidently? For when we have ſet it in its true Light, 'tis very certain, that we ſhall know our ſelves perfectly well: Let us then in the Name of the Gods endeavour to underſtand well the Precept of *Delphos*, of which we have already ſpoken. For we don't yet well comprehend all its Force.

"Know thy ſelf.

Alcib. What Force? What do you mean?

Socrat. I'm going to communicate to you what I take to be the Meaning of that Inſcription, and the Precept it includes. 'Tis hardly poſſible to make you underſtand it by any other Compariſon than this, which is taken from the Sight.

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. Obſerve well what I ſay. If this Inſcription ſpoke to the Eye, as it ſpeaks to the Man, and ſhould ſay to it, *Know thy ſelf*; what ſhould we think it required of it? Should we not think it required it to look upon it ſelf in ſomething in which the Eye might ſee it ſelf?

Alcib. That's evident.

Socrat. Let us then ſeek for this Thing, in which, as we behold our ſelves in it, we may ſee both it and our ſelves.

Alcib. We may ſee our ſelves in a Looking-glaſs, and all other Bodies of the like kind.

Socrat. You ſay very well. Is not there likewiſe ſome little Part of the Eye, which has the ſame Effect as a Looking-glaſs?

Alcib. Yes, certainly, there is.

Socrat. You have obſerved then, that as often as you look into an Eye, you ſee your own Image, as in a Glaſs, in that little Part which is call'd by a Name which

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* M. *Le Fevre* had Reaſon to ſay, that ἐναργέστερα ought to be read for ἐναργέσταλα, and that it ſhould be tranſlated *more clearly*. *Socrates* is now going to reſume the Propoſition he had quitted, which was to know the univerſal Eſſence of Things; and all he is going to ſay on this Subject is incomparably fine.

ſignifies a * Baby, becauſe 'tis the Image of him that looks on it.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. Then an Eye, that it may ſee into another Eye, ought to look into this Part of it, which is the moſt beautiful, and which alone has the Faculty of ſeeing.

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. For if he ſhould fix his Looks on any other Part of the Body of Man, or on any other Object, unleſs it were like this Part of the Eye which ſees, it would ſee nothing of it ſelf.

Alcib. You are in the right.

Socrat. Therefore an Eye that would ſee it ſelf, ought to look into another Eye, and into that Part of the Eye in which all the Virtue of it reſides, that is, the Sight.

Alcib. That's certain.

In what we ſhould look upon our ſelves, to know our ſelves well

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, is it not juſt ſo with the Soul? Ought it not to look into the Soul to ſee it ſelf, and into that Part † of the Soul, in which all its Virtues, that is to ſay, Wiſdom, is ingenerated? Or elſe ought it not to be-

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* There is a Fault in the *Greek* which I wonder to find left there; for what Senſe has κορυφὴν here, which ſignifies *the top of a Thing?* It ought to be read κόρην, that is, the Apple of the Eye; κόρη, *Pupilla*, a Poppet or Baby.

† That is, into our Intellect or Underſtanding. We ought ſtrictly to remark with what Wiſdom *Socrates* here expreſſes himſelf. In ſpeaking of the Soul of Man, he acknowledges, that Wiſdom is ingenerated in it; that is, that it comes to it from without, for it is not its own Light; this is derived into it from God. And a few Lines lower, as he ſpeaks of the Divine Intelligence, he does not chuſe to ſay, in which Knowledge and Wiſdom are ingenerated; but ſays he, *in which they reſide*; becauſe it is Wiſdom it ſelf, and the Source of Wiſdom. The *Latin* Interpreters, who did not pry into this Accuracy of *Socrates*, have ſpoiled all the Beauty of theſe Paſſages by their Tranſlations. More Attention and Fidelity ought to have been uſed in handling Theological Truths.

hold

hold it ſelf in ſome other Thing yet more noble, which this Part of the Soul in ſome ſort reſembles?

Alcib. So methinks, *Socrates.*

Socrat. But can we find any Part of the Soul which is more divine than that in which Knowledge and Wiſdom reſide?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. 'Tis then in this Soul, of which ours is but the Image; 'tis in this divine Soul we ought to behold our ſelves, and to contemplate the whole Deity in it; that is to ſay, God, and Wiſdom, if we would know ourſelves perfectly.

We muſt behold ourſelves in God, to know our ſelves well.

Alcib. This ſeems very probable.

Socrat. To know one's ſelf is Wiſdom, as we have both agreed.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. While we don't know ourſelves, nor are wiſe with this Wiſdom, we can't know either our Goods or our Evils; for it is not poſſible that he who knows not *Alcibiades*, ſhould know that what belongs to *Alcibiades* does indeed appertain to him.

Alcib. 'Tis impoſſible.

Socrat. 'Tis only by knowing ourſelves that we come to know that *that* which belongs to us does indeed appertain to us: And if we know not what belongs to us, neither ſhall we know what has reference to the Things that belong to us.

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. We therefore juſt now did ill to agree, that there are ſome Perſons, who tho' they don't know themſelves, yet know that which belongs to them, without knowing the Things that appertain to that which belongs to them. For theſe three Knowledges, to know one's ſelf, to know that which belongs to one, and to know the Things that appertain to that which belongs to one, are link'd together; they are the Action of the ſame Man, and the Effect of one and the ſame Art.

Alcib. 'Tis very likely.

Socrat. Now that Man that knows not the Things that belong to himſelf, neither will know thoſe that belong to others.

Alcib. That's evident.

Socrat. And if he knows not what belongs to others, neither will he know what belongs to the City.

Alcib. That's a certain Conſequence.

Socrat. Therefore ſuch a Man can never be a good Stateſman; nay, he can't be ſo much as a good Maſter to govern a Family: What do I ſay? He can't ſo much as govern himſelf, for he knows not what he does; and if he knows not what he does, 'tis impoſſible he ſhould be free from Faults.

Alcib. That is impoſſible indeed.

Socrat. And if he commits Faults, does he not do Ill both in private and publick? If he does Ill, is he not miſerable? And as he is miſerable, does he not involve thoſe that obey him in his Misfortunes?

Alcib. Who can deny it?

The Wicked can't be happy

Socrat. Then 'tis not poſſible that he who is neither good nor wiſe, ſhould be happy.

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Then all vicious Perſons are miſerable.

Alcib. I acknowledge it.

Socrat. Then a Man can't deliver himſelf from his Miſery by Riches, but by Wiſdom.

Alcib. That's certain.

The Happineſs of Cities and States conſiſts in Virtue.

Socrat. So that, my dear *Alcibiades*, Cities have no Need either of Walls, or Ships, or Arſenals, or Troops, or Grandeur, to make 'em happy: The only Thing they need is Virtue. And if you would manage the Affairs of the Commonwealth well, you muſt give your Citizens Virtue.

Alcib. This is an evident Truth.

Socrat. But can a Man give that which he has not?

Alcib. How ſhould he?

Socrat. Then you ought firſt of all to conſider how to acquire Virtue; and ſo muſt every Man who deſires

to

to take Care not only of himſelf, and the Things that belong to him, but alſo of the City, and the Things that belong to that.

Alcib. This is beyond all Doubt.

Socrat. Therefore you ought not to conſider how to acquire for yourſelf, or your City, a large Extent of Empire, and the abſolute Power of doing what you pleaſe, but only how to acquire Wiſdom and Juſtice.

Alcib. I believe what you ſay.

Socrat. For if you and your City govern your ſelves wiſely and juſtly, you will pleaſe God.

We can't pleaſe God but by wiſdom and juſtice.

Alcib. I am well convinc'd of that.

Socrat. And you'll govern your ſelves wiſely and juſtly, if, as I juſt now told you, you behold your ſelves always in the Deity; in that ſplendid Light which alone is capable of giving you the Knowledge of the Truth.

If we would conduct our ſelves wiſely and juſtly, we muſt behold ourſelves in God.

Alcib. This ſeems very reaſonable.

Socrat. For while you behold yourſelves in this Light, you will ſee your ſelves, and will ſee and know your true Goods.

Alcib. Without Doubt.

Socrat. And ſo you will always do what is good.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. If you always do what is good, I dare anſwer for it, and warrant you, you ſhall be always happy.

Happineſs is the certain Recompence of good Actions.

Alcib. Your Warrant is very good in this Caſe, *Socrates.*

Socrat. But if you govern your ſelves unjuſtly, and inſtead of beholding the Deity, and true Light, you look into that which is without God and full of Darkneſs, you will do nothing but the Works of Darkneſs, and ſuch as are full of Impiety: And it can't be otherwiſe, becauſe you will not know your ſelf.

Thoſe that look on Darkneſs, do nothing but the Works of Darkneſs.

Alcib. I am of the ſame Mind.

Socrat.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, repreſent to your ſelf a Perſon that has * a Power to do any Thing he pleaſes, and yet has no Judgment; what is to be expected from him? And what Miſchief is there that will not befal him? For example, ſuppoſe a ſick Man has Power to do whatever comes into his Head, has no Underſtanding in Phyſick, is in a Rage againſt every Body, ſo that no Perſon dare ſpeak to him, or reſtrain him; what will be the Event of this? He will without Doubt deſtroy his Body, and render himſelf incurable.

The terrible Effects of abſolute Power when not attended with Wiſdom.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Suppoſe ſome Perſon in a Ship, who has not the Judgment and Skill of a Pilot, ſhould yet have the Liberty to do what he thinks fit; you your ſelf ſee what muſt certainly befal him, and thoſe that abandon themſelves to his Conduct.

Alcib. They muſt all neceſſarily periſh.

Socrat. The Caſe is the ſame with Cities, Republicks, and all States; if deſtitute of Virtue, their Ruin is certain.

The Ruin of Cities and States is certain, when Virtue does not reign in 'em.

Alcib. 'Tis impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe.

Socrat. Conſequently, my dear *Alcibiades*, if you would be happy, your Buſineſs is not to acquire a large Extent of Empire for your ſelf or your Republick, but to acquire Virtue.

Alcib. Very true.

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* When Wiſdom is wanting, abſolute Power always tranſports Men beyond the Limits of their Duty, and induces 'em to trample Religion and Juſtice under their Feet.

Socrat. * And before this Virtue is acquir'd, 'tis better, and more advantagious, I don't ſay for a Child, but for a Man, to obey him who is the moſt virtuous, than to command.

'Tis more advantagious for vicious Perſons to obey than command.

Alcib. I am of the ſame Mind.

Socrat. And what is beſt is alſo moſt beautiful.

Alcib. Without Doubt.

Socrat. That which is moſt beautiful is likewiſe moſt becoming, and ſuitable.

Alcib. That's beyond Diſpute.

Socrat. 'Tis then becoming and ſuitable to a vicious Perſon to be a Slave, for that is beſt for him.

A vicious Perſon ought to be a Slave.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. Then Vice is a vile Thing, and ſuitable to a Slave.

The Baſeneſs of Vice.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. And Virtue is a noble Thing, and ſuits only with a free Man.

The Nobility of Virtue.

Alcib. That can't be conteſted.

Socrat. Then this Vileneſs ought to be avoided, which only ſuits with Slaves.

Alcib. Moſt certainly, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Well, then, my dear *Alcibiades*, do you now perceive in what Condition you are? Are you in this noble Diſpoſition of Mind, ſo becoming a Man of your Birth; or ———

Alcib. † Ah, *Socrates*, I perceive very well I am in the Condition you ſpeak of.

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* After *Socrates* has confounded the Pride of *Alcibiades*, he gives a finiſhing Stroke to lay him low, in reducing him to pronounce this terrible Sentence againſt himſelf, That he is only worthy to be a Slave, becauſe he has no Virtue, ſince 'tis Virtue alone that makes Men free.

† 'Tis upon this, without Doubt, that *Plutarch* ſays, *Alcibiades* ſtruck with the victorious Reaſons of *Socrates*, was like a Cock, that after a long Fight hangs the Wing, and yields himſelf conquer'd; and that *Socrates* by his ingenious Diſcourſes touch'd him to the Quick, and made him pour out a Flood of Tears.

Socrat.

Socrat. But do you know how to deliver your ſelf out of this Condition, which I dare not name, when I ſpeak of a Man of your Make?

Alcib. Yes, I do.

Socrat. Well, how can you deliver your ſelf?

Alcib. I ſhall deliver my ſelf, if *Socrates* pleaſes.

Socrat. You don't ſay well, *Alcibiades*.

Alcib. What ſhould I ſay then?

Socrat. You ſhould ſay, if God pleaſes.

We can do nothing without the help of God.

Alcib. Well, then, I ſay if God pleaſes: And I add, let us for the future change Perſons; you ſhall perſonate me, and I you; that is to ſay, I'll now * make my Court to you, as you have hitherto made yours to me.

Socrat. If ſo, my dear *Alcibiades*, what is reported of the Stork, may be ſaid of the Love I have for you; for after it has hatched and nouriſhed a little *winged Love* in your Boſom, this little Love ſhall take his Turn to cheriſh and nouriſh that in his old Age.

Alcib. It ſhall ſo; and from this Day I'll apply myſelf to Righteouſneſs.

Socrat. I deſire you may through the whole Courſe of your Life, perſevere in this Deſign; † but I confeſs, I fear it very much. Not that I diſtruſt your good

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* This Paſſage is corrupted in the Text. It ſhould be read ὡς ὑπὸ σοῦ παιδαγωγήθην, or ὡς σὺ ἐμὲ παιδαγώγησας, *I'll be your Pedagogue*, or Schoolmaſter, *as you have been mine*. We ſee *Socrates* has been conſtantly following *Alcibiades* as his Schoolmaſter; for the future, *Alcibiades* deſigns to follow *Socrates* in his Turn: But it will be to learn of him, and not to teach him. In *Greece* they had Schoolmaſters for their Children, becauſe they went to publick Schools, and there were no private Maſters but for Perſons of the firſt Quality; and they made uſe of em but rarely. *M. Le Fevre.* In the Tranſlation 'twas requiſite to put an equivalent Term, becauſe the Word *Pedagogue*, or *Schoolmaſter*, would not have ſounded well.

† The Event prov'd, that this Fear of *Socrates* was but too well founded. *Alcibiades* with all his good Temper, and with his great Qualities, entirely ruin'd himſelf, and did a World of Miſchief

good Temper: But the Force of the Examples that reign in this City, occaſions theſe Apprehenſions. I tremble for Fear they ſhould be too ſtrong for you and me too.

Miſchief to the *Athenians*. He abandon'd himſelf to Pleaſures, immerſed himſelf in Luxury, and made Spoil on all Hands, without any Reſpect to Honour or Decency: And if he did ill in ſeizing, he did ſtill worſe in ſpending, to furniſh Matter for his Intemperance and Debauches. Inſtead of following the Rules of Juſtice, he govern'd after a licentious Manner, full of Diſſolution, and mix'd with Treachery and Deceit; and gave himſelf up to extravagant Fits of Anger which occaſion'd great Miſchiefs. All which proceeded from his forſaking *Lyceus*, and forgetting the wiſe Leſſons of *Socrates*. *Alcibiades*'s Diſeaſe became incurable when he had left this Phyſician. It ſeiz'd him like a violent Fever, over-turn'd his Underſtanding, and made him as it were run mad. From *Lyceus* it drove him to the Aſſembly of the *Athenians*; from that Aſſembly it forc'd him to Sea, from the Sea to *Sicily*, from thence to *Lacedemonia*, from *Lacedemonia* to the *Perſians*, from the *Perſians* to *Samos*, from *Samos* to *Athens*, from *Athens* again into the *Helleſpont*; and from thence, in fine, it brought him to be confin'd in a Town of *Phrygia*; where he liv'd obſcurely in the Embraces of a debauch'd Woman, and was at laſt miſerably kill'd.

THE

THE Second *ALCIBIADES*: OR, Of PRAYER.

The ARGUMENT.

Piety is the only ſpring of our Happineſs, and 'tis Prayer alone that nouriſhes Piety: By this we keep up a continual Correſpondence with God, repreſent our Neceſſities to him, and draw down his Favours upon us. So that the Eſſence of Religion conſiſts in Prayer. For Prayers are properly the Sallies of a Soul penetrated with Piety, diſcovering its Miſery to God, in order to requeſt a Remedy. But our Paſſions fill our Minds with ſo much Darkneſs, that we know neither our Goods, nor our Evils; but following our own Deſires every Day, offer ſuch Petitions to God, as would be fatal to us, and would become real Curſes, if God ſhould hearken

ken to us. Therefore there is nothing of ſo great Importance as Prayer; nothing that requires ſo much Prudence and Attention, and yet we go about nothing with ſo much Temerity and Negligence. Plato *here vigorouſly oppoſes this Abuſe, and teaches, that if we would pray well, we muſt learn to know our Goods and Evils; that the Knowledge of this is only taught by God; and conſequently, that 'tis God alone that can diſſipate the Darkneſs of our Souls, and teach us to pray. Till then we can't ſafely make any Prayers of our ſelves, without being expoſed to great Dangers. But are we in the mean Time to continue without Prayer, though we are in continual Need of the Divine Aſſiſtance? There would be Stupidity or Pride in this kind of Inaction. Certainly it would be more eligible for the Soul to continue in ſilence, than to ask Evils of God, when ſhe deſires to ask Good; but God has given her ſome Help under this Ignorance, in inſpiring, even during the Time of Darkneſs, a Prayer which teaches us to abandon our ſelves to him, and to requeſt of him, that he would do his own Will in us, and not ours. Of all the Prayers Men are capable of making, this is the moſt agreeable to God, and this* Socrates *would have Men continually make. When God has once enlightened and inſtructed us, we ſhall then ask of him what we think neceſſary; for ſeeing we ſhall ſpeak only by his Spirit, we ſhall requeſt of him that which is truly good, which he is always willing to grant; and will never fail to give it, becauſe he truly loves us. This is what* Socrates *deſigns to teach in this Dialogue, which may be term'd ſacred; ſince it is full of Maxims very worthy of Chriſtianity it ſelf, and very uſeful both for Politicks and Religion. As when* Socrates *ſays, all the Sciences in the World, without the knowledge of that which is very good, are pernicious, inſtead of being uſeful; when he teaches us, that God is not to be corrupted by Bribes, and that he does not regard the Sacrifices and Offerings of the Wicked; but the Righteouſneſs and Holineſs of thoſe that invoke him: and when he aſſures us, that God is free, and has a ſovereign Power to hear or reject our ſupplications; whence*

it

it follows, that when he hears them, he ſhews us an Act of Grace, and not of ſtrict Juſtice. Here are many other Beauties which may be eaſily remark'd, becauſe they very ſenſibly and obviouſly offer themſelves. This Dialogue is a kind of Continuation of the precedent. As in the former, Alcibiades *ſeem'd to underſtand but little with reſpect to Human Affairs; in this he appears to be very ignorant in Divine Things: For there is ſo great a Connexion between 'em, that thoſe who are ignorant of the one, are neceſſarily ignorant of the other, as* Socrates *demonſtrates, when he ſhews, that to know God, to know one's ſelf, and to know what appertains to our ſelves, and what to others, is the Effect of one and the ſame Art. We may obſerve, by the Way, as we have done before, that this Dialogue is ſuſtain'd, as all the reſt are, by Action. And this Dramatick Air is that which animates it, and is one of its greateſt Beauties.*

All that is farther neceſſary to be known, is at what Time Plato *ſuppoſes it to be made. If we follow his Interpreters, they make him fall into a very ridiculous Inconveniency. For after he had ſaid* Archelaus, *King of* Macedonia, *was kill'd, he ſpeaks of* Pericles *as a Perſon yet alive, contrary to what is certainly known, namely, that* Archelaus *ſurviv'd* Pericles, *and was not aſſaſſinated till twenty Years after his Death; and contrary to what* Plato *himſelf ſays, in his* Gorgias *and* Theages. *We ſhall ſee in the Notes what led* Plato's *Interpreters into this Miſtake. In the mean Time it may be maintain'd, that* Socrates *held theſe Diſcourſes with* Alcibiades, *the firſt Year of the 93d Olympiad; for* Perdiccas *reigned thirteen Years after the Death of* Pericles, *who died the laſt Year of the 87th Olympiad.* Archelaus *who kill'd* Perdiccas, *reign'd ſeven Years, and then was kill'd the laſt Year of the 92d Olympiad. This naturally leads us to the Time of this Dialogue. They that make* Archelaus *to have reign'd ſixteen Years, or* Perdiccas *twenty-three, make* Archelaus *ſurvive* Alcibiades *and* Socrates.

This

This Dialogue is of the ſame Character with the precedent, μαιευτικὸς; *that is,* Socrates *here makes* Alcibiades *find out the Truths which he deſigns to teach him. 'Tis alſo a moral Dialogue, as well as the former.*

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates. A*Lcibiades,* are you going into this Temple to ſay your Prayers?

Alcib. Yes, *Socrates,* that is my Deſign.

Socrat. Indeed you ſeem very thoughtful: I ſee your Eyes are fix'd on the Ground, like a Man that's thinking on ſome very ſerious Matter.

Alcib. What ſhould I think on, *Socrates?*

Socrat. What ſhould you think on! On ſome very important Thing, I ſuppoſe: For I beſeech you, in the Name of God, tell me, whether when we addreſs our Prayers to the Gods, either in publick or private, do they not grant us ſome Things, and refuſe us others? Do they not hear ſome Perſons, and reject others?

Alcib. That's very true.

Socrat. Don't you think, then, that Prayer requires a great deal of Precaution and Prudence, leſt before we are aware we ask the Gods great Evils, while we think we are requeſting what is good; and leſt they ſhould be diſpoſed to grant what is requeſted of 'em? As they granted *Oedipus*'s Petition, who pray'd that his Children might decide their Rights by the Sword. This unhappy Father, who might have pray'd to the Gods to remove from him the Miſchiefs that oppreſs'd him, drew new Miſeries on himſelf by his horrible Imprecations; for his Petitions were heard, and this proved a Source of terrible Calamities

Prayer requires a great deal of Wiſdom and Prudence.

mities to his Family, the Particulars of which I need not relate to you.

Alcib. But, *Socrates*, you tell me of a mad Man; can you believe any Man in his Senſes would have made ſuch kind of Prayers?

Socrat. Then to be mad, you think, is oppos'd to being wiſe.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. Don't you think that ſome Men are Fools, and others wiſe?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Come, then, let us endeavour to know and diſtinguiſh 'em well; for you agree that there are ſome that are fooliſh, others that are wiſe, and others that are mad.

Alcib. I do ſo.

Socrat. Are not ſome People in Health, and others Sick?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. Theſe are not the ſame Perſons.

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Is there a third Sort, who are neither Sick nor in Health?

Alcib. * No; that can't be.

Socrat. For a Man muſt neceſſarily be in Health or Sick: There is no Medium.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But is it the ſame Thing with reſpect to Wiſdom and Folly, in your Opinion?

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. I ask you, if a Man muſt neceſſarily be either fooliſh or wiſe? Or is there a certain Medium which makes one become neither a wiſe Man, nor a Fool?

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* If one were diſpoſ d to criticize, one might ſay, there is a third State, which is that of Convaleſcence, in which Men have not yet recover'd Health, neither are properly ſick. But at Bottom, this is not true; for one who is recovering is no longer under the Power of Sickneſs, but is in the Way of Health.

Alcib.

Alcib. * No: There's no Medium.

Socrat. Then one muſt neceſſarily be one or t'other.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. Did you not juſt now grant, that Madneſs is oppoſite to Wiſdom?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And that there is no Medium, to put a Man into ſuch a Condition as to be neither wiſe nor fooliſh?

Alcib. I did grant it.

Socrat. But is it poſſible for the ſame Thing to have two Contraries oppos'd to it?

Alcib. By no Means.

Socrat. Then Folly and Madneſs will appear to be one and the ſame Thing.

Alcib. So methinks.

Socrat. Then if we ſay all Fools are mad, we ſhall ſay right.

Alcib. Certainly.

Socrat. Without going any farther: Among all the Men of your Age, if there are any Fools, as without Doubt there are, and ſome of a longer Standing, (for, I pray, don't you find wiſe Men are very rare in this City, and Fools very numerous) would you call theſe Fools mad?

Alcib. Without any ſcruple.

Socrat. But do you think we ſhould be very ſafe among ſo many mad Men? And that we ſhould not before now have borne the Puniſhment of ſuch Converſa-

The Difficulty which *Socrates* oppoſes to what *Alcibiades* has juſt granted.

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* To this 'tis objected, that there is a certain Medium between Virtue and Vice, which is the State of ſuch as are neither vicious nor virtuous, as *Tacitus* ſays of *Galba*, *Magis extra Vitia quam cum Virtutibus*. But 'tis eaſy to ſee, that this Expreſſion of *Tacitus* is not true, but only in the common Language of the World, which makes a ſuperficial Judgment, without penetrating deeply into Things, and ſo calls none vicious but thoſe who have groſs Vices; and 'tis falſe, when we ſpeak with a philoſophick Accuracy. Wherever Virtue is not, there Vice muſt neceſſarily be. The ſame may be ſaid of Wiſdom and Folly. Every Man who is not wiſe, can be no other than a Fool.

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tion, in ſuffering from 'em whatever might be expected from mad Men? Have a Care what you ſay, therefore, my dear *Alcibiades*, leſt this Matter be otherwiſe than you pretend.

Alcib. Well, then, how is it? For I perceive it may be otherwiſe than I ſay.

Socrat. I think ſo too; and we muſt examine the Matter after this Manner.

Alcib. After what Manner?

Socrat. I am going to tell you. Some Perſons are ſick, are they not?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. Is it abſolutely neceſſary that every one that is ſick, ſhould have the Gout, or Fever, or ſore Eyes? And don't you think he may be free from all theſe Diſtempers, and yet be ſick of another Diſeaſe? For there are divers kinds of Diſeaſes beſides theſe.

A Solution of this Difficulty.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. You believe every Diſtemper of the Eyes is a Diſeaſe; but you don't think every Diſeaſe is a Diſtemper of the Eyes.

Alcib. No, certainly; but yet I don't ſee what that proves.

Socrat. But if you'll follow me, I am perſuaded we ſhall find that preſently. You know that Saying of the Poet, * *Two Men that go together.*

Alcib.

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* *Plato* often intermixes Sentences of the Poets in his Diſcourſes, without giving any notice when he does it. To underſtand this Paſſage well, and to know all its Elegancy, 'tis neceſſary to remember the Words *Homer* puts in *Diomedes*'s Mouth, when *Neſtor* propoſes to ſend Spies into the *Trojan* Camp. For he ſpeaks thus: 'My Courage prompts me to go into the Enemy's Army; 'but if any one would accompany me, I ſhould go with greater 'Boldneſs and Confidence: For two Men that go together take 'a better View of Things; one ſees what the other does not obſerve. One Man alone, tho' he want not Prudence, yet has always leſs Vigour and Activity in his Mind. *Iliad.* K. *ver.* 224. So that here is a manifeſt Alluſion to this Paſſage. *Homer* ſays, συν-

Alcib. I follow you with all my Might, *Socrates.*

Socrat. Are we not agreed that every Diſtemper of the Eyes is a Diſeaſe, and that every Diſeaſe is not a Diſtemper of the Eyes?

Alcib. In that we are agreed.

Socrat. And that with good Reaſon: For all that have a Fever, are ſick; but all that are ſick, have not a Fever, or the Gout, or ſore Eyes. All theſe Afflictions are Diſeaſes, but Phyſicians aſſure us, that they are ſo many different Diſeaſes by their Effects; for they are not all alike, and they don't deal with them all after the ſame Manner, but according to the Nature and Violence of 'em. Are there not a great many Sorts of Artificers? There are Shoemakers, Bricklayers, Architects, Carvers, Painters, and a Multitude of others, whom I need not name; Work is divided among 'em. They are all Artificers, but they are not all Carvers or Architects.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. In like Manner, Folly is divided among Men: Thoſe that have the greateſt Share of it we call mad, or diſtracted; thoſe that have a Degree leſs, we call Fools, and ſtupid. But while Men ſeek to hide theſe Vices under honourable and ſpecious Names, they call the former Men of Magnanimity and Courage, and they call the others Men of Simplicity; or elſe they ſay they have no Harm in 'em, but have little Experience, and much Youth. You'll find a great many other Names beſides theſe, with which they palliate their weak Side. But theſe are the many ſorts of Folly, which differ only as one Art does

Folly is divided among Men, as Labour and Induſtry is ſhar'd among 'em.

ἅμα δὲ ἐρχομένω, *Two Men that go together:* And *Plato* ſays, ἅμα σκοπουμένω, *Two Men that examine together.* But becauſe *Homer* is not now ſo well known as he was in *Plato*'s Time, I have amplified the Paſſage in the Tranſlation, by adding, *You know the Saying of the Poet*; without which, the Alluſion would not have been perceivable. The *Latin* Tranſlators have ſlipt over it without perceiving it.

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from another, and one Diſeaſe from another. Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I am of the ſame Mind with you.

Socrat. To return then to our Subject. Our firſt Deſign was exactly to know and diſtinguiſh the fooliſh from the wiſe: For we agreed that ſome Men are wiſe, and others fooliſh, did we not?

Alcib. Yes, in that we agreed.

Socrat. Don't you call him wiſe who knows what he ought to ſay or do; and him fooliſh who knows neither one nor t'other?

Alcib. Yes, certainly.

The Definition of a wiſe Man and a Fool.

Socrat. Are they who know not what they ought to ſay or do, ignorant that they ſay and do what they ought not?

Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. I told you *Oedipus* was of that Number: But you'll yet find in our Time a Multitude of People, who without being tranſported with an Emotion of Anger, like him, will requeſt of God real Evils, while they think they are asking real Goods. For as to *Oedipus*, if he did not ask for what was Good, neither did he think he asked it; whereas others every Day do the quite contrary: And without going any farther, *Alcibiades*, if the God to whom you are going to pray, ſhould appear ſuddenly to you, and before you have open'd your Lips, ſhould ask you, if you would be content to be the Tyrant of *Athens*, or (if that ſeem too little for you) of all *Greece*; or if you were not yet ſatisfied, ſhould promiſe you all *Europe* together; and fully to gratify your Ambition, ſhould add, that *that* very Day all the World ſhould know that *Alcibiades* the Son of *Clinias* is King: I am perſuaded you would go out of the Temple with abundance of Joy, as one that has juſt received the greateſt of all Goods.

Alcib. And, *Socrates*, I verily believe there's no Man but he would be tranſported with Joy, if the ſame Thing ſhould happen to him.

Socrat.

Socrat. But you would not give your Life for the Empire of the *Greeks*, nor for that of the *Barbarians?*

Alcib. No, certainly; to what Purpoſe? For then I ſhould not enjoy that Empire.

Socrat. But ſuppoſe you could enjoy it, would you do it, if this Enjoyment were to be fatal to you?

Alcib. No; neither would I do it on that Condition.

Socrat. Then by this you ſee very well, that it is not ſafe to accept, or deſire what one does not know; if it be true, that it may bring great Miſchiefs upon us, or even make us loſe our Lives: For I could name to you a great many of thoſe ambitious Men, who having paſſionately deſir'd the Tyranny, and ſpar'd nothing to obtain it, as the greateſt of all Goods; yet have deriv'd no other Advantage from this great Elevation, than to be expos'd to the Stratagems of their Enemies, who have aſſaſſinated them on the Throne. 'Tis impoſſible but you muſt have heard of that tragical Story that has lately happen'd. * *Archelaus*, King of *Macedonia*, had a Favourite whom he lov'd with an unbounded Paſſion: This Favourite, who was yet more in Love with the Throne of *Archelaus*, than his Prince was with him, kill'd him to fill up his Place, flattering himſelf that he ſhould be the happieſt Man in the World: But he had ſcarce enjoy'd the Tyranny three or four Days, when he was cut off by others that were poſſeſs'd with the ſame Ambition. And among our *Athenians*, (for theſe are Examples which come not to us by hear-ſay, but ſuch as we have ſeen with our Eyes) how many have there been, who, after they had ardently aſpir'd to be Generals of the Army, and had obtain'd what they deſir'd, have

There is a great deal of Danger in asking and receiving what we know not.

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* *Archelaus* was the natural Son of *Perdiccas* He kill'd his brother, his Uncle *Alcetas*, and his Son. He afterwards kill'd the legitimate Son of *Perdiccas*; and after he had poſſeſs'd the Throne ſeven Years, was aſſaſſinated by his Favourite *Craterus*.

been put to Death, or baniſh'd? How many others who have ſeem'd more happy, have paſs'd thro' innumerable Dangers, and been expos'd to continual Fears, not only during the Time of their being Generals, but alſo after their Return into their Country, where they have all their Life-time had a more cruel Siege to maintain againſt envious Detractors, than all thoſe they ſuſtain'd in War againſt the Enemies of the State? So that the greateſt Part of 'em wiſh'd they had never been any more than private Men, rather than to have had the Command of Armies at ſo dear a Rate. If all theſe Dangers and Fatigues would produce a Man any Advantage in the End, there would be ſome Reaſon for him to expoſe himſelf to 'em; but 'tis the quite contrary. What I ſay of Honours, I ſay alſo of Children. How many People have we ſeen, who after they have importunately deſir'd of God, that he would give them Children, and have accordingly obtain'd 'em, have by this Means precipitated themſelves into terrible Miſeries and Troubles? For ſome of 'em have ſpent their whole Life in Sorrow and Bitterneſs, becauſe their Children have prov'd wicked; and others who have had ſuch as have prov'd good, have been no more happy than the former, becauſe they have loſt them for the moſt Part in the Flower of their Age. So that they had much rather never have had 'em. Now tho' all theſe Miſeries, and many others, are very obvious and common; yet there's ſcarce a Man to be found, who would refuſe theſe falſe Goods, if God ſhould give 'em him; or who would ceaſe to importune him for 'em, if he were aſſur'd he ſhould obtain 'em by his Prayers. The generality of Men would not refuſe, either the Tyranny, or the Command of Armies, or any other great Honours, which yet are certainly much more pernicious than uſeful; but would requeſt 'em of God, if they did not ſpontaneouſly offer themſelves to 'em. But wait a Moment, and you'll hear 'em ſing

A Recantation.

Palinodia, and offer Petitions quite contrary to the former. For my Part, I confeſs, I can't chuſe but think, that Men are really

blame * *in complaining of the Gods, and accuſing 'em of being the Cauſe of the Miſeries they ſuffer; for 'tis themſelves, who by their Faults, or rather by their Follies,*

In ſpite of Fate draw Miſchiefs on themſelves.

And therefore, *Alcibiades*, that ancient Poet ſeems to me to have had a great deal of Senſe and Reaſon, who having (as I think) very imprudent Friends, whom he ſaw every Day going on in a Courſe of asking of God ſuch Things as ſeem'd good to them, and yet were very bad for 'em, compos'd for 'em this Prayer, and gave it 'em: *Great God, give us the good Things that are neceſſary for us, whether we ask 'em or not; and keep evil Things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.* This ſeems to be a moſt excellent and very ſafe Prayer. If you have any Thing to object againſt it, do not hide it from me.

An admirable Prayer of an unknown Author.

Alcib. 'Tis hard to contradict what is well ſpoken. The only Reflection I make on it, *Socrates*, is, how many Evils are brought upon Mankind by Ignorance. For we don't ſo much as perceive that 'tis this that not only makes us every Day do ſuch Things as are fatal to us; but (which is moſt deplorable) engages us to ask our own Unhappineſs of God: And this is what no Man can tell how to imagine. There's no Perſon but thinks himſelf capable of asking ſuch Things of God as are very uſeful for him, and very uncapable of deſiring ſuch as are pernicious to him; for this would not be a Prayer, but a real Imprecation.

Socrat. Hold a little, my dear *Alcibiades*; 'tis poſſible there may be found ſome Perſon wiſer than you and I, who might with good Reaſon reprehend us, and tell us, we are very much in the wrong thus to blame Ignorance, without adding what ſort of Ignorance it is that we con-

* This is a Paſſage of *Homer*, in the firſt Book of his *Odyſſ.* at the Beginning

demn, and in what it conſiſts. For if Ignorance is bad in ſome Things, 'tis good in others.

Ignorance is ſometime good.

Alcib. How do you ſay, *Socrates?* Is there any Thing of what kind ſoever, of which 'tis more uſeful to be ignorant, than to know it?

Socrat. So I think, and you think otherwiſe.

Alcib. That I do, I proteſt.

Socrat. Yet I ſhall never believe you capable of being irritated againſt your Mother with the Fury either of an *Oreſtes*, or an *Alcmæon*, or any the like *Parricides*, if there have been any others who have committed the ſame Crimes.

Alcib. Ah! *Socrates*, I intreat you in the Name of God, alter your Diſcourſe.

Socrat. *Alcibiades*, you are to blame to deſire that of me; of me, I ſay, who tell you, I don't think you capable of committing thoſe Crimes. You could do no more if I accus'd you of 'em. But ſince theſe Actions appear ſo abominable to you, that one muſt not name 'em unleſs there be an abſolute Neceſſity for it; with all my Heart, ſo let it be. I only ask you, do you think, if *Oreſtes* had been in his Senſes, and had known what was good and uſeful for him, he would not have dar'd to do what he did?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Neither he nor any Body elſe would have done it.

Alcib. That's moſt certain.

Socrat. Then in my Opinion this Ignorance of what is good and uſeful, is a great Evil.

Alcib. I am of the ſame Mind.

Socrat. And that either in *Oreſtes*, or any other Perſon.

Alcib. I am fully perſuaded of that.

Socrat. Let us examine this Matter yet a little farther. Suppoſe then * it had formerly come into your Head on a ſudden

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* The *Latin* Interpreters have tranſlated this Paſſage, as *Plato* had ſaid, *If it ſhould come into your Head on a ſudden to go and kill* Pericles, *your Tutor and Friend*; not conſidering that the

ſudden, that it was a very good and laudable Action for you to go and kill *Pericles* your Tutor and Friend; and that you had taken a Dagger, and gone directly to his Door, to ask if he were at Home, as having a Deſign againſt him alone, and not any other; and that you had been told he was within. I don't mean by this, that you could ever have been capable of committing ſo horrible an Action; but I make this Suppoſition, to ſhew you, that there's nothing hinders, but a Man who knows not what is comely and honourable, may be in a Diſpoſition of taking that for very good which is in it ſelf very evil: Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I am perfectly of the ſame Mind.

Socrat. To go on, then: Suppoſing you had been told *Pericles* was at Home, and you had gone in, and ſeen him, but not known him, and imagin'd that you ſaw ſomebody elſe; would you have had the Boldneſs to kill him? No, certainly, for your Deſign would have been only againſt him; and every Time you had been at his Houſe on the ſame Deſign, and had miſtaken him for another, you would not have done him the leaſt Injury.

Alcib. That's very certain.

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make *Plato* fall into a very ridiculous Fault. For to ſpeak thus, *Pericles* muſt have been ſtill living. And *Plato* had been ſaying, that *Archelaus*, King of *Macedonia*, had been aſſaſſinated, and we know *Pericles* died twenty Years before. How then ſhall this Contradiction be reconcil'd? How ſhall we ſecure *Plato* from this Fault of which he is not guilty, ſeeing he ſpeaks the contrary in *Gorgias* and *Theages*? There's no great Difficulty in the Matter; 'tis only to tranſlate as the *Greek* Terms will bear; *if it had formerly come into your Head on a ſudden*; that is, *if while Pericles was living*, &c. By this Means we not only prevent a great Miſtake, in regard of the Time, but alſo eſcape a great Affront againſt the Rules of Decency. For that *Pericles* ſhould be yet alive when *Socrates* ſpeaks thus to *Alcibiades*, is a hard and ridiculous Suppoſition: But ſuppoſing *Pericles* to be dead, it has not the ſame Harſhneſs in it. *Athenæus* would not have forgot to improve this Paſſage to ſtrengthen his Chicanery againſt *Plato*'s *Gorgias*, if he had not very well underſtood it would bear another Interpretation beſides that given it by his Tranſlators.

Socrat. What then? Do you think *Oreſtes* would have laid his parricidial Hands on his Mother, if he had miſtaken her for another?

Alcib. No, doubtleſs.

Socrat. For he did not deſign to kill the firſt Woman he met, nor the Mother of this or that Perſon; but had a Mind to kill his own Mother.

Alcib. You ſay right.

Socrat. Then this ſort of Ignorance is very good for thoſe that are in ſuch a Diſpoſition of Mind as his, and have ſuch kind of Fancies in their Head.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. By this, then, you plainly ſee, that on ſome Occaſions, and in ſome Perſons whoſe Minds are diſpos'd after a certain Manner, Ignorance is a Good, and not an Evil, as you juſt now ſuppos'd.

Alcib. I perceive it very well.

Socrat. If you will take the Pains to examine what I am now going to ſay, how ſtrange ſoever it may at firſt ſeem to you, it may be you'll be of the ſame Mind with me.

Alcib. Well, *Socrates*, what is it?

Socrat. 'Tis true, that poſſibly all the * Sciences without the Knowledge of that which is very good, are ſeldom of Uſe to thoſe that poſſeſs 'em; nay, moſt commonly are pernicious to 'em. Follow me a little in your Thoughts, I intreat you. When we are about to ſay or do any Thing, is it not altogether neceſſary either that we really know what we are going to do or ſay, or at leaſt that we think we know it?

Alcib. Without Doubt.

Socrat. According to this Principle, the Orators who every Day adviſe the People, give them Advice about what they know, or at leaſt think they know. Some give 'em Counſel about Peace and War, others about the Walls that ought to be built, about the Fortifications

* All the Sciences are uſeleſs without the Knowledge of that which is very good.

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Gates, and Arſenals. In a word, all that the City does for it ſelf, or againſt another City, is not done but by the Advice of Orators.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. Obſerve well what follows, and ſee if I can finiſh my Proof. Don't you divide the People into wiſe Men and Fools?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Don't you call the greateſt Number Fools, and the leaſt wiſe Men?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Is it not with reference to ſomething that you call 'em ſo?

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. Do you then call him a wiſe Man, who can give this Counſel without knowing what is beſt, or in what Time it is beſt?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Nor do you call him wiſe, who can make War, but knows not when or how, nor how long 'tis beſt ſo to do?

Alcib. No, not I.

Socrat. Neither do you call thoſe Magiſtrates wiſe, who know how to put to Death, to fine, and to baniſh; and yet know not when, or on what Occaſion, theſe Puniſhments are beſt and moſt juſt.

Alcib. No, indeed.

Socrat. Well, then, when any one knows well how to do all theſe Things, and theſe Sciences are accompanied with the Knowledge of that which is very good, and this is the ſame with the Knowledge of that which is very uſeful, as you have granted) we call this Man wiſe, and ſay he is very capable to adviſe and conduct himſelf, and govern the Commonwealth. And we ſay directly the contrary of him who does not add the Knowledge of that which is good to theſe Sciences.

Alcib. This muſt be granted.

Socrat. When * a Man knows how to mount a Horſe, to draw a Bow, to wreſtle, in a word, to perform any of the like Exerciſes, or is well inſtructed in any other Art; how do you call him, when he knows perfectly well what is moſt conformable to the Art he profeſſes? Don't you call him a Querry that employs himſelf in managing of Horſes, him a Wreſtler that makes it his Buſineſs to wreſtle, and him a Muſician who underſtands Muſick, and ſo of the reſt? Don't you give them all ſuch Names as are deriv'd from their Art, and are ſuitable to it? Or do you give them other Appellations?

Alcib. We give them only ſuch Names as are taken from their Art.

Socrat. Do you think 'tis of abſolute Neceſſity that he who well underſtands the Art of which he makes Profeſſion, ſhould alſo be a wiſe Man; or ſhall we ſay he may be far from that Character?

Alcib. He may be very far from it, *Socrates.*

Socrat. † What will you ſay of a *Republick* compos'd of Wreſtlers, Pipers, Archers, and other ſuch kind of People, mingled with ſuch Perſons as we have been ſpeaking of, ſome of whom know how to make War, others to condemn to Death; and with thoſe Stateſmen, who are bloated with Pride on the Account of their pretended Capacity in Politicks? Suppoſing all theſe People to have Knowledge of what is very good, and that there is but one ſingle Man among them all who knows either on what Occaſion, or with whom each of theſe different Arts ought to be uſed?

Alcib. I ſhould ſay, *Socrates*, that would be a very ill-compos'd Commonwealth.

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* He is going to prove that to be skilful in the Art a Man profeſſes, is not ſufficient to merit the Name of a wiſe Man.

† This is a ſubtile Satire againſt the Republick of the *Athenians*, in which all Arts and Sciences were ſeen to flouriſh, but the Knowledge of what is very good was not to be found there; and therefore nothing but Confuſion and Diſorder was to be ſeen among them.

Socrat. Much more would you ſay ſo, when you ſaw every one full of Ambition, and ſtriving to engroſs the greateſt Part of Affairs to himſelf; that he might ſtill exceed himſelf, and become every Day more powerful in that Part of the Government which is the moſt noble: And if you ſhould at the ſame Time ſee every one making horrible Miſtakes againſt the Knowledge of what is very good, both on his own Account and that of the Commonwealth; becauſe he conducts himſelf by Opinion without Underſtanding. This being the State of the Caſe, ſhould we not have great Reaſon to ſay that ſuch a *Republick* can't chuſe but be full of Diſorder and Injuſtice?

Alcib. This is manifeſtly true.

Socrat. Have we not agreed that it is abſolutely neceſſary for us either to believe we know, or elſe really to know what we are about to do or ſay without any farther Deliberation?

Alcib. That has been agreed between us.

Socrat. * Have we not likewiſe acknowledged, that when any Man does that which he knows, or thinks he knows; provided he poſſeſſes the Knowledge of that which is very good, great Advantage hence accrues both to himſelf and to the State?

Alcib. Who can doubt that?

Socrat. And that when 'tis otherwiſe, the contrary enſues?

Alcib. That's evident.

Socrat. Do you ſtill perſiſt in the ſame Sentiments?

Alcib. I do.

Socrat. Have you not ſaid, that the greateſt Number is that of Fools, and that of wiſe Men the leaſt?

Alcib. Yes, and I ſay the ſame ſtill.

Socrat. Did we not upon this ſay, that the greateſt Number keep at a Diſtance from that which is good,

* The Knowledge of that which is very good conducts and directs us not only in the Things we know, but alſo in thoſe we know not.

becauſe they uſually abandon themſelves to Opinion without Underſtanding.

Alcib. Yes, ſo we ſaid.

Socrat. Then 'tis uſeful for this great Number to know nothing, and to believe they know nothing, becauſe what they know, or believe they know, they will be willing to put in Execution; and in ſo doing, inſtead of gaining any Advantage, they will receive great Prejudice.

Alcib. You ſay true.

Socrat. By this then you ſee very well, that I had Reaſon when I told you juſt now, that poſſibly all Sciences, without the Knowledge of what is very good, were ſeldom uſeful to thoſe that poſſeſs'd them, but were moſt commonly very pernicious to them. Were you not then ſenſible of this Truth?

Alcib. I was not then ſenſible of it, *Socrates*, but now I am.

Socrat. Then a City which would be well govern'd, and a Soul that would live well, applies it ſelf only to this Science; as a ſick Man commits himſelf to his Phyſician; and as a Sailor, that would arrive ſafe at his Port, obeys his Pilot. * Without this the greater For-

* This is one of the moſt difficult Places in *Plato*; *Marſilius Ficinus*, and *De Serres* have tranſlated it very ill, and have rather obſcur'd than interpreted it. However *Ficinus* ſuſpected that it was corrupted, tho' he could not correct it. I am of Opinion, that we ſhould read μέν for μὴ, and γε for γδ. But that is not all, the principal Fault in the Text conſiſts in the Word ψυχῆς, which makes a very ill Senſe; we muſt therefore neceſſarily read τύχης, and take away the Point. *Plato*'s Senſe is, that without the Knowledge of what is very good, the greater Fortune a Soul or a City enjoys, the greater Crimes will they commit to ſatiate their Paſſions. The Corruption came from the Word ψυχήν, which is 3 or 4 Lines higher. But *Plato* ſpeaks no more of the Soul than he does of the City, and conſequently could not repeat ψυχῆς. He certainly wrote τύχης, and this Mode of Speech ἐπιῤῥίπτει τὸ τῆς τύχης is very elegant, *quo magis fortuna affluverit*, properly, *the more Fortune blows on their Poop*. The Beauty of this Principle, and the Truth which it contains, prove the Neceſſity of reſtoring the Senſe after this Manner; The greater Fortune wicked Men have, the greater Sins do they commit.

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tune, Men or States enjoy, the greater Crimes will they commit, either to acquire Riches, or to augment their Power, or ſatiate their Paſſions. He that poſſeſſes all the Arts and Sciences, and is deſtitute of this, will be driven about, and toſs'd by each of them, and be really batter'd with a furious Tempeſt; and having neither Helm nor Pilot, 'tis impoſſible he ſhould go very far, and his Ruin muſt needs be near. Methinks what the Poet ſpeaks of one whom he would diſpraiſe, may be applied to him: * *He knew* (ſays he) *many Things, but knew them all amiſs.*

The more proſperous Men are, the greater Crimes they commit, if they have not the Knowledge of what is very good.

Alcib. How can one make ſuch an Application as this, *Socrates?* For my Part I don't think there is any Juſtneſs in it.

Socrat. On the contrary, I ſay there is a great deal of Juſtneſs in it. For, my dear *Alcibiades*, 'tis a ſort of Enigma. *Homer* and the other Poets are full of them. For all Poeſy is naturally enigmatick, and 'tis not given to every Man to penetrate thoſe Obſcurities: And if beſides its being Enigmatick, it be handled by envious Poets, who inſtead of diſcovering their Wiſdom to us, only ſeek to hide it from us; 'tis then almoſt impoſſible to ſound their Thoughts. But you'll never accuſe *Homer*, that moſt wiſe and divine Poet, of being ignorant that 'tis impoſſible to know amiſs what one knows; 'tis he that ſays of *Margites*, that † *he knew ma-*

All Poeſy is Enigmatick.

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* Or thus,

To a great Sum his Knowledge did amount,
But all he knew turn'd to an ill Account.

† *Homer* made a Poem againſt one *Margites*, who knew much, and yet ſpent his Life in Idleneſs and Debauchery; a certain Sign that he did not poſſeſs the Knowledge of what is very good. This Poem, which was made up of a Mixture of Heroick and Iambick Verſes, is loſt: In which *Homer* turn'd the pungent Raillories of thoſe ſatirical Pieces which were in Vogue before him, into pleaſant Stories and Jeſts; and by this Means was the firſt that gave us any Strokes of Comedy. See the fifth Chapter of *Ariſtotle* of the Art of Poetry.

ny Things, but knew them all amiſs: And he ſpeaks enigmatically, for he puts [*he knew*] for *his Learning*, and [*amiſs*] for *unhappy*; which Terms could not well enter into the Compoſition of his Verſe: But what he certainly meant by it, is, that *Margites* had a great deal of Learning and Knowledge, and that this was an unhappy or unfortunate Knowledge to him. If this Knowledge was unfortunate to him, he muſt needs have been a poor Man, if we will adhere to what has been ſaid.

All the Sciences are unhappy without the Knowledge of what is good.

Alcib. So I think, *Socrates*, I ſhould ſcarce yield to the moſt evident Truths, if I ſhould not grant that.

Socrat. You have Reaſon. But, *Alcibiades*, I intreat you, let us aſſure our ſelves of the Truth. You ſee how many Doubts and Uncertainties preſent themſelves. You have your Share of them, for you go ſometimes to the right, and ſometimes to the left. That which ſeems true to you this Minute, you receive as ſuch; and the very next Moment 'tis quite another Thing in your Opinion. Let us endeavour to know where to fix. And as I have already ſaid, if the God to whom you are going to pray, ſhould ſuddenly appear to you, and ſhould ask you before you have begun your Prayers, if you would be ſatisfied that he ſhould grant you ſome one of thoſe Things we firſt ſpoke of; or rather ſuppoſing he ſhould permit you to make your Requeſt, which would you think moſt ſafe and advantagious to you, whether to receive what he ſhould give you, or to obtain what you ſhould ask of him?

Alcib. I ſolemnly proteſt, *Socrates*, I know not how to anſwer you: For nothing ſeems to me to be more fooliſh, and more to be avoided with the greateſt Care, than to run the Riſque of asking real Evils of God, while one thinks one is asking true Goods of him, and thereby to expoſe one's ſelf, as you have very well ſaid, to retract the next Moment, and make new Requeſts quite contrary to the former.

Socrat. Is it not for this Reaſon that *that* ancient Poet I was ſpeaking of in the Beginning of our Diſcourſe, and

and who underſtood theſe Things better than we, would have us end our Prayers with theſe Words; *And keep evil Things from us, even when we ask them of thee?*

Alcib. So I ſuppoſe.

Socrat. In like Manner the *Lacedemonians*, whether they imitate this Poet, or have of themſelves found out this Truth, make both in publick and private a Prayer much like it. For they deſire the Gods *to give them that which is comely with that which is good.* They were never heard to make any other Prayer; and yet they are as happy as any People in the World: And if they have ſometimes ſeen an Interruption in the Courſe of their Succeſſes, however none can juſtly blame their Prayer. For the Gods are free, and it depends on their Will, whether they will grant what is deſir'd of them, or give what is contrary to it. And on this Occaſion I'll tell you another Story, which I have often heard related by ſome ancient People. The *Athenians* being engag'd formerly in a War with the *Lacedemonians*, it happen'd that they were always beat in every Battle that was fought: Being deeply concern'd at this Misfortune, and ſeeking Means to divert theſe Miſeries that impended, at laſt after divers Conſultations they thought it the beſt Expedient to ſend to the Oracle of *Ammon*, to enquire of him the Reaſon of their Misfortunes, and to pray him to tell them why the Gods granted Victory rather to the *Lacedemonians* than to the *Athenians*, who every Day offer'd them a great Number of choicer Sacrifices, who enriched their Temples with nobler Offerings, who annually made more magnificent and more devout Proceſſions in their Honour; and, in a word, who themſelves alone were at greater Expence in their Worſhip than all the reſt of the *Greeks* together. Whereas (ſaid they) the *Lacedemonians* have no Regard to theſe Ceremonies, they are ſo covetous in reference to the Gods, that they offer them mutilated Victims, and are at much leſs Charge in every Thing that concerns Religion than the *Athenians*,

The Prayer of the *Lacedemonians*

God is free, and can either hear or reject our Prayers without being unjuſt.

ans, tho' they infinitely exceed 'em in Riches. After they had thus preſented their Reaſons, they ask'd how thoſe Miſeries that preſs'd their City might be diverted. The Prophet gave 'em no immediate Anſwer, for doubtleſs the God would not permit him to give any. But after ſome Time, recalling the Ambaſſador, he told him, *This is the Anſwer* Ammon *gives the* Athenians; *he loves the Benedictions of the* Lacedemonians *much more than all the Sacrifices of the* Greeks. This was all he ſaid.

Prayers called Benedictions

By the *Benedictions* of the *Lacedemonians*, I ſuppoſe, he only meant their Prayers, which indeed are more perfect than thoſe of any other People. For as for the reſt of the *Greeks*, ſome of them indeed offer'd Bulls with gilded Horns, and others conſecrated rich Oblations to the Gods; but at the ſame Time requeſted in their Prayers whatever their Paſſions ſuggeſted, without informing themſelves, whether what they ask'd was Good or Evil. But the Gods, who hear their Blaſphemies, are not pleas'd with thoſe magnificent Proceſſions, nor do they accept their coſtly Sacrifices. Therefore nothing requires ſo much Precaution and Attention as Prayer; to know what we ought to ſay, and what not. You'll find many other Things in *Homer*, which amount to the ſame Thing with the Story I have been telling you. For he ſays, the *Trojans*, when they built a Fort, *offer'd whole Hecatombs to the Immortal Gods, that the Winds carried a pleaſant Odour from Earth to Heaven; and yet that the Gods refus'd to accept all this, but rejected it, becauſe they had an Averſion to the ſacred City of* Troy, *for* Priamus, *and all his People*. So that it was to no Purpoſe for them to offer Sacrifices, and make Preſents to the Gods that hated them; for the Deity is not to be corrupted by Bribes, like a covetous Usurer.

God is not to be corrupted by Bribes.

And we ſhould be Fools, if we ſhould pretend by this Means to render our ſelves more agreeable to the Gods than the *Lacedemonians*. For it would be a very horrible and moſt unworthy Thing, for the Gods to have

more

more Regard to our Gifts and Sacrifices, than to our Souls, in diſtinguiſhing thoſe that are truly Holy and Righteous. But they have Regard only to our Souls, and not at all to our Proceſſions, or Sacrifices, upon which the moſt profligate Perſons, and thoſe Cities whoſe Sins both againſt God and Man ariſe to the greateſt Height, commonly value themſelves more than good Men. Nor do the Gods ever ſuffer themſelves to be biaſs'd by Preſents, but deſpiſe all thoſe Things, as *the God* himſelf, and his Prophet, have aſſur'd us.

God only regards the Souls of them that offer Sacrifices to him.

So that it ſeems plain, that nothing is ſo precious as Wiſdom and Juſtice, both in the Sight of Gods and Men. And none are truly Juſt, and truly Wiſe, but thoſe who both in their Words and Actions know how to acquit themſelves of their Duty both to the Gods and to Men. Therefore I would now willingly know what your Sentiments are about what I have been ſaying.

In what true Juſtice and true Wiſdom conſiſt.

Alcib. For my Part, *Socrates*, I can't chuſe but conform my Sentiments in this Matter to yours, and thoſe of that God of whom we have been ſpeaking. Would it be reaſonable for me to go about to oppoſe my weak Underſtanding to that of a God, and to contradict his Oracles?

Socrat. Don't you remember you told me you were in great Perplexity, for Fear you ſhould at unawares pray for Evil Things while you deſign'd only to ask for Good?

Alcib. I remember it very well, *Socrates*.

Socrat. You ſee 'tis not at all ſafe for you to go and pray in the Temple, in the Condition you are in, leſt the God hearing your Blaſphemies ſhould reject your Sacrifices, and to puniſh you, ſhould give you what you would not have: I am therefore of the Mind that 'tis much better for you to be ſilent, for I know you very well. Your Pride, for that's the ſofteſt Name I can give your Imprudence; your Pride, I ſay, probably will not per-

permit you to uſe the Prayer of the *Lacedemonians*. Therefore 'tis altogether neceſſary you ſhould wait for ſome Perſon to teach you how you ought to behave your ſelf both towards the Gods and Men.

Alcib. And when will that Time come, *Socrates?* And who is he that will inſtruct me? With what Pleaſure ſhould I look upon him!

That is God.

'Tis God alone can diſſipate the Darkneſs of the Mind.

Socrat. He will do it, who takes a true Care of you. But methinks, as we read in *Homer*, that *Minerva* diſſipated the Miſt that cover'd *Diomedes*'s Eyes, and hinder'd him from diſtinguiſhing God from Man, ſo 'tis neceſſary he ſhould in the firſt Place ſcatter the Darkneſs that covers your Soul, and afterwards give you thoſe Remedies that are neceſſary to put you in a Condition of diſcerning Good and Evil; for at preſent you know not how to make a Difference between them.

Alcib. Let him ſcatter, then, let him deſtroy this Darkneſs of mine, and whatever elſe he pleaſes; I abandon my ſelf to his Conduct, and am very ready to obey all his Commands, provided I may but be made better by them.

God has a ſingular Love for Men.

Socrat. Do not doubt of that. For this Governor I tell you of, has a ſingular Affection for you.

Alcib. I think I muſt defer my Sacrifice to that Time.

Socrat. You have Reaſon, 'tis more ſafe ſo to do than to run ſo great a Riſque.

Alcib. Well, then, I'll defer it, *Socrates*; and to expreſs my Thankfulneſs for the good Counſel you have given me, give me Leave to place on your Head this Crown which I wear on mine. We'll preſent other Crowns to the Gods, and all the Service we owe them, when I ſee that happy Day; it will not be long before it come, if they pleaſe.

Socrat. I receive this Favour with very great Pleaſure; and ſhall always kindly accept whatever comes from you. And as *Creon* (in *Euripides*) ſeeing *Tireſias* approach

approach him with a Crown of Gold, which was the first Fruits of the Spoils of the Enemy, and with which the *Athenians* had honour'd him for his Art, said, *I take this Crown which is the sign of Victory, for a good Omen; for you see, we are also in a great Storm of War:* So I must say, I take the Honour I receive at your Hand for a happy Presage; for I am in no less a Tempest than *Creon*, while I am endeavouring to gain the Victory over all your Lovers.

'Tis in *Euripides* his *Phanicians*.

THEAGES,

OR,

Of WISDOM.

The ARGUMENT.

THE *Ancients cited this Dialogue under the Title of* Wiſdom, *or that of* Philoſophy, *as may be ſeen in* Diogenes Laertius: *But how old ſoever theſe Titles are, they were given by Philoſophers that were unacquainted with the Deſign of* Socrates, *who here propoſes only to treat of the Education of Children, which is the Baſis and Foundation of Philoſophy. As Plants do not thrive well, unleſs in Ground that is well prepar'd, and which has been variouſly manured, and alſo receives the benign Influences of the Heavens; ſo Virtues will not grow, unleſs in a Soul well cultivated, and under the Influences of the*

the Divine Favour: On this good Education, not only the Happineſs of Families depends, but alſo that of Cities, Republicks, and all States; this is what Socrates *endeavours to maintain in this Dialogue. The young People of the beſt Families of* Athens, *dazzled with the Glory of* Cimon, Themiſtocles, *and* Pericles; *and full of vain Ambition, thought of nothing but of adhering to the Sophiſts, who promiſed to make them very great Politicians, and to put them into a Capacity of governing the* Athenians *and their Allies. Their Parents were tinctur'd with the ſame Folly: The wiſeſt of them were thoſe that fear'd the Conſequences of this Ambition, and only diſcover'd the Dangers to which their Children were expos'd by the Corruption of thoſe that inſtructed Youth.* Socrates *here diſcourſes with a Father and a Son of this Character. The Son aims only to make himſelf a good Prince; and the Father does not blame this Ambition of his Son, provided he avoided the Corruption that reigned at that Time. All the Buſineſs is to find a good Maſter.* Socrates *makes an admirable Improvement of this Diſpoſition of theirs, to ſhew, that one Man can never teach another true Wiſdom, which alone makes Men govern well; but that the ſpecial Favour of God is requiſite to this Purpoſe, without which all the Endeavours of Maſters and Scholars too prove uſeleſs: And this he confirms by Examples. This is the true Subject of this Dialogue, in which we find divers ſurprizing Truths which ſhall be explain'd in their place. This Converſation paſs'd that Year in which the* Athenians *were beat at* Epheſus *by* Tiſaphernus; *which was the 4th Year of the 92d Olympiad,* 407 *Years before the Birth of* Chriſt. Plato *being* 20 *Years of Age, was then the Diſciple of* Socrates.

The Character of this Dialogue is the ſame with that of the two former.

Demo-

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages.

Demod. *Ocrates*, I have a great Mind to diſcourſe with you a little in private, if you are at Leiſure; and if you are not, I intreat you to take a little Time for my Sake, unleſs your Buſineſs is very urgent.

Soc. I have always Leiſure, and more to ſerve you than any other Perſon. If you have a Mind to diſcourſe with me, I am ready for you.

Dem. Shall we retire into the Porch of the Temple of *Jupiter Eleutherius*?

Soc. What you pleaſe.

We need the Help of a God, who is a Saviour, when we take Advice about the Education of youth.

Dem. * Let us go, then, *Socrates*; methinks Animals, and even Man himſelf, are like Plants: For we who manure the Earth, know by Experience that 'tis eaſy to prepare all Things neceſſary, before we plant; but when that which we have planted is come up, the Care and Pains we muſt take about it is very great and troubleſome. 'Tis the ſame with Men: And I judge of others by my ſelf. There's my Son: Ever ſince he has been born, his Education will not ſuffer me to reſt one Moment, but keeps me in continual Fear. Without entering into any particular Account of all the Occaſions of Fear I have concerning him, I'll tell you one which has but very lately appear'd; and that is, an Ambition he has, which indeed is not diſhonourable, but is a very nice and

* In the Original *Demodocus* ſpeaks like a good honeſt Countryman, who is wholly taken up with Husbandry: But I don't think it neceſſary to make my Tranſlation ſpeak after that Manner.

dangerous

dangerous Thing, and makes me afraid. He would fain fall upon the Study of * Wiſdom. Probably ſome of his Companions, and ſome young People of our Town who frequent *Athens*, give him an Account of ſome Diſcourſes they have heard, which have diſturb'd his Brain. For he's ſo full of Emulation, that he continually torments me with importunate Intreaties, that I would give a Piece of Money to ſome Sophiſt, to accompliſh him. 'Tis not the Charge that I fear; but I ſee this Paſſion of his will expoſe him to great Danger. Hitherto I have reſtrain'd him, by amuſing him with good Words; but now that I ſuppoſe I can be Maſter of him no longer, I think the beſt Courſe I can take, is to conſent to let him take his own Courſe, for fear the Converſation he may have in ſecret, and without my Knowledge, ſhould corrupt him. Therefore I am now come to *Athens*, to put him under the Tuition of ſome Sophiſt: And 'tis very happy that I have met you; for you are the Perſon whom above all others I ſhould wiſh to conſult upon this Affair. If therefore you have any Advice to give me, I earneſtly intreat it of you, and you are too juſt to refuſe me.

Soc. But have you not often heard, *Demodocus*, that Advice is a ſacred Thing? And if it is ſacred in all other Occaſions of Life, 'tis much more ſo in this: For of all Things on which a Man can ask Advice, there is nothing more divine than that which reſpects the Education of Children. Firſt, then, let you and I agree what it is preciſely that you deſire, and about what we are to conſult, leſt I underſtand one Thing, and you another, (as it may often happen) and ſo at the End of our Diſcourſe we both appear ridiculous

Advice is ſacred, and conſequently ought not to be lightly given; but well thought on.

Nothing is more divine than what belongs to the Education o Children.

* Wiſdom is a Word that ſignifies divers Things, as Knowledge, Skill, Virtue. *Plato* uſes it for that Science which teaches how to govern States.

to

to our ſelves, for having talk'd ſo long without under ſtanding one another.

Dem. You ſay right, *Socrates.*

Soc. I ſay right, ay certainly —— —— And yet I don't ſay ſo right as I thought, but retract in part; for it comes into my Mind, that this young Man may have a Deſire very different from that which we think he has; which would render us ſtill more ridiculous for conſulting about quite another Thing than the Object of his Wiſhes. 'Tis beſt therefore to begin with him, and ask him, what it is that he deſires?

Dem. Yes, certainly, that's the beſt Way.

Soc. But, I pray, what is this fine young Man's Name?

Dem. His Name is *Theages.*

Soc. * What an excellent and ſacred Name have you given him! Well, then, *Theages*, you deſire to become wiſe, and you urge your Father to find you a Man whoſe Converſation may furniſh you with that Wiſdom with which you are ſo much in Love?

The. Yes.

Soc. Who are thoſe Perſons you call wiſe? Are they ſuch as are skilful in what they have learnt, or the ignorant?

The. Such as are skilful.

Soc. What! has not your Father caus'd you to be inſtructed in every Thing that the Children of our beſt Citizens learn, as to read, to play on muſical Inſtruments, to wreſtle, and to perform all other Exerciſes?

The. Yes, my Father has caus'd me to be taught all this.

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* The *Athenians* were very careful to give fine ſacred Names to their Children: But all Names are falſe, when they don't deſcribe the Character of thoſe to whom they are given.

Soc. Well, then; and do you think there is any other Science in which your Father is obliged to cauſe you to be inſtructed?

The. Yes, without Doubt.

Soc. What Science is that? Tell me, that I may render you ſome Service in the Matter.

The. My Father very well knows it, for I have very often told him of it; but he is pleas'd to ſpeak after ſuch a Manner to you, as if he did not know what I deſir'd. There's no Day paſſes but he diſputes with me, and ſtill refuſes to commit me to the Care of ſome skilful Man.

Soc. But all that you have hitherto ſaid to him, has paſs'd only between you two. Now therefore, take me for an Arbitrator; and before me declare what Science it is you have a Mind to attain. For if you were willing to learn that Science which teaches how to ſteer Ships, and I ſhould ask you, *Theages*, what Science is it in which you complain your Father is not willing to have you inſtructed; would you not immediately anſwer me, that 'tis the Science of Pilots?

The. Yes, doubtleſs.

Soc. And if you were willing to learn the Art which teaches how to drive Chariots, would you not in like Manner tell me, 'tis that of Charioteers?

The. I ſhould tell you the very ſame Thing.

Soc. Has that, of which you are ſo deſirous, a Name, or has it none?

The. I believe it has a Name.

Soc. Do you know it, then, without knowing the Name of it?

The. I know it, and I know the Name of it too.

Soc. Tell me what it is, then.

The. What other Name can it have than that of * *Science?*

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* This Name is too general, and does not ſufficiently explain the Thing enquir'd after, as *Socrates* is going to ſhew.

Soc.

Soc. But is not the Art of *Charioteers* alſo a Science? What do you think 'tis a Piece of Ignorance?

The. No, certainly.

Soc. Then 'tis a Science: What is the Uſe of it? Does it not teach us to guide the Horſes that are faſten'd to a Chariot?

The. Moſt certainly.

Soc. And is not the Art of Pilots alſo a Science?

The. So I think.

Soc. Is it not that which teaches us how to guide Ships?

The. The very ſame.

Soc. Well, what is that which you have a Mind to learn? And what does that teach us to govern?

The. I think it teaches us to govern Men.

Soc. What, ſick Men?

The. No.

Soc. For that belongs to the Medicinal Art, does it not?

The. Who doubts it?

Soc. Well, then, does it teach us to regulate the Choir of Muſicians?

The. Not at all.

Soc. For that properly appertains to Muſick.

The. True.

Soc. But does it teach us to govern thoſe who perform the Exerciſes?

The. No more than the others.

Soc. For that belongs to the Gymnaſtick Art. What ſort of Men then does it teach us to govern? Explain your ſelf clearly, as I have done on the other Sciences.

The. It teaches us to govern thoſe who are in the City.

Soc. But are there not ſick Men too in the City?

The. Without Doubt there are; but I don't mean them: I ſpeak of the other Citizens.

Soc. Let's ſee if I underſtand well of what Art you ſpeak. I think you don't ſpeak of that which teaches to govern Mowers, Vine-dreſſers, Plow-men, Sowers and Threſhers; for that belongs to Husbandry. No

do you ſpeak of that which teaches to govern thoſe that handle the Saw, the Plane, and the Lathe; for that belongs to the Joiner's Art. But you ſpeak of the Art that teaches to govern, not only theſe, but all other Artificers, and all private Perſons, both Men and Women: Perhaps this is the Science you mean.

The. 'Tis the very ſame: I had no Deſign to ſpeak of any other.

Soc. But I pray anſwer me, did *Ægiſthus* who kill'd *Agamemnon* at *Argos*, govern thoſe ſorts of People, Artificers and private Perſons, both Men and Women, or others?

The. He govern'd only ſuch as theſe: Are there any others to be govern'd?

Soc. Did not *Peleus*, the Son of *Æacus*, likewiſe govern theſe at *Phthia?* And did not *Periander*, the Son of *Cypſelus*, rule them at *Corinth?* Did not *Archelaus*, the Son of *Perdiccas*, who ſome few * Years ſince aſcended the Throne of *Macedonia*, alſo command theſe ſorts of People? And did not † *Hippias* the Son of *Piſiſtratus*, who governs in this City, rule our Citizens in like Manner?

The. Who doubts it?

Soc. Tell me, what do you call ‖ *Boſis*, the Sybil, and our *Amphilytus*, *when you would denote their Profeſſion?*

The. What ſhould we call 'em but Diviners?

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* It was five or ſix Years before. He was kill'd at the End of this very Year.

† *Hippias*, the Son of *Piſiſtratus*, was Tyrant of *Athens* four Years; according to *Thucydides*, he ſucceeded his Father, and *Hipparchus* After he had reign'd four Years, he was ba- 20 Years after his Exile, was kill'd at the Battle where he bore Arms for the *Perſians*

‖ as a Prophet, who long before *Xerxes* made a Deſcent predicted to the People all that ſhould befal 'em. dares ſome of his Prophecies in his VIIIth Book, and 'em to be ſo formal and plain, ſince their Accom- that he ſays he neither dares accuſe theſe Oracles Manhood himſelf, nor ſuffer others ſo to do, or to refuſe to Credit to 'em. *Ariſtophanes* ſpeaks of this Diviner in his Comedy of Peace. As for *Amphylitus*, I know nothing of him.

Soc. Very well. Anſwer me after the ſame Manner about theſe: What do you call *Hippias*, and *Periander*, when you would denote their Profeſſion by the Dominion they exerciſe?

The. Tyrants, I think; What other Name can we give 'em?

Soc. Then every one who deſires to command all the People in this City, deſires to acquire a Dominion like theirs, a tyrannical Dominion, and to become a Tyrant.

The. I think ſo.

Soc. This then is the Science with which you are ſo much in Love.

The. That is a natural Conſequence of what I have ſaid.

Soc. You are a Villain! Do you deſire to become our Tyrant; and have the Boldneſs to complain that your Father does not put you under the Conduct of ſome Perſon that may qualify you for Tyranny? * And you, *Demodocus*, who know your Son's Ambition, and have wherewith to ſend him to be accompliſh'd in this fine Science which he deſires; are not you aſham'd to envy him this Happineſs, and not to provide him ſome great Maſter? But ſince he now complains of you, as you ſee, in my Preſence; let us conſider whither to ſend him, and if we know any one whoſe Converſation may make him an accompliſh'd Tyrant.

Dem. † *Socrates*, I beg of you for God's Sake, let us conſider it together. For on ſuch an Occaſion as this, we have Need of good Advice.

Soc. Hold a little, let us firſt know of him what he thinks of the Matter.

Dem. You may ask him what you pleaſe.

Soc. Theages, if we had to do with *Euripides*, who ſomewhere ſays,

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* This is an Irony of *Socrates*, founded on what *Demodocus* ſaid at the Beginning of this Diſcourſe, *viz.* that his Son had an Ambition that was not diſhonourable. *Marſilius Ficinus* and *Serres* were equally miſtaken here; and not perceiving the Irony, corrupted this Paſſage by their Tranſlation.

† *Demodocus* takes this in earneſt, which *Socrates* ſpoke ironically.

Wiſe are the Tyrants, who with the Wiſe converſe;
And ſhould ask him, *Euripides*, in what do you ſay Tyrants become wiſe by the Converſation of wiſe Men? If inſtead of that, he ſhould tell us,

Wiſe are the Plow-men, who with the Wiſe converſe;
We ſhould not fail to ask him, In what are the Plow-men render'd wiſe? Do you think he would give us any other Anſwer, than that they are render'd wiſe in that which belongs to Husbandry?

The. No, he would give no other Anſwer.

Soc. And if he ſhould tell us,

Wiſe are the Cooks, who with the Wiſe converſe;
And we ſhould ask him wherein they are made wiſe: What do you think he would anſwer? Would he not ſay, they are made wiſe in the Art of Cookery?

The. Without Doubt.

Soc. And if he ſhould ſay,

Wiſe are the Wreſtlers, who with the Wiſe converſe:
Would he not upon the Repetition of the ſame Queſtion give us the ſame Reply, that they are made expert in the Art of Wreſtling?

The. Yes, certainly.

Soc. This being ſo, ſince he tells us,

Wiſe are the Tyrants, who with the Wiſe converſe;
If we ſhould ask him, *Euripides*, in what are thoſe Tyrants render'd wiſe? What Anſwer do you think he would make us? In what would he make this Wiſdom conſiſt?

The. I proteſt I can't tell.

Soc. Shall I tell you then?

The. With all my Heart, if you pleaſe.

Soc. He would ſay they were made wiſe in that Art, which *Anacreon* tells us, * the wiſe *Callicrete* knew perfectly well. Don't you remember his Songs?

The. I do remember it.

Soc. Well, then, don't you deſire to be committed to

* This was a Virgin, who employ'd her ſelf in teaching Pocks, as *Aſpaſia*, *Diotima*, and ſome others did after her. The ſes which *Anacreon* made on her, are loſt.

the Care of ſome Man, who is of the ſame Profeſſion with this Virgin of *Cyane*, and knows, like her, the Art of forming Tyrants, that you may become our Tyrant, and that of the whole City?

The. *Socrates*, you have play'd and jeſted on me a great While.

Soc. How! Don't you ſay you deſire to acquire that Science which will teach you to govern all the Citizens? Can you govern them without becoming their Tyrant?

The. I could heartily wiſh to become the Tyrant of all Mankind, and if that be too much, at leaſt of the greateſt Part of 'em; and I believe, *Socrates*, you would have the ſame Ambition as well as other Men: Nay, perhaps it would ſo little content you to be a Tyrant, that you would be a God*; but I did not tell you that *that* was the Thing I deſir'd.

Soc. What is it you deſire? Don't you ſay you deſire to govern Citizens?

The. Not to govern them by Force as Tyrants do; but by their own Conſent, as thoſe great Men have done, whom we have had in this City.

Soc. What! as *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, *Cymon*, and other great Politicians have done?

The. Yes.

Soc. Well then, if you had a Mind to become very expert in the Art of Horſeman-ſhip, to what Men do you think you ought to apply your ſelf to become a good Horſe-man? Would you go to any other than Queries?

The. No, certainly.

Soc. Would you not make Choice of the beſt Queries; thoſe that have the greateſt Number of Horſes, and ſuch as ride not only their own Horſes, but thoſe of other Men?

The. Without Doubt, I ſhould chuſe ſuch.

Soc. And if you would become very expert at Shooting, would you not addreſs your ſelf to the beſt A-

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* This is founded on what *Socrates* was wont to ſay, that Men ſhould labour to make themſelves like God.

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chers; and to ſuch as beſt know how to uſe all ſorts of Bows and Arrows?

The. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Tell me, then, ſince you have a Mind to become expert in Politicks, do you think you can acquire this Skill in addreſſing your ſelf to any beſide Politicians, who have a Depth of Judgment in this Science, and know how to conduct, not only their own City, but many others, as well of the *Greeks*, as the *Barbarians?* Or, do you think by converſing with any other Sort of Perſons, to become as expert as theſe great Men?

The. Socrates, I have heard talk of ſome Diſcourſes of yours, which you made (as 'tis ſaid) to ſhew, that * the Sons of theſe great Politicians were no better than the Sons of Coblers; and as far as I can judge, 'tis an undeniable Truth. I ſhould therefore be a great Fool to believe that any one of 'em could give me his Wiſdom, which he did not communicate to his own Son, and which he ought to have beſtow'd on him much rather, if he were capable of doing it, than on a Stranger.

Soc. What would you do, then, *Theages*, if you had a Son that follow'd you ſo cloſely every Day, telling you, he had a Mind to be a great Painter? And complain'd continually, that you who were his Father, would not be at the leaſt Expence to ſatisfy his Deſire; while on the other Side he deſpis'd the moſt excellent Maſters, and refus'd to go to School to 'em to learn their Art? I ſay the ſame, if he had a Mind to play well on the Flute, or to be an excellent Harper: Should you know any other Way to gratify him, or any other People to ſend him to; when he ſhould refuſe ſuch Maſters?

The. For my Part, I know not what could be done.

Soc. This is exactly the ſame Courſe that you take with your Father: How then can you be ſurpriz'd and

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* All thoſe great Politicians could not teach their Children to be wiſe; a ſure Sign that Wiſdom can't be taught: There is nothing of it in Man, but what God puts into him, as *Socrates* proves more at large in his *Menon*.

complain, that he knows not what to do with you, nor where to ſend you to make you an accompliſh'd Man: *For it lies wholly at your own Door.* If you will, he will immediately put you under the Conduct of our beſt Maſters, and ſuch as are moſt expert in Politicks: You have nothing to do but to chuſe your Teacher; they'll ask nothing of you. So that you may ſave your Money, and acquire with them more Reputation among the People, * than you can obtain in the Converſation of any other.

The. Well, then, *Socrates*, are not you likewiſe one of thoſe great Men? If you'll ſuffer me to attend you, 'tis enough, I'll ſeek for no other Maſter.

Soc. What is that you ſay, *Theages?*

Dem. Ah, *Socrates*, my Son has ſaid very well, and you would do me a great Kindneſs! No, I have no greater Happineſs than to ſee my Son pleas'd with your Company; and that you are ſo good as to permit him to take this Liberty. I am aſham'd to ſay how much I deſire it: But I intreat you both, for God's Sake, you, *Socrates*, to receive my Son; and you, Son, never to ſeek any other Maſter than *Socrates*. By this Means you'll both deliver me from my greateſt Trouble and Fears. For I am continually ready to die with Fear leſt my Son ſhould fall into the Hands of ſome Perſon that will corrupt him.

Socrates was then perhaps the only Perſon at *Athens*, with whom a Man might truſt his Children without Danger.

The. Well, Sir, you may lay aſide your Fears on my Account; if you are but happy enough to perſuade *Socrates*, and engage him to be troubled with me.

Dem. Son, you have Reaſon. I'll now apply my ſelf to none but you, *Socrates*; and not to amuſe you with ſuperfluous Diſcourſe, I am ready to give my ſelf up to you, and all that I have in the World: You may entire

* For the common People are very ill Judges, and may be eaſily deceiv'd; they conſtantly take thoſe Men for the moſt wiſe and skilful, who are moſt bold and inſolent.

ly diſpoſe of me, if you will love my *Theages*, and procure him all that Good you are capable of doing him.

Soc. I don't wonder, *Demodocus*, that you are ſo very importunate, if you believe your Son may receive Advantage from me; for I know nothing about which a wiſe Father ought to be more earneſt and careful, than about what concerns his Son, and what may make him a good Man. But that which ſurprizes me, and which I can't comprehend, is, how you came to think me capable of rendering you this great Piece of Service, and of forming him into a good Citizen: And how come he to imagine me to be in a better Condition of aſſiſting him than his Father? For, in the firſt Place, you have liv'd longer in the World than I; you have exercis'd the principal Offices, and are the moſt conſiderable Perſons in your Town; and none is more honour'd or eſteem'd than you, in all the reſt of the City. Neither you nor your Son ſee any of theſe Advantages in me. But if *Theages* deſpiſes the Converſation of our Politicians, and is looking after thoſe Perſons, who promiſe to educate Youth well; we have here *Prodicus* of *Ceos*, *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, *Polus* of *Agrigentum*, and divers others, who are of ſo great Ability, that as they go their Rounds from City to City, they make a Shift to perſuade the young People of all the nobleſt and richeſt Families, who might be inſtructed *gratis* by one of their own Citizens, whom they would pleaſe to chuſe; they make a Shift, I ſay, to perſuade 'em to renounce thoſe of their own City, and to adhere to them, tho' they muſt pay 'em great Sums, and after all think themſelves under great Obligations to 'em. * Theſe are the Men that you and your Son ſhould chuſe, inſtead of thinking of me; for I know none of

What ought to be the greateſt Care of a wiſe Father.

For the City was compos'd of divers Towns or Burroughs.

* This is an Irony which *Socrates* uſes to ridicule that exceſſive Eagerneſs, with which the *Athenians* ran to theſe Sophiſts, who were good for nothing but to corrupt their Minds.

thoſe polite and happy Sciences: I would indeed underſtand 'em with all my Heart; but I have always profeſs'd to acknowledge, that I know nothing (as I may ſay) unleſs it be one little Science * which only reſpects Love. And I, for my Part, dare boaſt of being more profound in this Science, ſuch as it is, than any of my Predeceſſors, or thoſe of the preſent Age.

The. Sir, you ſee very well, *Socrates* will not trouble himſelf with me; if he would, I ſhould very readily put my ſelf under his Conduct: But he jeſts, when he thus ſpeaks of himſelf; for I know divers of my Equals, and others of a more advanc'd Age than mine, who, before they attended to him, had no great Matter of Merit; but ſince they have enjoy'd his Converſation, are in a little Time become the fineſt Men in the World; and far ſurpaſs thoſe, to whom they were much inferior before.

Soc. Theages, do you know how this comes to paſs?

The. Yes, truly, I know it very well; and if you were willing, I ſhould ſoon be like thoſe young Men, and ſhould have no Occaſion to envy 'em.

Soc. You are miſtaken, my dear *Theages*, and are very far from the Truth; which I am now going to inform you. † I have had, by the Favour of God, ever ſince I was born, a Genius that always accompanies and governs me. This Genius is a Voice, which, whenever it ſpeaks to me, always diverts me from what I have a Mind to do, and never prompts me to it. When any one of my Friends communicates any Deſign to me, if I hear this

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* *Socrates* means, that he was only fit to inſpire Men with the Love of Wiſdom. Without this Love all is dead. This is a Principle of Life, and, as he elſewhere ſays, the moſt ſpeedy, moſt certain, and moſt efficacious Help which God has given Men to bring 'em to ſupreme Happineſs.

† *I have had by the Favour of God*, the Greek ſays Θεᾶ μοίρᾳ *by a Divine Lot*, that is, to ſpeak properly, *by Predeſtination*; and conſequently by the Favour of God. μοῖρα is here the ſame Thing as κλῆρος in the Writings of St *Paul*; as that learned and pious Perſon, who has lately made a ſmall Extract of *Plato*, has obſerv'd before me.

Voice,

Voice, 'tis a certain Sign that God does not approve of this Deſign, but would divert him from it. I'll name ſeveral Perſons to you, who are Witneſſes of what I ſay. You know the gallant *Charmides*, *Glaucon*'s Son: He came to me one Day, to acquaint me with a Deſign he had to go and contend at the * *Nemean* Games. He had no ſooner begun to communicate this Matter to me, but I heard the Voice; therefore I endeavour'd to diſſuade him from it, and ſaid thus to him: As ſoon as you began to open your Mouth, I heard the Voice of the Genius that guides me, therefore I intreat you not to go. He reply'd, Perhaps this Voice advertiſes you that I ſhall not be crown'd: But if I don't obtain the Victory, I ſhall, however, exerciſe my ſelf; I ſhall engage with the reſt, and that is enough. With theſe Words he left me, and went to the aboveſaid Exerciſes. You may know from his own Mouth what befel him, and it well deſerves your Notice. And if you would ask *Clitomacus*, the Brother of † *Timarchus*, what this latter told him when he was going to die, for having deſpis'd the Admonition of my good Genius; and again, what was ſaid to him by *Evatolus*, who was ſo famous for running Races, and who entertain'd *Timarchus*, when he fled; he would tell you, that *Timarchus* ſaid to him in expreſs Terms———

The. What did he ſay to him, *Socrates?*

Soc. *I am going to die, becauſe I would not believe* Socrates. And if you are curious to know the Story, I'll tell it you. When *Timarchus* roſe from Table with *Philemon*, the Son of *Philemonides*, to go and kill *Nicias*, the Son of *Heroſcamander*, for none but they two were in the Conſpiracy; as he roſe up, he ſaid to me, *What do you ſay to me,* Socrates? *You have nothing to do, but to ſtay all here, and drink together; I am oblig'd*

* One of the four famous Games of *Greece*, which were celebrated once in three Years near the City of *Nemea* in *Peloponneſus*, in Honour of *Archemorus*.

† I ſuppoſe this is *Timarchus* of *Cerenea*, who deſir'd to be inter'd near one of *Socrates*'s Sons, who died a little before. I could never find any Footſtep of this Hiſtory elſewhere.

to be gone, but will return in a Moment, if I can. Upon this I heard the Voice, and immediately calling him back, ſaid to him, I beg you would not go out, my good Genius has given his wonted Signal. Upon which he ſtay'd: But ſome Time after riſes up again, and ſays, *Socrates, I am going.* The Voice was repeated, and I ſtopp'd him again. In fine, becauſe he would eſcape me, he roſe up the third Time, without ſaying any Thing to me; and taking his Opportunity, when my Thoughts were otherwiſe employ'd, he ſlipp'd out, and did that which brought him to his End: This was the Reaſon he told his Brother, he was going to die becauſe he would not believe me.

Under the Government of *Alcibiades* and *Nicias.*

You may alſo learn from many of our Citizens, what I told 'em about the Expedition of *Sicily*, and the Shocks that our Army would receive there. But not to mention Things that are paſt, of which you may be eaſily inform'd by thoſe that know 'em perfectly well; you may now make Trial of this Signal, which my good *Genius* commonly gives me, that you may ſee whether he ſpeaks true. For when the brave *Sannion* went for the Army, I heard this Voice; And he is now going with * *Thraſyllus* againſt *Epheſus*, and the other Cities of *Ionia:* I am perſuaded he'll die there, or ſome Misfortune will befal him; and † I very much fear that Enterprize will not ſucceed. I have told you all this, to make you comprehend, that even for thoſe who are willing to adhere to me, all depends on this good Genius that go-

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* *Thraſyllus* was choſen General with *Thraſybulus*, the 4th Year of the 93d Olympiad.

† Indeed the *Athenians* were beaten and repuls'd at *Ephesus*, *Xenoph.* Book I. Therefore *Plutarch* ſays in the Life of *Alcibiades*, that *Thraſyllus* his Army was terribly gall'd under the Walls of *Epheſus*; and that in Memory of this Defeat, the *Epheſians* erected a Trophy of Braſs, to the Shame of the *Athenians.*

verns

verns me. * For those whom he opposes can never derive any Advantage from me: I can't so much as have any Conversation with 'em. There are many, whom he does not hinder me from seeing; and yet these make no greater Proficiency than the former: But those, whose Conversation with me is approv'd and favour'd by this good Genius, are such as you told me of just now; who, in a very little Time, make a very great Progress; in some this Progress is stable and permanent, and takes deep Root; and in others 'tis but for a Time: That is, while they are with me, they advance after a surprizing Manner; but they no sooner leave me, but they return to their former Condition, and do not at all differ from the Generality of Men. This is what happen'd to *Aristides*, the Son of *Lysimachus*, and Grandson of *Aristides*: While he was with me, he made a very strange Progress in a very short Time; but being oblig'd to go in some Expedition, he embark'd: At his Return he found, that † *Thucydides*, the Son of *Melesias*, and Grandson of *Thucydides*, had been willing to be acquainted with me; but it happen'd the Day before, I know not how, that he fell out with me for some Words we had in Disputing. Now *Aristides*, coming to see me, after the first Compliments; *Socrates*, says he, *I am just now told, that* Thucydides *is angry with you, and acts with a great deal of Haughtiness, as if he were somewhat more than ordinary.* 'Tis

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* A remarkable Passage. Here are four States of Men. Some are rejected of God for their Wickedness, which can't be hid from him, others are tolerated for a Time: God gives 'em Time to see, and learn, but they are not attentive; and 'tis only their own Fault that they make no Progress. Others are approv'd, but these last succeed very differently: In some the good Seed falling into good Ground, takes deep Root, and in others it flourishes but for a Time; as the Gospel says of those who receive the Word in stony Places, or among Thorns. This is the Truth, *Socrates* designs to teach in this Place.

† The Grandson of *Thucydides*, who rival'd *Pericles* in the Government.

true, said I. * *Ha!* reply'd he, *what does he no longer remember what a Slave he was before he saw you? 'Tis very likely he has forgotten it*, said I. *Truly*, Socrates, added he, *a very ridiculous Thing has happen'd to me.* I presently ask'd him what it was. *'Tis this*, said he: *Before I went for the Army, I was capable of discoursing with Men of the greatest Sense; and was not inferior to any of 'em in Conversation. I made as handsome a Figure as another, and always kept Company with the* † *best and most polite Men I could find. Whereas now 'tis quite contrary: I carefully avoid 'em, I am so much ashamed of my Ignorance.* I ask'd him if this Faculty had left him suddenly, or gradually? He answer'd me, *that it left him gradually. Well, how did you come by it?* said I: *Was it while you were learning something of me, or some other Way? I'll tell you*, Socrates, reply'd he, *'tis a Thing that will seem incredible, but yet 'tis very true:* ‖ *I could never learn any Thing of you, as you know very well. However, I made some Proficiency, if I was but in the same House* ** *where you were, tho' not in the same Room; when I could be in the same*

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* Men are no better than vile Slaves, before they have attended to philosophical Discourses.

† *Socrates* calls those good and polite, who spent their Time in discoursing on solid and agreeable Subjects.

‖ He means, he learn'd nothing that had made a deep and lasting Impression on his Mind; he had Opinions only, and not Science, since he had been by himself; but was more knowing when he was with *Socrates*.

** There are four Degrees of Light, according as you more or less approach wise Men. 'Tis something to lodge in the same House, 'tis a little more to be in the same Room; 'tis yet a greater Advantage to have one's Eyes always upon 'em, that so one may lose none of their Words; but the greatest Benefit of all, is to be near 'em, and if I may so speak, to be always glew'd to 'em. Few Persons are so confirm'd in Wisdom, that they can lose Sight of 'em with Impunity, and without great Damage. These different Degrees are still more remarkable in Proportion to the Approach we make to the divine Wisdom. I believe this is all the Mystery *Socrates* designs to teach here. We see admirable Proofs of this Truth in the Writings of the Saints.

Room

Room, I advanc'd ſtill more; and whenever you ſpoke, I ſenſibly found my ſelf improve, yet more when I had my Eyes upon you, than when I look'd another Way: But this Progreſs was incomparably greater, when I ſat near you, and touch'd you, whereas now all this Habit is utterly vaniſh'd. Thus you ſee, *Theages*, what ſort of Converſation is to be had with me. * If it pleaſe God, you'll advance conſiderably, and in a very little Time; otherwiſe your Endeavours will be fruitleſs. Judge then, if it be not more advantagious, and ſafe for you, to apply your ſelf to one of theſe Maſters, who are conſtantly ſucceſsful with all their Scholars, than to follow me, with all the Hazards you muſt run.

A handſome Banter on the Sophiſts.

The. I'll tell you, *Socrates*, what we ought to do, in my Opinion. When we begin to live together, let us try this God that conducts us: If he approves our Converſation, I am at the Top of my Wiſhes: If he diſapproves it, let us immediately conſider what Courſe to take, and whether I ought to ſeek another Maſter, or ſhould endeavour to appeaſe this God † by Prayers, by Sacrifices, or any other Expiations, which our Diviners teach.

Dem. Don't oppoſe the young Man's Deſires any longer. *Theages* ſpeaks very well.

Soc. If you think 'tis beſt to do ſo; with all my Heart. I agree with you.

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* For all the Good we either do, or receive, comes from God.

† There are but three Ways Men can uſe to appeaſe the Anger of God, Prayers, Sacrifices, and Purifications.

EUTYPHRON,

OR,

Of HOLINESS.

The ARGUMENT.

IN *all Times, and in all Religions, there have been ſuperſtitious Perſons and Hypocrites. Both theſe have offer'd almoſt the ſame Injury to God, and equally hurt Religion.* Plato *introduces one of theſe Characters in this Dialogue; for 'tis not eaſy to determine whether* Eutyphron *acts ſuperſtitiouſly or hypocritically; the former is moſt probable.* Eutyphron *goes about to accuſe his own Father of Murder; this is a very unnatural Step: But on the other Hand, 'tis the Step of a Man who conſults not Fleſh and Blood; when the Queſtion is about doing an Action ſo agreeable to God as that of bringing a Criminal to Puniſhment. The Buſineſs in Hand therefore here, is to examine this Action, know if it be juſt. And* Plato *renews this Diſcourſe to ridicule the falſe Religions of the Pagans, and the plurality of*

of Gods, together with the reſt of their Fables: and to ſhew that they who then paſs'd for the moſt intelligent Perſons in Matters of Religion, had indeed no Knowledge of it, and render'd God only falſe Worſhip, which diſhonour'd him. This is as great a Deſign as he could have; and he executes it with marvellous Addreſs, to which purpoſe the Perſon againſt whom Socrates *had diſputed, ſerves extremely well. For* Eutyphron *was no ordinary Man; he was a Diviner, and conſequently cloth'd with the Character, and truſted with the Office of inſtructing others in Religion. Nothing can be more ingenious and natural, than the beginning of this Dialogue, where* Plato *with great Simplicity and Modeſty, and without the leaſt Appearance of Affectation, diſcovers at firſt View, not only the Character of* Eutyphron, *and that of all ſuperſtitious Perſons, who by their religious Miſtakes are commonly carried to the commiſſion of all ſorts of Injuries and Crimes, but alſo that of* Socrates, *that of his Perſecutors, and in general, that of the* Athenians. *This Dialogue is full of excellent Precepts of Morality and Religion. There's a great deal of Ingenuity and Subtilty in it: The lively Deſcriptions, the frequent Ironies, and ſatirical Strokes admirably diverſify it. Was there ever ſeen a more ſubtil Piece of Satire than that which* Plato *makes againſt* Melitus? *He is not content to mention his Name, and in what Part of the City he was born, but likewiſe draws his Picture; and yet all theſe Indications can't make him known to* Eutyphron. *He that accuſes* Socrates, *and thinks himſelf capable of reforming the Commonwealth, by ſhewing what it is that corrupts Youth, and overthrows Religion, is neither known to him whom he accuſes, nor to the Miniſters of that Religion, of which he pretends to be the great Support. All the other like Strokes will be eaſily obſerv'd in Reading; and the Beauty of the Character of the ſuperſtitious Man, who believes a Thing only becauſe he believes it, and who is always near the Truth without ever attaining it, will be plainly diſcern'd. The Reader will ſee with Pleaſure, that* Eutyphron *is a good honeſt Man, who has upright Intentions, but is ſo full of Reſpect for the Fables that have been taught him, that he receives 'em all as ſacred, without*

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cut ever entertaining the leaſt Suſpicion concerning 'em; he is ſo ſwell'd with Pride, and full of that precipitant Confidence, which Superſtition commonly inſpires, that he publiſhes his Viſions as certain Truths, not to be contradicted by any Man. And Socrates, *who makes as if he were willing to be inſtructed, receives his Doctrine with refin'd Ironies, and ambiguous Railleries; and at length confutes it with abundance of Strength and Solidity.*

Eutyphron, Socrates.

Eut. WHAT News, *Socrates?* What, have you left the Company of *Lyceus*, to come hither into the * King's Porch? You have no Buſineſs to bring you hither, as I have.

Soc. 'Tis ſomewhat worſe than Buſineſs, *Eutyphron*; the *Athenians* call it an Accuſation.

Eut. How do you ſay? Then 'tis likely ſome Body accuſes you, † for I can never believe you would accuſe any one.

Soc. You are in the right.

Eut. Well, who is your Accuſer?

Soc. I don't know very well my ſelf, I take him to be a young Man, who is not yet known; I think his Name

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* This King's Porch was a Place on the right Side of the *Ceramique*, where one of the nine *Archons*, who was call'd the King, preſided for the Space of a Year, and took Cognizance of the Affairs of Orphans, and of Outrages that were committed againſt Religion.

† This is very remarkable. *Eutyphron*, who is going to accuſe his own Father, can't believe that *Socrates* is capable of accuſing any Man. *Plato* makes uſe of the Precipitancy of this ſuperſtitious Man, or of the good Opinion he has of himſelf, to inſinuate that at *Athens* honeſt Men never drove the Trade of Accuſers.

is *Melitus*, he is of the Town of *Pittheus*; if you remember any one of that Quarter of the City, who bears that Name, who has lank Hair, a thin Beard, and a crooked Noſe, that is the Man.

Eut. I don't remember any ſuch Perſon, *Socrates*; but I pray what is the Charge he brings againſt you?

Soc. What is the Charge! why, 'tis ſuch a one as ſhews him to be no ordinary Man. For 'tis no little Thing to be ſo knowing in ſuch important and ſublime Matters, at an Age ſo little advanc'd as his. He ſays he knows how our Youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt 'em. He ſeems to be ſome able Man, who has taken Notice of my Ignorance, and is come to accuſe me for having corrupted his Companions; and to bring me before the City, as our common Mother. And it muſt be confeſs'd, he ſeems the only Perſon that knows how to lay the Foundations of good Policy. For 'tis reaſonable that a Stateſman ſhould always begin with the Education of young People, to render them as virtuous as may be; as a good Gardener beſtows his firſt Labour and Care on the young Plants, and then paſſes on to the others: *Melitus*, doubtleſs, takes the ſame Courſe, and begins by cutting us up who hinder the young Plants from ſprouting and improving. After this, without Doubt, he'll extend his beneficent Labours to thoſe Plants that are more advanc'd; and will by this Means do the greateſt Kindneſs imaginable to the City. This is what may be expected from a Perſon that knows ſo well how to begin at the right End.

The Education of Youth is the Foundation of good Policy.

Eut. I ſhould be glad to ſee it, *Socrates*; but I tremble for Fear of the contrary; * for in attacking you,

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* The *Greek* ſays, *In injuring you, he labours to ruin the City, and begins by the Fire-ſide.* 'Twas a Proverb in *Greece*, *To begin by the Fire-ſide*, when they ſpoke of beginning with what was moſt excellent and ſacred; for the Fire-ſide contain'd the Domeſtick Gods. So that this was a great Encomium of *Socrates*. Wiſe Men are to Cities what Domeſtick Gods are to Families.

he

he ſeems to me to attack the City in the moſt ſacred Part of it: But I pray tell me what he ſays, You do thus to corrupt young People.

Soc. He ſays, I do ſuch Things, as at firſt hearing muſt needs ſeem abſurd and impoſſible; for he ſays, I am a Forger of Gods, that I introduce new Gods, and do not believe the old ones. This is the Charge he has againſt me.

Eut. I underſtand you; 'tis becauſe you ſay, you have a Genius that daily guides you. Upon this he accuſes you of introducing new Opinions in Religion, and comes to defame you in this Court, well knowing, that the Mob is always ready to receive this ſort of Calumnies. What do not I my ſelf meet with, when in publick Aſſemblies I ſpeak of divine Things, and predict what ſhall come to paſs? They all laugh at me as a Fool; not that any one of the Things I have foretold has fail'd of its Accompliſhment; but the Buſineſs is this, they envy all ſuch as we are. And what remains for us to do? The beſt way is never to trouble our Heads about it; but to go on ſtill in our own way.

Soc. My dear *Eutyphron*, is it ſo great an Unhappineſs to be laugh'd at? For at Bottom I believe the *Athenians* don't much trouble their Heads to examine whether a Man has a great Capacity or not, provided he does not go about to teach others what he knows. But I believe, if a Man ſhould make it his Buſineſs to teach, they would be downright angry, either out of Envy, as you intimate, or for ſome other Reaſon that we know not.

The Character of the *Athenians*, which agrees well with the Account St. *Luke* gives us of 'em in the Acts of the Apoſtles.

Eut. I have no Mind to try, to my Coſt, as you do, what Sentiments they have of me.

Soc. That's another Matter; * it may be you are

* *Socrates* makes uſe of the Confeſſion which he has drawn out of *Eutyphron*, to ſhew by this Diviner the Character of thoſe who were ſet up to teach Religion: They neither taught nor refuted any Thing, but through Fear left the People in Superſtition and Ignorance

very

very reſerv'd, and do not willingly communicate your Wiſdom to others; whereas I am afraid they think the Love I bear to all Mankind engages me too freely to teach 'em all I know, not only without asking a Reward, but even by preventing them, and preſſing 'em to hear me. But if they would content themſelves with laughing at me, as you ſay they do at you, it would be no unpleaſant Thing to ſpend ſome Hours in this Court in Laughing and Divertiſement; but if they take up the Matter in earneſt, none but you Diviners know what will be the Event of it.

Eut. Perhaps you may ſuſtain no Damage, but may come to a happy Iſſue in your Buſineſs, as well as I in mine.

Soc. Have you Buſineſs here then? Are you Defendant or Plaintiff?

Eut. I am Plaintiff.

Soc. Whom do you proſecute?

Eut. If I ſhould tell you, you would take me for a Fool.

Soc. How! do you proſecute one that can't be taken? Has he got Wings?

Eut. The Perſon I proſecute, inſtead of having Wings, is ſo old that he can ſcarce walk.

Soc. Who is he?

Eut. 'Tis my Father.

Soc. Your Father!

Eut. Yes, my Father.

Soc. Of what do you accuſe him?

Eut. Of Murder.

Soc. Of Murder, good God! That's an Accuſation indeed above the Comprehenſion of the People, who will never conceive that it can be juſt: An ordinary Man would have enough to do to give it any tolerable Colour. * This is a Thing that belongs only to him who is arriv'd at the higheſt Pitch of Wiſdom.

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* From this Principle of *Socrates*, it follows by a juſt Conſequence, that it is only God's Province to command and authorize ſuch Actions as appear ſevere and cruel to Nature; which is a great Truth.

Eut.

Eut. You ſay true, *Socrates*, it belongs only to ſuch a Perſon.

Soc. Is it any one of your Relations that your Father has kill'd? Without Doubt it muſt be ſo; for you would not proſecute your Father in a Court of Juſtice for the ſake of a Stranger.

Eut. What an Abſurdity is that, *Socrates*, to think that in this Reſpect there is any Difference between a Relation and a Stranger! the Thing is equal; that which ought chiefly to be conſider'd, is to examine whether the Perſon that has kill'd him, did it juſtly or unjuſtly. If it was juſtly, he ought not to be put to any Trouble; but if unjuſtly, you are oblig'd to proſecute him, whatever Friendſhip or Relation there is between you. To have the leaſt Converſation with him, is to make your ſelf an Accomplice of his Crime; and ſo it is not to proſecute him, to bring him to Puniſhment, which alone can purify and expiate you both. But to apprize you of the Fact: The deceaſed was one of our Farmers, who rented a Piece of Land of us when we dwelt at *Naxus*: This Man having one Day drank too much, fell into a Paſſion, and was ſo tranſported with Rage againſt one of our Slaves, that he kill'd him. My Father order'd him to be caſt into a deep Pit with his Hands and Feet bound, and immediately ſent hither to conſult * one of thoſe who have the Inſpection of religious Matters, and Caſes of Conſcience, to know what he ſhould do with him; and in the mean Time neglected this poor Priſoner, and left him without Suſtenance, as an Aſſaſſin, whoſe Life was of no Conſequence; ſo that he died: Hunger, Cold, and the Weight of his Chains, kill'd him, before the Perſon, my Father had ſent, return'd. Upon this, our whole Family falls upon me, becauſe I, for the ſake of an Aſſaſſin, accuſe my Father of Murder, which they pretend he has not committed;

A falſe Principle: For Juſtice puſh'd too far, becomes injuſtice and Impiety.

* In *Greece* there were Interpreters of divine Things, who were publick Perſons, to whom the People addreſs'd themſelves in all weighty Caſes. Thoſe, who were any thing devout, would not undertake the leaſt Thing, without having firſt conſulted 'em.

committed; and if he had, they maintain I ought not to proſecute him, becauſe the deceaſed was a Villain and a Murderer; and beſides, they ſay 'tis an impious Action for a Son to prefer a criminal Proceſs againſt his Father: So blind are they about Divine Things, and ſo uncapable of diſcerning what is profane and impious, from what is juſt and holy.

Soc. But, I pray, *Eutyphron*, do you your ſelf think you ſo accurately underſtand all Divine Things, and that you can ſo preciſely diſtinguiſh between what is holy and what is profane, that the State of the Caſe being as you ſay, you can proſecute your Father without fearing to commit an impious Action?

Eut. Elſe I ſhould be very uneaſy; and *Eutyphron* would ſcarce have any Advantage above other Men, if he did not underſtand all theſe Things perfectly well.

Soc. O admirable *Eutyphron*, I ſee then the beſt Courſe I can take, is to become your Diſciple, and before the Determination of my Proceſs, to let *Melitus* know, that I have hitherto look'd upon it as the greateſt Advantage in the World, to have a good Underſtanding in Divine Things, and to be well inſtructed in Religion. But now, ſeeing he accuſes me of falling into Error, and of raſhly introducing new Opinions about the Deity, I have put my ſelf into your School. So that, *Melitus*, I'll ſay, if you acknowledge *Eutyphron* to be a Perſon of Ability in thoſe Matters, and that he has good Notions, I declare to you, I have embraced the ſame Sentiments. Therefore forbear to perſecute me any farther. And if, on the contrary, you think *Eutyphron* is not Orthodox, cauſe the Maſter to be call'd in Queſtion before you meddle with the Scholar: He is the Cauſe of all this Miſchief; 'tis he that ruins both his Father and me. He ruins me in teaching me a falſe Religion; and he ruins his Father in proſecuting him by the Principles of this ſame Religion, which you account ſo pernicious; and if he continues to proſecute me without any Regard to my Requeſt, or leaves me to purſue you, you will not fail to make your Ap-

'Tis the greateſt advantage in the World to be well inſtructed in Religion.

Appearance, and to ſpeak the ſame Thing which I ſhall have ſignified to him.

Eut. Upon my Word, *Socrates*, if he is ſo impudent as to attack me, I ſhall ſoon find his weak Side, and ſhall at leaſt run but half the Danger.

Soc. I know it very well, and that is the Reaſon I am ſo deſirous of being your Diſciple, being well aſſur'd, that no Perſon is ſo bold as to dare look you in the Face; no, not *Melitus* himſelf, who looks ſo intently, and who can ſee ſo well to the Bottom of my Soul, that he accuſes me of Impiety.

In the mean Time, then, tell me, I beſeech you, what you juſt now affirm'd, and which you know ſo well, *viz.* what is holy and juſt, impious and unjuſt, in reſpect of *killing Men*, for inſtance, and ſo in all other Subjects that may offer themſelves to us. Is not Sanctity always like it ſelf in all ſorts of Actions; and is not Impiety, which is its contrary, always the ſame too? So that the ſame Idea, the ſame Character of Impiety, is always found in every Thing which is impious.

Eut. 'Tis certainly ſo, *Socrates*.

Soc. What is it then that you call pious and holy, profane and impious?

Eut. I call that pious and holy, for example, which I am doing To-day, namely, to proſecute every Man who commits Murder, Sacrilege, and ſuch other Crimes, whether it be Father, Mother, Brother, or any other Perſon. And I call it an impious Thing to ſuffer the Criminal quietly to enjoy his Crime. I pray, *Socrates*, mind well what I ſay; I'll give you very certain Proofs that my Definition is * conformable to the Law. I have already mention'd it to many Perſons, and have made 'em confeſs, that there is nothing more juſt, than not to ſpare a wicked Man, let him be

A wrong Definition which ſprings from blind Zeal.

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* 'Tis ſo indeed; but it is ill applied here, and is not true on all Occaſions as it is not on this. That which *Eutyphron* here calls the Law, is the Law of Nature, which teaches us to imitate God in all we know of him.

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who he will. All Men are convinc'd that *Jupiter* is the beſt and moſt juſt of all the Gods; and all agree, that he put his Father in Chains, becauſe he, contrary to all Manner of Juſtice, devour'd his Children. *Saturn* had before treated his Father with yet greater Severity for ſome other Fault. And yet People cry out againſt me, when I proſecute my Father for an atrocious Act of Injuſtice; and they fall into a manifeſt Contradiction, in judging ſo differently of the Actions of thoſe Gods, and mine, * in which I had no other Deſign than that of imitating them.

Soc. Is this the Thing, *Eutyphron*, which has brought me To-day to this Bar; becauſe when I am told theſe Tales of the Gods, I can't hear 'em without Pain? Is this the Crime with which I am going to be charg'd? If you, who are ſo able in Matters of Religion, agree with the People in this, and believe theſe Stories, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that I ſhould believe 'em too, who confeſs ingenuouſly that I know nothing of theſe Matters. Shall I pretend to be wiſer than my Teachers, and make Head againſt them? Therefore I beg of you, in the Name of that God who preſides over Friendſhip, do not deceive me: Do you believe all theſe Things you ſay?

Eut. I not only believe theſe, but others too that are more ſurprizing, of which the People are wholly ignorant.

Doubtleſs he means thoſe Myſteries which were known only to thoſe that were initiated.

Soc. You ſeriouſly believe then that there are great Quarrels, Animoſities and Wars among the Gods? You believe all thoſe other Paſſions that reign among 'em, which are ſo ſurprizing, and are repreſented by Poets and Painters in their Poems and Pictures, which are expos'd to View in all Parts of our Temples; and † are wrought with various

* The Imitation of thoſe falſe Gods could only produce very ill Actions, as the Poets themſelves have acknowledg'd.

† This Tapeſtry was the Sail of *Minerva*'s Ship, on which the principal actions of this Goddeſs were deſcrib'd in Needle-work, which

various Colours in that myſterious Tapeſtry which is carried in Proceſſion to the Citadel every fifth Year, during the *Panathenea*; muſt we receive all theſe Things as ſo many great Truths, *Eutyphron?*

The Feaſt of *Minerva.*

Eut. Not only theſe, *Socrates*, but a great many others beſides, as I told you juſt now, which I will explain to you if you pleaſe; and upon my Word they'll make you wonder.

Soc. No, they will not make me wonder much, but you may explain 'em to me another Time when you are more at Leiſure. I pray endeavour now to explain to me what I asked you, a little more clearly, for you have not yet fully anſwer'd my Queſtion; you have not taught me what Holineſs is. You have only told me, that *that* is a holy Thing which you do in accuſing your Father of Murder.

Eut. And I have told you the Truth.

Soc. It may be ſo: But are there not a great many other Things which you call holy?

Eut. Without Doubt there are.

Soc. I intreat you therefore to remember, that what I ask'd you was not to teach me one or two holy Things among a great many others that are ſo too; but to give me a clear and diſtinct Idea of the Nature of Holineſs, and of that which cauſes all holy Things to be holy. For you told me your ſelf, that there is only one and the ſame Character which makes all holy Things to be what they are; as there is one that makes Wickedneſs to be always Wickedneſs: Don't you remember it?

Eut. O ho; yes, I remember it.

Soc. Then teach me to know what this Character is, that I may have it always before my Eyes, and may uſe it as the true Model, and real Original, that ſo I may be

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which after it had been expos'd in the Ship at the Beginning of the Feaſt, was carried in Proceſſion. The Ship was roll'd along on firm Ground to the Temple of *Ceres* at *Eleuſine*, from whence it was brought back, and carried to the Citadel; and the Statue of the Goddeſs was at laſt adorn'd with it.

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in a Condition to affirm of every Thing which I ſee you or others do, that *that* which reſembles it is holy, and that which does not reſemble it is wicked.

Eut. If that's it you deſire, *Socrates*, I am ready to ſatisfy you.

Soc. Truly, that's what I would have.

Eut. I ſay then, that Holineſs is that which is agreeable to the Gods, and Wickedneſs is that which is diſagreeable to 'em.

A ſecond Definition of Holineſs.

Soc. Very well, *Eutyphron*, you have at laſt anſwer'd me preciſely according to my Queſtion. But I don't yet know whether you ſpeak true. However, ſurely you will know how to convince me of the Truth of what you advance.

Eut. I'll anſwer you.

Soc. Come then, let us lay down what we ſay plainly. A holy Thing, or a holy Man, is a Thing or a Man that is agreeable to God; a wicked Thing, or a wicked Man, is a Man or Thing that is diſagreeable to him. Thus what is holy, and what is wicked, are directly oppoſite, are they not?

Eut. That's beyond Contradiction.

Soc. I think this is very well laid down.

Eut. I think ſo too, *Socrates*.

Soc. But have we not alſo affirm'd, that * the Gods have frequent Animoſities and Contentions among themſelves, and are often embroiled and divided one againſt another?

Eut. Yes, without Doubt.

Soc. Therefore let us now examine what may be the Occaſion of that Difference of Sentiments that produces [illegible] Quarrels, and that Enmity among 'em. If you ſhould diſpute about Numbers, to know which [illegible] greater, would this Difference make us Enemies, [illegible]rry us to all Manner of Exceſſes and Violences?

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rates refutes this Definition of Holineſs, by ſhewing that [illegible] can't ſubſiſt with their Theology.

Should we not immediately ſet our ſelves to reckon, that we might preſently be of the ſame Mind?

Eut. 'Tis very true, we ſhould ſo.

Soc. And if we ſhould diſpute about the different Bigneſs of Bodies, ſhould we not preſently go about meaſuring 'em? And would not that ſoon put an End to our Diſpute?

Eut. It would ſo.

Soc. And if we ſhould conteſt about Weight, would not our Difference be ſoon determin'd by Means of a Pair of Scales?

Eut. No doubt of it.

Soc. Well then, what is there, about which if we ſhould come to diſpute, without having a certain Rule to which we might recur, we ſhould become irreconcileable Enemies, and fall into extravagant Paſſion one againſt the other? Perhaps none of theſe Things at preſent occur to your Mind. I'll tell you ſome of 'em, and you ſhall judge whether I am in the right. Is it not what is juſt and unjuſt, comely and indecent, good and evil? Are not theſe the Things about which we every Day differ, and not finding a ſufficient Rule to make us accord, we fall into the greateſt Enmity? When I ſay *We*, I ſpeak of all Mankind in general.

Eut. That indeed is the true Cauſe of all our Law-Suits, and all our Wars.

Soc. And if it be true, that the Gods are at Variance among themſelves about any Thing, muſt it not neceſſarily be ſome one of theſe?

Eut. It muſt needs be ſo.

Soc. * According to you then, excellent *Eutyphron*, the Gods are divided about what is juſt and unjuſt, comely and indecent, good and evil. For if they did not conteſt about theſe Things, they would have no Occaſion of wrangling, but would be always united, would they not?

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* *Socrates* handſomely ridicules thoſe Gods, who know not what Juſtice and Injuſtice, Vice and Virtue are.

Eut.

Eut. You ſay very right.

Soc. And the Things which each God takes to be comely, good and juſt, are lov'd by him, and the contrary hated.

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. According to you, then, one and the ſame Thing ſeems juſt to ſome of them, and unjuſt to others, ſeeing Wars and Seditions are ſtirr'd up among 'em by ſuch Diſputes as theſe: Is it not ſo?

Eut. 'Tis ſo without Doubt.

Soc. Hence it follows, that one and the ſame Thing is the Object both of the Love and Hatred of the Gods, and is at the ſame Time pleaſing and diſpleaſing to 'em.

Eut. So it ſeems.

Soc. And conſequently, according to you, what is holy and profane, are the ſame Thing.

Eut. I grant, this Conſequence may be juſt.

Soc. Then you have not anſwer'd my Queſtion, incomparable *Eutyphron*; for I did not ask you what it was that at the ſame Time was holy and profane, pleaſing and diſpleaſing to the Gods. So that I foreſee 'tis poſſible, without a Miracle, that the Action you are about to Day, in proſecuting your Father to bring him to Puniſhment, may pleaſe *Jupiter*, and at the ſame Time may diſpleaſe *Cælum* and *Saturn*; may be approv'd by *Vulcan*, and diſapprov'd by *Juno*; and ſo of the reſt of the Gods, who may be of different Sentiments.

Eut. But, *Socrates*, I ſuppoſe there's no Diſpute about this among the Gods; nor does any one of 'em pretend, that he who has kill'd a Man unjuſtly, ſhould be ſuffer'd to go unpuniſh'd.

Soc. Neither is there any Man that pretends to that: Did you ever ſee any one that dar'd put the Matter in Queſtion, whether he that had wilfully murder'd a Man, or committed any other Act of Injuſtice, ought to be puniſh'd or not?

Eut. We every where hear and ſee ſcarce any Thing elſe before the Tribunals, but Perſons who have com-

mitted Acts of Injuſtice, ſaying and doing what they can to avoid Puniſhment.

Soc. But do the Perſons of whom you ſpeak, *Eutyphron*, confeſs that they have done thoſe Acts of Injuſtice of which they are accus'd; and after this Confeſſion, maintain that they ought not to be puniſh'd?

Eut. They have no Mind to confeſs ſo, *Socrates*.

Soc. Then they do not ſay and do all they can; for they dare neither maintain nor aſſert, that when their Injuſtice is manifeſt, and ſufficiently atteſted, they ought not to be chaſtis'd for it. Is it not ſo?

Eut. 'Tis very true.

Soc. They don't put the Matter in queſtion, whether he that is guilty of Injuſtice ought to be puniſh'd; no Body doubts of that: But that about which they diſpute, is the Nature of Injuſtice, to determine in what, how, and on what Occaſion it is committed.

Eut. That's certain.

Soc. And is it not the ſame in Heaven, if it be true, as you have aſſerted, that the Gods are at Variance about what is juſt and unjuſt? Do not ſome of 'em affirm that others of 'em are unjuſt? And don't the latter maintain the contrary? For there is not one among 'em, no more than among us, who dares advance ſuch a Notion as this, That he that commits Injuſtice ought not to be puniſh'd.

Eut. All you ſay is true, *Socrates*; at leaſt, in general.

Soc. You may ſay in particular too; for 'tis about particular Actions that both Men and Gods diſpute every Day, if it be true that the Gods diſpute about any Thing. Do not ſome ſay ſuch an Action is juſt, and others that 'tis unjuſt?

Eut. Yes, doubtleſs.

Soc. Come then, my dear *Eutyphron*, for my particular Inſtruction, tell me what certain Proof you have that the Gods all diſapprove the Death of your Farmer, who, after he had ſo barbarouſly knock'd his Fellow-Servant on the Head, was laid in Irons, and ſo periſh'd before your Father had receiv'd the Anſwer which he expected from

from *Athens*. Demonſtrate to me, that on this Occaſion 'tis a pious and juſt Action for a Son to accuſe his Father of Murder, and to endeavour to bring him to Puniſhment for it; and ſee if you can fairly and evidently prove to me, that the Action of ſuch a Son is pleaſing to the Gods. If you do this, I ſhall never ceaſe to admire and celebrate your Capacity as long as I live.

Eut. This is ſomewhat difficult indeed, to prove it to you. For my Part, I could prove it as evidently as ——

Soc. I underſtand you. That is to ſay, you think I have a duller Head than any of your Judges; for as to them, there's no Difficulty in the Caſe: You'll make it appear to them that your Farmer was unjuſtly kill'd, and that all the Gods diſapprove your Father's Action.

Eut. I'll make it appear to 'em as clear as the Light, provided they will but hear me.

Soc. Oh! they will not fail to hear you, * provided you make a fine Speech to 'em. But I'll tell you what Reflection I juſt now made, while I was hearkening to what you ſaid. I ſaid within my ſelf, Suppoſe it were poſſible for *Eutyphron* to perſuade me that all the Gods are of the Mind, that this Farmer was unjuſtly kill'd; ſhould I be ever the wiſer? Should I underſtand, better than I do, what is holy, and what profane? The Death of this Farmer is diſpleaſing to the Gods, as he pretends. I'll grant it: But this is not a Definition of what is holy, and its contrary, ſeeing the Gods are divided; and that which is diſagreeable to ſome of them, is agreeable to others. Very well, I paſs that, *Eutyphron:* I am willing to ſuppoſe that all the Gods account your Father's Action unjuſt, and that they all abhor it. I pray then let us correct our Definition a little, and ſay, *That which all the Gods condemn is profane, and*

* *Socrates* reproaches the *Athenians*, that they lov'd to hear ſuch as could talk finely, and did not much trouble their Heads about the Truth of Things. We learn from the Sacred Hiſtory, that this was the Character of the *Athenians*; they ſpent their Time in hearing either Noveliſts or Orators.

that which all the Gods approve is holy; and that which is approved by ſome of 'em, and diſapprov'd by others, is neither one nor t'other, or rather is both together. Shall we ſtand by this Definition of what is holy and what profane?

Eut. What ſhould hinder us, *Socrates?*

Soc. For my Part I'll not hinder it: But do you ſee your ſelf if this ſuits your Opinion, and if upon this Principle you can inſtruct me better in what you have been endeavouring to teach me.

Eut. And for my Part, I ſhall make no Difficulty of aſſerting, that *that* is holy which all the Gods approve, and that profane which they all diſapprove.

Soc. Examine this Definition, to ſee if it be true; or ſhall we receive it without any Ceremony? And ſhall we have that Reſpect for our ſelves and others, as to give our Aſſent to all our Imaginations and Fancies; ſo that for a Man to tell us a Thing is ſo, ſhall be ſufficient to gain our Belief; or is it neceſſary to examine what is ſaid to us?

Eut. Without Doubt we ſhould examine it; and I am well aſſur'd, that what we have laid down is a good Poſition.

Soc. That we ſhall ſee preſently. Hear me a little. * Is that which is holy belov'd of the Gods becauſe it is holy, or is it holy becauſe it is belov'd of 'em?

Eut. I don't well underſtand what you ſay, *Socrates.*

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* This Thought is too high for *Eutyphron*, who conceiving Holineſs as a Thing diſtinct from God, could not tell how to comprehend that which is holy is at the ſame Time lov'd of God, becauſe it is holy; and holy becauſe lov'd of God: For Holineſs comes from God, *Sanctitas primitiva*; and the Holineſs of Men is the Effect of the divine Communion, which *Socrates* underſtood, and of which he elſewhere ſpeaks. So that *Socrates* here ſpeaks with reference to the groſs Manner of conceiving the Things of Religion which was to be found in ignorant Men, who judg'd of this as of all other Things in which the Relatives are very different, as that which is lov'd is different from that which loves; that which is moved is different from that which moves it, &c.

Soc.

Soc. I'll endeavour to explain my ſelf. Don't we ſay, that a Thing is carried, and that a Thing carries? That a Thing is ſeen, and that a Thing ſees? That a Thing is mov'd, and that a Thing moves it? And the like to Infinity. Do you conceive that they are different? And do you underſtand in what they differ?

Eut. I think I do.

Soc. Is not the Thing belov'd different from that which loves?

Eut. A pretty Queſtion indeed!

Soc. Tell me then, is the Thing which is carried, carried becauſe one carries it, or for ſome other Reaſon?

Eut. Becauſe one carries it, without Doubt.

Soc. And the Thing mov'd is mov'd becauſe one moves it; and the Thing ſeen becauſe one ſees it?

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. Then it is not true that one ſees a Thing becauſe it is ſeen; but on the contrary, 'tis ſeen becauſe one ſees it. 'Tis not true that one moves a Thing becauſe 'tis mov'd, but it is mov'd becauſe one moves it. Nor is it true that one carries a Thing becauſe 'tis carried, but 'tis carried becauſe one carries it. Do you underſtand me now? Is this plain enough? My Meaning is, that one does not do a Thing becauſe it is done, but that it is done becauſe one does it: That a Being which ſuffers, does not ſuffer becauſe it is paſſive, but is paſſive becauſe it ſuffers. Is not this true?

Eut. Who doubts it?

Soc. Is not that which is lov'd ſomething that is done, or that ſuffers?

Eut. Certainly.

Soc. Then 'tis with that which is lov'd as 'tis with all other Things; 'tis not becauſe it is loved that one loves it, but on the contrary 'tis becauſe one loves it that it is lov'd.

Eut. That's as clear as the Light.

Soc. What ſhall we ſay then of that which is holy, my dear *Eutyphron?* Shall we not ſay it is belov'd of the Gods, as you have aſſerted?

Eut. Yes, certainly.

Soc. But is it belov'd becauſe it is holy, or is it for ſome other Reaſon?

Eut. 'Tis for no other Reaſon.

It is belov'd ſo far as it is holy. 'Tis this Quality that renders it amiable.

Soc. Then it is belov'd becauſe it is holy; but it is not holy becauſe it is belov'd.

Eut. So I think.

Soc. But is it not belov'd of the Gods becauſe the Gods love it?

Eut. Who can deny it?

Soc. * Then that which is belov'd of God is not the ſame with that which is holy, nor that which is holy the ſame with that which is belov'd, as you ſay: But they are very different.

Eut. How then, *Socrates?*

Soc. Becauſe we are agreed that *that* which is holy is belov'd becauſe it is holy, and that it is not true that it is holy becauſe it is belov'd. Are we not agreed in that?

Eut. I confeſs it.

Soc. We are farther agreed, that *that* which is belov'd of the Gods, is belov'd of 'em only becauſe they love it; and that it is not true, to ſay they love it becauſe it is belov'd.

Eut. That's right.

Soc. † But, my dear *Eutyphron*, if that which is belov'd of the Gods, and that which is holy, were the ſame Thing, ſeeing that which is holy is belov'd only becauſe it is holy; it would follow, that the Gods ſhould love that which they love, only becauſe it is belov'd of 'em. And on the other Hand, if that which is belov'd of the Gods, were lov'd only becauſe they love it; then it

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* This is evident, ſeeing what is holy is lov'd only becauſe it is holy, and that which is lov'd is lov'd only becauſe one loves it: There muſt needs be a Difference between theſe two, viz. what is lov'd, and what is holy.

† For if theſe two Terms *belov'd* and *holy* were the ſame Thing, one might be put for t'other; whence all that Abſurdity would follow which *Socrates* repreſents here.

would

would be true likewiſe to ſay, that which is holy is holy, only becauſe it is belov'd of them. By this therefore you ſee that thoſe two Terms, *belov'd of the Gods*, and *holy*, are very different. One is belov'd becauſe the Gods love him, and another is lov'd only becauſe he deſerves to be lov'd. Thus, my dear *Eutyphron*, when you ſhould have given me an exact Anſwer what it is to be holy, to be ſure you were not willing to explain to me wherein the Eſſence of it conſiſts, by an accurate Definition; but were content to ſhew one of its Qualities, which is that of being belov'd of the Gods; but you have not given me an Account of the Nature of it. I conjure you therefore, if you think fit, diſcover this great Secret to me; and beginning with it from its very Principle, teach me preciſely to know what *Holineſs* is, without having Reſpect to any Thing that is adventitious; as whether it is belov'd of the Gods or not. For we ſhall have no Diſpute about that. Come then, tell me freely, what is it to be holy, and what to be profane?

For when one knows the Nature of a Thing, one may eaſily know whether it be lov'd or hated of God.

Eut. But, *Socrates*, I know not how to explain my Thoughts to you on this Subject; for all that we lay down vaniſhes from us, and does not continue fix'd and ſtable in what Condition ſoever we put it.

Soc. All the Principles, *Eutyphron*, which you have eſtabliſh'd, are ſomewhat like * the Figures of *Dædalus*, one of my Anceſtors. If I had aſſerted 'em, to be ſure

* *Dædalus* was an excellent Carver, who made Statues that had Springs within 'em, by means of which they would ſtart out and go along as if they had been alive. There were two Sorts of 'em, as appears by what is ſaid in *Menon*. What *Socrates* ſays here of *Dædalus*, that he was one of his Anceſtors, is only in Raillery. *Dædalus* deſcended from the Kings of *Athens*; and *Socrates* was very far from having the Vanity of pretending to be of that Family. His Meaning is only this, that he knew how to make himſelf Wings, as *Dædalus* did, to fly towards Heaven, and to raiſe his Mind to the Knowledge of divine Things. This Matter was ſpoken of in the firſt *Alcibiades*.

you would not have fail'd to jeer and reproach me, as if I had deriv'd this pretty Quality of making Things that ſlip out of a Man's Hands, when he thinks he holds 'em faſteſt. But it unhappily falls out, that 'tis you that have aſſerted 'em. Therefore I muſt ſeek for ſome other Turns of Raillery; for 'tis certain your Principles give us the Slip, as you ſee very well.

Eut. For my Part, *Socrates*, I need not ſeek any other Turn of Raillery; that ſuits you perfectly well: For 'tis not I that inſpire our Reaſonings with this Inſtability, which hinders 'em from fixing, but you are the *Dædalus*. If I were alone, I tell you they would continue firm and ſteddy.

Soc. Then I am more expert in my Art than *Dædalus* was; he could only give this Mobility to his own Works, whereas it ſeems I give it not only to my own, but alſo to thoſe of other Men: And that which is yet more ſtrange, is, that I am thus expert againſt my Will; for I ſhould much rather chuſe to have my Diſcourſes continue fix'd and immoveable, than to have all the Riches of *Tantalus*, together with all the Skill of *Dædalus* my Progenitor. But enough of this Jeſting. Seeing you are afraid of the Trouble, I'll endeavour to eaſe you, and to open a ſhorter Way to conduct my ſelf to the Knowledge of what is holy: And you ſhall ſee if it does not appear to be of abſolute Neceſſity, that whatever is holy is juſt.

Eut. It cannot be otherwiſe.

Soc. Do you think whatever is juſt is holy, or whatever is holy is juſt? Or do you ſuppoſe that *that* which is juſt is not always holy; but only that there are ſome juſt Things that are holy, and others which are not ſo?

Eut. I can't well comprehend what you mean, *Socrates*.

Soc. And yet you have two great Advantages above me, having both more Youth and more Capacity than I. But, as I juſt now told you, ſwimming in the delicious Abundance of your Wiſdom, you are afraid of putting your ſelf to much Trouble. Shake off, I beſeech you, this

this effeminate Softneſs, and apply your ſelf a little to thinking. What I ſay, is not very hard to be underſtood. For I ſay juſt the contrary to what the Poet aſſerts, who to excuſe himſelf for not ſinging the Praiſes of *Jupiter*, ſays,

Shame ev'ry where keeps Company with Fear.

I am not at all of his Mind: Shall I tell you in what?

Eut. You'll oblige me in ſo doing.

Soc. I think 'tis not true that Shame always accompanies Fear; for I think we every Day ſee People in Fear of Sickneſs and Poverty, who yet are not at all aſham'd of the Things they fear. Don't you think ſo too?

Eut. I am of the ſame Mind.

Soc. On the contrary, Fear always follows Shame: For is there any one who is aſham'd, and put into Confuſion by any Action, who does not at the ſame Time fear the Diſhonour that is the Conſequence of it?

Eut. It can't be otherwiſe, he muſt be afraid of it.

Soc. Then it is not true to ſay,

Shame ev'ry where keeps Company with Fear:

But we ſhould ſay,

Fear ev'ry where keeps Company with Shame.

For 'tis falſe that Shame is continually found with Fear, Fear having more Extent than Shame: Indeed Shame is one Part of Fear, as the unequal is one Part of Number. Wherever you find a Number, you do not neceſſarily find it unequal; but wherever it is unequal, there you neceſſarily find a Number. Do you underſtand me now?

Eut. Very well.

Soc. This is what I juſt now ask'd you; *viz.* if wherever that which is Juſt is to be found, there is alſo that which is Holy; and if wherever that which is Holy is to be found, there is alſo that which is Juſt? Now it appears that *that* which is Holy is not always found with that which is Juſt; for that which is Holy is a Part of that which is Juſt. Shall we then lay this down as a Principle, or are you of a different Sentiment?

Eut. 'Tis a Principle that can't be conteſted.

Soc. Now mind what follows: If that which is Holy is a Part of that which is Juſt, we muſt find out what Part of that which is Juſt, that which is Holy is. As if you ſhould ask me what Part of Number is that which is equal, and what Number is it? I ſhould anſwer, that it is * the *Iſoſcele*, and not the *Scalene*: Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Eut. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Now do you in like Manner ſee if you can inform me what Part of that which is Juſt that which is Holy is; that I may let *Melitus* know, that 'tis beſt for him to forbear to do me any farther Injuſtice in accuſing me of Impiety; me, who, I ſay, have been perfectly inſtructed by you what Piety and Holineſs, and their Contraries, are.

A third Definition, which at Bottom has ſomething of Truth in it, but theſe falſe Teachers had not right Conceptions of it.

Eut. For my Part, *Socrates*, I think that Holineſs and Piety is † that Part of what is Juſt which concerns the Care and Worſhip of the Gods, and that all the reſt of it is that which properly reſpects Men.

Soc. Very well: Yet there is ſome little Matter ſtill wanting. For I do not well underſtand what you mean by this Word [*Care.*] Is this Care of the Gods the ſame with that which we take about all other Things? For we every Day ſay, that none but a Querry knows how to take Care of a Horſe, and to look well after him, do we not?

Eut. Yes, doubtleſs.

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* The *Iſoſcele* ſignifies that which has two equal Sides; for the even Number divides it ſelf into two equal Parts. And the *Scalene* is that which has two unequal Sides.

† This is true: But the *Pagans* had falſe Ideas of it; becauſe they did not underſtand that this Care of God, which conſiſts on our Part in obeying him, in conforming to his holy Will, and in reſigning our ſelves to him, was preceded by his Care of us, in creating us, and in enlightning our Minds: And this is what *Socrates* teaches in other Places.

Soc.

Soc. Then the Care of Horſes properly belongs to the Querry's Art.

Eut. It does ſo.

Soc. All Men are not fit to take Care of Dogs, and to look after them, but only the Huntſman.

Eut. None but he.

Soc. Then the Care of Dogs properly belongs to the Art of Hunting.

Eut. Without Doubt it does.

Soc. And it belongs to the Grazier to take Care of Oxen.

Eut. True.

Soc. Now Holineſs and Piety is the Care of the Gods: Is not this what you ſay?

Eut. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Has not all Care, for its End, the Good and Advantage of that which is taken Care of? Don't you every Day ſee that the Horſes which an able Querry takes Care of, become better, and more fit for Service than others?

Eut. Yes, without Doubt.

Soc. Does not the Care which a good Huntſman takes of Dogs, and that which a good Grazier takes of Oxen, make both the one and the other better? And may not the like be ſaid of all other Care? Or can you think that Care tends to hurt and ſpoil that which is taken Care of?

Eut. No, certainly.

Soc. Then it tends to make it better.

Eut. That's right.

Soc. Then Holineſs being the Care we take of the Gods, tends to their Advantage; and ſo the End of it muſt be to make them better. But would you dare to aſſert, when you do any holy Action, that you make any one of the Gods better by it?

Men are uncapable of doing any Thing to the Advantage of God.

Eut. I am far enough from uttering ſuch horrid Blaſphemy.

Soc. Nor do I think you have any ſuch Thought; I am very far from ſuch a Suppoſition: And 'tis for this Reaſon I ask'd you what this Care of the

the Gods is, being perſuaded that was not your Meaning.

Eut. You have done me Juſtice, *Socrates.*

Soc. So much for that: But tell me then, what ſort of Care of the Gods is Holineſs?

Eut. 'Tis of the Nature of that Care which Servants take of their Maſters.

Soc. I underſtand you; that is to ſay, Holineſs is a kind of Servant to the Gods.

Eut. You hit it.

Soc. Can you tell me what Phyſicians operate by means of the Art of Medicine, which is their Servant? Do they not reſtore Health?

Eut. Yes.

Soc. What do the Ship-Carpenters, who are in Ports, do? And what do our Architects perform by the Miniſtry of their Servants? Don't the former build Ships, and the latter Houſes?

Eut. Yes, certainly.

Soc. * What then do the Gods perform by the Miniſtry of their Servants? For you muſt certainly know this, ſince you pretend to know Religion better than any Man in the World beſide.

Eut. And I have Reaſon to make that Pretence.

Soc. Tell me then, I beſeech you, what wonderful Work is it that the Gods perform by making uſe of our Service?

Eut. They perform many very great and wonderful Things.

Soc. The Generals of our Army perform many great Things too; but yet there is always one Thing that

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* *Socrates* would hereby inſinuate, what he elſewhere teaches, that God by the Miniſtry of Holineſs works the Converſion of Souls: That this Converſion produces Love, and that this Love engages us to render him that which appertains to him, and which we cannot innocently refuſe him.

is the principal, and that is the Victory they obtain in Battle; is it not?

Eut. 'Tis ſo.

Soc. And the Graziers do many good Things, but the principal is that of ſupplying Mankind with Food by their Labour.

Eut. I grant it.

Soc. Well then, of all thoſe good Things which the Gods operate by the Miniſtry of our Holineſs, what is the principal?

Eut. I juſt now told you, *Socrates*, that there needs more Time and Pains to arrive at an accurate Knowledge of all theſe Things. All that I can tell you in general, is, that to pleaſe the Gods by Prayers and Sacrifices, is that which we call Holineſs; and * in this conſiſts the Welfare of Families and Cities: Whereas to diſpleaſe the Gods is Impiety, which utterly ruins and ſubverts every Thing.

Soc. Indeed, *Eutyphron*, you might have told me what I ask'd in fewer Words, if you had pleas'd. 'Tis eaſy to ſee you have a Mind to inſtruct me; for when you ſeem to be juſt in the Way to do it, you preſently ſtrike off again: If you had but anſwer'd me a Word more, I had very well underſtood the Nature of Holineſs. But now, (for he that asks muſt follow him who is ask'd) don't you ſay, Holineſs is the Art of Sacrificing and Praying?

Eut. Yes, that I do.

Soc. To ſacrifice, is to give to the Gods: To pray, is to ask of 'em.

Eut. 'Tis right, *Socrates.*

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* In what the Safety or Ruin of Families, Cities and States conſiſts, even by the Confeſſion of the blindeſt *Pagans.*

Soc.

A 4th Definition which is very true; but the Truth of which these falſe Teachers did not underſtand.

Soc. It follows then, from your Diſcourſes, that Holineſs is * the Science of giving to the Gods, and asking of them.

Eut. Socrates, you perfectly comprehend my Meaning?

Soc. 'Tis becauſe I am in Love with your Wiſdom, and give my ſelf up entirely to it. You need not fear that I ſhall let one of your Words fall to the Ground. Tell me then, what is this Art of pleaſing the Gods? Do you ſay it is to give to 'em and to ask of 'em?

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. To ask well, muſt we not ask ſuch Things as we have need to receive of them?

Eut. And what then?

Soc. And to give well, muſt we not give them in Exchange ſuch Things as they have need to receive of us? For it would be a Folly to give any one ſuch Things as he does not want, but are entirely uſeleſs to him.

Eut. You ſay very well.

Soc. Holineſs, my dear *Eutyphron*, is then a kind of Traffick betwixt the Gods and Men.

Eut. Let it be ſo, if you will have it ſo.

Soc. I would not have it ſo, if it be not ſo: But tell me, what Advantage do the Gods receive from the Preſents which we make 'em? For the Advantage we derive from them is very evident, ſince we have not the leaſt Good but what proceeds from their Liberality. Of what Advantage then are our Offerings to the Gods? Are we ſo crafty, as to draw all the Profit of this Commerce to our ſelves, while they derive no Advantage from it?

All the Goods of Men come from God.

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* This fourth Definition is admirable. *Socrates* deſigns by it to ſhew that Holineſs leads us to ask of God, his Spirit, his Aſſiſtance and Grace; and to ask even our ſelves of him; for 'tis on him our very Being depends: And that it alſo engages us to give our ſelves to him. And this makes up the whole of Religion.

Eut.

Eut. Socrates, do you think the Gods can ever draw any Advantage from the Things they receive from us?

Soc. To what Purpoſe then do all our Offerings ſerve?

Eut. They ſerve to ſignify our Veneration and Reſpect to 'em, and the Deſire we have to pleaſe 'em.

Soc. Then Holineſs does not profit, but pleaſe the Gods?

Eut. Yes, without Doubt.

Soc. Then that which is holy, is only that which pleaſes the Gods.

Eut. 'Tis only that.

Soc. When you ſpeak thus to me, do you wonder that your Diſcourſe is not fix'd and ſteddy? And dare you accuſe me of being the *Dædalus*, that gives it this continual Motion? You, I ſay, who are a thouſand Times more ingenious than that great Artiſt, and give your Words a thouſand different Turns? Don't you find that your Diſcourſe makes only a Circle? You remember very well, that *that* which is holy, and that which is agreeable to the Gods, were not counted the ſame Thing by us juſt now, but were acknowledg'd to be very different? Don't you remember this?

Eut. I do.

Soc. Well, and don't you conſider that you now ſay, that which is holy is that which pleaſes the Gods? Is not what pleaſes 'em agreeable to 'em?

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. Then one of theſe two Things muſt be granted: Either that we did not well diſtinguiſh juſt now; or, if we did, that we are now fallen into a falſe Definition.

Eut. That's plain.

Soc. Then we muſt begin all again in our Enquiry after Holineſs; for I ſhall not be weary nor diſcourag'd till you have inform'd me what it is. I beg you would not deſpiſe me, but bend your Mind with all the Application you can, to teach me the Truth; for you know it, if any Man alive does: And I will not let you go, like another *Proteus*, till you have inſtructed me. For if you had not a perfect Knowledge of what is holy and profane, doubtleſs you would never, for the ſake of a wretched

wretched Farmer, have undertaken to accuſe your Father of Murder, when the good old Man ſtoops under the Burden of Age, and has already one Foot in the Grave; but would have been ſeiz'd with Horror to ſee your ſelf about to commit (it may be) an impious Act, and would have fear'd the Gods, and reſpected Men. So that I cannot doubt but you think you know perfectly well what Holineſs and its contrary are. Inform me therefore, moſt excellent *Eutyphron*, and do not hide your Thoughts from me.

What it is to fear God, and reſpect Men.

Eut. We'll * reſerve it for another Time, † for now I am a little in Haſte, and 'tis Time for me to leave you.

Soc. Alas, my dear *Eutyphron*, what do you intend to do! this haſty Motion of yours raviſhes from me the greateſt and ſweeteſt of all my Hopes: For I flatter'd my ſelf, that after I had learn'd of you what Holineſs is, and its contrary, I ſhould eaſily have got out of *Melitus*'s Clutches, by making it plainly appear to him, that *Eutyphron* had perfectly inſtructed me in divine Things, that Ignorance ſhould never more prompt me to introduce of my own Head new Opinions about the Deity; and that my Life ſhould be more holy for the future.

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* Obſerve the Pride of this ſuperſtitious Man; he is juſt confounded, and yet he always thinks himſelf capable of teaching what he does not know himſelf.

† The Ancients inform us, that *Eutyphron* got ſome Advantage by this Converſation of *Socrates*; for he dropt his Proſecution, and let his Father alone. By which 'tis eaſy to ſee, that theſe Dialogues of *Plato* were not made upon feign'd Subjects, but had a very true and real Foundation, as well as thoſe which *Xenophon* has preſerv'd to us.

AN —

ABRIDGMENT

OF THE

First *ALCIBIADES*;

OR,

Of the NATURE of MAN.

Alcibiades was one of the moſt ambitious and moſt haughty Men in the World. His Birth, his Beauty, his Riches, and the Credit of his Tutor *Pericles*, had ſo puff'd him up, that he thought no Perſon ſo worthy as himſelf to command the *Athenians*, and to go to their firſt Aſſembly to get himſelf declar'd their Captain-General. His proud and arrogant Carriage had driven away all his Lovers; who being taken only with his Beauty, were at length diſcourag'd by the cold Reception he gave them. *Socrates* was the only Perſon who loving him more truly than the reſt, (for he lov'd him only to make him virtuous) could never be wearied out. This makes the Beginning of this Dialogue.

Socrates tells *Alcibiades*, that he doubts not but he is ſurpriz'd to ſee, that as he was the firſt, ſo he is alſo the laſt of his Lovers; and that tho' he was never troubleſome to him, during his tender Youth, he ſhould now follow him every where to diſcourſe with him, without fearing

fearing the ſame diſdainful Treatment which he gave his Rivals. *Alcibiades* confeſſes, he thinks it ſtrange that he ſhould perſiſt in his Affection; and that he can't comprehend upon what Foundation he builds, that he ſhould have any Hope remaining, after all his Rivals had loſt theirs. *Socrates* tells us, he'll give him an Account of his Reaſons, tho' it be a difficult Thing to ſpeak to a Perſon whom one loves, and of whom one is not belov'd. He tells him then, that if he had ſeen him likely to ſpend his whole Life in Softneſs, Lazineſs, and all the Amuſements of Youth, he ſhould have ceas'd loving him: But that as he ſaw him paſſionately aſpiring after Glory, the Love he bore to him was renew'd and augmented; that he came to offer him all neceſſary Helps, becauſe of all the Lovers he had *had*, he was the only Perſon who was able to ſerve him in his Ambition; and that by this Means he might know the Difference between ſuch as love only corporeal Beauty, that frail and withering Flower, and one that loves only the Beauty of the Soul, which being perfect, is the true Image of the Deity.

This great Promiſe fixes the reſtleſs Humour of this ambitious young Man, and diſpoſes him to hear what he had to ſay.

Socrates immediately throws him into the midſt of that Aſſembly, whither he was going to get himſelf declar'd General of the *Athenians*; and with Abundance of Addreſs, ſhews him, that inſtead of that great Ability with which he flatters himſelf, he had indeed nothing in him but the Prejudices of his Youth, accompanied with a great deal of Arrogance and Preſumption. When you are in that Aſſembly (ſays he) you'll riſe up to ſpeak without Doubt of ſuch Things as you know, rather than any other Matters: For otherwiſe, how could you preſume to ſpeak? But a Man knows nothing but what he has either found out himſelf, or learnt of ſome other Perſon. I don't know any Thing that you have found out your ſelf; your Knowledge is not by Infuſion; and all the Knowledge you have learnt, is only to write, to play on the Muſick, and to perform your Exerciſes; and none of theſe Things are talk'd of in the Council. There-

Therefore when will you go? And what will you go for? It muſt not be when they diſcourſe of Buildings; the meaneſt Bricklayer would ſpeak better than you on that Subject: Nor muſt it be when they are conſidering any Prodigies, or any Point of Divination; for that's the Buſineſs of the Diviners: And ſo of other Things.

Alcibiades being preſs'd, anſwers, that he'll ſpeak when the *Athenians* deliberate on their Affairs.

The Matter then in Queſtion, is, how to explain what is meant by the Affairs of the *Athenians*.

Alcibiades ſays, 'tis Peace and War, and all that belongs to the higheſt Politicks.

Then it muſt be (replies *Socrates*) when they are conſidering with whom, and at what Time 'tis beſt to be at Peace or War. But as Maſters in all Arts and Sciences ſeek what is beſt and moſt convenient, ſo in Peace and War that ought to be ſought out which is beſt and moſt advantagious; that is to ſay, moſt juſt: And in order to find it, 'tis neceſſary to know in what theſe conſiſt. In what then do they conſiſt?

Alcibiades knows not what to anſwer. How! (ſays *Socrates*) are you going to the Aſſembly of the *Athenians* to give 'em your Advice about Peace and War, and yet know not why War or Peace ſhould be made?

Alcibiades anſwers, that War is made either to repel ſome Inſult, or to recover ſome Good.

This is ſomething, (ſays *Socrates*) but 'tis not all. For 'tis neceſſary to know, whether the Evil that is done us, is done juſtly or unjuſtly: On this Knowledge depends the Knowledge of what is beſt and moſt advantagious, that which is beſt being always moſt juſt. So that on theſe Matters we ought to have an exact Knowledge of Juſtice, and to keep it always in View: And this is a Thing of which you are ignorant; for of whom ſhould you have learnt it?

Juſtice (replies *Alcibiades*) may be known without a Maſter.

Yes, ſays *Socrates*, provided it be ſought after: But no Man ſeeks for what he thinks he knows; and at every Degree of our Age we think we know what Juſtice is,

is, becauſe we ſpeak of it throughout the whole Courſe of our Life, and nothing is more common than to hear Children complaining of the Wrongs and Injuries that are done 'em. So that we continually ſpeak of Juſtice without having learn'd what it is, either of our ſelves or others, and conſequently without knowing it.

Alcibiades thinks to extricate himſelf out of this Difficulty, by ſaying, he learn'd it of the People.

That's a very bad Maſter, ſays *Socrates*; how ſhould the People teach what they know not themſelves? They have no Knowledge of Juſtice, but by their Prejudices, as you have; and one certain Sign that they are ignorant of it, is, that they are always at Variance on this Subject, and that 'tis the Difference alone that cauſes the Wars that deſolate the World. For if the People would agree about what is juſt and unjuſt, they would always live in Peace.

Alcibiades endeavours to get rid of this Difficulty, in ſaying, that 'tis rarely deliberated in Councils, whether a Thing is juſt or unjuſt, but only whether it be uſeful; for Juſtice and Utility (ſays he) are not always the ſame Things: Seeing ſome notorious Acts of Injuſtice have been very advantagious; and a great many Perſons have been deſtroy'd for having acted juſtly. Which is too true a Draught of the Politicks of moſt Princes. *Socrates* refutes this miſchievous Opinion, and ſhews, that an Action can't be uſeful and advantagious, unleſs it be comely and juſt. He firſt tells him, he could prove to him, by the ſame Arguments that he had us'd, that he knows not what is uſeful any more than he does what is juſt, ſince he had neither learn'd it of any one, nor found it out of himſelf. But not to offend a Perſon ſo nice and tender; (for *Alcibiades*, being accuſtom'd to the diverſify'd and florid Diſcourſes of the Sophiſts, did not like to hear the ſame Thing twice, but lov'd Change and Variety in Language, as well as in his Clothes) *Socrates* takes another Courſe, and asks him, if that which is comely or honourable, is always good, or whether it ſometimes ceaſes to be ſo.

Alcibiades

Alcibiades anſwers, that there are comely and honourable Things, which are ſometimes evil. For example, in a Battle, when a Man ſuccours his Friend, and is kill'd in the Action, this Action is honourable, but is fatal. Another abandons his Friend, and eſcapes Danger; this Action is evil, but 'tis uſeful.

Socrates anſwers, that the Succour a Man gives his Friend, is that which is call'd Valour, which is a Thing quite different from Death; and that therefore theſe ought to be conſider'd ſeparately. So that the Queſtion is, whether Valour be a Good or an Evil?

Alcibiades anſwers, that 'tis a great Good, and that he would not preſerve his Life upon the Condition of being a Coward.

Then (ſays *Socrates*) you confeſs that Cowardice is a greater Evil than Death: So that Valour is a greater Good than Life, and conſequently the Action of ſuccouring one's Friend is good, conſider'd as abſtracted from all its Conſequences; if it is good it is honourable, and it can't be honourable, without being uſeful: For whatſoever is comely is good, and that which is good is uſeful; there being nothing that is comely and honourable that can be evil, ſo far as it is honourable; nor any Thing which is ſhameful, that can be good, ſo far as it is ſhameful. Which he proves by this invincible Argument: Thoſe that do good Actions are happy; Men can't be happy but by the Poſſeſſion of Good; the Poſſeſſion of Good is the Conſequence of a good Life; therefore Happineſs neceſſarily attends thoſe that do good Actions; ſo that Happineſs is a comely and honourable Thing, and conſequently that which is good, that which is comely, and that which is uſeful, are never different one from another. Therefore Juſtice being comely and good, can't be oppos'd to Utility.

Alcibiades not only grants all theſe Truths, but is the Perſon that affirms 'em; for he is convinc'd by himſelf, and 'tis himſelf that makes the Anſwers. He therefore admires how it comes to paſs, that the Things about which *Socrates* interrogates him, appear to him with quite another Aſpect, than they had done before: Hereupon,

upon, he asks how it comes about, that upon the ſame Subject he is forc'd to anſwer ſometimes after one Manner, and ſometimes after another.

Socrates informs him, that this proceeds from his Ignorance, becauſe we never contradict our ſelves in the Things we know; but 'tis impoſſible for the Mind not to err in thoſe Things of which we are ignorant. But this does not ariſe abſolutely from Ignorance; ſince 'tis certain we never commit any Fault in Things of which we are ignorant, provided we know our own Ignorance: But it ſprings from a conceal'd Ignorance, when we think we know what indeed we do not underſtand. And this was exactly the Caſe of *Alcibiades*, who was going to intermeddle with Affairs of State, in which he had not been inſtructed. A deplorable Condition! But ſuch as was common to him, with almoſt all that had govern'd the *Athenians*, only *Pericles* perhaps may be excepted.

Alcibiades obſerves, that *Pericles* did not arrive at ſo great a Capacity of himſelf; but had acquir'd his great Abilities in the Converſation of Philoſophers and Politicians. For ſtill (ſays he) as old as he is, he converſes with *Damon*, the greateſt of all our Politicians.

Socrates, who perceives the Tendency of this Anſwer of *Alcibiades*, inſinuates to him, that the Company of thoſe great Men was very uſeful for the Acquirement of Virtue, in which true Accompliſhment alone conſiſts. And this he proves by the Example of *Pericles* himſelf, who had not been able to teach his own Children any Thing; a ſure Sign that Virtue cannot be taught, and that he himſelf had not learn'd it from Men, becauſe 'tis the Gift of God, and there is nothing of Good in us, but what he implants. But this being too general a Queſtion, he reſerves it to be treated elſewhere, and confining himſelf to his Subject, he carries on his Deſign, which is to confound the Pride of *Alcibiades*. Therefore he asks him how he intends to diſpoſe of himſelf: *Alcibiades* anſwers, that he'll endeavour to get himſelf inſtructed; but at the ſame Time gives him to underſtand, that ſince they who then concern'd themſelves in Affairs of State, were moſt of 'em ignorant Perſons, he ſhould not be oblig'd to

to give himſelf ſo much Trouble to excel 'em; and that ſince he had good natural Parts, it would be an eaſy Matter for him to out-do 'em.

Socrates, amaz'd at the Baſeneſs of this Sentiment, which is but too common, gives him an admirable Leſſon upon it. He repreſents to him, that nothing is more unworthy of a great Mind, than for a Man to propoſe to himſelf only to ſurpaſs ignorant People and Slaves: That a Stateſman will never ſerve his Country well, if he is not a greater Man, not only than the Citizens whom he governs, but alſo than their Enemies; that the *Athenians*, being commonly in War with the *Lacedemonians*, or the King of *Perſia*; he ought to ſtrive to excel thoſe Enemies in Capacity and Virtue.

Alcibiades, like a young Spark full of Vanity, asks if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Perſia*, were not made like other Men.

Socrates ſhews him, that if it were ſo, he ought to form a great Idea of 'em in his Mind; that ſo he might take the greater Care of himſelf, and render himſelf ſtill more accompliſh'd: But that there was ſo little Truth in this, *viz.* that they were made like other Men, that no Perſons in the World ſeem'd ſo great as they, either for Birth, or Education, or the Extent of their Dominions. And to mortify *Alcibiades* the more, he oppoſes the Manner of his Birth and Education to that of the Kings of *Perſia*. When a King of *Perſia* is born (ſays *Socrates*) all the People that are ſpread over that vaſt Empire, celebrate his Nativity, and afterwards that Day is annually kept, as one of their greateſt Feſtivals; ſo that in all the Provinces of *Aſia*, nothing is to be ſeen but Sacrifices and Feaſts. Whereas (ſays he) when we are born, my dear *Alcibiades*, that Paſſage of the comick Poet may be applied to us:

The News ſcarce to our neareſt Neighbours comes.

When the Child is born, he is nurs'd under the Conduct of the moſt virtuous Eunuchs, who ſhape and faſhion his Body. When he is about ſeven Years of Age, they be-

gin to let him ſee Horſes, and to put him under the Care of Querries. He performs his Exerciſes till he is fourteen; and from that Age, they give him four of the greateſt and moſt virtuous Lords of the Country. The firſt teaches him Piety; the ſecond forms his Mind to Truth and Juſtice; the third inſtructs him to be free, and to conquer his Paſſions; and the laſt teaches him to deſpiſe Dangers and Death: For if a King ſhould be fearful, he would become a Slave. Whereas you, *Alcibiades*, have been brought up by a vile *Thracian* Slave, who was good for no other Office, becauſe of his extreme old Age. As for Riches, there is ſtill as great a Diſproportion; the *Lacedemonians* being richer than all *Greece* together, and yet having an Eſtate but like that of a private Man, in compariſon of the King of *Perſia*. In fine (ſays he) there is ſo great a Diſparity in every Thing, between theſe Kings and you, that if one ſhould go and tell the Mother of King *Agis*, or the Mother of *Artaxerxes*, that a Citizen of *Athens*, nam'd *Alcibiades*, was preparing to go and make War in their Country, they would certainly imagine that long Exerciſe, great Experience, and a conſummate Wiſdom had inſpir'd you with ſo great a Deſign. But how would they be ſurpriz'd, if they ſhould be told that 'tis no ſuch Matter! that you are young, ignorant and preſumptuous; that you never would take Care to cultivate your Mind, and that you have no other Fund to carry on ſo great a Deſign, but your Beauty, your fine Shape, your Extraction, your Riches, and the Advantages of a happy Genius! they would look upon you as a Fool, becauſe in all theſe Things the *Lacedemonians* and *Perſians* infinitely ſurpaſs us. Is it not a very ſhameful Thing, that the very Women among our Enemies know better than you your ſelf what you ought to be, to attempt to make War againſt 'em with any Hope of Succeſs? Don't think therefore that you have to do with ordinary Men: But imagine you have the greateſt Project in the World in your Head; and either renounce your Ambition, or rouze from this Stupidity into which you have caſt your ſelf. The Glory with which you are ſo much charm'd, is not acquir'd without a great deal of

Toil

Toil and Labour; and if you would attain it, you muſt take Care of your ſelf; that is, you muſt endeavour to become very good.

But ſince the Word *Good* is a general Term, that ſignifies ſeveral very different Things, the Queſtion is, in what ſuch a Man as *Alcibiades* ought to endeavour to become good. He anſwers, that 'tis in doing thoſe Things which the beſt Citizens ought to do. The beſt Citizens (he ſays) are thoſe whom we call wiſe and prudent; and Wiſdom and Prudence are neceſſary to all Arts. Thus the Anſwer of *Alcibiades* is yet too indefinite. Who then are the beſt Citizens? *Alcibiades* again anſwers, that they are thoſe who know how to command Men that live under the ſame Government, who mutually aſſiſt each other; but what is this Science that teaches how to command Men, who make one and the ſame political Body, and what is its End? *Alcibiades* ſays, 'tis good Counſel, and that the End of governing well, is to procure the Welfare of the People

Socrates asks him what ought to be done to govern a State well. *Alcibiades* anſwers, that Amity and Concord ſhould be made to reign in it.

The Queſtion then is, what Art produces this Amity or Concord in States. *Alcibiades* anſwers, that this is brought about when every Man minds his own Buſineſs.

This is not a ſufficient Anſwer, and *Socrates* refutes it with a great deal of Addreſs and Solidity, by ſhewing, that when every Man only minds his own Affairs, Amity can't be among 'em, becauſe there's no Concord. For how ſhould they accord about Things which are known to ſome of 'em, and unknown to others?

Alcibiades is ſo embaraſs'd, that he is oblig'd to deny a Truth which he had before acknowledg'd, and to confeſs, that when the Citizens do that which is juſt, yet they can't tell how to love one another. He does not ſee what *Socrates* aims at: His Deſign is to ſhew, that when Men only mind their Affairs, they take Care only of what belongs to themſelves, and ſo confine themſelves to the Knowledge of particular Things, and don't aſcend to that of the Eſſence of univerſal Things, the on-

ly Knowledge that produces Charity, the Mother of Union and Concord: Whereas the Knowledge only of particular Things, produces Diſorder and Diviſion.

So that to make Concord reign in a State, 'tis not enough that every one takes Care of what appertains to himſelf, he muſt alſo take Care of himſelf; theſe being two very different Arts. For the Art by which we take Care of our ſelves, is not the ſame with that by which we take Care of that which appertains to us. Now to take Care of one's ſelf, is to know one's ſelf: But what is it to know one's ſelf? Juſt as an Artificer uſes his Tools, ſo a Man makes uſe of his Body. So that the Body is not the Man, for the Body can't uſe and govern it ſelf. Nor is the Compound the Man; for if one of the Things of which we are compounded does not govern, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould govern both together: And conſequently, ſince neither the Body, nor the Compound of Soul and Body together, are the Man, it muſt be the Soul alone: 'Tis then only neceſſary that we know the Soul, and take Care of that, if we would become truly wiſe. For to take Care of our Bodies, is to take Care of what belongs to us; but to take Care of our Souls, is to take Care of our ſelves; to be employed with the Care of amaſſing Riches, is to be employ'd about Things ſtill more remote than thoſe that appertain to us. Thus they who love *Alcibiades*'s Body, don't love *Alcibiades* himſelf, but that which belongs to *Alcibiades*. To love *Alcibiades*, is to love his Soul, to love that which is himſelf, and not that which belongs to him. Therefore we ſee thoſe that love only his Body, retire from him when the Beauty of his Body is fading: And thoſe who love his Soul, do not ceaſe to love him as long as he is virtuous, and labours by this Means to render himſelf as lovely as poſſible; and this (ſays *Socrates*) is the Cauſe of the Inconſtancy of my Rivals, and of my Steddineſs.

But what muſt we do to come to the Sight and Knowledge of our Souls? *Socrates* ſpeaks divinely to *Alcibiades* on this Occaſion. As our Eye (ſays he) can't ſee it ſelf but in the Objects that repreſent it, or in another Eye; that is, in that Part of the Eye, which is the moſt excellent,

excellent, namely, that wherein the Sight is: So the Soul, to ſee and know it ſelf, muſt view it ſelf in that Part of the Soul in which Wiſdom and Virtue are generated, or rather in that Soul, of which ours is but the Image, and in which Wiſdom, Virtue, and Prudence, are found in their ſovereign Perfection, that is, in God. For 'tis by this Means only that the Soul can know God, and her ſelf, which is true Wiſdom. When ſhe knows her ſelf, ſhe'll alſo know what belongs to her; for we muſt firſt know our ſelves, before we can know what belongs to us. She'll likewiſe know whatever reſpects the Things that belong to others. For one Art is ſufficient for all this, and this Art is the true ſort of Prudence.

He therefore that is ignorant of himſelf, is ignorant of that which appertains both to himſelf and others; and not knowing what belongs to others, he knows not what belongs to the Commonwealth, and conſequently can't be a good Miniſter of State. Nay, he is not capable to govern a Family, nor ſo much as to conduct himſelf: For becauſe he is ignorant, 'tis impoſſible but he muſt commit Faults; in committing Faults, he does Ill, in doing Ill he is miſerable, and renders thoſe miſerable who obey him. Thus he who is not wiſe or prudent can't be happy, and he who is wicked can't but be miſerable. So that the Happineſs of a City depends neither on its Riches nor the Strength of its Fortifications, nor the great Number of its Troops, nor its Galleys, nor the Magnificence of its Arſenal; but on Virtue, without which there is nothing but Miſery in the World.

Therefore to govern a State well, 'tis neceſſary to provide Virtue for thoſe that compoſe it, and to endeavour to communicate it to 'em. And conſequently, *Alcibiades*, to ſatisfy your Ambition, you ought not to think of acquiring great Dominion and exorbitant Power, either for your ſelf, or your Republick, but that Juſtice and Prudence, for which you have ſo much Occaſion. For while you and others act juſtly and prudently, you'll pleaſe God, who is the Source of true Felicity; and you'll govern your ſelf after this Manner, if (as I juſt now told you)

you conſtantly look upon the Deity, that Light in which alone you can know your ſelf, and all that belongs to you. But if you govern your ſelf unjuſtly, and turn away your Eyes from the Deity, to unite your ſelf to dark Objects, you'll neither know your ſelf at all, nor the Things that belong to you: And your Actions will be nothing but Works of Darkneſs; and the more Power you have, the more unhappy you'll be. *Alcibiades* can't diſſent from theſe great Truths. But *Socrates* does not ſtop here; but gives the finiſhing Stroke to mortify his Pride, in asking him, whether it is not more for the Advantage of thoſe who are not yet endued with Virtue, to obey ſuch as are better than themſelves, than to be abandon'd to their own Conduct: And (ſays he) is not that which is moſt profitable, moſt beautiful, and that which is moſt beautiful, moſt becoming and ſuitable? *Alcibiades* agrees to this. Then (ſays *Socrates*) 'tis becoming that vicious Perſons ſhould be Slaves, and be made to obey; and conſequently Vice is a baſe Thing, and ſuitable to a Slave; as on the contrary, Virtue is beautiful, and ſuitable to a Freeman. In what a Condition then are you?

Alcibiades is ſenſible of what he means, and confeſſes he is not worthy of any Thing but Slavery, but hopes in a little Time to get rid of his Vices, if *Socrates* pleaſes.

You don't ſpeak well (replies *Socrates*;) you ought to ſay, if God pleaſes, for we can do nothing without him.

Well then (ſays *Alcibiades*) I ſay (if God pleaſes) and I add, let us for the future change Perſons; and as you have hitherto made your Court to me, I'll for the future make mine to you. I'll follow you wherever you go, and I ſolemnly proteſt to you, I'll now carefully apply my ſelf to Righteouſneſs.

I wiſh you may (ſays *Socrates*, concluding the Diſcourſe.) But whatever good Opinion I have of you, I am afraid of the Contagion of our Republick, and can't but tremble at the Examples that reign in it, leſt they ſhould be too ſtrong for you and me too. For 'tis a very difficult Matter to be wiſe in the midſt of ſo blind and corrupt a People.

AN

ABRIDGMENT

OF THE

Second *ALCIBIADES*;

OR,

Of PRAYER.

Socrates meets *Alcibiades* going into a Temple to pray, and ſeeing him very penſive, and with his Eyes fix'd on the Earth, he asks him on what he was thinking. What ſhould I think on? (replies *Alcibiades* very faintly) being more concern'd about his ambitious Deſigns than his Prayers. It muſt be on ſome very important Matters, (ſays *Socrates*) for ſince 'tis certain that the Gods often hear our Prayers, there's nothing that requires more Prudence and Wiſdom than to pray well; ſo as not to requeſt Evils of 'em, while we think we are asking Goods; or not to ask Evils of 'em willingly and knowingly, as *Oedipus* did, whom *Euripides* brings in praying, that his Children might decide their Rights by the Sword.

You tell me of a mad Man (ſays *Alcibiades*;) does any Man, who is in his Senſes, make ſuch Prayers as thoſe to the Gods?

Hereupon, *Socrates* asks him, if being mad is not oppos'd to being prudent: If Men are not wiſe, or fooliſh,

as they are either in Health, or ſick: For as there is no Medium between Health and Sickneſs, neither is there any between Wiſdom and Folly. To which *Alcibiades* agrees.

Since Madneſs then is oppos'd to Wiſdom, (ſays *Socrates*) Folly and Madneſs are but one and the ſame Thing. For one ſingle Subject can't have two Contraries oppos'd to it, and conſequently every Fool is mad. And ſeeing there are always a thouſand Fools to one wiſe Man in the World, while we live in it, we are among mad Men.

The only Thing that can militate againſt this Principle, is, that it would be impoſſible to live among ſo great a Number of mad Men; and the Wiſe, whoſe Number is but ſmall, could never eſcape their Fury. And yet wiſe Men live in Cities, therefore it ſeems not true to ſay they live with mad Men. This is what *Socrates* objects againſt the Truth which he has made *Alcibiades* acknowledge. But he reſolves this Difficulty in ſhewing, that there are divers Degrees of Folly, as there are divers ſorts of Diſeaſes. The Fever is a Diſeaſe, but every Diſeaſe is not the Fever. 'Tis juſt ſo with Folly. All mad Men are Fools, but all Fools are not mad. A Diſeaſe is a Genus which comprehends many Species. Folly or Imprudence in like manner comprehends many Species, which differ in Degree. As Men have divided Arts and Trades among 'em, ſo they have ſhar'd Folly among themſelves too; thoſe who have the greateſt Share of it, are ſaid to be diſtracted and mad; and they who have ſomewhat leſs, are call'd Fools, and ſtupid. But becauſe Men ſeek to hide theſe Vices under ſpecious Names, they call the former, Men of Magnanimity, and of great Spirit; and they call the others ſimple, or elſe they ſay they are harmleſs Men, but have little Experience, and much Youth. There are beſides theſe, a Multitude of Names with which all ſorts of Vice are diſguis'd.

The next Queſtion is, in what Wiſdom and Folly conſiſt. A wiſe Man is one that knows what ought to be ſaid and done, and a Fool is one that is ignorant of both. But is he that is thus ignorant, in this Condition without

without knowing it? Yes, certainly. *Oedipus*, for inſtance (ſays *Socrates*) was in this Condition when he made that Prayer which we ſpoke of before; but we ſhall find a great many others, who without being tranſported with Anger like him, will requeſt real Evils of God, while they think they are asking real Goods. For as for *Oedipus*, if he did not ask for what was good, neither did he think he ask'd it; whereas others do the contrary. To begin with your ſelf, *Alcibiades:* If the God to whom you are going to pray, ſhould ſuddenly appear to you, and ask you, if you would not be willing to be King of the *Athenians*, of all *Greece*, nay, of all *Europe*, or (if that ſeem'd too little for your Ambition) of the whole World; would you not be extremely pleas'd, and return Home with Abundance of Joy, as one who had receiv'd the greateſt Good in the World? Who would not be tranſported with ſuch a Thing as this? (replies *Alcibiades.*) But (ſays *Socrates)* would you give your Life for the Empire of the *Greeks*, or that of all the *Barbarians* together? No, certainly, (ſays *Alcibiades)* for then I could not enjoy it. But what if you could not enjoy it, (continues *Socrates)* and this Enjoyment muſt needs prove fatal to you? No (ſays *Alcibiades)* I would not do it on that Condition.

You ſee by this therefore (ſays *Socrates)* that it is not ſafe to deſire or accept what we know not. How many Men, after they have paſſionately deſir'd to be Kings, and have left no Stone unturn'd to obtain their End, have become the Sacrifices of their extravagant Ambition? The Story of *Archelaus* King of *Macedonia* is yet freſh in Memory. He aſcended the Throne by his Crimes, and was aſſaſſinated by his Favourite, who could not maintain himſelf in it above three or four Days; but was murder'd by a third, who was ambitious to fill the ſame Place.

But without looking after foreign Examples, how many of the Generals of our Army have been condemn'd to Death in our own City! How many of 'em exil'd! and how many others have we ſeen, who after they had paſs'd through innumerable Dangers, Toils and Labours, have fallen in the midſt of their Triumphs, by the Ca-

lamnies of their Enemies! A great many other Perſons, after they have ardently deſir'd Children, have been very unhappy in obtaining 'em. And thus it is with the reſt of our Deſires; and tho' nothing is more common than Inſtances of this kind, yet there's ſcarce any Man, who would refuſe the Thing he deſires, if God ſhould offer it to him, or who would ceaſe to ask it, if he were ſure to obtain it. And we may every Day ſee Perſons repenting their former Prayers, and making ſuch as are quite contrary to 'em. Therefore we muſt acknowledge the Truth of what *Homer* ſays, *viz.* that nothing is more unjuſt than the Complaints Men make againſt the Gods, whom they accuſe of being the Cauſe of their Miſeries, whereas they are the Occaſion of 'em themſelves, who by their Folly draw down Miſchiefs on their own Heads, which were not deſign'd for 'em.

A great Poet, who knew the Ignorance of Mankind upon this Account, endeavour'd to cure it by giving 'em this Prayer, which I think is an admirable one: *Great God! who knoweſt better than we what is neceſſary for us, give us the good Things we need, whether we ask 'em or not; and keep evil Things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.*

Then Ignorance is a very fatal Thing (ſays *Alcibiades,*) ſeeing it changes our Prayers into Curſes, and prompts us to beg of God our own Miſeries.

Hold a little, ſays *Socrates*, don't condemn Ignorance in general; if one Sort of it is pernicious, there's another that is very uſeful. For inſtance, would not *Oreſtes* have been happy if he had not known his Mother, when he ſought after her to kill her? For if he had not known her, he had not kill'd her, his Deſign being only againſt her. So that this kind of Ignorance would have been very good for him: There is an Ignorance then (ſays he) which ought to be commended; and this he proves with great Evidence. And now he lays down this as a Principle, that all the Sciences in the World without that by which we know what is very good, are not only uſeleſs, but moſt commonly extremely dangerous.

'Tis not ſufficient (ſays he) that in the Council of a Prince, or of a Republick, there be Men of Ability in every Thing that relates to Peace, War, and all other Things belonging to Politicks, if they are not expert in the Knowledge of what is very good; that is, if they are not under the Direction of the Divine Spirit, and do not well underſtand what is beſt, and moſt juſt, they are incapable of governing a State well; ſo that nothing but Injuſtice and Diſcord will be ſeen to reign in it. For while theſe Miniſters think they know what indeed they do not underſtand, and continually ſuffer themſelves to be led by Opinion, and not by Knowledge, they never judge aright but by Accident. They are like Ships well ſtor'd with every Thing needful for a long Voyage; but which for want of a Pilot can't chuſe but be loſt in a little Time. It would be much more uſeful for theſe Men to be ignorant of what they know, provided they were convinc'd of their Ignorance; for then they would not intrude themſelves to give Counſel in Things which they don't underſtand, and yet think they do. Therefore that Soul, that City, or that Republick that would be happy, muſt acquire this Science, which alone makes others turn to a good Account; without it, the greater Fortune either particular Men or States enjoy, the more impoſſible it is for 'em not to commit very great Crimes, either in acquiring Riches, or augmenting their Forces, or the like. Without this Science a Man may have all others, and yet never be the better for 'em: And to ſuch a one that Verſe which *Homer* made againſt *Margites* may be apply'd;

He knew many Things, but knew them all amiſs.

For this wiſe and divine Poet does not mean by this, that he did not know 'em well, as if one could properly know amiſs what one knows; but ſignifies by this enigmatical Expreſſion, that he knew 'em all unhappily; or that it was a great Unhappineſs to him to know 'em. For where the Knowledge of God is not, there is no Good. And if theſe Sciences are unhappy to us, 'twould be better for us to be ignorant of 'em, and conſequently, there is a ſort of Ignorance more uſeful than the

Sciences. This is ſtill more true in Prayer, than in all other Actions of Life. And 'tis better to ask nothing of God, than to ask what is Evil of him, when we think we are asking Good; and conſequently, the Prayer I have been ſpeaking of, is the moſt perfect of all others.

Upon this Model, the Prayer of the *Lacedemonians* was form'd; who are content to ſay, *Lord, grant us what ſeems good and comely to thee.* They never requeſt any Thing but this, and yet are the happieſt People in the World. To this Purpoſe, *Socrates* relates a Story, which he had heard told by ſome old People. He ſays, the *Athenians*, having been often overcome in the Wars they had with the *Lacedemonians*, reſolv'd to ſend to the Oracle of *Jupiter Ammon*, to know the Reaſon why the Gods rather favour'd the *Lacedemonians* than the *Athenians*, who offer'd 'em more Sacrifices, erected more Temples and Statues in their Honour, and made 'em more Preſents, and more magnificent Oblations than all the *Greeks* together. Whereas the *Lacedemonians* were ſo guilty of Avarice in their Worſhip, that they ſcarce ſacrific'd any Beaſts but what were blemiſh'd, and mutilated; tho' they were very rich. The Prophet anſwer'd 'em in a few Words: *The Benedictions of the* Lacedemonians *are more agreeable to* Jupiter, *than all the Sacrifices of the* Greeks. He calls their Prayers, *Benedictions.* So that the *Lacedemonians* were beloved of God, becauſe they knew how to pray; whereas the reſt of the *Greeks* were hated of him, becauſe they did not underſtand how to offer Sacrifice. And *Homer* (ſays he) ſignifies the ſame Thing, when he ſays, The *Trojans*, when they built a Fort, *offer'd whole Hecatombs to the Gods, the Smoke of which aſcended to Heaven; but the Gods refus'd to accept 'em, becauſe they hated the ſacred City of* Troy, *King* Priamus, *and his People.* The Occaſion of this Hatred was, becauſe the *Trojans* knew not how to pray, but would have oblig'd God by their Sacrifices to do, not his own Will, but theirs. But God ſuffers not himſelf to be corrupted by Gifts, like

like a Uſurer; and that Man muſt be a Fool, who thinks to obtain his Favour by ſuch Sacrifices as the Wicked are better able to offer than the Righteous. God only regards the Sanctity and Purity of the Soul, and eſteems nothing but Juſtice and Wiſdom. Now none are truly juſt and wiſe, but thoſe who know how to perform their Duty toward God and Men, both in their Words and Actions. What do you think of all this, *Alcibiades?*

Alcibiades ſtruck with the Evidence of theſe Truths, anſwers, that he is not ſo ſenſeleſs, as to oppoſe his weak Underſtanding to that of God, and to contradict his Oracles.

Then don't be in ſo much Haſte, *Alcibiades*, (continues *Socrates)* to offer your Prayers, leſt God, to puniſh you, ſhould anſwer the Imprecations you are going to utter againſt your ſelf: For you are not a Man likely to uſe the Prayer of the *Lacedemonians*; you are too proud, for that is the ſofteſt Name I can give your Imprudence: Therefore wait till you are better inſtructed how to demean your ſelf, both toward God and Men.

Alas! when ſhall I be inſtructed in this? (replies *Alcibiades)* and who ſhall be my Maſter? What Pleaſure I ſhould take in obeying him!

It muſt be he who takes Care of you (ſays *Socrates*) and who truly loves you; that is God, 'tis he that muſt teach you to pray well. But before he communicates to you this Knowledge of what is very good, which alone can make you diſcern what is your true Good, and ſuggeſt ſuch Prayers to you as will be for your Advantage, he muſt diſſipate the Darkneſs that beclouds your Soul; as *Minerva*, in *Homer*, diſpell'd the Miſt that cover'd *Diomedes* his Eyes, and hinder'd him from diſtinguiſhing God from Man. For while we are deſtitute of the Knowledge of God, we are incapable, either of underſtanding him, or of following him; and conſequently, 'tis impoſſible for us to pray well.

Let

Let him ſcatter then, (replies *Alcibiades)* let him deſtroy this Darkneſs of mine; I abandon my ſelf to his Conduct: And till that happy Day comes, which, if it pleaſe God, I ſhall not be long expecting, I'll defer my Prayers and my Sacrifice. In the mean Time, give me Leave to expreſs my Thanks to you for your wiſe Counſel, by putting this Crown on your Head which I wear on mine.

I readily accept that Favour (ſays *Socrates)* and as in *the* Phœnicians *of* Euripides, *Creon*, ſeeing *Tireſias* coming to him with a Crown of Gold, which was the Firſt-fruits of the Spoil of the Enemy, and with which the *Athenians* had honour'd him for his Art, ſaid, *I take your Crown, which is the Sign of Victory, for a good Omen, for you ſee we are alſo in a great Storm of War:* So I muſt ſay, I take the Honour, I now receive at your Hands, for a happy Preſage; for I am engag'd in no leſs a Conflict than *Creon*, while I am endeavouring to gain the Victory over all your Lovers.

THE

ABRIDGMENT

OF

EUTYPHRON,

OR,

Of HOLINESS.

EUtyphron meets *Socrates* in the King's Porch, which was a Place on the Right Hand of the *Ceramique*, where one of the IX Archons, who was call'd *the King*, preſided during his Year. Surpriz'd at this Novelty, (for it was the firſt Time that *Socrates* had appear'd in this Place) he asks him, what it was that could oblige him to leave *Lyceus* to come into this Porch. For 'tis not likely (ſays he) that you have any Proceſs here before the King, as I have. 'Tis worſe than that, (ſays *Socrates*) the Buſineſs I have is that which the *Athenians* call an *Accuſation*. How (ſays *Eutyphron*) does any one accuſe you then? For I can't imagine that you would accuſe any Body. *Eutyphron*, who is going to accuſe his own Father, can't believe that *Socrates* would accuſe any Man; of ſuch a ſtrange Piece of Extravagance, and of ſo fond an Opinion of himſelf, is a ſuperſtitious Man capable. And *Plato* improves this with a great deal of Addreſs;

to

to inſinuate, that at *Athens*, honeſt Men never follow'd the Trade of Accuſers.

Socrates ſays, he accus'd no Body. Who is it that accuſes you then, (ſays *Eutyphron?*) I don't very well know him (ſays *Socrates*) he is a young Man: And not content to tell his Name, and the Place of his Birth, he draws his Picture; which is that of a Man whoſe Phyſiognomy promiſes nothing of good. He has, ſays he, lank Hair, a thin Beard, and a crooked Noſe. All theſe Marks can't make him known. This young Man (continues *Socrates*) like a great Politician, has cauſed me to be cited before the City, as our common Mother, and accuſes me of forging new Gods, and rejecting the old.

Oh (ſays *Eutyphron*) I perceive what the Matter is, becauſe you ſay you have a familiar Genius, a God that conducts you, *Melitus* accuſes you of introducing new Opinions, knowing very well that all ſuch Things as theſe are ſuſpected by the common People, who are always ready to receive Accuſations of this kind. What do not I ſuffer, when I ſpeak of Divine Things in the Aſſemblies, and am predicting what ſhall come to paſs! The People laugh at me, as if I were a Fool: Not that any Thing that I have foretold has fail'd of its Accompliſhment; but 'tis becauſe they naturally envy all ſuch as we are.

My dear *Eutyphron*, (replies *Socrates*) perhaps 'tis no ſuch great Misfortune to be laugh'd at. The *Athenians* don't much trouble their Heads about a Man's Ability, provided he concerns not himſelf to teach others what he knows: But if any one makes a Profeſſion of Teaching, they are downright angry with him; either out of Envy, as you ſay, or for ſome other Reaſon which we know not. I don't at all deſire (ſays *Eutyphron*) to make Trial (as you have done) to my Coſt, what Sentiments the *Athenians* have of me.

There's a great deal of Difference (replies *Socrates*, improving this Confeſſion of *Eutyphron*, to ſhew, in the Perſon of this Diviner, the Character of t' oſe that preſided to teach Religion, *viz.* that they taught nothing,

thing, but through Fear leſt the People in Ignorance) perhaps you are very reſerv'd, and refuſe to teach what you know; whereas I fear the *Athenians* will think the Love I bear to all Mankind induces me to tell 'em too freely all I know, without asking any Reward of 'em. But if they would only laugh at me (as I ſaid juſt now) as you ſay they do at you, it would be no very troubleſome or unpleaſant Thing to paſs a few Hours in laughing and jeſting. But if they take up the Matter in earneſt, then 'tis only for ſuch Diviners as you to know what will be the Event.

It may be (ſays *Eutyphron*, like a great Diviner) you'll ſuſtain no Damage by it, and I hope you'll have a happy Iſſue of your Buſineſs, as well as I of mine.

Then you have ſome Buſineſs here, (replies *Socrates)* are you Plaintiff or Defendant? I am Plaintiff, ſays *Eutyphron*. Whom do you proſecute (ſays *Socrates?)* I proſecute my Father (ſays the other.) Your Father! Good God! (ſays *Socrates)* and what is the Accuſation then? Of what do you accuſe your Father? I accuſe him of Murder (replies *Eutyphron*.) Of Murder! (ſays *Socrates)* that indeed is an Accuſation above the Reach of the People, who will never comprehend that it can be juſt. For this is not an Attempt for an ordinary Man, but for one who is arriv'd to the utmoſt Pitch of Wiſdom.

You ſay true, *Socrates*, (replies *Eutyphron*) deluded by this Commendation. But (ſays the other) is it any one of your Relations that your Father has kill'd? Without Doubt (continues he) it muſt be ſo: For you would not bring your Father before a Court of Juſtice, if he had only kill'd a Stranger.

What an Abſurdity is that (ſays *Eutyphron)* to think there's a Difference in this Reſpect between a Relation and a Stranger! the Caſe is equal. The only Thing to be regarded, is the Juſtice or Injuſtice of the Action: For if the Action be evil, you are obliged to proſecute the Author of it, whatever Friendſhip or Relation is between you; for you render your ſelf an Accomplice of

of his Crime to have the leaſt Familiarity with him, and not to endeavour to bring him to Puniſhment, which alone can purge and expiate you both. But to apprize you of the Fact, the Deceaſed was one of our Farmers when we liv'd at *Naxos:* He held a Piece of Land of us. One Day having drank too much, he fell into a Paſſion with one of our Slaves, and knock'd him o' th' Head. My Father put him into a deep Pit, bound Hand and Foot, and ſent hither to conſult thoſe who have the Inſpection of all Matters of Religion, and Caſes of Conſcience, to know what he ſhould do; and during all this Time, neglected the poor Priſoner, as an Aſſaſſin whoſe Life was of no Conſequence; and ſo he died: Hunger, Thirſt, and the Weight of his Irons, kill'd him, before the Return of the Meſſenger that my Father ſent. Upon this, the whole Family is mightily diſturb'd at me, becauſe for the ſake of an Aſſaſſin I accuſe my Father of Murder, which they pretend he has not committed; and if he had committed it, they maintain that I ought not to proſecute him, ſeeing the Deceaſed was a Villain and a Murderer; beſides that 'tis an impious Action for a Son to bring a criminal Proceſs againſt his Father: So ignorant are they of Divine Things, and ſo incapable of diſcerning what is profane and impious from what is juſt and holy.

Socrates, amaz'd at a Poſition ſo preſumptuous and falſe, asks him if he thinks he ſo exactly knows all Divine Things, and can ſo preciſely diſtinguiſh that which is holy from that which is profane; that the Caſe being as he relates, he can proſecute his Father without fearing to commit an impious Act.

Eutyphron, like a ſuperſtitious Bigot, who deſpiſes all the World beſide, and thinks he ſees more clearly into Matters of Religion than any Body elſe, anſwers, What Advantage ſhould I have above other Men, if I did not very exactly know all theſe Things?

Socrates feigns himſelf extremely pleaſed that he had found a Man of ſo clear a Head, and ſo great Abilities, who might give him ſo much Aſſiſtance in the troubleſome Affair in which *Melitus* had engag'd him; and earneſtly

earneſtly conjures him to teach him what is properly holy, and what profane; and to give ſuch a juſt Idea of both, as may always enable him to diſtinguiſh 'em with Certainty.

Eutyphron here ſtill keeps his Character very well. That is holy (ſays he) which I am doing, namely, to proſecute in a Court of Judicature every one that commits Murder, Sacrilege, or any other unjuſt Act of the like Nature, without any Diſtinction: Let it be Father, Mother, Brother, *&c.* 'tis the ſame Thing.

This Definition, which ſprings rather from blind Zeal, than the Knowledge of Holineſs, not ſatisfying *Socrates*, *Eutyphron* attempts to prove it by Authority. He maintains, that all Religion conſiſting in imitating the Gods, he could not do a more pious and holy Thing than to proſecute his own Father, ſeeing *Jupiter* put *Saturn* in Chains becauſe he devour'd his Children; and *Saturn* himſelf had treated *Cælus* with yet greater Rigour, for ſome other Fault.

Socrates inſinuates, that he doubts of the Truth of theſe Stories, becauſe even Reaſon teaches us not to attribute any unworthy Thing to the Deity. However (ſays he ironically to *Eutyphron*, after his uſual Manner) if you, who are ſo able a Man in religious Matters, agree with the common People in this, and believe theſe Traditions as well as they, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that I ſhould believe 'em too, I who am but ignorant in theſe Things. Therefore I intreat you, in the Name of that God who preſides over Friendſhip, do not deceive me, but tell me if you believe that there ever were ſuch Things as you have been relating.

This Bigot, who is always credulous and conceited, makes no ſcruple not only to ſay that he believes it, but adds, that he believes Things yet more ſurprizing, of which the common People are ignorant; meaning, without Doubt, the Myſteries that were known only to thoſe that were initiated: And maintains all the Fables of Poets, and Fancies of Painters, as fundamental Points of Religion.

Socrates

Socrates does not trouble himſelf with the Confutation of 'em; that would finiſh the Diſpute too ſoon; and he is not willing to offend him. Therefore he proceeds to ask him, as if he were willing to be inſtructed by him, what it is that he calls pious and holy; and deſires him to give a clear and diſtinct Idea by which he may judge of every Thing that is pious and holy. For a true Definition ought to make known the Eſſence and Nature of that which is defin'd.

Eutyphron anſwers, That it is that which is pleaſing to the Gods; and conſequently, that *that* is profane and impious which is diſpleaſing to 'em.

Socrates takes Advantage of this Definition, and ſhews, that the Gods being often divided among themſelves, their Quarrels muſt needs ariſe from their Diſagreement about what is juſt or unjuſt, profane or holy: And that according to this, one and the ſame Thing is holy and profane, ſeeing it pleaſes ſome of 'em, and diſpleaſes others. Therefore the Definition of holy and profane can't ſubſiſt with the Plurality of Gods.

This Conſequence is certain, and will be ſufficient to reclaim a wiſe Man from that Error, and to convince him that there is but one God. But *Eutyphron* preſerves his Character better than ſo. 'Tis no ſuch eaſy Matter to undeceive a ſuperſtitious Man. To elude this Conſequence, he engages to prove, that the Action of his Father was diſpleaſing to all the Gods, and that his was agreeable to 'em.

Socrates does not preſs him with the Abſurdity of this Perſuaſion, which is rather a Suppoſition than a Certainty. For ſince their Theology acknowledges that the Gods are very often conteſting about Matters of this Nature, how could *Eutyphron* be certain that they agreed about the Action he was going to undertake? In an Affair of this Conſequence, a greater Certainty is requiſite than that which ariſes from Opinion. It was very eaſy by this Means to reduce him to an Abſurdity: But *Socrates* takes another Courſe to

expoſe

expoſe the Ignorance of the Man ſtill more, and thereby to overthrow a Religion which had no better Props than theſe. Therefore he convinces him that this Definition is not perfect.

Eutyphron thinks to rectify it, by ſaying, that which is holy, is what pleaſes all the Gods. But *Socrates* anſwers, that this is only to explain one of the Properties of a holy Thing, inſtead of diſcovering the Eſſence of it. He does not ask, if that which is holy is belov'd of the Gods; no Body doubts of that: He would know, why it is lov'd, and what it is that renders it worthy of Love. For if that which is holy, and that which is belov'd of the Gods, were the ſame Thing, ſince the Gods love that which is holy only becauſe 'tis holy, they would love that which they love only becauſe it was belov'd of 'em. And on the other Hand, if that which is belov'd of the Gods, were belov'd of 'em only becauſe they love it, it would follow that the Gods love without Reaſon, and that *that* which is holy would be holy only becauſe it was belov'd. In a word, (ſays he) there is a great deal of Difference between theſe two Terms, *Holy*, and *Belov'd of the Gods*; and that they are entirely oppoſite. For one Man is lov'd only becauſe they love him, and another is lov'd becauſe he deſerves to be lov'd. That is to ſay, that which is holy is belov'd of the Gods only becauſe it is holy; but 'tis not holy becauſe 'tis belov'd of them. The Matter in Hand therefore is to explain the Nature of that which is holy, and not its Qualities; and to define what it is, and why the Gods love it. This is very perplexing to a ſuperſtitious Man, who continually takes up Things without Examination, and believes a Thing only becauſe he believes it.

Eutyphron does not diſſemble his Trouble, but confeſſes that his Thoughts are fluctuating, and that he knows not how to fix 'em.

Socrates, to make the Matter (which is very ſerious) a little pleaſant, takes Occaſion from it to ſpeak of the Works of *Dædalus*, who made moveable Statues, which never ſtood ſtill, but when a certain Spring which

which they had, was tied and ſtopt. He lets *Eutyphron* know, that his Principles are as moveable as theſe Statues. The governing Spring is not yet ſtopt, but is continually going: His Meaning is, that *Eutyphron* ſpoke by Opinion, and not at all by Science. To help him out therefore, he asks him, if he does not think that which is holy is juſt? To this, *Eutyphron* agrees. Next to this, the Queſtion is, whether that which is holy is a Part of that which is juſt, or that which is juſt a Part of that which is holy? 'Tis ſoon decided, that what is juſt is the Genus, and what is holy the Species: For there are many Things juſt which are not holy, but none holy which are not juſt. So that what is juſt has a larger Extent than what is holy.

Nothing now remains but to know what Part of that which is juſt, that which is holy is. *Eutyphron* ſays, 'tis that Part of Juſtice which reſpects the Gods, and the Care of their Worſhip, and that the other Part concerns Men only.

This Anſwer throws 'em into another Difficulty, and that is, how to know in what this religious Care conſiſts, and whether it be of the Nature of all other Cares which tend to the Profit of that which is car'd for. For if ſo, our Holineſs muſt render the Gods better and more excellent; which would be an impious Thought.

Eutyphron anſwers, that 'tis a Care like that which Servants take of their Maſters. Holineſs then (ſays *Socrates*) is a kind of Servant to the Gods: But what do the Gods do by the Miniſtry of this Servant? For as Phyſicians operate Health by the Miniſtry of their Art, the Gods muſt needs operate ſomething by the Miniſtry of our Holineſs. Now, what is it that they operate? *Eutyphron* anſwers, that they engage us to pleaſe them by our Prayers and Sacrifices; and that Holineſs and Piety conſiſt in this, on which the Welfare of Families and Republicks depends. As, on the contrary, Impiety is the Ruin both of particular Perſons and States.

Socrates

Socrates collects from this indefinite Anſwer, that Holineſs is the Art of ſacrificing and praying. To ſacrifice is to give, and to pray is to ask. So that Holineſs conſiſts in giving and asking. Such Things only are ask'd as are wanted, and ſuch Things only given as are neceſſary to thoſe to whom they are given; for it would be ridiculous to give a Thing which they have no Occaſion for.

From hence he draws this Concluſion, that Holineſs is a Traffick between God and Man. But what Profit can God receive from our Offerings? For as for us, 'tis very viſible what Profit we receive from him, ſince we have not the leaſt Good but what proceeds from his Bounty. Are we then ſo crafty (ſays he) to draw all the Advantage of this Commerce to our ſelves only, ſo that God gets nothing by it?

Eutyphron, preſs'd with this Argument, ſhuts up all, in ſaying, that God leaves what is profitable to us, and contents himſelf with that which is pleaſant; and that 'tis our Reſpect and Gratitude that is ſo pleaſant to him: Which returns exactly to the former Definition, that *that* is holy which is pleaſing to the Gods.

Socrates ſhews him, that he has hitherto only made a Circle; and intreats him not to refuſe him the Knowledge of ſo great a Good. But *Eutyphron*, like a true Votary of Superſtition, who is always preſumptuous, and never confeſſes his Ignorance, ſeeks only how to get rid of him, and refers this Enquiry to another Time, telling him ſome urgent Buſineſs calls him elſewhere.

Thus ends this Dialogue, which deſtroys the falſe Opinions which then reign'd in the World, without eſtabliſhing the true. The Death of *Socrates* occaſion'd *Plato* to write thus imperfectly and ſparingly: Beſides, this is his Method, he always refutes before he teaches. But his Manner of refuting fails not to make a Diſcovery by way of Anticipation of what he deſigns to eſtabliſh, and does maintain elſewhere. Here we ſee the ſuperſtitious Man is always near the Truth, but never reaches

reaches it. 'Tis certain, that Holineſs is pleaſing to God; 'tis certain likewiſe that it produces a kind of Commerce between God and Men, and that this conſiſts in giving and asking: But the ignorant *Athenians* conceiv'd this after too groſs a Manner.

Holineſs can't be in us without Converſion, nor Converſion without Love; and this Love engages us to give our ſelves entirely to God, and to ask of him to give himſelf to us, that he may keep alive in us that divine Flame which purifies our Souls, and makes us reſemble him. In this conſiſts that Commerce between God and Men which makes up the whole of Religion, as *Socrates* and *Plato* both acknowledg'd.

The End of the FIRST VOLUME.